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I develop a theory of learning grounded in Charles Peirce’s semiotics. This 
endeavour comes in the context of the iconic (phenomenological) turn in semiotics, 
which resulted in a Peircean renaissance, and of the growing semiotic trend in 
education.  
Peirce’s semiotics offers insights into the phenomenon of learning and 
contains an implicit philosophy of education. The application of Peirce’s 
phenomenological categories to education reveals the semiosic character of 
education. Learning, education, and research constitute a triad, having the structure 
of a sign (phenomenon of signification). As such, they are correspondingly governed 
by Peirce’s three criteria of evolution: chance, necessity, and love. Therefore, 
Peirce’s theory of education can only be understood in the context of his theory of 
evolution. 
I develop three central arguments: (1) that according to Peirce’s taxonomy of 
signs, learning is the evolution of signification from the Icon sign type to the 
Argument sign type, (2) that learning is the Universe’s way of discovering itself 
through life forms, thus being both an evolutionary factor and an explanation for the 
emergence of life and (3) that learning can only be fulfilled in self-denying love for 
the other. Using Peirce’s taxonomy of signs I analyse the student/teacher relation, 
explaining how the passage from Icon to Argument proceeds and how learning is 
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This thesis consists in a theory of learning grounded in the semiotics of 
Charles S. Peirce. It develops a teleological semiotic view of education, thus 
approaching learning and education in terms of signification phenomena. On the 
grounds of Peirce’s pragmaticism and his semiotic terminology, the theory is a 
thoroughly philosophical expression of the critical common-sense opinion that only 
love is a purpose in itself. One of the central assumptions is that any growth can only 
be a going out of the self (an ecstasy). As such, the self has to focus on a non-self, on 
the other, in order to evolve. Therefore, to expand a self’s knowledge by learning is 
to go out of the self, towards the other, towards the knowledge of the other and her 
intention of sharing her knowledge. Teaching is characterized by the same 
movement: going out of the self, reaching for the other’s knowledge with the 
intention of giving, of offering, whatever the self has to offer (be it second degree 
equations, Kantian deontology, information about the weather, or chocolate). As 
such, learning, education, research and all other human endeavours are justified by 
and have solely this rationale: to fulfil the principle of love. The main argument of 
this theory is that learning, as well generally as in educational contexts, is only 
possible as a manifestation of love. This is supported on the ground that learning can 
only occur freely, being a phenomenon of discovery of similarities, and love is 
characterized by freedom. Following a Peircean argumentation, I explain that the 
learning-education-research continuity is an embodiment of signification that reflects 
its underpinning principles of cosmological and biological evolution.  
I develop this theory in the context of the following epistemic trends of the 
late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries: (1) the general reinvigoration of semiotics within 
philosophy and the proposal of semiotics as postmodern, non-dualist philosophy 
(Deely 2001), underpinned by (2) the recent “Peirce renaissance” in semiotics 
(Stjernfelt 2007), (3) the reception of semiotics in education and the coining of the 
edusemiotics branch of theoretical semiotics (Stables 2005, 2012, Semetsky ed. 
2010, Stables and Semetsky 2015), and (4) the iconic (or phenomenological) turn of 
semiotics (Stjernfelt 2007, Stjernfelt in eds. Bundgaard and Stjernfelt 2009), which 
advantages (5) the retake of Jakob von Uexküll’s Theoretical Biology (1926), on 
account of the co-extensiveness of life and signification phenomena and the further 
development of biosemiotics (eds. Sebeok, Umiker-Sebeok 1992, eds. Emmeche, 
Kull 2011, Hoffmeyer 2009, Kull 2003, 2005). 
 I approach learning and education as phenomena of a semiotic Universe. As 
developed by Peirce, semiotics is a relational logic with rich hermeneutic resources. 
Semiotics is not a binary logic, which would accept only two absolute values of 
truth. Value of truth is attributed to signs, the main semiotic concept, which are 
relational entities. As such, Peircean semiotics denies the possibility of expressing 
truth in its totality by a sign or a set of signs. Instead, signs tend to the truth. Their 
tendency to the truth is described by their mode of signification. Therefore, the 
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present approach to education is neither psychological, nor sociological. It does not 
explain educational issues in terms of cognitive capacities, social and cultural 
background, or power relations. Education and learning are approached as meaning 
phenomena, in all their complexity. As such, this Peircean Theory of Learning 
claims to bring a holistic perspective to education, as it is claimed that semiotics 
could (Gough and Stables, 2012). 
Peirce is one of the two major logicians of his time to develop a thorough 
anti-psychologistic logic. The other one is Edmund Husserl. Both Peirce and Husserl 
develop phenomenological philosophies which go against noumenal ontology. The 
main difference between the two consists in Peirce’s focus on triadic relations. 
Identifying the sign with the genuine triadic relation, Peirce developed a cosmology 
wherein the Universe is accounted for as populated by phenomena of signification. 
The core observation of Peirce’s cosmology, not always evident in his texts, is that 
substitution, and therefore causality, is triadic, and not dyadic. Peirce’s semiotics and 
Husserl’s phenomenology bring logic into the domain of life. They do so not by 
subduing logic to cognition, but on the contrary: cognition, as well as life in general, 
occurs within real possibilities that have an inner logical coherence. Peirce’s 
semiotics led to a semiotic life science, underpinned by metaphysics and 
underpinning in its turn social and cultural phenomena. These domains are not 
separated ontologically and the borders between them can only be observed vaguely, 
because they are vague. 
Peirce presented semiosis, the cooperation of signs (CP 5.484), as an 
adequate explanation for the emergence of life, at least according to the metaphysical 
and scientific understanding of the age (CP 6.322). Therefore, logic is alive; it is 
embodied in life forms which best express it by re-cognizing the logical 
(meaningful) structures of the Universe. We re-cognize the Universe by observing it 
through the application of the Universe’s own cyclical and continuous method of 
abduction, deduction, and induction. Through our re-cognition the Universe 
discovers itself. As such, Peirce developed a cosmology of meaning, to which 
Frederik Stjernfelt refers as physiology of arguments (2007). In the mature stage of 
his semiotics, in the 1890s, Peirce was led by his investigations on signification to 
develop a theory of cosmological evolution based on three principles: chance, 
necessity, and love. Following Peirce, these three principles are active in the 
Universe. The emergence of semiosis, practiced by life forms, is the embodied 
manifestation of these principles. While chance can be observed in the real existence 
of the necessary requirements sustaining life, these two (chance and necessary 
conditions) cannot fully account for the emergence and or sustainment of life. 
Peirce’s argument is that signification is fulfilled by love, a principle that transcends 
chance and necessity. These principles of evolution are continuously distributed 
from cosmological to biological and to historical evolution. In the present thesis I 
explain education and learning as phenomena within such a cosmological evolution. 
Learning is a semiosis occurring on a biological timescale and education is a 
semiosis occurring on a historical timescale, organizing learning in a system which 
proves historically fit for human life. Learning is a life form’s continuous adaptation 
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to an environment. As such, the difference between learning and teaching is only 
artificial. Learning concerns the self while teaching is simply an assistance to the 
learning performed by another. Teaching is learning another. 
The cornerstone of this Peircean Theory of Learning is Peirce’s doctrine of 
agapasm (evolution by the principle of love), where the tychistic (chance) and 
synechistic (necessity) principles of evolution lead to and are transcended by (see CP 
6.302). To explain learning, I follow the evolution of meaning through continuous 
sequences of learning from basic iconicity (signification by similarity, occurring by 
chance) to argumentation (the fulfilment of general signification by love). As such, I 
define learning as the passage from the Icon sign type to the Argument sign type.  
The recent and first semiotic account of the history of ideas, John Deely’s 
Four Ages of Understanding (2001), calls the prospect of a semiotic history of 
education. The project of a semiotic history of education brings into awareness the 
strong historical connection between semiotics and the liberal curriculum. A 
scholarly semiotic consciousness first arose from the endeavour of justifying the 
curriculum of the seven liberal arts (Deely 2001, 2009, Olteanu 2014). Semiotics, 
being a hermeneutically reach account of logic, makes a strong stand for freedom as 
a condition for growth and development generally (Stjernfelt in Bundgaard and 
Stjernfelt, p. 232). Learning is understood as free discovery. This account of learning 
does not justify other forms of education except liberal education. I explain that 
Peirce’s cosmological evolution does not support the systematic and institutionalized 
learning and teaching of a non-liberal curriculum because such an educational 
system does not follow the telos of the Universe to transcend chance and necessity 
by and into love. Non-liberal education, the teaching of skills and crafts, is driven by 
necessity and characterized by an instrumental perspective. It justifies teaching as 
instruction. Love is characterized by freedom. One can only engage freely in an act 
of love. Non-liberal education aims at satisfying social and cultural needs. It is 
characterized, if not by chance, then by necessity: the necessity of labour, 
production, consumption, ideology, generally any psychological, social, cultural, or 
anthropic necessity. Education, in order to be aligned with the tendency of the 
meaningful cosmos (semiotic Universe) within which it proceeds, can only point out 
to the learner general methods that proved generally useful on a historical timescale.  
I shall use the term cosmos to refer to the semiotic Universe described by 
Peirce as composed of signs (CP 5.448), since Peirce describes semiosis as 
cosmological. In Peirce’s work the term cosmos is preferred when referring to 
ontology and to evolution, while the term world is not employed when approaching 
semiosis (relational being). The term world shall be used here, coherently with 
Peirce’s use, to refer to environmental worlds (Innenwelt, Umwelt, Lebenswelt).  
The development of skills and attributes that qualify a person for a type of 
work, a particular job, should only be educational subjects if that is the result of the 
person’s free choice and, therefore, coherent with the agapic principle. Only when a 
person, out of love for such a practice, freely decides to undertake such works as 
pluming, managing, accounting, knitting, and so on, she should follow institutional 
education that focuses on helping her acquire the particularly required skills. The 
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semiotic perspective holds that such crafts are only practically acquired and that 
there is not much to teach about them, apart from offering to the learner the 
possibility of practicing and observing practitioners at work. Otherwise, education is 
only justified as an environment for free discovery, where only liberal arts are 
taught, because of their universal applications and being approved by semiosis of 
historical dimension. 
The theory, therefore, expresses in a thorough philosophical approach a belief 
to which common sense might adhere also: that love is the only possibility of 
growth. This immediately implies a strong connection between love and learning. 
Learning and education are evoked and enhanced by love. It is a spread, common 
sense, and folkloric idea that we learn better from a teacher that we like. More than a 
few times have we heard that a person decided to become a chemist because she 
liked her chemistry teacher for whatever reasons: perhaps the teacher was nice, 
gentle, young, manifested a mutual appreciation for her student, and perhaps she 
used to wear cool clothes. Appreciation for the chemistry teacher generates 
appreciation for chemistry. Of course, there is much more than a mere appreciation 
to the principle of agapism. The present thesis explains that the rationale of 
education is fulfilled when the student and teacher literally love each other. The 
Peircean Theory of Learning explains the phenomena of signification that occur in 
the teacher-student personal relation which result in the desire to learn and to 
learning. Thus, this theory offers a fertile conceptual ground for understanding 
learning as loving. 
Therefore, this Peircean Theory of Learning should be of interest, besides to 
the general semiotic approach to education, to any approach to education that 
connects learning with loving and claims the importance of the inter-personal 
teacher-student relation as more important than the actual taught content. The 
implicit relation between learning and loving has been expressed by other scholars as 
well. Two such examples are Erich Fromm (1956) and Emmanuel Levinas 
(throughout all his work). For his phenomenological approach to the face-to-face 
encounter, the latter is particularly interesting for this Peircean approach to 
education. I argue that Levinas’ work and the development of his lines of thought 
within philosophy of education can be a complementary support for the Peircean 
Theory of Learning for two reasons: (1) Levinas’ Husserlian phenomenological and 
anti-psychologistic inheritance, and (2) the argument for love of the Other as the 
purpose of teaching stemming from his phenomenology of the face. If in the recent 
decades Levinas’ philosophy gained serious popularity within philosophy of 
education, Peirce’s semiotics is still underexplored in this field. Both Peirce and 
Levinas support the sine-qua-non character of love in teaching and learning. 
However, I consider that the Peircean work frame, semiotics, can offer an analysis 
that alone Levinas’ phenomenology did not arrive at. Using Peirce’s semiotics, new 
concepts bring new insights in approaching the teacher-student love relation. These 
concepts aim at the mereological analysis of this relation as a continuously evolving 
relation of signification. 
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To develop the argument I divide the thesis in three parts: Part I introduces 
the main concepts that are used to develop this Peircean Theory of Learning and 
explains its epistemological place within philosophy, Part II develops the core 
argument of the thesis, namely the application of agapic evolution to learning and 
education, and Part III contours the theory by answering to possible objections to it 
by comparing it with other mainstream philosophical approaches to education, such 
as phenomenology, pragmatism, humanism, and instructionalism. 
Part I is divided in five chapters, starting with the second chapter of the 
thesis. In Chapter 1 I explain the epistemological need and position of a fully 
Peircean approach to learning and education. I briefly explain the common history of 
semiotics and liberal education and the relevance of a non-dualistic, biosemiotic 
awareness for education. I explain that the Peircean Theory of Learning is a 
postmodern, non-dualistic, phenomenological educational philosophy. Through the 
lens of biosemiotics it appears that learning, education, and science are results and 
stages of evolution. 
In Chapter 2 I explain Peirce’s concepts that I will use to develop the theory: 
his phenomenological categories, his concepts of sign, semiosis, and the 
classifications of signs. I insist on the concepts that describe iconic signification, the 
Icon and the Hypoicons. Iconic signification is signification by the criteria of 
similarity. This plays an important role in the Peircean theory of learning for two 
reasons: (1) the iconic turn in semiotics advances the hypothesis that reality is 
intelligible due to its inner similarities and, as such, the Icon is the only sign type 
through the contemplation of which learning more than what defines its constitution 
is possible and (2) the criteria of similarity proves essential for the possibility of 
agapic learning, in contrast with the criteria of difference and/or identity. 
Iconic turn semiotics accounts reasoning as diagrammatic – recognition of 
similarities between parts and whole. As such, any reasoning is a mereological 
analysis – an analysis of the relations between parts and whole. This highlights a 
compatibility between Peircean semiotics and Husserlian phenomenology. 
Difference does not evoke learning, understood in semiotic terms as use of 
predicates, which have to be iconic. Identity obscures the possibility of compassion 
between teacher and student because the teacher and the student will never be 
identical. Demanding identity from and with the other obscures the authenticity of 
the other, the real personality of the non-self. Self and non-self can be similar 
though, and engage with each other by a re-cognition of similarities. Such an 
engagement leads to knowing the other as a genuine web of signs evolving in her 
own right in time-space. 
In Chapter 3 I explain Peirce’s pragmaticism as a maxim of logic (CP 5.18) 
and doctrine of critical common sense (CP 5.494). I explain how Peirce’s 
pragmaticism is different from mainstream pragmatism and in what consist the 
insights that pragmaticism offers to philosophy of education that the pragmatic 
approach to education (e.g. Dewey) did not touch upon so far. The advantage of 
pragmaticism stems from the approach to learning experiences as semiosis. 
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In Chapter 4 I discuss Peirce’s Divisions of Sciences, explaining what are the 
implications of Peirce’s consideration that pedagogy is a practical science. To 
understand Peirce’s view on pedagogy I explain how, according to Peirce, 
knowledge acquisition happens generally, stemming from the Divisions of Sciences. 
Also, I explain that Peirce’s branch of theoretical sciences, in his Divisions of 
Sciences, reflects the optimal liberal curriculum. Since learning is a matter of 
observation the sciences will be best learned in the way they were naturally 
observed. Educational learning inherits the Universe’s abduction-deduction-
induction structure, which was inherited by life forms in their general free discovery 
of the environment. 
In Chapter 5 I focus on how Peircean semiotics unites ontology, 
phenomenology and epistemology. As such, it defines being as suprasubjective, 
denying ontological dichotomies between mind independency and mind dependency. 
I discuss the relevance of suprasubjective existence for education. This 
suprasubjective philosophy approaches the self as a continuously evolving sign. 
Therefore, it has many implications in what regards the relation between self and 
non-self. At this stage I explain the concepts of consciousness and personality 
according to Peirce. These concepts are essential for approaching the teacher-student 
relation. 
Part II contains three chapters. Chapter 6 explains thoroughly the account of 
learning as passage from the Icon sign type to the Argument sign-type. 
Chapter 7 explains how genuine predicates and metaphors are developed 
from a play on diagrams. Diagrammatic reasoning leads to free discovery, the 
learning experience that is justified by the Peircean Theory of Learning. 
Chapter 8 develops the main claim of the theory, namely that learning is 
fulfilled by love. I explain Peirce’s theory of evolution and how signification evolves 
from iconic to argumentation. Any life form learns, in a certain sense, by being 
engaged in semiosis, according to its own semiotic capabilities. Humans, like any 
other life forms, learn to survive. This learning is enjoyable and happens mostly by 
chance. The free abduction that any human being performs leads to an inductive state 
characterized by an imposed focus. The educational system is the mechanism which 
on an historical timescale proved to enhance learning by drawing the attention of 
learners to particular subjects. In a natural environment learning is characterized by 
chance. In society, particularly in educational environments learning proceeds by 
necessity. As such, education can be frustrating: free learning, which is paying off, is 
replaced by learning a curriculum of which the learner might be or might not be 
interested. Also, the learner has to adapt to the semiotic environment of the 
educational institution. This might require some efforts, as it assumes a shift of 
environment. Education, therefore, can inhibit learning. Historically, though, it 
proves useful. This is so because the purpose of education is not to restrict the 
freedom of chance to the aims of necessity. The purpose of education is disseminated 
from the purpose of cosmological evolution. By bringing the student and the learner 
face to face, having to teach and learn from one another, learning by chance and 
being educated by necessity are transcended into love: love for the teacher and love 
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for the student. The student, by loving the teacher genuinely loves the very subject 
the teacher is teaching. The teacher, by loving the student genuinely, loves the 
student’s genuine and unique apprehension of what is taught, regardless of 
contradictions between their understandings. Therefore, life forms not only learn to 
survive, assuming a tychistic existence, but they learn to live, evolving an agapic 
existence. They learn their own life and the lives of those populating their 
environment. 
Part III regards the position of the Peircean Theory of Learning in relation to 
other approaches to education. By this stage the main argument is fully explained 
and the theory is further developed by comparing its consequences to positions 
stemming from other approaches. This analogical analysis strengthens the theory by 
explaining its main arguments in contrast to potential critique. It is divided into two 
chapters: the first (Chapter 9) explains what the Peircean Theory of Learning has to 
offer to approaches with which it is not contradictory, and the second (Chapter 10) 
answers to possible objections coming from approaches that argue contradictorily.  
Chapter 9 explains that the one school of thought which proves essentially 
coherent with this semiotic approach is the phenomenological school. In regard to 
semiotics, phenomenology lacks the perspective of a world of continuously evolving 
signification. As such, the development of phenomenological semiotics can inspire a 
semiotic turn in phenomenology. The chapter brings to light the relevance and 
necessity of a non-psychologistic philosophy in education that has as its cornerstone 
the real signification phenomena by which life proceeds, among which, most 
important is love. 
Phenomenology has developed some themes that Peircean semiotics is 
engaged with as well: pure logic, in the case of Husserl; a philosophy of the body in 
the case of Merleau-Ponty; a notion of the self that is justified only through relations 
to non-self, in the case of Heidegger; the authenticity and impossibility of 
conceptualization of aspects of human life, such as love in the case of Levinas. 
Husserl’s pure logic, Heidegger’s approach to the self (Dasein), and Levinas’ 
phenomenology of the face do not contradict in any essential point the Peircean 
Theory of Learning. However, semiotics would bring certain critique. For instance, 
Husserl’s phenomenology might still be suspected of traces of a priorism (givenism) 
and Heidegger’s metaphysics is anthropologically centred. Peirce’s semiotics, and its 
application to education, does not present these obstacles by the hypothesis that all 
phenomena are phenomena of signification. On these lines, Levinas’ apology for 
love as the purpose of learning (and of all human activity in general) can be justified 
without supposing an ontological distinction between human and non-human 
animals. 
Chapter 10 explains what recommends the Peircean Theory of Learning in 
favour of other approaches to education that so far have been more broadly explored. 
I develop this argumentation by answering to the major objections that would stem 
from three paradigms: (1) pragmatism, (2) other brands of humanism (such as 
structuralism), and (3) instructionalism. By defending the position of the Peircean 
Theory of Learning in respect to such potential critique I explain several points that 
12 
 
entrench its epistemological relevance. These envisage the logocentric, but not 
hermeneutically narrow aspect of the theory, its non-dualistic character, the 
relevance of iconic learning, the importance of the focus on the personal relation 
between student and teacher over the focus on the taught content, and the 
understanding of human learning as continuous with the learning performed by all 
life forms, but species specific as well. 
Within the Peircean semiotic paradigm, this theory explains rigorously the 
importance that actions of empathy, compassion, care and so on, have in the human 
environment. However, such actions, feelings, and attitudes are only signs evoked by 
the educational environment that this thesis proposes, not its rationale. Beyond 
feelings and attitudes of compassion, the rationale of the aimed educational 
environment is personal love. The teacher has to offer herself to the student and this 
can be only sustained as an immediate consequence of the teacher’s love for her 
student. Viceversa, the student should love her teacher as well; their relation has to 
be symmetrical. The only thing that the teacher can do to inspire this in her student is 
to love her unconditionally. The teacher has to love the student unconditionally: 
regardless of her progress through schooling and her results. The student’s success, 
failure, problems become a part of the teacher’s life, her signifying environment. 
This deep compassion has to inspire the student to do likewise. The activity of 
teaching and learning is therefore not seen as a formal responsibility, but as a 
personal engagement, an apprenticeship. Not to care genuinely about the student, 
about the one whom I teach, is a refusal of life. To teach by imposing the self’s 
knowledge on the other, without acknowledging the genuine other, the life of the 
other, her genuine personality, is useless and perhaps even harmful. Such a teaching 
attitude is not only sterile in offering new ideas to an other, but it can be traumatic: it 
closes the possibility of the other’s expansion towards these ideas. Any dismissal of 
the student is a serious obstacle in learning. This semiotic theory explains what can 
be translated as a simple remark: why would one speak to me if one is not interested 
in me? Teaching and learning consist in an intimate act of love: the self is offered to 
the other. It supposes the re-cognition of life, in its uniqueness, standing in front of 
the self. The teacher stands before the student: what can she offer? If the teacher 
wants to offer a learning experience, the expansion of the signifying environment of 
the student, and as such, to irrevocably change the life of the student she has to give 
herself. The awareness that to offer the teaching of a curricular subject requires 













In this part I investigate the theoretical background on which I will develop 
the Peircean Theroy of Learning. 
I explain (1) that the disciplines of semiotics and education share a common 
history, (2) the semiotic approaches to education, and (3) the main concepts of 
Charles Peirce’s semiotics. I argue that a contemporary semiotic approach to 
education has to take into account the insights of biosemiotic research. 
I present Peirce’s phenomenological categories, his concepts of sign and 
semiosis, and his taxonomy of signs. This semiotic foundation accounts for a 





































Semiotics and Education 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to point out the close connection between the 
disciplines of semiotics and education, in terms of a common history. The recent 
emergence of a body of literature that proposes semiotics as an educational 
philosophy does not come as a surprise. Initially, the development of semiotics 
constituted the rationale of the implementation of a liberal educational philosophy.  
The rediscovery of semiotics that is occurring in the present age brings along 
a new wave of philosophy of education. In 2009 Frederik Stjernfelt remarked that “it 
is only in the ongoing interaction with other disciplines that semiotics finds its place 
as the non-skepticist mediator between formal and material, humanist and scientific, 
strands of academia.” (Stjernfelt in Bundgaard and Stjernfelt, p. 233) Being so, this 
might tempt one to consider that it is just a convenience that semiotics has recently 
become an interesting approach for what used to be principally the business of 
psychology and sociology. The compatibility between semiotics and education is 
deeper than this, however.  
About a century ago semiotics was rediscovered, in the last half of a century 
it gained serious popularity within academia but only in the last decade it has begun 
to be developed within philosophy of education. Education’s delay in rediscovering 
semiotics comes as a surprise, as Marcel Danesi noticed (in Semetsky 2009). In the 
1930s Vygotsky noticed what St Augustine noticed in the 4
th
 century: “the very 
essence of human memory is that human beings actively remember with the help of 
signs.” (Vygotsky 1978, p. 51) Danesi expressed his surprise that despite Vygotsky’s 
popularity among pedagogues, and the rising interest that semiotics is currently 
enjoying, in philosophy of education semiotics is still not being given enough 
attention, particularly in relation to learning. In a psychologist, non-semiotic 
paradigm, it was acknowledged that signs play an important role in memory and 
learning, but such cognitive phenomena (memory, learning, etc.) were regarded only 
as using signs as tools and not being constituted exclusively of signs. Perhaps a part 
of the explanation for the delayed joining of semiotics and education consists in that 
such a psychologist approach as Vygotsky’s would not stir the interest of 
semioticians or of philosophers looking for new approaches to education. For 
Vygotsky learning is only aided by signs, while a fully semiotic approach to 
education will explain learning and all the phenomena involved in education 
occurring exclusively as action of signs (also cf. Stables 2006).   
A body of work, to which this thesis intends to be a part of, has started being 
developed recently. It frames semiotics of education epistemologically, outlining the 
general purpose of this research. Works belonging to this corpus include Stables 
(2005, 2006, 2008, 2012), Pikkarainen (2011), Pesce (in Semetsky, 2009, 2011) and 
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Winfried Nöth (in Semetsky, 2009, 2012). Semiotics approached particular 
educational matters such as: language learning, in Danesi (2000) and Nöth (2012), 
knowledge acquisition in Semetsky (in Semetsky 2005a), skematicism, iconicity and 
notation in Pigrum (2010, 2011a, 2011b), ethics in Semetsky (in Semetsky, 2009), 
rhetoric of education in Strand (2013a, 2013b, 2014), the teaching and learning of 
mathematics in Bakker and Hoffman (2005). In his Foreword to the 2009 Semiotics, 
Education, Experience volume, edited by Inna Semetsky, Marcel Danesi coined the 
term edusemiotics. Peirce’s stand in relation to education was specifically explored 
in the 2005 volume Peirce and Education, edited by Inna Semetsky. However, this 
collection of essays only explores various aspects of Peirce’s philosophy which are 
relevant for education, but does not develop a fully and systematic Peircean 
approach to education. As such, the volume justifies all the more the need for a fully 
Peircean approach to education. 
I argue that philosophy of education’s rediscovery of its semiotic foundation 
does not come as a surprise. Rather, the surprise consists in that so much time passed 
since the rediscovery of semiotics, in the late 19
th
 century, until its implementation in 
education studies, in the early 21
st
 century. This return of semiotics has already 
provided insights for education in several areas such as learning, adaptation, 
interpretation, the classroom and its phenomenology, skematism, iconicity, 
diagrammatic reasoning, and the student–teacher relation. Owing to this already 
existing work now it is possible to develop understandings of education more 
broadly in terms of meaning phenomena, in semiotic terms. This thesis develops a 
fully semiotic theory of learning and this chapter presents the epistemological 
foundation for the theory. The chapter has five stages. First I will use Charles 
Peirce’s idea of a semiotic cosmological evolution and its biosemiotic applications to 
explain the theoretical background that allows education to be understood as a result 
of evolution. Secondly, I will explain the historically interwoven developments of 
liberal education and semiotics, which shows that a semiotic consciousness arose as 
the rationale of liberal education. In this framework the institution of University – 
the institutionalized form of liberal education – will be presented as a crystallization 
of signs to which natural and cultural evolution led. Thirdly, I will introduce the 
semiotic concept of Icon, the concept which constitutes the cornerstone of this 
learning theory. The fourth stage consists in explaining how this semiotic approach 
favours liberal education to instructional education, by defining learning as 
discovery. The chapter ends by explaining why such a semiotic perspective is 
preferred to traditional psychological or sociological approaches to education. 
 
A. Learning the Semiotic Universe: Life and learning 
 
Charles Peirce offers an understanding of the Universe as a teleologically 
expanding web of signs. This semiotic perspective replaces the idea of being as 
monad or object, or as a static entity in any sense, a perspective that has prevailed in 
both classical and modern philosophy. On a Peircean account being is the sign, the 
mediation. To exist means to be in relation and relation is the mode of being.  
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For Peirce the sign is a relation of three termini. Throughout his work Peirce 
offers many definitions of sign, one of the most synthetic and comprehensive being 
the following: “a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to 
some interpretant thought, C.” (CP 1.346) One among the many examples of 
signification is language. Language use illustrates signs: the word “freedom” (A) 
denotes a fact,  <<freedom>> (B) to the interpretant thought of a neoliberal (C). For 
the communist and the anarchist the sign is different, even though the signifier 
“freedom” might be the same. The signifier is only the perceptible ground for 
significaiton. 
What is not in relation to the existing world, what is out of any possible 
interpretation, is not of this world; it does not exist. Signs are dynamic phenomena of 
meaning, always evolving according to their modes of relation within the web of 
signs. Peirce explained that this uninterrupted expansion of relations accounts that 
the whole Universe is constituted of signs: 
“It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign should 
leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but the explanation of the 
phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe -- not merely the universe of 
existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, 
the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as ‘the truth’ -- that all this 
universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs.” (CP 
5.448) 
Thus, Peirce’s semiotics implies not only an ontology of signs, but also a 
cosmology of signs – the world is the world of sign relations. If the idea of a 
relational ontology would suggest a certain idealism this explanation of universe as 
truth dismisses it. Being is not something belonging strictly to the realm of mind or 
strictly to a realm outside mind. Semiotician John Deely clearly explained that 
Peirce’s semiotics does not make an ontological distinction between mind 
independent and mind dependent being (the medieval concepts of ens reale and ens 
rationis). The sign is suprasubjective (e.g. Deely 2001a, 2009, Bains 2006), it is 
neither strictly subjective, neither strictly objective. Thus, semiotics easily 
overcomes the typical dualism that modern philosophy preached since Locke and 
Descartes. The mind/body, ideal/material, mind-dependent/mind-independent 
dichotomies are unknown to semiotics
1
. Signs compose the world as a web of signs, 
linking things in their subjective existence and things in our apprehension as well as 
among themselves. The termini of the relations have their being only as part of the 
relation and if one were to focus on any of the three termini (A, B, or C) she would 
find nothing else but other such relations. Therefore semiotics dismisses any 
discussion on being as pure ideas or things-in-themselves. Stables explained that this 
semiotic non-dualism is an epistemological advantage for philosophy of education 
(2012).  
                                                          
1
It might be said that reality is ignorant of being’s sweeping through mental and non-mental domains. 
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Being rooted in the scholastic realism of Duns Scotus, Peirce’s semiotics 
opposes the relativism promoted by 20
th
 century structural and post-structural 
semiology, with its deconstructive tendency. This understanding of being as relation 
does not consist in relativism, being rather a holistic ontology: something would be 
completely different than it is without or in a different relation to something else. 
Take the smallest, apparently insignificant constituting part of the Universe out of 
the Universe and the whole Universe crumbles into meaninglessness. This 
understanding of the Universe of existents as suprasubjective also accounts for the 
evolution of life forms as a particular result of a larger cosmological evolution. The 
evolution of life forms is continuous with the whole expansion of signs: 
“In short, the problem of how genuine triadic relationships first arose in the 
world is a better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of how life 
first came about; and no explanation has ever been offered except that of pure 
chance, which we must suspect to be no explanation, owing to the suspicion that 
pure chance may itself be a vital phenomenon. In that case, life in the 
physiological sense would be due to life in the metaphysical sense.” (CP 6.322) 
Using the same argument, evolution on a cultural (historical) timescale is 
continuous with cosmological and natural evolution. Stjernfelt (2011) explained that 
natural selection adapted to signs, not the other way around. Evolution has been 
increasingly adapting to signs and, as such, learning is a semiotic result of evolution. 
Life forms adapted to signs: they learned to identify signs and to use them – I shall 
call this re-cognition, as it consists in the reinterpretation of being through cognition. 
The term ‘re-cognition’ has been used in semiotic research, without being developed 
or insisted upon, by Peer Aage Brandt (2007). He used it in the same sense intended 
in the present work, as a phenomenon of categorisation, but he also ascribed to it the 
identification of sameness: 
“[…] seeing something as something (and not something else) allows the Subject 
to retrieve it under the distinct category, remembered as attached to a location to 
where it should then orient its response. Object constancy, a fundamental property of 
perception, is of course not a gift of the ‘given’, but has to be mentally achieved as 
re-cognition of some cognized entity under a constant (and spatially localized) 
category: sameness of an individual as ‘belonging to’ a category remembered to 
appear at some location in the Subject’s surround space.” (p. 51) 
In the present thesis the term is used without necessarily implying the 
identification of a semiotic object. Certainly, identification of sameness is a re-
cognition in this sense. 
Since along natural evolution learning was achieved, on a cultural timescale, 
adaptation led to education, the institutionalization of learning, the socially 
legitimated learning. 
Learning happens within the signifying environment of a living being. The 
semiotic concept of environment, due to Thomas Sebeok’s work, came to be Jakob 
von Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt. At the beginning of the 20
th
 century Jakob von 
Uexküll developed a Kantian biology which approaches life in terms of signs (von 
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Uexküll, 1926), classifying signification into perception and action. The difference 
between the (non-semiotic) environment and Umwelt consists in that by the concept 
of Umwelt it can be explained that two individuals might share apparently the same 
mind-independent environment, but actually live in different systems of 
signification. For example, a mosquito and a frog populating the same pond live, 
nevertheless, in different webs of signs, since their embodied modes of existence 
make them re-cognize different signs in the environment. The same can be argued 
about two individuals of the same species: since they are distinct and never coincide, 
their Umwelten will be different to some extent. In edusemiotics this perspective was 
recently investigated by Stables (2012). 
In 1971 Stepanov coined the term biosemiotics, as a realization of the biological 
science’s dependence of language stemming from linguistics, semiotics, logic, 
informatics, philosophy, and so on. Biology always approached life in specifically 
semiotic terms: code, information, message, etc. The biosemiotic project consists in 
developing biology by these metaphors. It bring the argument that life consists in 
such phenomena very similar to sign interaction (Stjernfelt 2011, 2014). 
In educational circumstances, the knowledge of a student and that of a teacher 
will never coincide. Of course, living in different Umwelten does not suppose a 
schizophrenic reality: living beings still communicate and their knowledge has 
degrees of similarity. Concisely, the Umwelt is suprasubjective: 
“We comfort ourselves all too easily with the illusion that the relations of 
another kind of subject to the things of its environment play out in the same space 
and time as the relations that link us to the things of our human environment. This 
illusion is fed by the belief in the existence of one and only one world, in which 
all living beings are encased. From this arises the widely held conviction that 
there must be one and only one space and time for all living beings. Only recently 
have physicists raised doubts as to the existence of one universe with one space 
valid for all beings. That there can be no such space comes already of the fact that 
every human being lives in three spaces, which interpenetrate and complete but 
also partially contradict each other.” (von Uexküll 1926, p. 54) 
At this point it becomes clear why Peircean semiotics is particularly favourable 
to offer conceptual tools for biosemiotics. The reason is that both Peircean semiotics 
and Uexküll’s biology, besides its approach to life via signs, account for a 
suprasubjective being. Stables explained that on a semiotic account phenomenal 
worlds overlap (2012). This has implications for education (Stables 2012, more on 
this in Chapter 5 and Part II). Uexküll’s account of meaning is suprasubjective and in 
accord with Peirce’s maxim of pragmatism (Chapter 3) for explaining that the same 
sense-perceptible entity can be the ground for different signs. Thus the Umwelt is 
determined by the subjects’ interpretation: 
“An angry dog barks at me on a country road. In order to get rid of him, I grab 
a paving stone and chase the attacker away with a skillful throw. In this case, 
nobody who observed what happened and picked up the stone afterward would 
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doubt that this was the same object, “stone,” which initially lay in the street and 
was then thrown at the dog. Neither the shape, nor the weight, nor the other 
physical and chemical properties of the stone have changed. Its color, its 
hardness, its crystal formations have all stayed the same— and yet it has 
undergone a fundamental transformation: it has changed its meaning. As long as 
the stone was integrated into the country road, it served as a support for the 
hiker’s foot. Its meaning was in its participation in the function of the path. It had, 
we could say, a “path tone.”
2
 That changed fundamentally when I picked up the 
stone in order to throw it at the dog. The stone became a thrown projectile— a 
new meaning was impressed upon it. It received a “throwing tone.” (1934, p. 140) 
Like in the case of Peirce’s semiotics, for Uexküll entities are meaningless if they 
are “relationless” (p. 140). Once a thing is used it becomes a “carrier of meaning,” 
shaping the user’s Umwelt, as in the case of the stone, being either weapon, either 
part of the road: 
“Only through the relationship is the object transformed into the carrier of a 
meaning that is impressed upon it by a subject.” (p. 140) 
Uexküll’s Umwelt concept is a “functional cycle,” (e.g., Uexküll, 1934, p. 49) 
which describes the suprasubjective reality of a living being in opposition to the 
linear functionality of a machine (see fig. 1). The Umwelt is the result of the action 
of senses by means of which a living being makes sense of the environment: 
“If one further imagines that subjects are linked to the same objects or 
different ones by multiple functional cycles, one can thereby gain insight into the 
fundamental principle of the science of the environment: All animal subjects, 
from the simplest to the most complex, are inserted into their environments to the 
same degree of perfection. The simple animal has a simple environment; the 
multiform animal has an environment just as richly articulated as it is.”(pp. 49-50) 
 
Figure 1 – Umwelt as functional cycle (in Uexküll, 1934, p. 49) 
                                                          
2
Without going further into the matter I mention that Uexküll’s use of the term “tone” here is 
peculiarly interesting. Peirce would surely agree with this use of the term, since he uses the same 
term, tone, to designate a quality which is a sign (also Qualisign, in Peircean terminology). This is 
exactly what tone means here: it describes the emphasized quality that makes something belong to 




 On this ground semiotics developed its own concept of body (see Nöth (ed.) 
2006), distinct from the modern body concept which stands in opposition with that of 
mind: “the Umwelt concept furnishes semiotics with a basic idea of body as 
semiotically defined by the set of its perception and action sign possibilities” 
(Stjernfelt 2007, p. 262). The realization that semiotics brings is that the body is part 
of its own Umwelt. Moreover, the body is the central and essential feature of an 
Umwelt – the Umwelt takes the form of the organism’s semiotic possibilities. 
Stjernfelt remarked that on this account an organism’s life consists in both the 
internal and external parts of the functional cycle:  
“This definition of the body is thus correlated with that of the environment 
it constitutes. In this conception the organism, the body per se is conceived as a 
semiotic device: it is an intrinsic property of a body that it is able to perceive the 
surroundings through signs and act correlatively through signs.” (2007, p. 261)  
This semiotic account of body dismisses any questions regarding a priorism, 
since it describes the life of the organism in terms of sign use. The modern mind and 
body complementary concepts are united and undistinguished in the semiotic body. 
On this account mind and body are to some extent synonymous, as mind is a 
phenomenon occurring in the semiotics capabilities of the embodied life form. The 
only distinction is that the mind extends into the whole Umwelt of the organism. 
Thus, if a tree becomes, in a semiosic way, part of the mind of a living creature, the 
body of the creature is still distinguishable from the tree. Nevertheless, that the mind 
incorporated the tree it means that the body is familiar in interacting with the tree (it 
can climb it, sit on it, feed from it, rest at its shade, etc.). 
If the body determines the Umwelt, the very life of the organism, it 
immediately stems that the lives of two organisms are similar in respect to how their 
bodies are similar. A tick and a frog might be populating the same geographical 
place, e.g. a pond, but they live in essentially different worlds. Their worlds, 
however, overlap, because their bodies, no matter how different, still have some 
similarities. Even the basic fact that they are both embodied and have volume, shape 
and weight allows their worlds, however different, to overlap to some degree. The 
tick and the frog acknowledge each other and partake to each other’s Umwelt. This is 
a simple way of explaining why inter-species communication is so radically more 
difficult than communication within the same species. The focus of this thesis is an 
Umwelt such as the classroom. Here the subjects involved belong to the same 
biological species. Nevertheless, their worlds are quite different, as their life 
experiences are different. Their bodies differ to some degree as well: they have 
different height, weight, pulse, skin and hair color, and so on. 
 The reality of living beings as Umwelten connected by common objects best 
is resonant with Peirce’s semiotics and has implications for education that will be 
explored. As Fig. 1 suggests, Uexküll distinguished between perception signs and 
action signs which together constitute one circular and continuous life experience, as 
one of these modes of signification is the presupposition for the other which 
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becomes the purpose of the first and so on (see also Stjernfelt 2007, p. 226). This 
process has a structure of infinite iteration, like Peirce’s abduction-deduction-
induction process of logical inquiry (it will be investigated in the next chapters). 
Thus, like in Peirce’s case, teleology does not need to be justified perennially, 
imposed from the outside, but it is rather set and continuously redefined from within 
the functional cycle. Induction sheds a new light on the understanding of the whole 
problem, thus producing a reshaping of hypothesis which consists in a new 
abduction and so on. This is one of the cornerstones of Peirce’s pragmatism 
(explained in Chapter 3). According to Stjernfelt, Peirce’s semiotics describes the 
existing world as a physiology of arguments since it supposes the Universe to be a 
continuous interaction of signs (this concept will be explained thoroughly in 
Chapters 2 and 5). The physiology of arguments, constituting the entire Universe, 
becomes a biology of arguments in the world of living beings. The present thesis 
investigates the classroom and the relation between teacher and student as a 
particular biological phenomenology of such kind, which takes into account, 
according to Uexküll’s biology, that living beings and their interactions do not have 
the characteristic of functioning machines: 
“Whosoever wants to hold to the conviction that all living things are only 
machines should abandon all hope of glimpsing at their environments. 
Whosoever is not yet an adherent of the machine theory of living beings 
might, however, consider the following. All our utensils and machines are no 
more than aids for the human beings. Of course there are aids to producing effects 
[Wirken], which one calls tools [Werkzeuge], a class to which all large machines 
belong, such as those in our factories that process natural products and 
furthermore all trains, automobiles, and aircraft. But there are also aids to 
perception [Merken], which one might call perception tools [Merkzeuge]: 
telescopes, eye-glasses, microphones, radio devices, and so on.” (1934, p. 41) 
Developed on this ground, a semiotic theory of learning will prove to bring 
forth an anti-instrumentalist account of education
3
. Learning is not an instrument, an 
aid to our life, but an intrinsic and essential, sine-qua-non aspect of human life. This 
Stables’ simple observation constitutes the nucleus of semiotics of education: 
“If all living is semiotic engagement, then learning is semiotic engagement.” 
(Stables, 2006, p. 6) 
On this account, if learning is a mode of living to which evolution arrived in 
its adaptation to signs, through their physiology, learning is the Universe’s way of 
discovering itself: throughout life forms the Universe can know itself. This is the 
conclusion of Peirce’s semiotic explanation of life emergence. According to Gough 
and Stables (2012) learning itself is adaptation, which is, as explained above, 
interpretation. With such an argument coming from semiotics of education it 
becomes clear that biology might have a lot to offer to education. Biology and 
semiotics have already merged into one discipline, namely biosemiotics.  
                                                          
3
The instrumentalism semiotics opposes is not the pragmatic instrumentalism of Dewey, but 
mechanistic views of human behavior and education, such as instructionalism.  
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Thomas Sebeok has the main merit in the developing of biosemiotics. His 
development of biosemiotics, grounded in Peircean semiotics, was possible only 
because of and building upon the work of Jakob von Uexküll. Jakob von Uexküll, a 
biologist contemporary of Peirce, is the author of a theoretical biology which 
expresses life in terms of sign use (von Uexküll, 1926). For this epistemological 
compatibility, von Uexküll’s biology proves some of the epistemological strengths 
of Peircean semiotics. Peirce has explicitly shown the central place of a biosemiotic 
project within his semiotics: 
“Therefore, if botany and zoölogy must perforce rest upon metaphysics, by 
all means let this metaphysics be recognized as an explicit branch of those sciences, 
and be treated in a thoroughgoing and scientific manner.” (CP 1.204) 
Kull (2005) explained that so far there are mainly two approaches to 
biosemiotics, among which he adheres to the account eventually developed by 
Sebeok and inherited from von Uexküll: 
“The intersection between semiotics and biology can be interpreted in two 
quite different ways.  
Firstly, biosemiotics can be seen as a field that emerges in the periphery of 
general linguistics or communication science on the one hand, and of ethology on 
the other — thus covering a set of interdisciplinary problems arising in few cases 
when biology and semiotics intersect, for instance, when analysing the signaling 
behaviour of non-human animals. This is a view that can be applied when 
interpreting the early zoosemiotic works of Sebeok (1962; 1969). 
Alternatively, biosemiotics is an approach to the whole living world, a 
semiotic biology, a field that has a scope and importance no less considerable 
than biology itself. This is a view espoused by Sebeok in most of his later works, 
at least since the late 1970s when he started to appraise Jakob von Uexküll’s 
approach as one of a general semiotics.” (p. 16) 
Therefore, the present thesis brings an approach to education from the perspective 
that regards the whole living world as a biosemiotic system. Only within the 
Peircean branch of semiotics has so far emerged an influential approach to biology. 
Thisapproach is growing due to the works of, inter alia, Hoffmeyer (2009, 2013 in 
Brian Henning & Adam Scarfe), Kull (1998, 2001, 2003, 2005), Stjernfelt (2011, 
2013 in Brian Henning & Adam Scarfe), Andersen (in Sebeok 1992). The title of the 
2011 volume Towards a semiotic biology: Life is the action of signs, edited by Claus 
Emmeche and Kalevi Kull, declares the main statement of this biological trend. 
From the perspective of biosemiotics, Kalevi Kull describes life as local plurality, 
thus explaining complementarity. As such, biosemiotics embraces Peirce’s 
observation that the interpreter supplies a part of the sign’s meaning. Peirce also 
identified life with diversity, and therefore the boundaries of life are not as clear as 
we have been used to think. Peirce considered “that what we call matter is not 
completely dead, but is merely mind hidebound with habits. It still retains the 
element of diversification; and in that diversification there is life.” Biosemiotics, 
therefore, brings a vitalist account, in contrast with modern dualist philosophy which 
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largely proved itself a mechanical philosophy. As such, semiotics offers an 
ecological understanding of education. That semiotics favours an ecological 
philosophical paradigm has been discussed by Andersen (i.e. Andersen in Sebeok 
1992). The biosemiotic approach brings a strong awareness that a living organism is 
a part of the world in the sense that it cannot be isolated from the world. Modern 
dualist philosophy and science were not ready to embrace the “Gaia hypothesis,” 
claiming that the Earth is a living organism, but rather only that the Earth is like a 
living organism: 
“The strong metaphor form of the Gaia hypothesis – the earth is a living 
organism – can be distinguished from the weak form resting on analogy – the earth is 
like a living organism.” (Andersen, p. 5) 
As Andersen noticed, semiotics offers a new possibility. Semiotics teaches 
that to signify is to be and for being like something semiotics has a name: Icon
4
 – the 
sign that signifies according to likeness. Thus, the earth, the whole of living nature, 
is an icon for a living organism
5
. From this perspective, human life and learning are 
implicit. Learning happens continuously wherever there is life and it proceeds 
according to the conditions of the environment, to the way in which sign action 
multiplies reality: 
“A study of the nature of semiosis that includes its inevitable attributes 
(recognition, memory, feed-forward, code, emergence of absence, etc.) leads to a 
general model of the life process, a model that explains the emergence of 
complementarity. A most compact conclusion from this understanding states that 
semiosis multiplies reality, that mind means plurality. Or, synonymously, that life 
is the local plurality. This means that this “discovery” is also the answer to the 
question about the nature of life. Life is the phenomenon of the occurrence of 
plurality in the world. What thus turns to be locally plural is the reality itself. And 
this IS life, life itself (Kull 2007).” (Kull in Bundgaard and Stjernfelt 2009, p. 
116) 
These recent developments of biosemiotics have revealed the achievement of 
knowledge and the development of science to be the results of the semiosis
6
 of all 
life forms including those commonly regarded as cultural constructs. Education is 
thus a semiosic structure to which evolution itself has adapted (see Stjernfelt, 2011), 
while learning is the semiotic phenomenon that determines the renewal of life itself. 
Learning is a result of semiosis prehistorically, occurring even since before the 
human species had appeared. By the time humans came about, learning was already 
a way of life for most species. Learning is our mode of being. 
Such an ecological, biosemiotically grounded theory of learning immediately 
offers several advantages to education. For instance, Gough and Stables (2012) 
                                                          
4
The Icon concept will be introduced in section C and further developed throughout the thesis. 
5
In her article, Andersen explains that this is a metaphor. This does not contradict it being an Icon, on 
the contrary. The metaphor is a particular type of Icon (see Chapter 2, section D), thus, by naming it a 
metaphor, Andersen is simply being more precise. 
6
Semiosis is the action of signs. It will be explained later on in Chapter 2. 
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remark that, because of its non-dualist doctrine, a semiotic account of Darwinism 
does not present any more the danger of justifying racism, sexism or other 
discriminatory doctrines in philosophy of education, as a non-semiotic account of 
Darwinism used to: 
“On a strict substance dualist account, Darwinism itself can be understood 
as construing ‘reality’ as brute mechanical physicality, devoid of mind or 
intention. By overcoming this dualism, a fully semiotic account effectively 
removes this objection to Darwinism. Darwinism on this account does not, 
therefore, endorse racism, sexism, imperialism or the triumph of might over right, 
forbid altruism or collaboration, or explain human aspirations in purely genetic or 
biological terms.” (Gough and Stables 2012, p. 371) 
 The biosemiotic model of evolution is not arborescent, meaning that 
evolution is not simply a process leading from simple and dull to complex and 
knowing. Species are not better or worse, under-evolved or evolved, species are 
simply different, as each species (and actually every individual) is engaged in a 
different Umwelt. This is a way of expressing the fact that the lives of different 
species are different. Different signification means different being (to be embodied 
differently.   
The point which Gough and Stables draw is that interpretation is a matter of 
adaptation, an argument also advanced within biosemiotics (e.g. Stjernfelt 2011). 
Such is the case of institutions and, generally, social life: these are the structures of 
meaning which biological and socio-cultural evolution (which, as argued above, are 
not separate, but continuous) have arrived at. They are not necessarily better or 
worse than previous or impending structures of meaning, but are the instant 
embodiments of a semiosis – an interpretation at a moment in time-space. Semiotics, 
in a Peircean tradition, easily accounts for the continuity of nature and culture, body 
and mind. This evolutionary approach to education accounts for the phenomenon of 
learning as discovery of one’s own Umwelt. Human beings’ mode of learning is 
strongly committed to our cultural mode of living. The concept of Umwelt does not 
describe cultural life. Nevertheless, since socio-cultural evolution and natural 
evolution are continuous, a particular case of human Umwelt can be inferred. John 
Deely names this concept Lebenswelt. The suprasubjectivity of the Umwelt is 
sustained by a psychological reality of each knowing subject, the Innenwelt: 
“Two people have the same ideas, but these ideas as psychological 
realities are but the foundations for a relation to an object; and while each person 
may have his or her own idea, that which the idea is considered is the same 
between two people, they may well feel differently about that object. The 
Innenwelt gives rise to and sustains an Umwelt, and each Umwelt in turn gives 
rise to an indefinite number of possibilities for both communication and 
“misunderstanding”. I put this last word in quotation marks, because it introduces 
us to the distinguishing feature of the human Umwelt, to what further makes of a 
simple Umwelt a linguistic Lebenswelt: the human animal is the only animal 
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which becomes aware of the difference between objects and things in terms of the 
difference between what is related to the knowing organism and what exists apart 
from or regardless of that relation.” (Deely, 2001a, p. 8) 
The concept of Lebenswelt is the semiotic equivalent of the relativist concept 
of paradigm (Kuhn 1970). The paradigm concept is descriptive of the specific socio-
cultural and idiolectical characteristics of a (scientific) community. Lebenswelt 
consists in the system of relations of signification constituting the group.Because to 
be in the Universe means to be related to everything else the Lebenswelt concept, 
while describing the borders of systems, takes into consideration that no system is 
closed. Within the physiology of arguments there are some thresholds of 
signification, delineating Lebenswelten, but these thresholds do not block 
signification between Lebenswelten. Also, the margins of the Lebenswelten are 
vague. It is difficult to say where does a student stop being a student: at school she is 
a student, on her way from school towards home she is still a student in some sense, 
because she is coming from school, while studying at home she is still a student, in 
the pub she might still be a student, as the pub Lebenswelt might very well provide 
the inspiration for the student’s assignments.  
In the present thesis educational institutions (situations) will be treated as 
Lebenswelt. Stables (in Stables and Semetsky, 2015) explained the implications of 
the semiotic non-dualist approach for the understanding of a teaching environmnent:  
“If living is a process of semiotic engagement, then what is real is both 
physical and humanly interpreted: there are not two sorts of reality, one external and 
one internal. A school, for example, is not determined solely either by a set of 
buildings nor by a mental interpretation. A school simply and really ‘is’ first and 
foremost a school: the same set of buildings could stop being a school, and a school 
could exist on the same site without the existing buildings. Whate makes a school a 
school is that it signifies such. It is not simply a matter of a human mind interpreting 
a non-human reality; it is simpler still than that.” (p. 91) 
While this section has identified learning as the main characteristic of the 
Umwelten of various species, in the next section of this chapter I explain the 
educational Lebenswelt, typical for humans. Thus, education is accounted for as 
continuous with the evolutionary realization of learning. The existence of human 
beings pertains to Lebenswelt, but learning is a characteristic belonging to the natural 
world of Umwelt, for both human and non-human animals. Of course, since humans 
live in a linguistic, socio-cultural Umwelt, such as Lebenswelt, learning will occur 
within this realm. Nevertheless, this does not impose defining learning as human 
specific. Learningis here approached as a biological characteristic, even if 
investigating a specific learningsuch as it takes place in a Lebenswelt such as a 
school. Also, learning is not strictly innate or acquired; it is, as explained above, a 
telos of evolution, set from within evolution – the result of evolution’s adaptation to 
signs. 
 




John Deely is one of those to affirm and explain that Peirce did not develop a 
new philosophical system, but rather recovered and further developed an old, 
forgotten medieval philosophy, that modern philosophy has put aside (e.g. Deely 
1982, 2001a). In this section I will explain that the sources from which Peirce 
rediscovered Doctrina Signorum (the Doctrine of Signs) constitute the main sources 
that developed and exercised liberal education, thus affirming that semiotics was 
initially developed to serve education. This tradition starts in the early Medieval 
Age. Of course, both semiotics and education are disciplines that have ancient 
origins. The interest that human beings have shown both towards signs and towards 
passing on what has been acquired are probably as old as humanity itself, or at least 
as old as humanity’s conscious interest in knowledge in general. The 
conceptualisation of something standing for something else (what we now call sign) 
probably started in practices such as astrology or divination (Deely, 2001a). Both of 
these inquiries, the study of signs and the art of teaching and learning were 
developed in classical Greek philosophy, each usually independently one of the 
other, but they met in a moment that was crucial for the development of philosophy. 
In Ancient Greece, especially with Socrates, the consciousness of teaching that 
which is valuable per-se was entrenched. With Aristotle and Cicero the tradition of 
the seven liberal arts began and it was carried on later by authors such as Tertullian 
and Quintilian. The liberal arts have been broadly understood as those arts that are 
valuable per-se, in contrast to utilitarian arts (crafts) and the seven fine arts 
(architecture, instrumental music (playing technique), sculpture, painting, literature, 
drama, and dance), which were valuable throughout their production. The main 
argument for teaching the arts which are valuable per-se, immanent and intransitive 
that is, is that these generally prepare the intellect of a being for knowledge in 
general. The liberal arts make the understanding and practice of any craft possible. 
Whatsoever the object to be known is, the liberal arts, or rather the principle of the 
liberal arts, prepare the mind to grasp it. To put it simply, the liberal arts are 
universal. 
The middle of the first millennium is an essential moment for the history of 
liberal education. At the time there was a certain cultural competition between 
Byzantium and Rome (see Mark Vessey’s 2004 Introduction to Cassiodorus, p. 26-
27), which fuelled a race for knowledge on both sides. From this situation a strong 
interest for education emerged. Among the Patristic authors of the time a general 
interest towards signs is evident. One of the most influential thinkers of the early 
Medieval Age, St Augustine, set the agenda not only for the education of his times, 
but for the eventual emergence of the institution of University. St Augustine’s De 
Doctrina Christiana is recognized both as a crucial work for the further development 
of the liberal arts and also as the first theoretical development of the Doctrine of 
Signs. One of St Augustine’s tasks was to justify the need of liberal education at the 
dawn of a Christian age. The issue that needed clarification was the relation between 
non-Christian and Christian teaching. St Augustine argued that that which is not 
directly, immediately Scriptural is not necessarily profane, but it can be regarded as 
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secular. The secular is valuable according to its use. Therefore, secular teachings are 
good for the Christian to learn, in service of the Christian mission of transfiguring 
the world. 
This same work is considered to set, for the first time, a semiotic 
consciousness (Deely 2001a, 2009 and Marmo 2010). Deely explains that: 
“Semiotic consciousness, thus, first arose in the time of Augustine, but its 
principal development as a theoretical theme did not occur until much later, 
beginning with Aquinas and Roger Bacon in the 13th century and continuing 
thereafter right down to the time of Galileo and Descartes, where it found its 
theoretical vindication in the work of John Poinsot. This main period of 
theoretical development occurred in two phases, both of which have been 
identified only in the most recent times and both of which have only begun to be 
explored in depth.” (Deely, 2001a, p. 40) 
St Augustine was the author of the time to approach and develop signs 
theoretically, but a semiotic thinking was common among the Patristic authors 
generally. Examples include St Ambrose (e.g. Hexaemeron, I.5), who particularly 
had a strong influence on St Augustine, and St Dionysius the Areopagite (e.g. On the 
Celestial Hierarchy, II.2). Their manner of regarding the world as sign is probably 
inherited from the apostolic method of allegoresis. This method cultivated a certain 
text analysis whereby fragments of text from one Scriptural Book would directly 
signify fragments from another Scriptural Book, thus broadening meaning by 
unlimited correlations of a type – image kind. The Patristics did not particularly need 
the development of a semiotic theory, their focus being that of having a spiritual life 
of prayer. Any theoretical developments were inquired only to serve this purpose. 
Their understanding of Scripture and its typologies, while having an implicit 
semiotic character, did not require the further development of a sign theory. 
Therefore, the question that arises is “what determined St Augustine to develop a 
theory of signs?” At the outset of De Doctrina Christiana St Augustine stated the 
reason for developing a theory of signs: “all teaching is teaching of either things or 
signs, but things are learnt through signs” (St Augustine, On Christian Teaching, 
I.4). Therefore, from its beginning, semiotics had the rationale of developing liberal 
education. In this same work, it is widely admitted, St Augustine gave the definition 
for the concept of sign that set the path for the further development of medieval 
semiotics, which in turn dominated medieval philosophy. From the start, he stated 
that the interest in the study of signs is not their being, but their signification. This is 
a first insight towards an ontology of relations that semiotics will later prove to be. 
Expressing the idea in a later terminology which semiotics will develop, Deely 
comments that St Augustine managed to explain that “signs make us aware of an 
objective world which includes but does not reduce to the things of the physical 
surroundings, and that it is only through and as part of that objective world that we 
become aware of objects and aspects of objects that do not reduce to our experience 
of them (do not reduce wholly to their objective being) but obtain also and at the 
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same time subjectively as existing in their own right, and as well as, as known.” 
(2009, p. 36-37) 
Introducing his definition of sign, which will remain a central reference for 
semiotics ever since, St Augustine expresses this suprasubjectivity of the sign by 
stating that regarding signs attention  should be paid on their signification, not on 
their objective being: 
“Now that I am discussing signs, I must say, conversely, that attention 
should not be paid to the fact that they exist, but rather to the fact that they are 
signs, or, in other words, that they signify. For a sign is a thing which of itself 
makes some other thing come into mind, besides the impression that it presents to 
the senses. So when we see a footprint we think that the animal whose footprint it 
is has passed by; when we see smoke we realize that there is fire beneath it; when 
we hear a voice of an animate being we observe its feeling; and when the trumpet 
sounds soldiers know they must advance or retreat or do whatever else the state of 
the battle demands.” (Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, II.1) 
Thus, St Augustine brings a new perspective in philosophy by adding to the 
realm of signs phenomena which are not strictly natural. Deely expresses this in 
Greek philosophical language, by stating that the Augustinian “sign is a general 
mode of being that travels between φυσις and νομος, as well as within each.” (2009, 
p. 37) 
As already mentioned, it is agreed among semioticians today that De 
Doctrina Christiana set the theoretical premises for the development of the Doctrine 
of Signs: 
“Medieval semiotics has developed along the path traced by Augustine in 
De Doctrina Christiana (I,  2, 1) and has conceived the sign as a res or a 
signifying quid, whose apprehension allows one to know something else 
(significatum).” (Marmo, 1987) 
Deely reinforces this: 
“With this definition, at a stroke, Augustine proposes the sign as superior 
to the division of being into natural and cultural: any material structure, whether 
from nature or art, which, on being perceived, conveys thought to something 
besides itself functions as a sign.” (Deely, 2001a, p. 221) 
Therefore, semiotics and liberal education fundamentally have the same root, 
the development of semiotics having the rationale of serving liberal education. De 
Doctrina Christiana is the source of the medieval curriculum, the curriculum of the 
liberal arts, which, in Western Europe, constituted the very reason for the emergence 
of the institution of University. Education and semiotics not only have the same root, 
therefore, but their historical evolution is interdependent. The main authors 
responsible for the practice of liberal education, as Deely identifies them, are St 
Augustine, Boethius, Cassiodorus and Isidore of Seville:  
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“The tradition of liberal arts education in the West is rooted in certain 
conceptions (and misconceptions) of Augustine, Boethius, Cassiodorus, and 
Isidore of Seville; but it was Cassiodorus (c. AD 480-573), a contemporary of and 
noble Roman like Boethius, who first pulled the sources together so as to initiate 
this great tradition.” (2001, p. 183)  
Hence, the beings that live in the Lebenswelt of liberal education live in the 
Lebenswelt of a semiotic consciousness. Scholastic philosophy was a genuinely 
semiotic paradigm. Deely considers scholasticism a second step in the development 
of semiotics, following Augustine (2009, p. 40). Semiotic consciousness has been 
alive throughout history, uninterruptedly, albeit at times silently. Deely, though he 
developed the most comprehensive history of ideas noticed with semiotic spectacles, 
nevertheless omitted a whole range of thinkers that have their place within the 
semiotic project. Such are the cases of St John of Damascus, St Theodore the Studite 




 centuries). These authors particularly developed 
the concept of Icon, which I will briefly introduce in section C. Taking these authors 
into consideration within the history of semiotics, or rather in the attempt to develop 
a semiotic history of ideas, results in acknowledging the importance of iconic 
signification for the whole semiotic tradition. However, this thesis is not the place to 
explain their views on signs thoroughly. 
 In the 13
th
 century the sign constituted the main philosophical interest and 
debates on signs were common among the main figures of scholasticism, inter alia 
Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon, Bonaventura of Bagnoregio, Thomas of Erfurt, 
Henry of Ghent and other scholastics (Marmo, 2010). 
In late scholasticism the semiotic paradigm was still fertile. Joao Poinsot 
(1589 – 1644) explains about the academic Lebenswelt of the Iberian peninsula of 
his time that the debates on sign and signification were “a matter of daily dispute in 
the schools” (Joao Poinsot1632: 680a38-39 in Deely 1982, p. 50). These semiotic 
disputes were kept alive in the Iberian Peninsula by scholastics such as Petrus 
Fonsecus, Francisco Suárez, and Ignatius of Loyola. Contemporary semioticians, 
such as Deely, regard Poinsot as one of the first to develop a fully suprasubjective 
ontology, a doctrine of signs peculiarly similar with Peirce’s. 
One of the earliest educational texts was Cassiodorus’s 6
th
 century work, 
Institutiones divinarum et saecularium litterarum, in which the most frequent 
Patristic reference is De Doctrina Christiana. If in Institutiones Cassiodorus does not 
explicitly offer any insights on signs it does not mean that the work lacks a semiotic 
consciousness, but rather that it is implicit. This can be inferred simply by looking at 
Cassiodorus’ bibliographical references and scholarship. Cassiodorus was focused in 
explaining what subjects to study and where is the pedagogical material to be found, 
he did not focus on explaining methods of teaching and learning. These methods, 
that constitute the semiotic background of liberal education, were already developed, 
mostly by St Augustine, whom is Cassiodorus’ main reference. Cassiodorus himself 
makes it explicit that he is not interested in making his own contribution to the 
matter of education, but rather that he wants to pass on the teachings of the Patristics 
30 
 
on education, which, as mentioned before, especially in the Latin world, were 
profoundly semiotic:  
“I commend in them not my own teaching, but the words of earlier writers 
that we justly praise and gloriously herald to later generations.” (Institutiones, I.1) 
In an introduction to Cassiodorus’ Institutiones, Mark Vessey notes that 
Cassiodorus inherited the division of knowledge into divine and secular, as well as 
the justification for the need of both, mostly from two Latin Patristic authors, Jerome 
and Augustine:  
“His masters in this domain were the two greatest Latin fathers of the later 
fourth and early fifth centuries, Jerome and Augustine. Between them they 
supplied him with a rationale for distinguishing the categories of ‘divine’ and 
‘secular’ knowledge and for combining their respective textual resources in a 
single pedagogy.” (p. 28) 
Thus, it is within a semiotic mind frame that liberal education sets off and it 
is in the Lebenswelt of western scholasticism that the institution of University 
emerges. Out of early scholasticism were developed the first universities: Bologna 
(1088), Paris (c. 1150), Oxford (1167), Palencia (1208), Cambridge (1209). The 
university appears as the institutionalized embodiment of liberal education, the 
instantiation of the rationale of the Doctrine of Signs. Note that in parts of the world 
where a semiotic consciousness was not entrenched the university did not emerge, 
such as in Eastern Europe, or did emerge but did not endure, such as in the Islamic 
world. These Lebenswelten developed their intellectual endeavours by different 
structures. The Byzantine world, however, had its own various impressive thinkers 
in between early Patristics and modernity, some of whose works are highly relevant 
for semiotics, but unfortunately bearly known at all to semioticians
7
.  
 Starting with early modernity – Locke and Descartes – philosophy draws 
towards mind-dependent ontology, by identifying being with idea (e.g. Deely 2001a, 
2009). This ontological stand reached its utmost expression with Kant. I argue that 
the absence of a semiotic consciousness in modern philosophy determined a gradual 
detachment from liberal education in favour of instructional education in the 
schooling institutions. The present thesis places liberal education in opposition to 
instructional education (such as presented in Davydov 2008). Modern society, driven 
by modern philosophy, tends to instruct its individuals, through its educational 
system, to support the society’s means of production. Arguably, an example of the 
orientation of higher education away from liberal education and towards instruction 
is the growing similarity between university and corporation. Naomi Klein offers 
such an example, as she noticed that the University is adopting the Lebenswelt of a 
different institution – the corporation: 
                                                          
7
Literature that approaches the history of ideas via semiotics, including the most comprehensive work 
in this area, Deely’s Four Ages of Understanding, lacks a thorough study of important authors for 




“I had been doing some research on university campuses and had begun to 
notice that many of the students I was meeting were preoccupied with the inroads 
private corporations were making into their public schools. They were angry that 
adds were creeping into cafeterias, common rooms, even washrooms; that their 
schools were diving into exclusive distribution deals with soft-drink companies 
and computer manufacturers, and that academic studies were starting to look 
more and more like market research.” (Klein 2000, p. xxxviii) 
The corporation, arguably a postmodern institution, is, nevertheless built on a 
strong modern philosophy, being the inheritance of industrialization – a modern 
society per excellence. Therefore, such cases show the deviation away from liberal 
education that the University institution witnessed under modern philosophy. For his 
rediscovery of the pre-modern Doctrina Signorum and its systematization, Deely 
proposes Peirce as the first postmodern philosopher (Deely 2001a, 2009). From this 
perspective, a theory of learning developed on the basis of Peirce’s semiotics will be 
a postmodern educational philosophy which should implicitly re-establish liberal 
education.  University education has become more and more focused on teaching 
skills and crafts, generally preparing students for a job market – a particular semiosic 
structure of the capitalist Lebenswelt. This is a narrowly utilitarian education, not 
liberal. This turn in education can be understood as a result of the turn from a 
semiotic to a non-semiotic philosophy.  
If liberal education endured for a while in the non-semiotic modernism, it 
was because of a conservatism that characterizes educational institutions. This 
conservatism is easily justified: capital was gained through the work of universities. 
The university was a vital organ and its research a vital function for the well-being of 
the state.  
There are examples of liberal education projects during modernity. There is 
the case, for instance, of the British analytic school of philosophy of education, the 
main exponents of which are Richard S. Peters and Paul H. Hirst. Peters and Hirst 
mark the beginning of an analytic philosophy of education, starting in the late 1950s. 
Due mostly to their work the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain was 
founded in 1965. This school’s core approach consists in the conceptual analysis of 
issues that are relevant for education. Their arguments aimed at developing a liberal 
curriculum (Hirst 1974, p. 35) as an endeavour of free thinking, in contrast to the 
mere achievement of skills: 
“Whatever else an educated person is, he is one who has some understanding 
of something. He is not just a person who has know-how or a knack.” (Peters in 
Peters, Hirst and Dearden (eds) 1972, p. 3-4). 
As an attempt at developing a project of liberal education, this school has 
advanced some views which are similar to those which the present work is claiming. 
For instance, it brings an awareness of the importance of the personal character of 
educational activities, besides the brute delivering of established information: 
“Teachers, it is argued should not regard their pupils just as potential 
recipients of knowledge and skill; they should enter into personal relationship with 
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them. […] Education is not just a matter of the meeting of minds; it is a process of 
personal encounter.” (Hirst, Peters, p. 88) 
That teaching and learning are a personal endeavour is one of the main 
claims of this monograph (see Chapters 5 and 7). However, there are some essential 
differences between Hirst and Peters’ account of personality. From a Peircean 
perspective a “meeting of minds” is a ‘personal encounter’. The mind is not a 
blackbox, but a phenomenon constituted of all the components of the self. All the 
more, at least in the case of humans, the self consists in a person (Chatper 5). This 
difference results in contradictory conclusions. For example, for Peters and Hirst a 
punishment imposed by the teacher on the pupils can be a justified conclusion 
safeguarding the learning process: 
“The view which a teacher has of his pupils as learners should, therefore, 
provide a thread of unity which runs through a whole range of his dealings with them 
– varrying from conversations with them about their visit to the cinema to having to 
punish them in order to safeguard the conditions necessary for learning to proceed.” 
(Hirst, Peters, p. 89-90) 
No matter how this issue is further tackled, if punishment of this sort is 
understood as a justifiable act, an asymmetry in the teacher-student relation is 
assumed. The application of Peirce’s theory of evolution to education completely 
excludes such asymmetry and the practice of punishment (Chapter 7, CP CP 5.51). 
On the Peircean account punishment is not educational. It is explained as an 
intermediary obstacle, a symptom of a semiosically immature personal relation (a 
matter of Secondness), perhaps oftenly occurring, but not as a conclusion 
(Interpretant). Also, it can be practiced by both teacher or student, not only by the 
teacher. The teacher-student relation should not be an assymetrical power relation. 
There are also other fundamental differences to the educational philosophy of 
Hirst and Peters. Their attempt can be seen as the result of an academic institutional 
inertia demonstrated by the understanding of education as “knowledge industry” (p. 
4), a typical view for modern western culture. It differs fundamentally from a 
semiotic account of liberal education and from the educational philosophy developed 
in the present work. Peters and Hirst’s notion of objective, the concept that  ought to 
offer perspective to education, is the outcome of modern dualist and essentialist 
philosophy. While, as I shall explain, Peirce’s teleological semiotics accounts for an 
organic evolution of science and education (Chapter 4), where the system’s telos is 
set and continuously, cyclically redefined from within, Peters and Hirst’s notion of 
objective of education is underpinned by the givenist assumption that education has 
some universally established defining features.  
Also, this analytical approach draws clear distinctions between knowledge, 
belief and understanding. They stem from the typically modern understanding of 
concept as something pertaining to mind, where mind is an inner psychological 
feature, detached from the external world of an organism, which can only reflect 
reality:  
 “Indeed there can be effective thinking only when the outcome of mental 
activity can be recognised and judged by those who have the appropriate skills and 
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knowledge, for otherwise the phrase has no significant application.” (Hirst and 
Peters, 1970, p. 35) 
On a semiotic account mental activity is a form of semiosis and, as such 
cannot be separated from non-mental; it is interpretation, which resulted from 
adaptation. This analytical approach is, not surprisingly, bounded to an anti-iconic 
philosophy by assuming a dichotomy between concept, the tool of the rational mind, 
and image: 
 “What is a concept? It obviously is not an image.” (Peters in Peters, Hirst, 
Dearden (eds), p. 3) 
 Therefore, on this account, education is an endeavour suitable only in the 
realm of the concepts of mind, which can be analysed. Education would not apply to 
non-human animals or to “primitive tribes”, cultures where no proper knowledge 
could be found (p. 4).  
 Nevertheless, even if this account of liberal education founded on modern 
analytical philosophy is dominated by dualism and essentialism, it has the merit of 
entrenching a tradition of British philosophy of education. As such, it led to research 
that detached from both modern dualism and analytic philosophy. Examples of 
contemporary researchers from the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 
environment that prove that this school detached from modern solipsist thought and 
dualism are inter alia Paul Standish, Andrew Stables and Gert Biesta. Arguably, the 
present work was written within the influence of this academic environment. 
Despite modern attempts at developing a liberal curriculum, once the 
semiotic consciousness faded away from the educational Lebenswelt, philosophy of 
education lost the rationale of its liberal principle and the university had to change its 
way of being. However, insofar as semiotics underpinned liberal education, a return 
to liberal education might be promoted through a re-emergence of semiotics. This is 
possible now, given education’s recent rediscovery of semiotics. The present thesis 
will only develop a Peircean semiotic theory of learning and does not aim at 
analysing the Lebenswelt of university. Nevertheless, the development that it brings 
permits this possibility: a Peircean theory of learning should offer the conceptual 
apparatus to analyse educational institutions as Lebenswelt. It will be a mereological 
analysis method, comparing signifying parts (diagrams) of the Lebenswelt among 
themselves and with the whole system. This should prove to be an useful prognosis 
method: once the educational institution and system are understood as Lebenswelt 
then the direction of an educational institution can be predicted to some extent. Most 
important is that the intimate compatibility between philosophy of education and 
semiotics was rediscovered and developed, providing new insights that were not yet 
achieved in medieval semiotics. I will argue that the switch from the present 
dominating functionalist education to liberal education consists in a switch from an 
attitude to teaching and learning that is focused on instruction to an attitude which 
regards free discovery to be the essential element of teaching and learning. This 
switch can be generated by a semiotic philosophy of education. The semiotic concept 
of icon is necessary for a semiotic educational theory that regards learning as free 
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discovery. The icon is a central concept in Peirce’s semiotics. The next section 
introduces the Icon concept. 
 
C. The Icon in semiotics 
 
 In section B it was explained that semiotics was developed theoretically first 
by the Patristics, who had a certain inclination towards understanding the world as 
sign, a tendency inherited from the Apostolic method of allegoresis (e.g. the 
typological relations between Old Testament and New Testament texts). For 
example, the Patristics often shown an understanding of the unperceivable in a 
relation of likeness to the perceivable: these are the seeds of the semiotic 
consciousness. The Icon has been generally understood as the sign that signifies due 
to similarity (likeness) and it is therefore defined in contrast to purely conventional 
signs. In Peirce’s semiotics the Icon has a central role in apprehension:  
“For a great distinguishing property of the icon is that by the direct 
observation of it other truths concerning its object can be discovered than those 
which suffice to determine its construction. Thus, by means of two photographs a 
map can be drawn, etc. Given a conventional or other general sign of an object, to 
deduce any other truth than that which it explicitly signifies, it is necessary, in all 
cases, to replace that sign by an icon. This capacity of revealing unexpected truth 
is precisely that wherein the utility of algebraical formulae consists, so that the 
iconic character is the prevailing one.” (CP 2.279) 
The physiology of arguments itself is intelligible because it has an iconic syntax 
(further developed in Chapter 5). With this consideration, the Icon obviously plays a 
central role in a Peircean learning theory. In this section I will introduce the concept 
of signification by means of similarity that Peirce picked up from his semiotic 
forerunners. 
Throughout the history of semiotics there are two principle foci that the discipline 
requires: defining the sign and classifying signs according to their criteria of 
signification. Classifying is necessary because once the criteria of signification and 
the relations among the criteria are established the way in which signs are used is 
elucidated. Among the many criteria and many classifications developed a certain 
dichotomy is often present: the dichotomy between natural and conventional signs. 
There are some signs which do not need convention (such as the case of the female 
firefly’s mating signalization explained in Stjernfelt 2014) – be it cultural, political, 
juridical, technical, or other kinds of convention. There are other signs, essential for 
the life of many species, that are conventional. For instance, the first famous 
classification of signs, belonging to St Augustine, developed in De Doctrina 
Christiana divides signs into natural (naturalia) and given (data). The criterion for 
this division is intentionality. Natural signs are not intentional, such as the cases of 
smoke signifying fire or a footprint signifying the passing by of an animal. Given 
signs are intentional – such is the case of speech. The distinction between non-
conventional and conventional is not clear here yet, but it is remarkable that natural 
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signs tend to be non-conventional while given signs tend to be conventional. This 
natural/given signs distinction does not necessarily qualify St Augustine’s semiotics 
as dualist, since both of these modes of signification fall under the same category of 
phenomena – the sign, which is relational being. The dualism of St Augustine’s 
semiotics is still debated (Deely 2009). 
In Peirce’s taxonomy of signs the signs that signify immediately, naturally, 
without convention pass by the name of Icons. The term is of Greek origin, εικών 
(eikon).  
Perhaps Peirce was not even thoroughly knowledgeable about these authors in 
particular, but the moment in the development of semiotics when the term εικών was 




 centuries). Eikon 
was defined as a representation by means of likeness, in contrast to symbol, and the 
acceptance of the possibility of purely iconic signification justifies a realist doctrine. 
As a text can signify a historical narrative because the text is like the narrative, in the 
same way a depiction can signify a historical narrative. Thus, since a text and an 
image can refer to the same object in the same way there is no semiotic distinction 
between text and image – they are both icons:  
“A true “icon” claimed to be something essentially different from a 
“symbol.” It had to be a representation of something real, and a true and accurate 
representation. A true icon had to be, in the last resort, a historic picture.” 
(Florovsky, 1950, p. 92) 
The main authors who accounted for this understanding of εικών are St John of 
Damascus, St Theodore the Studite, and Patriarch Nikephoros. Their adversaries, 
from a philosophical point of view, were the adversaries of Peirce: idealists. The 
arguments against the use of Icons came from neoplatonism, not Hebraic scholarship 
as it is often thought (cf. Florovsky 1950, Lock 1997). While Peirce labelled his own 
doctrine as extreme scholastic realism, the argument for the use of Icons was also 
“bound to be some sort of historic realism” (Florovsky 1950, p. 92). Therefore, the 
sides of this debate were nominalists – refuting the relevance of icons on account of 
their ontological uncertainty – and realists – embracing descriptions in terms of 
likeness. The semiotic main argument of the theologians of the time that defended 
the veneration of Icons in the Christian Church was that without an iconic form of 
signification not even conventional signification would be possible. For instance, 
Charles Lock sums up St John of Damascus’ argument by paraphrasing him thus: 
“Either accept these [icons], or get rid of those [Gospels]...” (1997, p. 10) 
Conventional signification, such as speech and written text, is here argued 
possible only due to icons that offer the ground for intelligibility. This idea is built 
upon the earlier Fathers’ explanation that reality itself would not be intelligible 
without analogy
8
. The same is stated clearly in Peirce: 
                                                          
8
Andreopoulos (2006) noticed a difference between two hermeneutical methods: (1) 
anagogy,employed in the Christian practice of veneration of icons on the basis of allegoresis, and (2) 
analogy, mere representation due to similarity, a parallelism. However, this distinction is not relevant 
for the present semiotic developments. 
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“The meanings of words ordinarily depend upon our tendencies to weld 
together qualities and our aptitudes to see resemblances, or, to use the received 
phrase, upon associations by similarity; while experience is bound together, and 
only recognisable, by forces acting upon us, or, to use an even worse chosen 
technical term, by means of associations by contiguity.” (CP 3.419) 
Thus, in Peirce’s case the concepts of similarity and continuity are inter-
dependable. Together, similarity and continuity constitute reality – the reality of 
infinite possibilities, which is the ground for what is generally termed reality. This 
idea will be further explored in the next chapters. 
It is already obvious that this account of Icon does not limit this sign type to 
sensory or mental images, as modality is not its defining character. The Icon is not 
simply an image of something. The image is rather a subtype of Icon. Another 
previous account that clearly posits the essential role of similarity in conceiving the 
intelligible world is the 16
th
 century classification of signs of Petrus Fonsecus. 
Fonsecus distinguished between formal signs, which form cognition, and 
instrumental signs, which consist in the further use of formal signs. Fonsecus’ formal 
signs mostly coincide with St Augustine’s natural signs, but with his definition 
Fonsecus also stated that cognition is formed by similarity (similitude): 
“Formal signs are similitudes or certain forms (species) of things signified 
inscribed within the cognitive powers, by means of which the things signified are 
perceived. Of this sort is the similitude which the spectacle of a mountain 
impresses upon the eyes, or the image which an absent friend leaves in another’s 
memory, or again the picture one forms of something which he has never seen. 
These signs are called “formal,” because they form and as it were structure the 
knowing power.” (Petrus Fonsecus, 1564: lib I, cap VIII in Deely, 1982, p. 51) 
Fonsecus’ instrumental sign is St Augustine’s concept of given sign – a sign 
conveying more than the formation of knowledge, a value such as aesthetic or 
scientific, a cultural, perhaps even linguistic sign. These signs can occur only on the 
basis of an existing formal sign: 
“Instrumental signs are those which, having become objects for knowing 
powers, lead to cognition of something else. Of this sort is the track of an animal 
left in the ground, smoke, a statue, and the like. For a track is a sign of the animal 
which made it: smoke the sign of an unseen fire: a statue finally is a sign of 
Caesar or someone else.” (Petrus Fonsecus, 1564: lib I, cap VIII in Deely, 1982, 
p. 51) 
Thus, according to Fonsecus, similarity is the basis of cognition and 
representation. The formal and instrumental signs are not in a relation of dichotomy, 
but rather of co-extensiveness: the latter develop on the former. This is as well the 
crux of Peirce’s semiotics and it is therefore of essential importance for a theory of 
learning. Signification is continuous: a symbol does not cease to be an icon, but 
rather it is a further development upon an icon. This further development makes it 
essentially more complex than the icon, but it does not do away with the basic iconic 
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character which evoked its possibility of signification in the first place. The icon, for 
Peirce, is the only sign that can be a predicate. To explain to someone is to predicate 
within her world of resemblances: 
„The only way of directly communicating an idea is by means of an icon; 
and every indirect method of communicating an idea must depend for its 
establishment upon the use of an icon. Hence, every assertion must contain 
an icon or set of icons, or else must contain signs whose meaning is only 
explicable by icons. The idea which the set of icons (or the equivalent of a set 
of icons) contained in an assertion signifies may be termed the predicateof 
the assertion.” (CP 2.278) 
The concept of Icon plays a crucial role in Peirce’s semiotics, therefore. 
Peircean scholars have only recently begun to understand the icon’s place in Peirce’s 
work. Actually, it is with a certain switch of attention from conventional signs to 
iconic signs that semiotics makes a step towards understanding Peirce’s philosophy 
in its own terms, as a realist semiotics and not as a nominalist or linguistic semiotics. 
The hypothesis of Iconicity, consisting in that icons suffice for signification to occur 
and that more complex signification needs an iconic ground, also supports the 
doctrine of suprasubjective reality. Peirce gives a hint in this direction by proposing 
a doctrine of physical-psychological parallelism. This parallelism is iconic, namely 
the psychical is like the physical. A similar idea of parallelism, but applied only to 
text analysis was noted earlier in the method of allegoresis used in the interpretation 
of Scripture, which is here proposed as a theoretical starting point for iconicity 
grounded semiotics. This parallelism actually occurs between an Innenwelt and an 
Umwelt – the Umwelt serves as an iconic ground for the Innenwelt, the two being 
inseparable but distinguishable parts of a living organism. In the same way, while the 
psychical is different from the physical, the physical is the iconic ground for the 
psychical. The psychical is contained by the physical, but the two are nevertheless 
independent in some regard from the other: 
“Yet as to there being nothing in the physical universe that corresponds to 
a given psychical phenomenon, the doctrine of parallelism itself disavows that 
opinion. Better let us say that in the present state of physical theory the peculiarity 
of redness finds no definite explanation. It would be an illogical presumption to 
say that it never can be explained. Redness, though a sensation, does not in the 
percept proclaim itself as such. At any rate, whether the psychical can be directly 
observed or not, no linguist, ethnologist, nor historian -- no psychologist, even, in 
an unguarded moment – but will agree that his science rests very largely, if not 
quite entirely, upon physical facts.” (CP 1.254) 
Both conventional and iconic signs play a crucial role in the biological realm, 
the signifying structures of the Universe, but, from this point of view, it is strictly 
due to iconic signs that other types of signification become possible. Frederik 
Stjernfelt identified a certain ‘iconic turn’ within semiotics, taking place in the 
1990s, marked by Umberto Eco’s new take on Peirce in Kant and the Platypus: 
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“One of the results of the iconic or phenomenological turn of semiotics 
during the recent decades is that its close affiliation with the Linguistic Turn is 
weakening. Thus, linguistics ceases to be the model science of semiotics, even if 
language, as an object, of course, remains a core issue for semiotics. Language 
appears as the most central of many cognitive and communicative tools of man, 
and semiotics – as indicated by the predicate “cognitive” in cognitive semiotics – 
must base itself on the study [of] all such tools. This implies the empirical 
connection of semiotics to all aspects of cognitive science (from sociology over 
psychology to neuroscience) – and the conceptual connection of semiotics to 
epistemology, philosophy of science, and ontology.” (in Bundgaard and Stjernfelt, 
p. 232) 
Therefore, the iconic turn has a crucial role in the conceptualisation of semiotics 
as a discipline, an academic Lebenswelt in itself, distinct from, for instance, 
linguistics. The rationale of the present thesis is to develop an iconic turn semiotic 
educational theory. 
Thus, if the foundation of any predication is similarity, the present Peircean 
Theory of Learning regards learning as a discovery of similarities. 
 
D. Learning as discovery 
 
If natural evolution had to adapt to structures of signification (see section A of 
the present chapter and Stjernfelt 2011, 2014) and living beings learned to re-cognize 
signs then culture is a semiosic result on the stage of evolution – evolution’s 
interpretation of the natural world. Kull (in Bundgaard and Stjernfelt 2009 and 
Emmeche and Kull 2011) accounted that categorization, which is knowledge 
acquisition, or rather the integration of signification within a web of signs, is based 
on recognition. Living beings discover their Umwelten and within their Umwelten 
various signs that they could use, that they actually live by. This is the process which 
evokes the relation of similarity: 
“Categorisation is what all living beings do and what organises them; 
categorisation is based on recognition processes that are inevitable for organisms; 
speciation and perceptual categorisation are analogical in their mechanism. This is 
in the nature and origin of species – that species is a self-keeping category per se; 
that species occur because the continuous variability in a communicative 
population is unstable; that biological species is the same kind of category as any 
semiosic category (Kull 1992). Thus, what we have here is an explanation of the 
origin of qualitative differences, or a general mechanism that makes differences, 
or a process from which the relation of similarity emerges. This leads also to a 
general definition of semiotics as a study of qualitative diversity.” (Kull in 
Bundgaard and Stjernfelt, p. 116) 
The Icon is the only sign that can be a predicate because it is the sign “from 
which information may be derived” (CP 1.309, see also CP 2.314). If the Icon, 
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signification by similarity that is, is the only sign that can be used as a predicate then 
learning consists in a discovery of similarities. The claim is, surprising as it may 
seem, that similarity evokes qualitative diversity. 
The recent orientation that educational studies have taken towards semiotics is 
not a mere coincidence. The contemporary semiotician can now observe a structural 
coherency of this evolution of institutionalized liberal education, within the much 
longer, broader and general evolution of life: evolution itself had to come about with 
the phenomenon of learning. The discovery that life forms benefit from learning 
promoted systematized learning, first on a geological timescale and then on a 
historical timescale. Systematized learning on a historical timescale is called 
education. Living beings became better at re-cognizing their Umwelt, expanding the 
dimensions of their significant world, discovering new significations and predicating 
with them. To predicate is not merely to use, as explained by von Uexküll: our vital 
functions are distinct from our utensils (things that we use) that come to our aid. 
Semiosis is vital and predication is a form of semiois. Of course, using instruments is 
also a form of semiosis, but it is only a subcase of predication. Learning to use a 
hammer to hammer nails, a pen to write, to place a stone so as to build something 
consists in discovering certain predications of an icon or a set of icons. The type of 
semiosis that allows the use of a stone as a part of a building or a pavement is the 
same type of semiosis that allows the use of the stone as a weapon. The various uses 
of a carrier of meaning are different interpretations which stem from different 
adaptations to different environments. One discovers certain qualities of a potential 
carrier of meaning in certain conditions.  
This explains creativity as well. Creative acts consist in discovering useful 
similarities which until their discovery were obscured, probably by the discoverer’s 
own Umwelt. A new discovery of similarities triggers the reshaping of an entire 
Umwelt: this is a re-cognition. Thus biosemiotics proves to be very relevant for 
education studies. The account of learning as discovery of similarities has 
consequences in all important issues of education, such as creativity, intuition, and 
evaluation, generating an entire epistemology of education. Stjernfeltadds that banal 
remarks as well as the most impressive achievements of human knowledge consist in 
discoveries of similarities:  
“The fact that it has never before been asserted that this orange on the 
table before me is similar in shape to the moon (given a certain granularity of 
similarity classes), might cause sensible souls to see me as a genius for 
creating metaphors, but, modestly, it seems strange that this similarity should 
be something created by me. I merely discover (no great effort) this similarity 
by applying a certain tertium comparationis (a circle, give or take a certain 
rate of deformation). In rare cases, of course, it may take great pains to 
establish a new complicated tertium comparationis to see a similarity 
(Newton discovering the similarity between the movement of the apple and 
of the heavenly bodies, Eliot discovering the similarity between cruelty and 
the growth of April flowers)” (Stjernfelt, 2007, p. 57) 
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Thus, if learning consists in discovery of similarities, the relation between 
semiosis in general and the semiosis that consists in the use of tools is the same as 
the relation between liberal education and instruction. Using tools is a particular case 
of discovery of similarities and instruction is a particular case of learning (discovery 
of similarities). Instruction proceeds much easier on the foundation of a genus: 
learning to play an instrument in a certain style is facilitated if the student knows 
musical theory (the liberal art classically understood as the application of arithmetic) 
and musical theory is easier to learn if the student knows arithmetic (the first liberal 
art of the quadrivium). Of course, semiotics aims at explaining much more: the 
learner will perform much better if that certain use of that particular instrument fits 
as signification in her web of signs. Signification (semiosis) is infinite and therefore 
this match (or mismatch) cannot be quantified, but up to a certain extent it can be 
described in terms of signification. A teacher can help the learning just in the way in 
which another fellow learner can help his colleague. Teaching is not instruction, but 
has the same semiosic structure as learning. This argument, that teaching is a form of 
learning is made by St Augustine in the previously mentioned De Doctrina 
Christiana, when he introduced to concept of sign and its necessity for educational 
philosophy. The teacher and the learner discover together, actually, discovering each 
other, or each others’ structures of signification. Discovery is also a revelation, 
because by it not only is something unknown made known to a knowing subject, but 
the discovered object, being genuinely understood, can also be further on revealed to 
others. It is all part of the same learning process. When defining learning as free 
discovery of similarities a liberal account of education, where learning happens 
freely, is implied: 
“Thus, I tend to think it is a duty for scientists to support free speech: the 
most liberal exchange of signs compatible with democracy.” (Stjernfelt in 
Bundgaard and Stjernfelt, p. 232) 
 
E. The relevance and aim of a semiotically grounded education 
 
Thus, I argue that the switch from the present dominating modern, mechanical, 
education to liberal education consists in a switch from an attitude to teaching and 
learning that is focused on instruction to an attitude which regards free discovery to 
be the essential element of teaching and learning. This switch can be generated by a 
semiotic philosophy of education. This is possible now, given education’s recent 
rediscovery of semiotics. The rediscovery of the intimate compatibility between 
philosophy of education and semiotics proves to be essential. 
Approaching education in semiotic terms does not explain the lack of success of 
the student as a cognitive impediment (as psychology tended to) or social 
disfavouring, a lack of capital, a lack of social power, the belonging to certain social 
strata (as sociology tended to). Semiotics does not acknowledge such a crude 
account as the failure of the learner. What is taught by the teacher never coincides 
perfectly with what is learned by the student. On a semiotic account, learning is 
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interpreting. An immediate conclusion is that genuine learning, whatever might it be, 
is possible only in a free environment. If earning something new consists in a 
discovery of similarities it consists in the placing of a Subject in a newly discovered 
relation of signification with a Predicate, and this relation is always hidden for the 
teacher. This stand, that can set the direction of research in semiotics of education, 
can only be valid by accepting that the learner does not only learn to handle a 
language (a code), but she is learning the general doctrine of signs (logic), which 
occurs wherever there is life (Kull 2005). Thus, the teacher should offer the learner 
the optimal experiences for learning so that the learner develops her logical 
(semiotic) capacities for handling real-world events. The learning process of logic is 
immanent, occurring naturally, as evolution perfected it over time, being any human 
person’s capability of predicating (discovering similarities). What it is not immanent 
and should be learned is that which is valued socio-culturally. 
Two types of performances are therefore expected from the learner: (1) to 
discover the similarities that led to her understanding the web of signs evolving as 
society and (2) discovering similarities which society has not yet discovered, thus 
contributing to the continuous evolutionary progress. This is the previously 
mentioned concept of re-cognition: the learner has to re-cognize the similarity 
between her inherent web of signs (herself) and the yet unknown object (what is 
taught). By assuming these two performances from the students there is no more 
justification for a strict distinction between teaching and learning. Teaching and 
learning are bound together as a phenomenon of interpretation. Therefore there is 
only one phenomenon which we might divide into two concepts (teaching and 
learning), arguably for the sake of conceptual development; ‘teaching and learning’ 
can be more simply be called ‘learning,’ or ‘life,’ or ‘local plurality.’ On a semiotic 
account one necessarily implies the other. If learning is free interpretation under the 
form of discovery then the teacher does not know what the student is about to 
discover. Learning, in this semiotic sense, is a continuous abduction-deduction-
induction phenomenon and it is in all cases unique and the chance of an identical 
repetition of the same learning phenomenon is impossible, since there are no chances 
of repeating an identical situation of sign relations. Every living organism is 
semiotically distinct (a biologist might argue that two zebras are physiologically 
equal, but semiotically they will never coincide). To be semiotically distinct is to be 
unique and being unique means learning in a unique way. If organisms are unique 
(despite their similarities and even partial coincidences of Umwelt) then it does not 
mean that reality is schizophrenic and communication impossible. The uniqueness of 
living organisms is possible in a local plurality. This is equivalent with saying that 
similarity makes communication possible. Nöth and Santaella (2011) explain that on 
a Peircean account the relation of identity would make communication superfluous 
or unnecessary. The relation of similarity implies a degree of difference. However, in 
the context of Peircean semiotics, the relation of similarity is relevant for learning, 
not that of difference. The student and the teacher are involved in the same 
phenomenon, the same local plurality, as they are both learning. Thus, the argument 
for learning that which is intrinsically valuable, the principle of liberal education, 
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flows naturally from a semiotic perspective. A craft cannot be taught at all, the skills 
of hammering, knitting or riding a bike are learned only in an accident of 
signification, due to an experience of the learner (this will be thoroughly explained in 
Part II). 
To develop a semiotic framework that investigates the semiosic phenomenon of 
learning and the role of similarity in learning, in the next chapter I explain Peirce’s 











































Charles S. Peirce’s list of categories and taxonomy of signs 
 
In the previous chapter some concepts that are central for developing a 
Peircean Theory of Learning – such as iconicity, suprasubjectivity, biosemiotics and 
semiotic evolution – have been introduced. The present chapter looks at how Charles 
Peirce picked some of these concepts and built a semiotic philosophy at the center of 
which stands nothing else but what Peirce found to be the principle of learning, 
namely diagrammatic reasoning.  
Peirce’s work is vast and rich but still we do not possess an organized 
collection of it. Now, after a century since Peirce, the interpretation of his writings is 
still subject to controversy. I consider that a key for understanding Peirce’s 
philosophy is acknowledging Peirce’s own bibliographical sources, reason for which 
I considered the previous chapter necessary. The present thesis accepts a certain 
reading of Peirce that is found in Deely (2001) and Stjernfelt (2007). Seen through 
this perspective, Peirce’s pragmaticistic philosophy appears as asuprasubjective 
realism, an extreme scholastic realism, to put it in Peirce’s own terms (CP 5.470). 
This reading of Peirce fits in a large extent with the late Eco’s re-reading of Peirce 
marked by Kant and the Platypus (1997). Since throughout Peirce’s writings it can 
be noticed that for him education is a method with the only purpose of serving the 
evolution of science, which serves the evolution of signs in general, life in itself that 
is, I argue that in Peirce’s semiotics there is an implicit philosophy of education. 
This implicit philosophy of education that Peircean semiotics implies is probably 
inherited from the scholastics’ Doctrine of Signs, which, as it was argued in the 
previous chapter, had the rationale of developing liberal education. The purpose of 
the present thesis is to bring to light this philosophy of education so that, with its 
own semiotic means, to serve education explicitly. It will constitute, more focused 
than semiotics general, a Peircean Theory of Learning. 
 
A. Peirce’s categories 
 
Peirce has the merit of rediscovering the doctrine of signs of the medievals in 
the second part of the 19
th
 century (Deely, 2001). His philosophy can be called 
triadic, for the three categories that he discovered and used. Besides having proved 





 degree graph (a triad) is irreducible to 1
st
 (monads) or 2
nd
 (dyads) degree 
graphs, Peirce found three principles that seem to appear in most philosophical 
systems, three principles that he used to explain several aspects of the Universe: 
“Three conceptions are perpetually turning up at every point in every theory 
of logic, and in the most rounded systems they occur in connection with one 
another. They are conceptions so very broad and consequently indefinite that they 
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are hard to seize and may be easily overlooked. I call them the conceptions of First, 
Second, Third. First is the conception of being or existing independent of anything 
else. Second is the conception of being relative to, the conception of reaction with, 
something else. Third is the conception of mediation, whereby a first and second 
are brought into relation.” (CP 6.32) 
On this three principles Peirce built his semiotics, a physiology of arguments 
as Stjernfelt described it (2007). Even though some are tempted to see in this the 
haste of following a somewhat naïve categorical schema, this physiology of 
arguments proves to be highly insightful and brings a revolution in philosophy by 
overcoming the typical dualisms that modern philosophy preached ever since Locke 
and Descartes (see Deely 2001, 2009). The physiology of arguments is the Universe 
suprasubjective – a Universe of mediations. It is a physiology because signs are 
natural phenomena, harmoniously interacting organically and it is a physiology of 
arguments because the argument is the fully developed sign, to which all signs tend
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and contribute to, in their interaction. Even though living beings encounter many real 
arguments in their experience, and arguments cannot be incomplete, as they are par 
excellence the completely evolved signs, the fully developed argument is, 
nevertheless, probably infinitely distant on the continuum of evolution according to 
Peirce. Arguably a typical conclusion for a 19
th
 century mathematician such as 
Peirce, this assumption justifies that since there is Truth and the search for Truth is 
not futile, but mandatory and beneficial, Truth will probably never be reached: 
“At any time, however, an element of pure chance survives and will remain 
until the world becomes an absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in 
which mind is at last crystallized in the infinitely distant future.” (CP 6.33) 
These words of Peirce encapsulate the rationale of education: education has 
the purpose of leading the mind towards this perfect system, to the point where 
perhaps mind and Truth coincide. The quintessence of Peirce’ pragmaticism is that 
there is Absolute, Perennial Truth, the Truth that philosophy has been thinking about 
as ἀλήθεια, but while the achievement of it is impossible actually the search for it is 
mandatory, this search being evolution (growth) itself. The features of the 
physiology of arguments are infinitely developing towards Truth, with every 
moment closer, but always infinitely distant. Thus, Peircean philosophy is neither 
idealist – there are no universal ideas whose vague emanations we are – nor skeptikal 
– the pursuit of truth is not futile, but, on the contrary, mandatory – and nor material 
– ideal reality does not stem from material reality. Ideas, material objects, 
psychological states, every such entity is a signifying phenomenon with the same 
ontological statues. Ontologically nothing prevails, nothing is prior or posterior. 
Even while Peirce’s semiotics can acknowledge that some phenomena are vague in 
themselves (Nöth & Santaella 2011), their ontological status is not diminished: they 
exist as vague as other things exist as clear. This evolution towards Truth is the 
principle that generates life, in the form of the manifestations of triadic relations, and 
                                                          
9
 Chapter 5 will develop further on the notion of physiology of arguments.  
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it is the principle that constitutes the purpose of life as well. Life occurred so that 
itcan know, so that someone can know the Universe, arguably the Universe’s way of 
knowing itself. Only in the service of this endeavor the idea of education first came 
about and at the service of this endeavor education has been institutionalized at a 
certain evolutionary stage. From this point of view, any other purpose, any other 
drive that education might have would corrupt it. The argument for liberal education 
it is thus clear. 
Thus, if these three categories – Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, as Peirce 
refers to them – best describe the Universe, there are three types of signs: the first, 
signifying a mere independent existence, the second, a signifying relation of two 
termini, and the third, a mediation, that is the habit connecting a mere independent 
existence and a dyadic relation. Any relation of signification consists in three termini 
– a First, a Second and a Third – or otherwise, if it would not contain three elements, 
it would be either a mere quality, either a mere individual existence, isolated from 
the physiology of arguments. The classification of signs does not stop at these three 
basic types, then, because a sign can signify in three different aspects: according to 
its First, according to its Second, and according to its Third. Peirce set the 
terminology for the First, the Second and the Third of a sign: the First of a sign is the 
Representamen, the Second is the Object and the Third is the Interpretant – the 
Interpretant is the result of the interpretation, of the action of signs, the conclusion 
namely. Hence, Peirce found nine (three times three) essential types of signs, three 
trichotomies: 
“Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as the sign in 
itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law; secondly, according 
as the relation of the sign to its object consists in the sign’s having some character 
in itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an 
interpretant; thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of 
possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason.” (CP 2.243) 
This does not mean that a sign is strictly one of these nine types, but that 
these nine types of signification reveal aspects of the sign’s signification. Stjernfelt 
remarked this: 
“As the sign consists of three components it comes hardly as a surprise that 
it may be analysed in nine aspects – every one of the sign’s three components may 
be viewed under each of the three fundamental phenomenological categories.” 
(2007, p. 25) 
The sign is the genuine triadic relation, that is, its three termini are irreducible 
and have their being only within the act of representation. The genuine triadic 
relation evokes an infinity of representation beyond itself; even if it is self-sufficient 
it inevitably produces signification ad infinitum: 
“A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, 
called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it 
46 
 
stands itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three 
members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus 
of dyadic relations. That is the reason the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a 
mere dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as the 
Representamen itself does. Nor can the triadic relation in which the Third stands be 
merely similar to that in which the First stands, for this would make the relation of 
the Third to the First a degenerate Secondness merely. The Third must indeed stand 
in such a relation, and thus must be capable of determining a Third of its own; but 
besides that, it must have a second triadic relation in which the Representamen, or 
rather the relation thereof to its Object, shall be its own (the Third’s) Object, and 
must be capable of determining a Third to this relation. All this must equally be true 
of the Third’s Thirds and so on endlessly; and this, and more, is involved in the 
familiar idea of a Sign; and as the term Representamen is here used, nothing more 
is implied. A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. Possibly there 
may be Representamens that are not Signs.” (CP 2.274) 
Peirce names the action occurring among the Representamen, Object and 
Interpretant semiosis: 
“All dynamical action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical, either 
takes place between two subjects [whether they react equally upon each other, or 
one is agent and the other patient, entirely or partially] or at any rate is a resultant of 
such actions between pairs. But by "semiosis" I mean, on the contrary, an action, or 
influence, which is, or involves, a coöperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its 
object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way 
resolvable into actions between pairs.” (CP 5.484) 
 
B. Division’s of signs 
 
The first trichotomy of signs, according to First significance, is the Qualisign-
Sinsign-Legisign triad, to which Peirce also refers as Tone-Token-Type. Peirce’s, at 
least at a first glance, strange terminology suggests that these types have to do with a 
quality, a singularity and a law. Like each of the three triads of sign types, the 
qualisign, sinsign and legisign are situated on a continuum of signification – this is 
why they constitute a trichotomy. Therefore, to understand Peirce’s divisions of 
signs it is needed to understand his controversial concept of continuity. The concept 
of continuity was a life-long concern for Peirce. After not being satisfied anymore 
with the broadly assumed continuity proposed by Cantor, and neither with the simple 
Kantian definition of continuity as “infinite divisibility” (CP 6.168), in the 1890s 
Peirce finally expressed his own account of continuity, the difference consisting in 
that according to Peirce a continuous set is never exhausted by its individual 
components (cf. Stjerfnel, 2007, Chapter I and Bellucci 2013, p. 186). A continuum 
does not diminish if constituting parts of it are extracted, because any constituent 
part of a continuum is indistinct within the continuum, and, therefore, something can 
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only be a part of a continuum potentially; if it were actually a part of a set, the set 
would cease to be a continuum, as interrupted by a component, by a “topical 
singularity”: 
“A continuum cannot be disarranged except to an insignificant extent. An 
instant cannot be removed. You can no more, by any decree, shorten a legal holiday 
by transferring its last instant to the work-day that follows that feast, than you can 
take away intensity from light, and keep the intensity on exhibition while the light is 
thrown into the ash-barrel. A limited line AB may be cut into two, AC and C’B, and 
its ends joined. C’ to A and C to B. That is to say, all this may be done in the 
imagination.” (CP 1.499) 
Returning to the first trichotomy of signs, Peirce defines these sign types as 
follows: 
“According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign, a Sinsign, 
or a Legisign. 
A Qualisign is a quality which is a Sign. It cannot actually act as a sign until 
it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign.” 
(CP 2.245) 
The Qualisign is a signifying quality. Such is the feeling of perceiving 
redness, or a noise. The Qualisign is vague and it is a limit case of signification. 
When such a sign is used it immediately evolves into a more complex sign, such as 
an Icon, or a Sinsign, which is the Second type of this trichotomy: 
“A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning “being only once,” as 
in single, simple, Latin semel,etc.) is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. 
It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or rather, 
several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and only form a sign 
through being actually embodied.” (CP 2.246) 
The Sinsign is an objectified dyad of qualities, such as perceiving red in 
contrast to blue. The Third of this trichotomy, termed Legisign, is a mediation of 
qualities. It embodies a convention: 
“A Legisign is a law that is a Sign. This law is usually established by men. 
Every conventional sign is a legisign [but not conversely]. It is not a single object, 
but a general type which, it has been agreed, shall be significant. Every legisign 
signifies through an instance of its application, which may be termed a Replica of 
it. Thus, the word „the” will usually occur from fifteen to twenty-five times on a 
page. It is in all these occurrences one and the same word, the same legisign. Each 
single instance of it is a Replica. The Replica is a Sinsign. Thus, every Legisign 
requires Sinsigns. But these are not ordinary Sinsigns, such as are peculiar 
occurrences that are regarded as significant. Nor would the Replica be significant if 
it were not for the law which renders it so.” (2.246) 




Thus, the sign in itself is: (1) as a mere quality, a Qualisign, (2) as an actual 
existent, a Sinsign, and (3) as a general law, or habit, a Legisign. 
The sign according to its Second, as according to its relation to its object, is: 
(1) as the sign’s character in itself, an Icon, (2) in its existential relation to the object, 
an Index, and (3) in relation to its interpretant, a Symbol. It is an important remark 
for the effort of understanding the phenomenon of learning according to Peirce that 
the criterion which is continuous within this trichotomy, keeping the Icon-Index-
Symbol trichotomy coherent, is similarity. The criteria which sets a trichotomy’s 
continuity is set by the First type of the trichotomy, in this case the Icon, which 
signifies due to similarity (likeness), as it is clear from Peirce’s own definitions: 
“According to the second trichotomy, a Sign may be termed an Icon, an 
Index, or a Symbol. 
An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue 
of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such 
Object actually exists or not. It is true that unless there really is such an Object, the 
Icon does not act as a sign; but this has nothing to do with its character as a sign. 
Anything whatever, be it quality, existent individual, or law, is an Icon of anything, 
in so far as it is like that thing and used as a sign of it.” (CP 2.247) 
A photograph can be an example of Icon: if somebody who has seen me 
before sees a photograph of me might think of me because of the resemblance 
between me and the colors imprinted on the paper constituting the photograph. If it 
has a reference, an Icon evolves into an Index: 
“An Index is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of 
being really affected by that Object. It cannot, therefore, be a Qualisign, because 
qualities are whatever they are independently of anything else. In so far as the Index 
is affected by the Object, it necessarily has some Quality in common with the 
Object, and it is in respect to these that it refers to the Object. It does, therefore, 
involve a sort of Icon, although an Icon of a peculiar kind; and it is not the mere 
resemblance of its Object, even in these respects which makes it a sign, but it is the 
actual modification of it by the Object.” (CP 2.248) 
The photograph is a good example of Index as well, because the imprinted 
color on the paper is a direct effect of a real state of affairs: I was sitting such a way, 
like in the photograph, in a certain place at a certain time, when light was imprinted 
on the film.As when one notices a mark on the ground and concludes that an animal 
of a particular shape and size passed by, in a certain direction, with a velocity 
inferred from the characters of the imprinted trace, in the same way light is imprinted 
on the film in the case of photography, which makes the Sign emerging from a 
photograph be directly affected by its Object – this is an Index. From an Index a 
Symbol can evolve: 
“A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a 
law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to 
be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus itself a general type or law, that 
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is, is a Legisign. As such it acts through a Replica. Not only is it general itself, but 
the Object to which it refers is of a general nature. Now that which is general has its 
being in the instances which it will determine. There must, therefore, be existent 
instances of what the Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by 
“existent,” existent in the possibly imaginary universe to which the Symbol refers. 
The Symbol will indirectly, through the association or other law, be affected by 
those instances; and thus the Symbol will involve a sort of Index, although an Index 
of a peculiar kind. It will not, however, be by any means true that the slight effect 
upon the Symbol of those instances accounts for the significant character of the 
Symbol.” (2.249) 
 The photography can very well be a Symbol, like the photography taken by 
Alfred Eisenstaedt on Victory over Japan Day of a sailor kissing a woman, in our 
socio-cultural environment, in our Lebenswelt, became a symbol for freedom. That 
something signifies means that it is used in a certain way (to use is a relation). A 
photograph can be the sense perceptible ground for anything. Actually, a brute, 
singular entity such as a photograph is a non-existent abstraction. When things come 
into being, that is into the physiology of arguments, they are themselves phenomena 
of signification, interacting with other signs. As in Peirce’s definition, anything can 
be an Icon of anything else as long as it is used in such a way according to a likeness. 
A photograph of me can very well be an Icon signifying, by means of similarity, a 
man, an animal, a feeling, stupidity, a rectangle, light, darkness, etc., all depending 
on how it is used. If a mathematics teacher grabs a photo of me to explain what a 
rectangle is, it works as a rectangle, if a photographer explains to his apprentice how 
light is imprinted on the film using a photograph of me, it signifies light and the 
natural phenomena involved. Of course, these exemplified signs work for the teacher 
in this way and the teacher can never know how the students are interpreting her 
examples. For instance, in the case of the mathematics teacher, one of the students 
might ignore the teacher’s explanations and her finger pointing to the four edges of 
the photograph and notice the imprinted colors so as to recognize and think about the 
person in the photograph. This is one of the strong points that semiotics, particularly 
this Peircean approach to learning, brings in the service of education: a strong 
consciousness that the taught sign can never perfectly coincide with the learned sign. 
As Peirce made it clear, the Symbol would not be possible without the Index, 
which in turn would not be possible without the Icon. Moreover, a less developed 
sign not only makes a more developed sign to be a real possibility, but, signs tend to 
develop: the web of signs evolves. Thus, Icons tend to become Indices, Symbols, etc. 
 In what regards the third trichotomy of signs, signification of Thirdness, 
which regards the Sign’s relation to its Interpretant, the Sign can be (1) a Rheme, 
which is a sign of possibility, (3) a Dicisign (or Proposition), if it is a sign of fact, or 
(3) an Argument, if it is a sign of reason. Peirce developed his whole semiotics as a 
logic based on the maxim of pragmaticism (which is explained thoroughly in 
Chapter 3), but this third trichotomy is particularly the trichotomy of sign types that 
describes logical operations. The Rheme is an Icon which is used as a predicate. 
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According to Peirce only Icons can be and implicitly are predicates. The Rheme 
describes how a predicate signifies in relation to its conclusion, its Interpretant. The 
Dicisign (dicent sign) is Peirce’s concept of proposition, the usual concept of 
proposition used in logic. Peirce’s logic (semiotics), like that of Frege, developed a 
concept of proposition which accepts the application of multiple subjects to a single 
predicate (Stjernfelt, 2011). The Argument is the Interpretant par excellence – a 
Third signification in its Third dimension, the general conclusion. This trichotomy 
explainshow the Subject-Predicate (S-P) structure, the proposition, is constituted and 
how it leads to argumentation. The propositionis here regarded in a 
phenomenological manner, not as the subject of semantics or linguistic syntax. This 
is where it becomes clear that the philosophical school that resembles Peirce’s 
semiotics in an essential way is phenomenology, particularly Husserl’s 
phenomenology. As Husserl was clear in expressing that logic is much broader than 
psychological logic and that a holistic approach to pure logic would be 
phenomenology, so Peirce clearly expressed that the subject of logic is not the 
subject of psychology, but of phenomenology. Husserl expressed the rationale of his 
Logical Investigations: 
“It [Logical Investigations] attempt[s] to show that the exclusively 
psychological  grounding of logic, to which our age ascribes so great a value, rests 
on a confusion of essentially distinct classes of problems, on presuppositions 
erroneous in principle concerning the character and the goals of the two sciences 
which are involved here – empirical psychology and pure logic.” (1913, p. 3) 
 Pure logic for Husserl is not restricted to the acquisition of knowledge by 
living organisms. Peirce assumes the same, a reason for which he is at times 
suspected of panpsychism, because logic supposes mind. Nevertheless, so stated 
Husserl as well: 
“The most essential theoretical foundations of logical technique are not to 
be found in the psychology of knowledge – although this too comes under 
consideration – but in pure logic.” (1913, p. 4) 
 When explaining his Rheme-Dicisign-Argument trichotomy, Peirce affirmed 
that logic is concerned with the concept of judgment while, like in Husserl’s case, 
not reducing logic to psychological logic. For Peirce the subject of logic is meaning 
(signification), and this discipline, logic, here also called semiotics, is investigated 
distinctively from psychology, since signification is independent of it being 
cognized. The sign has its character of sign independently of its reception by a 
knowing subject, even though it becomes a real sign when it is in actu, in its use. 
Signs, things that signify, find most clearly their logical characteristic in their 
relation to their Interpretant, to their conclusion that is. Even though a judgment, the 
subject of logic, is embodied as a cognition, its character as cognition is not defining 
it and it is not the subject of logic: 
“A judgment is the mental act by which the judger seeks to impress upon 
himself the truth of a proposition. It is much the same as an act of asserting the 
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proposition, or going before a notary and assuming formal responsibility for its 
truth, except that those acts are intended to affect others, while the judgment is only 
intended to affect oneself. However, the logician, as such, cares not what the 
psychological nature of the act of judging may be. The question for him is: What is 
the nature of the sort of sign of which a principal variety is called a proposition, 
which is the matter upon which the act of judging is exercised? The proposition 
need not be asserted or judged. It may be contemplated as a sign capable of being 
asserted or denied. This sign itself retains its full meaning whether it be actually 
asserted or not. The peculiarity of it, therefore, lies in its mode of meaning; and to 
say this is to say that its peculiarity lies in its relation to its interpretant.” (CP 2.252) 
That judgments require cognition is explained by the categorically 
phenomenological relation between cognition and judgement. A judgement is 
exercised through cognitions in the same way as any sign of Thirdness (e.g. 
Legisign) is exercised through Replicas which pertain to Secondness (e.g. Sinsigns). 
On this ground Peirce refuted Ribot’s physiological psychology, an early detachment 
of psychology from metaphysics: 
“Yet common sense will never admit that feeling can result from any 
mechanical contrivance; and sound logic refuses to accept the makeshift hypothesis 
that consciousness is an “ultimate” property of matter in general or of any chemical 
substance.” (W 8:15) 
Stjernfelt (2007) also approached and elaborated the compability between 
Peirce’s semiotics and Husserl’s phenomenology. In some of the following chapters 
this compatibility and its implications in education will be more closely investigated 
(Chapters 6 and 9). It is important to remark that phenomenology already is a 
popular approach to philosophy of education, while the same cannot be said about 
semiotics yet. The field of phenomenology of education has been broadly 
investigated (Peters, 2009) and both of Husserl’s disciples, Heidegger and Levinas, 
are common references in educational philosophy. 
Expressing it in Peircean terms, presented previously in this chapter, a 
cognition can be regarded as the Replica (or set of Replicas) of a judgment, if it were 
to regard the judgement as a Type. Thus, if the signification type that expresses 
logical operations is Thirdness, it is no surprise that the types that describe 
judgments, such is clearly the case of propositions and arguments, are to be found in 
the trichotomy which analyses the Sign in relation to its Interpretant. Below are 
Peirce’s definitions for these three types: 
 “According to the third trichotomy, a Sign may be termed a Rheme, a 
Dicisign or Dicent Sign (that is, a proposition or quasi-proposition), or an Argument. 
A Rheme is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of qualitative 
Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and such a kind of possible 
Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford some information; but it is not interpreted 
as doing so. 
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A Dicent Sign is a Sign, which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of actual 
existence. It cannot, therefore, be an Icon, which affords no ground for an 
interpretation of it as referring to actual existence. A Dicisign necessarily involves, 
as a part of it, a Rheme, to describe the fact which it is interpreted as indicating. But 
this is a peculiar kind of Rheme; and while it is essential to the Dicisign, it by no 
means constitutes it. 
An Argument is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of law. Or we 
may say that a Rheme is a sign which is understood to represent its object in its 
characters merely; that a Dicisign is a sign which is understood to represent its object 
in respect to actual existence; and that an Argument is a Sign which is understood to 
represent its Object in its character as Sign.” (CP 2.250 – 2.252) 
The Argument is a tendency of the world, since signs tend to evolve. This 
being the case, Peirce approached the knowing self as an evolving sign, a quest 
through labyrinths of meaning, having as telos the discovery of itself, or, more 
explicitly, the discovery of its own harmonious place within the web of signs. This 
account of the self has already been explored in edusemiotics by Stables who 
advanced a “sound understanding of living as semiosis” (2012, p. 1). 
The three thricotomies can be represented as a bidimensional matrix, its two 
dimensions being the categories describing the mode of signification – as according 
to how the sign is used. The diagram below describes this matrix: 
 
 Firstness Secondness Thirdness 
Firstness Qualisign Icon Rheme 
Secondness Sinsign Index Dicisign 
Thirdness Legisign Symbol Argument 
Figure 2 – Peirce’s taxonomy of signs 
 
The columns describe how the sign signifies categorically in itself and the 
horizontal lines describe how the sign signifies in relation to its three termini. 
According to the matrix, the sign evolves from up to down and from left to right 
(from Qualisign to Argument). Thus, a sign includes signs that in the diagram are 
represented above and left of itself. For instance, the Index includes an Icon, which 
includes a Qualisign. The Dicisign includes an Index, which functions as a Subject, 
which needs to include an Icon, which functions as a Predicate, which needs to 
include a Qualisign. When deconstructing a sign in this way the tendency, as 
represented in this diagram, is to include firstly the sign situated above and then the 
sign situated to the left. 
  
C. Signification and learning 
 
Beholding these three trichotomies it is obvious that for Peirce Firstness is 
the domain of qualities, Secondness that of individuals (single, actual, brute 
existents), and Thirdness that of laws – also referred to as generals, universals, habits 
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or tendencies. Tendencies are general and laws are nothing else but tendencies, the 
same as habits. The fully developed sign, the Argument, is a tendency of the world, 
since signs tend to evolve.  
This being the case, a Peircean Theory of Learning will approach the 
knowing self as an evolving sign (Chapter 5), a quest through labyrinths of meaning, 
having as telos the discovery of itself, or, more explicitly, the discovery of its own 
harmonious place within the web of signs. When one is learning astrophysics, or the 
Kantian categorical imperative, or learning to hammer nails, or wine tasting, and the 
same when one is learning to love, one is learning any of these in relation to the self, 
and thus in all these inquiries one is discovering herself, because what is occurring is 
the evolvement of the web of signs which the self is. The event of having learnt 
something integrates into the self a new web of significations, thus the self itself is 
restructured and redefined so as to fit the new meanings into a more comprehensive 
Interpretant. This expansion of the self towards a new Interpretant is the evolution of 
life, as it is the very diversification of quality, the realization of local plurality. In the 
present thesis this is termed re-cognition. 
Self-discovery and the exploration of the outer world are thus implicit one 
with the other. When two different human individuals are studying what appears to 
be the same content, say mechanics, they are learning different things, because it is 
impossible (or at least the probability of a coincidence is so small that any reasoning 
being will regard it impossible) for two different selves to discover the same signs 
even in the same Umwelt or Lebenswelt. The concept of force, as it is elaborated in 
classical mechanics cannot signify in the same way for someone who knows how to 
swim and for someone who does not. What happens when learning is that structures 
of signification (what needs be apprehended) have to settle on already existing 
structures of signification: a learner. In their interaction, these signs will find their 
own compatibility and the probability for this to happen in the same manner in two 
different cases is too small to be considered. Replicas are unique and unrepeatable 
but this does not imply that learning or the effort of teaching are futile. In this 
suprasubjective acceptance of the world, namely semiotics, it is admitted that both 
individuals and universals exist, individuals constituting the subjects of Secondness 
and universals those of Thirdness.  
Two physicians have two different understandings of force, but they 
understand each other’s discourse regarding this concept. Peirce explained how 
modes of signification are mingled in real experience. Actually, it is not the nine 
types of signs that one will encounter in her life experience, but Peirce advances ten 
classes of signs, in which the nine are logically (compatibly) mingled that are 
experienced within the physiology of arguments. It might seem surprising that the 
combinations of nine sign types result in ten classes, but this is the case between 
some combinations would be either superfluous, or impossible, or require another 
type in their composition. This is not the place to elaborate in detail on these ten 
classes; just for achieving a general awareness of the actions of signs within their 
physiology mentioning them will suffice. These classes are: Qualisign (needs be also 
an Icon and a Rheme in order to signify, e.g. “a feeling of “red” (CP 2.254)), Iconic 
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Sinsign (needs to incorporate a rheme, e.g. “an individual diagram” (CP 2.255)), 
Rhematic Indexical Sign (e.g. “a spontaneous cry” (CP 2.256)), Dicent Sinsign 
(implicitly incorporates an Index, e.g. “a weathercock” (CP 2.257)), Iconic Legisign 
(needs to incorporate a Rheme, e.g. “a diagram, apart from its factual individuality” 
(CP 2.258)), Rhematic Indexical Legisign (e.g. “a demonstrative pronoun” (CP 
2.259)), Dicent Indexical Legisign (e.g. “a street cry” (CP 2.260)), Rhematic Symbol 
(e.g. “a common noun” (CP 2.261)), Dicent Symbol (e.g. a proposition), and 
Argument. As I mentioned some sign type combinations would be either useless or 
impossible. For example, a Symbol contains a Legisign signification, so a Rhematic 
Symbolic Legisign coincides with the Rhematic Symbol. There are classes that are 
not considered, such as a Rhematic Iconic Legisign. This means that a Rhematic 
Iconic Legisign is useless without an Index, which makes it a Rhematic Indexical 
Legisign, unless it is diagrammatical (the next section approaches the concept of 
diagram) and signifies as an Iconic Legisign (a potential predicate). 
 
D. Hypoicons in learning 
 
 So far it has been argued that icons are the signs that afford learning, all 
signification having an iconic ground. In the project of a Peircean Theory of 
Learning, therefore, this sign type has a central role and the iconic semiosis in 
learning will be investigated in more detail in the next chapters. For now, to develop 
the conceptual apparatus for this theory of learning, mentioning the hypoicon types 
and their way of signification suffices.  
In accordance to how the Icon was presented so far, Peirce also describes it as “a 
Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness of it as a First. That is, a 
quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit 
to be a Substitute for anything that it is like. (The conception of ‘substitute’involves 
that of a purpose, and thus of genuine thirdness.)” (CP 2.276) A sign is a genuine 
triad and the Icon signifies in its First; the Icon is a possibility that signifies. This 
leads Peirce to identify a subclass of Icons developing only within a dimension of 
Firstness, without taking aboard any Second or Third signification, thus being still 
pure Icons. Hypoicons is the term he chose for these pure Icons (CP 2.276). Pure 
Firstness is difficult to grasp, despite its obviousness in real signification. Peirce 
explained the impossibility of having a correct conception of it, since Firstness: 
“[…] precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It 
cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic 
innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of 
it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, 
before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence 
-- that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, 
vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must 
be false to it.” (CP 1.357) 
Thus, giving examples of hypoicons is a difficult task of imagination. When 
giving an example for a hypoicon Peirce makes an abstraction, explaining that to 
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identify the hypoicon we have to separate within the sign the similarity of qualities 
from other modes of signification (such as convention): 
“Any material image, as a painting, is largely conventional in its mode of 
representation; but in itself, without legend or label it may be called a hypoicon.” 
(CP 2.276) 
Hence, hypoicons are a trichotomy of Firstness. Among them Peirce 
distinguishes the Image, Diagram and Metaphor types: 
“Hypoicons may be roughly divided according to the mode of Firstness of which 
they partake. Those which partake of simple qualities, or First Firstnesses, are 
images; those which represent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the 
parts of one thing by analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams; those 
which represent the representative character of a representamen by representing a 
parallelism in something else, are metaphors.” (CP 2.277) 
The diagram type is most important for learning. Diagrams are analogy per 
excellence. Since diagrams are icons that represent the relation of similarity between 
the parts of and a whole thing, diagrams are the signs that present the evidence of a 
thing as useful. Diagrams prescribe how a thing can be used. An equation may be 
completely useless for a pupil who does not see the similarity between the algebraic 
function and the (geometric) graph. The same is the situation where one does not see 
the similarity between a hammer and hitting: if the diagrammatic structure of 
knocking nails in a wall is not discovered the hammer cannot be used for it. For 
Peirce reasoning in general is mathematical (hence the analogy here between solving 
equations and knocking nails): 
“Now all necessary reasoning, whether it be good or bad, is of the nature of 
mathematical reasoning.” (CP 5.147) 
Mathematical reasoning is essentially diagrammatic: 
“Now mathematical reasoning is diagrammatic. This is as true of algebra as of 
geometry. But in order to discern the features of diagrammatic reasoning, it is 
requisite to begin with examples that are not too simple. In simple cases, the 
essential features are so nearly obliterated that they can only be discerned when one 
knows what to look for. But beginning with suitable examples and thence proceeding 
to others, one finds that the diagram itself, in its individuality, is not what the 
reasoning is concerned with.” (CP 5.148) 
Diagrams are the tools of reasoning, things become intelligible, they are learned, 
that is, by discovering their inner iconicity. The inner iconicity of a signifying 
possibility is its diagrammatic structure. Things are useful when comprehended as 
diagrams. To illustrate this Peirce used the example of a pupil learning to calculate 
the sum of two complementary angles: the key here is that the pupil essentially needs 
to see the inner similarities of the lines which build the angles. There is a 
diagrammatic structure which has to be seen and makes the measure of angles 
obvious, besides what might be regarded as the rigorous demonstration that 
algebraically accounts for it: 
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“A line abuts upon an ordinary point of another line forming two angles. The 
sum of these angles is proved by Legendre to be equal to the sum of two right angles 
by erecting a perpendicular to the second line in the plane of the two and through the 
point of abuttal. This perpendicular must lie in the one angle or the other. The pupil 
is supposed to see that. He sees it only in a special case, but he is supposed to 
perceive that it will be so in any case. The more careful logician may demonstrate 
that it must fall in one angle or the other; but this demonstration will only consist in 
substituting a different diagram in place of Legendre’s figure. But in any case, either 
in the new diagram or else, and more usually, in passing from one diagram to the 
other, the interpreter of the argumentation will be supposed to see something, which 
will present this little difficulty for the theory of vision, that it is of a general 
nature.” (CP 5.148) 
Legendre’s demonstration, Peirce explained, is possible as well by understanding 
the diagrammatic structure of algebraic expressions. If there were no similarities 
perceived (seen) between the algebraic expression and the geometric figure the 
demonstration would not have been possible. All these composing parts resemble the 
whole phenomenon – they act diagrammatically. The diagram might be a difficult 
concept to grasp immediately, like the concepts of Icon and similarity, because its 
simplicity makes it difficult to conceptualize. A possible misleading fact is that 
similarity, as obvious as it is, is not necessarily something formal. Peirce warned his 
reader about this, explaining that similarity, as the criteria for diagrams, is a matter 
or relation: 
“Many diagrams resemble their objects not at all in looks; it is only in respect to 
the relations of their parts that their likeness consists.” (CP 2.282) 
Peirce considered that a thorough understanding of diagrammatic reasoning 
would be supporting his anti-psychologist logic and would generate relevant insights 
in all sciences: 
“Diagrammatic reasoning is the only really fertile reasoning. If logicians would 
only embrace this method, we should no longer see attempts to base their science on 
the fragile foundations of metaphysics or a psychology not based on logical theory; 
and there would soon be such an advance in logic that every science would feel the 
benefit of it.” (CP 4.571) 
This thesis applies Peirce’s idea about diagrammatic reasoning to education. This 
results in more than merely positing a desired educational practice. The outcome is a 
fully semiotic philosophy of education with cosmological underpinnings and 
consequences. The next two chapters explain two important aspects of this 
educational semiotics: how a Peircean approach to education is a logical and non-








Semiotics as Pragmatic Logic 
 
In the previous two chapters I explained the conceptual apparatus that this thesis 
uses to develop a semiotic theory of learning, namely some key concepts in Peirce’s 
semiotics and its background. It occurred that Peirce’s pragmaticism is different 
from the more popular pragmatism of William James and John Dewey. In this 
chapter I will explain the authenticity of Peirce’s pragmaticism and its particular 
significance for education. The accounts of pragmatism that have been mostly used 
to approach education have not developed semiotics. While semiotics is being 
applied to education (see Chapter 1) there still is no thoroughly pragmatic semiotics 
of education. A Peircean Theory of Learning is a pragmatic semiotic educational 
philosophy.  
I will explain that the main reason for the broader horizon of pragmaticism over 
pragmatism in education consists in the account of experience as semiosis. However, 
between these two accounts there are some essential similarities, after all Dewey and 
James inherited their idea of pragmatic philosophy directly from Peirce and 
supposed, perhaps until Peirce signalized the difference, that Peirce’s doctrine is the 
same as theirs. It was pragmatism, in conformity to a large extent to Peirce’s 
doctrine, but still different in some aspects, that gave the proper ground for Dewey’s 
experience based philosophy of education. 
William James marked the dawn of pragmatic philosophy, especially with his 
famous book entitled Pragmatism. It is often overlooked that James himself 
attributed the title of father of pragmatism to Peirce. John Dewey is the second most 
popular early pragmatist, after James. Dewey’s merits consists in applying 
pragmatism to philosophy of education and political philosophy. 
The main difference between Peirce’s pragmaticism and the later pragmatism 
stands in that Peirce meant pragmaticism as a principle of logic while his followers 
developed it as a theory of knowledge or a richer account of empiricism. Despite this 
essential difference and its profound implications contemporary pragmatists who 
inherited the Jamesian account still seem to understand Peirce as a pragmatist in the 
same sense as James. I shall discuss the example of Colin Koopman and distinguish 
between two contemporary schools: Koopman’s third wave of Jamesian pragmatism 
as meliorism (the first wave being the account of Peircean pragmatism as a still 
givenist philosophy and the second wave being that of Rorty and Putnam) and the 
new revival of Peircean pragmaticism, linked with the iconic turn. 
 
A. Experience and continuity 
 
James acknowledged and promoted Peirce as the founder of the pragmatist 
doctrine. In the famous 1907 Pragmatism James clearly pointed to Peirce’s first use 
of the term from 1878 as marking a philosophical paradigm as well as to Peirce’s 
etymological motivation for choosing this term: 
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“A glance at the history of the idea will show you still better what 
pragmatism means. The term is derived from the same Greek word πράγμα, 
meaning action, from which our words ‘practice’ and ‘practical’ come. It was first 
introduced into philosophy by Mr. Charles Peirce in 1878. In an article entitled 
‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear,’ in the ‘Popular Science Monthly’ for January of 
that year
10
 Mr. Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, 
said that, to develop a thought’s meaning, we need only determine what conduct it 
is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance.” (1907, p. 46-47) 
James appreciated Peirce’s pragmatism for one of the main reasons for which it 
still impresses philosophers today: it easily deals away with abstract distinctions that 
are estranged from practical use, acknowledging the value of truth of judgements by 
inquiring on the conducts they produce: 
“The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical 
disputes that otherwise might be interminable. Is the world one or many? — fated 
or free? — material or spiritual? — here are notions either of which may or may 
not hold good of the world; and disputes over such notions are unending. The 
pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its 
respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to 
any one if this notion rather than that notion were true?” (p. 45) 
Similar reasoning underpins the recent semiotic turn in philosophy of education, 
which is above all an anti-dualist turn (Stables 2005, 2006, 2012). For instance, the 
typical modern mind/body dualism is not fruitful anymore for several branches of 
philosophy among which perhaps most of all philosophy of education.
11
 Semiotics, 
by understanding reality as a physiology of arguments and learning as semiotic 
engagement (Stables 2005, 2012) does not encounter such, eventually artificial, 
distinctions. 
As he stated, for James pragmatism was an efficient method for knowledge 
theory. The value of truth, from this perspective, resides in the consequences of an 
action: 
“You must bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it at work 
within the stream of your experience. It appears less as a solution, then, than as a 
program for more work, and more particularly as an indication of the ways in 
which existing realities may be changed.” (p. 53) 
This same concept of experiencethat James uses is the cornerstone of Dewey’s 
philosophy of education. This is a more developed notion of experiencethan the 
mainstream empiricist concept, not framing experience as strictly the product of 
sense-perception. However, this pragmatic account of experience did not lead to an 
understanding of life in terms of phenomena of signification. For Peirce, experience 
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Translated in the Revue Philosophique January, 1879 (vol. vii). 
11
In Chapter 1 I have discussed the advantages that semiotics brings to education in contrast to 
modern dualist philosophy. 
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is semiosis. While a Peircean approach to education would agree with Dewey’s 
philosophy of education, being as well experience based, it would be a 
semioticphilosophy of education because of the concept of experience as semiosis. 
Dewey brought a strong awareness of the continuity of learning, due to the 
continuity of experience: 
“The two principles of continuity and interaction are not separate from each 
other.” (1938, p. 44) 
This application of continuity is certainly inherited from Peirce (Chapter 2). It is 
such an inner continuity that keeps a knowing subject together:  
“A divided world, a world whose parts and aspects do not hang together, is at 
once a sign and a cause of a divided personality. When the splitting-up reaches a 
certain point we call the person insane. A fully integrated personality, on the other 
hand, exists only when successive experiences are integrated with one another. It 
can be built up only as a world of related objects is constructed.” (p. 44) 
This is Peirce’s concept of diagrammatic signification applied to cognition: in the 
case of a cognitive system, if the parts do not resemble each other and do not 
resemble the whole then the system is not coherent – such is the case of an insane 
person, in Dewey’s terms. The sane mind lives in a continuous flow of experiences. 
This can be described as the diagrammatic character of the inner self – a world of 
related objects. That cognitions are compatible it translates that among them there is 
iconic syntax (see Chapter 1, section C). This stands both for the cognitions of 
oneself as for cognitions belonging to various persons. This being the case, an 
educational system has to provide the free environment where the learner can 
experience such experiences that will integrate harmoniously within herself and 
evoke the acquisition of knowledge. Also, the system has to be careful not to 
provoke experiences that would obscure learning possibilities for the learner. This is 
one of the main observations that Dewey brought to philosophy of education: 
“What avail is it to win prescribed amounts of information about geography 
and history, to win ability to read and write, if in the process the individual loses 
his own soul: loses his appreciation of things worth while, of the values to which 
these things are relative; if he loses desire to apply what he has learned and, above 
all, loses the ability to extract meaning from his future experiences as they 
occur?” (Dewey, p. 49) 
As in Peirce’s case, Dewey’s experience based educational philosophy brings a 
strong argument for liberal education, refuting both conservatism and progressivism 
as educational trends (even though Dewey is generally recognized as the father of 
progressive education). Peirce, while acknowledging experience as the central 
phenomenon that makes learning possible, explicitly distanced himself from the 
notion of experienceof the empiricists by clearly refuting the tabula rasa hypothesis. 
When stating the central role that experience has in learning Peirce immediately feels 
the need to mention that his concept of experience is not that of the empiricists: 
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“Experience is our only teacher. Far be it from me to enunciate any doctrine of a 
tabula rasa.” (CP 5.50) 
Since Peirce admits experience as the “only teacher” while rejecting the idea of 
tabula rasa it is clear that his concept of experience is not the mainstream modern 
concept. The key to understanding Peirce’s notion of experience stands in the 
semiotic account of the Universe, the Universe as physiology of arguments. As 
Peirce expressed it, the Universe is “all of a piece,” by this intending precisely its 
diagrammatic coherence – the compatibility between the constituting parts of the 
Universe due to their resemblance with the whole. Learning occurs via experiences, 
but not upon a tabula rasa, and neither upon innate ideas that rationalism would 
promote. Experience is the action of signs, which are constituting the Universe.  
Learning is a characteristic of semiosis typical for certain beings that are part of the 
same Universe and came to be as a result of natural and cosmological evolution. 
Human beings, who are discovering the Universe, are part of the Universe and are, 
therefore, in diagrammatic coherence with the Universe as whole and with its other 
parts – we resemble it to a certain degree: 
“The idea of the word ‘experience’ was to refer to that which is forced 
upon a man’s recognition, will-he nill-he, and shapes his thoughts to something 
quite different from what they naturally would have been. But the philosophers of 
experience, like many of other schools, forget to how great a degree it is true that 
the universe is all of a piece, and that we are all of us natural products, naturally 
partaking of the characteristics that are found everywhere through nature. It is in 
some measure nonsensical to talk of a man’s nature as opposed to what 
perceptions force him to think. True, man continually finds himself resisted, both 
in his active desires and in that passive inertia of thought which causes any new 
phenomenon to give him a shock of surprise. You may think of an element of 
knowledge which thus resists his superficial tendencies; but to express precisely 
that idea you must have a new word: it will not answer the purpose to call it 
experience. You may also reflect that everyman’s environment is in some 
measure unfavorable to his development; and so far as this affects his cognitive 
development, you have there an element that is opposed to the man’s nature. But 
surely the word experience would be ill-chosen to express that.” (CP 5.613) 
Therefore, Peirce’s notion of experience as action of signs is equivalent with 
the biosemiotic account of life as local plurality (Chapter 1). Living beings are 
engaged in the evolution of the universe, because they are a part of it. Knowing and 
learning are suprasubjective phenomena which do not characterize the isolated action 
of any isolated individual. A new born human being shares already several qualities 
with the universe in general (it has a form, a consistency), with many living beings 
(it needs to feed, it has eyes, it is covered in skin, it has hands, it has a mouth, a 
nervous system etc.) and particularly with other human beings (it cries, it developed 
as a fetus in the womb of a woman out of which it was born, etc.). Experience is an 
unceasing continuous phenomenon to which one partakes already as a part of the 
physiology of arguments. As such, the value of truth of a proposition does not 
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simply stand in its consequences, because there is no separation between the 
proposition and its consequences. Value of truth is something shared and diffused 
through the continuity of experience: value of truth is synonymous with meaning. 
The effort to which James advises, that of setting words at work within the stream of 
our experience is superfluous from a Peircean point of view, as words are part of our 
experience (as semiosis). Experience, “our only teacher” (CP 5.50), is different from 
the pragmatic (Jamesian) notion.  
Peirce placed mental acts (imagination, judgement, etc.), under the category 
of experience (semiosis), avoiding the assumption of tabula rasa. The particularity 
of Peirce’s pragmatic logic is that it does not make an ontological distinction 
between mind-dependent and mind-independent being, reality being suprasubjective. 
Therefore, mind has to be understood as part of this suprasubjective real existence. 
As such, this approach is coextensive with the embodiment philosophy hypothesis 
that mindis a phenomenon for which the whole body is responsible, not only an 
organ, such as the brain (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Semiotics goes even further, 
because the body is nothing else but the centre of an Umwelt and therefore, the entire 
Umwelt is responsible for mind. If re-cognition is a result of evolution, which itself 
had to adapt to semiosic structures (Chapter 1) then the whole environment of a 
living being is responsible for mind (Jakob von Uexküll 1926, 1934, 1940). The 
generation of pragmatists after Peirce, such as James and Dewey, certainly inherited 
the importance of the concept of experience from Peirce, but their account of 
pragmatism did not make such a strong case against an ontological mind/non-mind 
dualism. The reason is that since they did not take pragmatism as a maxim of logic 
and did not busy themselves with the logic that might occur from it, they did not 
account for experience as the action of logical phenomena. For Peirce this is 
precisely what experience is, semiosis: the action (cooperation) of signs. 
The explanation of the continuous experience that determines a living organism 
will give new insights in what regards the coincidence between self and mind, a new 
horizon for philosophy of education. It is an often overlooked curious accident that 
the consciousness referred to as self coincides with a certain mind evoked by an 
organism. I consider that the biosemiotic account sheds light on this, thus bringing 
new insights in what regards the development of the self. It can bring new directions 
into the attention of educational philosophy. 
Thus, semiotics advances an ecological philosophy of education
12
, raising the 




This difference between Peirce’s account of experience and that of James and 
Dewey is due to their different understanding of pragmatism. Upon the pragmatic 
maxim of logic Peirce could develop semiotics. This was for Peirce the rationale of 
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the maxim of pragmatism. He had several attempts at defining it, proving it to be 
quite a difficult principle to grasp in a definition. The first attempt (from Revue 
philosophique) is the following: 
“Considérer quells sont les effets pratiquesque nous pensons pouvoir être 
produits parl’objet de notre conception. La conception de tous ces effets est la 
conception complète de l’objet. [p. 48.] 
Pour développer le sens d’unepensée, ilfautdoncsimplement determiner 
quelles habitudes elle produit, car le sens d’une chose consistes implement dans 
les habitudes qu’elle implique. Le caractère d’une habitude dépend de la façon 
don’t elle peut nous faire agir non pas seulement dans telle circonstance probable, 
mais dans toute circonstance possible, si improbable qu’elle puisse être. Ce qu’est 
une habitude dépend de ces deux points: quandet comment elle fait agir. Pour le 
premier point: quand? tout stimulant à l’action dérived’une perception; pour le 
second point: comment? le but de toute action est d’amener au résultat sensible. 
Nous atteignon sainsi le tangible et le pratique comme base de toute différence de 
pensée, si subtile qu’elle puis se être. [p. 47.]”
13
 (CP 5.18) 
A later formulation, easier to grasp but otherwise equivalent, to which Peirce 
himself seemed to be more committed is the following: 
“Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a 
sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only 
meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical 
maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis in the imperative 
mood.” (CP 5.18) 
Putting it plainly, but reducing the edifying rigour of Peirce’s language, 
pragmatism is the assertion that what is named is called: there is no pure affirmative 
statement, things are understood as imperatives. Pure constatives are useless 
abstractions. Pragmatism, as mentioned previously, easily eliminates useless 
abstractions that do not correspond to obvious states of affairs. Peirce also described 
it as critical common-sense: 
“I have myself called pragmatism ‘critical common-sensism’; but, of course, I do 
not mean this for a strict definition.” (CP 5.494) 
This is what James found particularly interesting about pragmatism, its naturalism 
and immediate practicality as a common-sense doctrine. Coextensive with Peirce’s 
semiotic Universe, whereas more complex forms of signification are developed upon 
                                                          
13
“Consider what are the practical effects that we expect to be produced by the object of our 
conception. The design of all these effects is the complete design of the object.  
 To develop a sense of a thought, we must simply determine what habits it produces, because 
the meaning of something consists simply within the habits it involves. The natureof a habit depends 
on how it can make us act not only in such probable circumstances, but in all possible circumstances, 
however unlikely theymay be. That which is a habit depends on these two points: when and how it 
makes act. For the first point: when? All stimulating of the action derives from a perception; for the 
second point: how? the purpose of  all action is conveying to sensitive result. We thus reach the 
tangible and the practice like basis for all difference of thought, as subtle as it can be.” (CP 5.18) 
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and in continuity with basic forms of signification, James emphasized the importance 
of common-sense as a first, and therefore essential, stage of reasoning: 
“My thesis now is this, that our fundamental ways of thinking about things 
are discoveries of exceedingly remote ancestors, which have been able to 
preserve themselves throughout the experience of all subsequent time. They form 
one great stage of equilibrium in the human mind’s development, the stage of 
common sense. Other stages have grafted themselves upon this stage, but have 
never succeeded in displacing it. Let us consider this common sense stage first, as 
if it might be final.” (p. 170) 
Thus, James correctly noticed that pragmatism was not a new doctrine, but a 
refined philosophical method, used before by various philosophers in various ages: 
“There is absolutely nothing new in the pragmatic method. Socrates was an 
adept at it. Aristotle used it methodically. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume made 
momentous contributions to truth by its means. Shadworth Hodgson keeps 
insisting that realities are only what they are ‘known as.’ But these forerunners of 
pragmatism used it in fragments: they were a prelude only.” (p. 50) 
James is right in assuming that pragmatism had its pre-paradigmatic stages. As 
critical common sense, pragmatism was certainly present in the Socratic method, in 
Aristotelian logic and in the thought of the modern philosophers James mentioned. 
Nevertheless, James’s reference to the modern philosophers as precursors of 
pragmatism is not coherent with Peirce’s line of arguments. Though his intention 
was to align himself with Peirce, James here proved that something essential about 
Peirce’s pragmatism evaded him. Peirce would not consider Locke, Berkeley, and 
Hume as forerunners of his doctrine, but rather a detour. Deely considers that 
philosophy deviated from the medievals’ path towards a strand of semiotic realism 
such as Peirce’s once with the development of modern mind-dependent accounts of 
ontology (2001, 2009). Explaining his readings, Peirce reveals the history of 
semiotics. He informs his reader that a critical point in his intellectual formation was 
his dissatisfaction with modern philosophy which pushed him to a thorough study of 
the medievals:  
“Before I came to man’s estate, being greatly impressed with Kant’s Critic of 
the Pure Reason, my father, who was an eminent mathematician, pointed out to 
me lacunæ in Kant’s reasoning which I should probably not otherwise have 
discovered. From Kant, I was led to an admiring study of Locke, Berkeley, and 
Hume and to that of Aristotle’s Organon, Metaphysics, and psychological 
treatises, and somewhat later derived the greatest advantage from a deeply 
pondering perusal of some of the works of medieval thinkers, St. Augustine, 
Abelard, and John of Salisbury, with related fragments from St. Thomas Aquinas, 
most especially from John of Duns, the Scot (Duns being the name of a then not 
unimportant place in East Lothian), and from William of Ockham.” (CP 1.560) 
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While showing awareness of these modern philosophers’ importance along the 
history of ideas, on a Peircean account Locke, Berkeley, and Hume along with the 
other modern philosophers, culminating with Kant obscured the development of 
pragmaticism. In Deely’s terms, modern philosophy deviated the focus from the 
“Path of Signs,” set by Augustine to the “Path of Ideas” (2009). On a Peircean 
account philosophy “took a wrong turn in the work of Descartes and slightly later 
with John Locke as well.” (2009, p. v) If this is the case, Peirce’s pragmatism is 
delivered from accusations of dualism. Deely explained thus that Peirce’s 
semiotics is not a form of empiricism because, like rationalism, empiricism places 
epistemology and ontology in a dichotomic relation: 
“For even though Locke chastised Descartes for separating ideas of reason 
from the sense experience, yet more fundamentally he agreed with Descartes that 
ideas, mental representations formed by the human mind in its interiority (albeit 
of sense first rather than of reason), wholly constitute the direct and immediate 
object of human experience. Thus arose the modern distinction between 
“Empiricism” attending to sense and “Rationalism” touting the primacy of reason. 
But both alike distinguished “epistemology”, concerned with human knowledge 
in its direct immediacy, from “ontology”, which concerns rather the world beyond 
the appearances – a “beyond” which (modern science to the contrary 
notwithstanding) the philosophers, ignorant of the Latin semiotic development 
and sceptical in any case (since Ockham) of the reality of relation, slyly came to 
consider as unknowable. (Such at least was the ineluctable consequence of their 
epistemology.)” (2009, p. vi)  
From this perspective, since it is a suprasubjective doctrine, Peirce’s pragmatism 
has to be distinct from both rationalism and empiricism. Both Peirce and James were 
aware that until James’ use of the term in 1898 pragmatism was not popular enough 
to generate a trend in philosophy: 
“This is the principle of Peirce, the principle of pragmatism. It lay entirely 
unnoticed by any one for twenty years, until I, in an address before Professor 
Howison’s philosophical union at the university of California, brought it forward 
again and made a special application of it to religion. By that date (1898) the 
times seemed ripe for its reception. The word ‘pragmatism’ spread, and at present 
it fairly spots the pages of the philosophic journals. On all hands we find the 
‘pragmatic movement’ spoken of, sometimes with respect, sometimes with 
contumely, seldom with clear understanding. It is evident that the term applies 
itself conveniently to a number of tendencies that hitherto have lacked a collective 
name, and that it has ‘come to stay.’” (1907, p. 47) 
Emerson, James, and Dewey are the first authors to raise a wide interest for 
pragmatism. As Peirce himself noticed, he had to rename his own coinage, as his 
own term became popular as something different from what he meant. The disciples 
of pragmatism did not spread their mentor’s pragmatism. Peirce labelled James as 
psychologist, and his use of the term pragmatism as “radical empiricism.” (CP 3.414) 
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Also, Peirce found it used as a form of “humanism” by Ferdinand Schiller. These 
developments of pragmatism, genuine in their own right and philosophically fertile 
as they proved to be, differ from what Peirce intended pragmatism to be. These uses 
of the term would be accepted, Peirce commented, unless this terminological 
confusion would not have triggered a series of critics to Peirce’s coinage that were 
wrongly addressed to it: 
“But at present, the word begins to be met with occasionally in the literary 
journals, where it gets abused in the merciless way that words have to expect 
when they fall into literary clutches. Sometimes the manners of the British have 
effloresced in scolding at the word as ill-chosen -- ill-chosen, that is, to express 
some meaning that it was rather designed to exclude. So then, the writer, finding 
his bantling "pragmatism" so promoted, feels that it is time to kiss his child good-
by and relinquish it to its higher destiny; while to serve the precise purpose of 
expressing the original definition, he begs to announce the birth of the word 
"pragmaticism," which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers.” (CP 3.414) 
For Peirce it was clear that the misunderstanding comes from the difficulty of the 
“new pragmatists” to understand pragmatism simply as a principle of logic: 
“[…] one of the faults that I think they might find with me is that I make 
pragmatism to be a mere maxim of logic instead of a sublime principle of 
speculative philosophy. In order to be admitted to better philosophical standing I 
have endeavored to put pragmatism as I understand it into the same form of a 
philosophical theorem.” (CP 5.18) 
 Once semiotics was developed, upon the principle of pragmatism, the 
principle itself could be much clearly expressed with the new semiotic terms. Thus, 
the clear expression of the pragmatic maxim in pragmatic logic (semiotics) is that “A 
sign is only a sign in actu by virtue of its receiving an interpretation, that is, by virtue 
of its determining another sign of the same object.” (CP 5.569) This could be easily 
misinterpreted as being the foundation of a relativist paradigm. Actually, James and 
Dewey’s pragmatism is strongly relativist, as it was mentioned that James saw a 
precursor of pragmatism in Hodgson’s assumption that “realities are only what they 
are ‘known as’.” Peirce’s pragmaticism is different in this regard. The pragmaticist 
semiotic claim is that relations are real existing phenomena and so are the termini 
partaking to the relations, but the termini only have being as parts of relations. This 
is to say that the physiology of arguments accepts being only as gathering all the 
three phenomenological categories (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness) together. 
Relations only have being in relation as well. In Chapter 2 I have explained that 
according to Peirce, in our scientific inquiries and not only, we are asymptotically 
approaching Absolute Truth. This Truth, however, will never be reached: we have to 
draw near to it while we always remain infinitely distant to it. In the circumstances 
of a relational ontology, this pragmatic understanding of Truth dismisses the 




C. Two accounts of pragmatism: transitionalism and the iconic turn 
 
Despite Charles Peirce’s renaming of his principle of logic from pragmatism to 
pragmaticism the version of pragmatism as theory of knowledge is still attributed to 
him. Such an example, I argue is that of Koopman (2009). While offering a fresh and 
fertile take on pragmatism, Koopman still misinterpreted Peirce’s account in 
precisely this manner. Koopman approached Peirce’s pragmatism without taking into 
consideration its telos: semiotics. On most accounts pragmatism implied a 
hermeneutic method, such as critic cultural analysis, but not a system of logic. 
 
i. Pragmatism as transitionalism 
 
Colin Koopman aimed to bring pragmatism to a new stage with his 2009 
Pragmatism as transition: historicity and hope in James, Dewey and Rorty. 
Koopman argued that pragmatism is a transitionalist stream of thought, concerned 
with the issue of process, the transition from something to something else. To put it 
simply, pragmatism is focused on how to “get from here to there.” (Koopman 2009, 
p. 2) This holds true, I argue, as much for Peirce’s account as for the further accounts 
of pragmatism. Peirce’s pragmatism brought forth a relational logic (semiotics), 
which might be described as transitional in this sense. Pragmatic logic directly 
implied for Peirce a cosmology of sign evolution (Chapters 1, 2, and 7). Also, the 
present thesis, consisting in a fully Peircean account, brings a theory of learning as 
passage (a transition) from one type of signification, through other types of 
signification, to another type of signification. 
Koopman remarks three stages in the history of pragmatic philosophy. The first 
two stages of pragmatism according to Koopman are: “the classical pragmatisms of 
William James, John Dewey, and Charles Santiago Peirce, and the contemporary 
neopragmatists of Richard Rorty and such of his interlocutors as Hilary Putnam and 
Robert Brandom.” (p. 2) 
I argue that this is an example which proves that the error of reading Peirce as a 
pragmatist in the same sense as James is still lingering. Koopman’s effort consists in 
that of polishing the lines on which a third way of pragmatism would occur, 
synthesizing and transcending the previous two stages into a more comprehensive 
philosophy. A pragmatist himself, Koopman, while recognizing the importance of 
the first two stages of pragmatism, also saw some limitations in both. He proposes a 
third wave of pragmatism which would overcome these limitations through a 
typically pragmatic method: that of meliorism, the transition towards better. The 
proof of the limitations of both of these accounts of pragmatism, for Koopman, is 
their failure to collaborate. He noticed that classicopragmatism is an experience 
focused philosophy, while neopragmatism is language centred. As such, 
classicopragmatism is a philosophical doctrine of the past, not belonging to a 
linguistic age, to which the naturally occurring linguistic turn brought philosophy. 
This is so, but I argue that while this critique can be applied to James and Dewey, it 
does not hold in the case of Peirce. Koopman suspects classicopragmatism of still 
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inheriting traces of the modern fallacy which he termed givenism. I argue that 
Peirce’s pragmaticism is absolved of givenism. The reason is that, as argued in 
sections A and Bof the present chapter, while Peirce’s philosophy is experience 
focused, his notion of experience is not the modern idea of experience, but, instead, 
for Peirce experience is semiosis. Peirce explicitly rejected both accounts of modern 
givenism, rationalism and empiricsm. He also showed an aspect in which his 
pragmatism differs from Mill’s utilitarianism, besides the difference of focus on 
logic of the former and ethics of the latter. The difference stands in that according to 
Peirce both mental and non-mental acts pertain to experience in the same way: 
“If Mill wishes me to admit that experience is the only source of any kind 
of knowledge, I grant it at once, provided only that by experience he means 
personal history, life. But if he wants me to admit that inner experience is 
nothing, and that nothing of moment is found out by diagrams, he asks what 
cannot be granted.” (CP 4.91) 
Experience is life and, at least in the case of humans, it has a personal dimension 
(Peirce’s notion of person will be discussed in Chapter 5). This remark is the 
stepping-stone of biosemiotics: semiosis characterizes life. Experience, as semiosis, 
entertains an Umwelt and, in the case of an assumed personal life, involving intra-
personal relations, a Lebenswelt. 
As to what regards rationalism, Peirce clearly denies the a priori stakes: 
“The very word a priori involves the mistaken notion that the operations of 
demonstrative reasoning are nothing but applications of plain rules to plain cases.” 
(CP 4.92) 
Signs (the agents of semiosis) are suprasubjective relations that do not imply any 
given hypothesis from outside the system. For James and Dewey semiotics was 
never a concern. Reading Peirce as a pragmatist of the same strand with James and 
Dewey makes him a subject of this same anti-givenism critique. Koopman clearly 
applies this critic to all three of them: 
“Unfortunately the classicopragmatists prove frustratingly ambiguous about 
givenism. In certain moments, they appear theoretically committed to avoiding 
the pernicious errors of givenism. Yet in certain other moments, they warmly 
invite subtle forms of givenism that exhibit pernicious connections to 
representationalist foundationalism. This ambiguity is present throughout much of 
the work of Dewey, James, and Peirce.” (p. 77-78) 
Koopman mentioned the account of a perspective according to which Peirce is 
spared from the anti-givenism critic, but eventually found Peirce indefensible against 
it. He noticed that the early Peirce started off his philosophy with an attack to ‘given’ 
hypotheses (p.80-81), but states that Peirce eventually assumes transcendental 
assumptions because of his account of experiencing qualities (Firstness). Koopman’s 
critique to Peirce envisages a certain givenism on which Peirce’s phenomenological 
categories function, since, according to him, experience starts with Firstness in an a 
priori manner (2009, p. 81). Koopman considers that Peirce thought that there is a 
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mental correspondent to the non-mental reality of quality. He quotes Peirce that “the 
quality of feeling is the true psychical representative of the first category of the 
immediate as it is in its immediacy, of the present in its direct positive presentness.” 
(CP 5.44) What Koopman did not observe here is that this descpription of experience 
does not allow the possibility of isolated experiences. His account ignores Peirce’s 
concept of continuity. Any experience is integrated, as a constituting part, to an 
infinite set of experiences which is rightly called experience. What Peirce explained 
in the above citation is that experience is mediation (semiosis) and it cannot be 
decomposed (deconstructed) into Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. It is the 
essential character of the sign that it is not reducible to its three relata. Third degree 
graphs are not reducible, there is nothing prior to relations of signification in their 
fullness. Koopman did not take into account that mediation is Thirdness per 
excellence according to Peirce. The sign-relation (mediation) is being and therefore 
nothing can exist subjectively or objectively, but only suprasubjectively. Things 
outside of minddo not have correspondents in the mind, but their status of real 
entities expands into mindas the sign itself always provides a part of its meaning 
(Interpretant). Experienceis the shaping of an Umwelt. Peirce was very clear that 
Firstness per se cannot be experienced, as any thought about it, the slight mentioning 
of it, is false to it: 
“The idea of the absolutely first must be entirely separated from all 
conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is 
itself a second to that second. The first must therefore be present and 
immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and 
new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be initiative, original, 
spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining cause. It is also 
something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some 
sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and 
no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its 
characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something 
else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the 
day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had 
become conscious of his own existence -- that is first, present, immediate, 
fresh,new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and 
evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it.” 
(CP 1.357) 
Signs are phenomena populating and constituting the world. Firstness per se 
cannot be experienced, like no category per se cannot be experienced isolated. To 
think of a Peircean syncategoremata of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdenss is 
useless because, as explained in Chapter 2, Secondness supposes and incorporates 
Firstness, and Thirdness supposes and incorporates both Secondness and Firstness. 
Thirdness incorporates Firstness as well, implicitly through Secondness as directly 
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mediating it to a matter of Secondness.
14
 Thirdness is a form of syncategoremata. 
The reading of Peirce offered by Koopman does not take into account this important 
aspect of Peircean philosophy when stating that the dilema of givenness in Peirce’s 
philosophy stands in that “Quality prescinded is either directly experienced or is 
always already mediated by relation and representation.” (p. 81) The first objection 
to this is that direct experience is mediation. Mediation does not make something be 
less direct, as the three termini of a sign are not separable (see Chapter 2). As 
explained in Chapter 1, to be un-mediated is not to be part of the physiology of 
arguments. By relation Koopman refers to dyadic relation (strictly Secondness), 
which brings the second objection: that, according to Peirce, dyadic relations do not 
mediate. Only signs are mediators, linking the Universe all together. The idea that 
needs to be stressed is that termini of signs only have being as in the relation. The 
three categories, while we can observe them, cannot be separated from each other.  
Also, signification is dynamic, never static. The physiology of arguments is 
continuously evolving, as signification develops in time (this argument will be 
investigated in Chapter 5), or, rather reality takes on a temporal dimension because 
this is how signification develops – gradually and continuously. The temporal 
dimension of signification necessarily implies a form of mediation, from past to 
present and to future. The passing of time, or, generally, the passing from a basic to a 
more complex sign type, requires all three phenomenological categories. Koopman 
finds one philosophical inssuficiency in all three, Peirce, James and Dewey, namely 
that they still inherit modern dualism: 
“Subsequent commentators who have wrestled with Dewey’s discussions of 
primary experience, James’s of pure experience, and Peirce’s of qualitative 
firstness have found it extraordinarily difficult to say just how it is that we can 
deploy these conceptions of experience without specifying them in terms of the 
outworn metaphysical dualisms of mind and reality or subject and object that 
pragmatism was meant to help us overcome.” (p. 82-83) 
In the case of Peirce this is not so. Koopman does not consider in his analysis the 
major characteristic of Peirce’s philosophy, namely that it consists in a relational 
logic (semiotics). The notion of experience as semiosis is indeed suprasubjective and 
non-dual. I consider that the arguments presented in sections A and B (the present 
Chapter) suffice to prove this.  
Koopman, therefore, brought a critique of Peirce comming from a pragmatism 
that does not lead to semiotics. If the classicopragmatism of James and the 
neopragmatism of Rorty proved valuable, their synthetic overcoming into 
Koopman’s meliorism is a pragmatic philosophy of this kind in its own right. The 
only inconsistency is the account of Peircean pragmaticism as dualist philosophy. 
                                                          
14
For example, a Rhematic IndexicalLegisign (e.g. a demonstrative pronoun used as a predicate) 
contains an Iconic Sinsign (unsaturated predicate), which contains a Qualisign, but it also contains an 
Iconic Legisign, different then the one that contains the first mentioned Iconic Sinsign. The copulation 
of this Sinsign (Secondness) and Legisign (Thirdness) constructed by different Icons brings about the 
Rhematic Indexical Legisign.  
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Perhaps a second possible critique to Koopman is whether his meliorism overcomes 
dualism, as he pretends. While Koopman saw in the early Peirce a good intuition 
against dualism and in the late Peirce a failure to overcome it fundamentally, I argue 
that it is actually in the late Peirce’s mature semiotics that dualism is clearly 
overcome. This is seen in the iconicity hypothesis, the idea that the Universe is 
diagrammatic, that is, its inner coherency is due to its iconic syntax. If a cognitive 
being is living in this world it will experience this world because, as part of it, it 
presents similarities to the non-self part of the world. The borders between self and 
non-self are vague and as such they exist (vaguely).  
As for the neopragmatists, for Koopman their only epistemic advantage to 
classicopragmatism is that of being able to benefit from the linguistic turn. As well, 
the only excuse that the classicopragmatists have in defence of their dualism is that 
their work was exhausted before 20
th
 century philosophy was maturated by the 
linguistic turn. 
 
ii. The iconic (schematic) turn 
 
Koopman therefore brought a critique of Peirce from a pragmatic but non-
semiotic stand. The non-pragmatic but semiotic attacks to Peirce have been more 
frequent. Such is the case of Umberto Eco’s 1979 A theory of semiotics which is a 
poststructuralist attempt to develop a fully semiotic theory of communication. In this 
work Eco clearly delimitated the borders of semiosis within socio-cultural human 
activity. Evidently, this is not so according to Peirce. 
The semiotic scene of the 20
th
 century was dominated by structuralism and post-
structuralism which did not advance the hypothesis of Iconicity (cf. Stjernfelt 2007, 
p. 51). The structuralist philosophical tradition was extrapolated from Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s linguistics. De Saussure applied the concept of sign (signe) in linguistics 
(1915), thus developing semiology (semiologie). As de Saussure uses the 
signconcept, it is a psycho-linguistic entity. Peirce’s concept of sign is not bound 
strictly to linguistic use, but, as explained (Chapter 2), it is a matter of ontology as 
well as of epistemology: an unification of these two by the claim that being is the 
phenomenon of relation. While Peirce’s semiotics cannot and would not bring any 
critique to de Saussure’s semio-linguistic project, Peirce’s philosophy presents some 
incompatibilities with the structuralist philosophy developed after de Saussure 
(Stjernfelt 2007, p. 51). In the context of the linguistic turn, de Saussure’s linguistics 
was a strong ground for philosophy. Several continental philosophical schools 
picked up and developed saussurean semiology into proper semiotic philosophy. The 
Prague (Roman Jakobson), Moscow-Tartu (Yuri Lotman) and 
Copenhagen
15
(Hjelmselv, Uldall) schools were the first to develop semiology in a 
                                                          
15
It is interesting that the Copenhagen and the Tartu schools of semiotics, presently at the third 
generation, underwent a conversion from semiology to Peircean biosemiotics. Hjelmslev’s student, 
Per Aag Brandt, initially a structuralist thinker, developing cognitive semiotics, gradually found a 
stronger foundation in Peirce (about Per Aag Brandt’s conversion see Per Aag Brandt in Bundgaard 
and Stjernfelt, 2009). Once with thinkers such as Frederik Stjernfelt and Jesper Hoffmeyer, the third 
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philosophical frame. Starting with Claude Lévi-Strauss and Roland Barthes the 
structuralist movement became popular among French philosophers. This is where 
structuralist philosophy, arguably detaching from its link to linguistics, made a next 
step towards poststructuralism, with Derrida explaining the non-static and indefinite 
character of structures and Deleuze accounting for the structures’ rhizomatic (and 
not strictly arborescent) formation. Even though structuralism eventually brings de 
Saussure’s signe into a broad philosophical use, independent of linguistics, an 
essential difference still makes Peircean semiotics and structuralism incompatible in 
some regards. The basic reason for the essential difference between these accounts of 
semiotics (or semiology) and Peirce’s semiotics can be noticed in Peirce’s semiotics’ 
seeds in medieval scholastic realism. This inheritance is foreign to structuralism. The 
tendency of some scholastics, such as Aquinas and Duns Scotus, of developing a 
relational logic was inherited and fulfilled by Peirce (Deely, 2001, see also Stjernfelt, 
2011 on relational logic). Structuralism is rather a relativist epistemology (not 
relational logic). 
Peircean semiotics is not favoured by and does not favour the linguistic turn of 
philosophy. In the strictly psycho-linguistic use of the sign concept, iconicity is not 
an issue: it is irrelevant if the word ‘dog’ is familiar with the four legged, barking 
animal (the very object it describes). Iconicity becomes a relevant matter when the 
sign concept is applied to investigate any possible suprasubjective relation. In 
Chapter 1 I mentioned that Stjernfelt observed an iconic turn, to which he also 
referred as phenomenological turn, which semiotics has been taking since recently 
(Stjernfelt in Bundgaard and Stjernfelt, p. 232)
16
. The problem for embracing a fully 
Peicean account of semiotics consists in “the preference for a purely symbolic 
calculus at the expense of iconicity” (Stjernfelt 2007, p. 60) which dominated 20
th
 
century. This tendency which, in different ways, was present in both structuralism 
and analytic philosophy did not allow room for the iconicity hypothesis (introduced 
in Chapter 1, section C). 
The early Umberto Eco is an exponent of 20
th
 century semiotics marked by the 
linguistic turn. In Eco’s rejection of iconicity, arguably coherent with the general 
                                                                                                                                                                    
generation of the Copenhagen school already assumed a thorough Peircean approach. Peircean 
biosemiotics, via Thomas Sebeok, proved to be a better ground for the cognitive and experimental 
semiotics research proceeding at the Universities of Copenhagen, Aarhus and Lund. In the same time, 
the breakthrough of biosemiotics led to the Tartu’s school rediscovery of Jakob von Uexküll, its own 
legacy. Thus, there can now be observed a Copenhagen-Tartu biosemiotic school, being represented 
by authors such as Kalevi Kull, Claus Emmeche, Timo Maran, Frederik Stjernfelt, Jesper Hoffmeyer. 
16
 See Bundgaard and Stjernfelt in Chapter 1: “One of the results of the iconic or phenomenological 
turn of semiotics during the recent decades is that its close affiliation with the Linguistic Turn is 
weakening. Thus, linguistics ceases to be the model science of semiotics, even if language, as an 
object, of course, remains a core issue for semiotics. Language appears as the most central of many 
cognitive and communicative tools of man, and semiotics – as indicated by the predicate “cognitive” 
in cognitive semiotics – must base itself on the study [of] all such tools. This implies the empirical 
connection of semiotics to all aspects of cognitive science (from sociology over psychology to 
neuroscience) – and the conceptual connection of semiotics to epistemology, philosophy of science, 
and ontology.” (Stjernfelt in Bundgaard & Stjernfelt, p. 232) 
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culturalist view of structuralism, the argument is that similarity occurs only as 
stimulus in the physiology of the nervous system. This excludes it from being the 
syntax of a physiology of the Universe. Thus, even similarity is something taught and 
learnt culturally. Stjernfelt explained that if this is the case “it would be impossible 
to teach anybody anything if one were not allowed to say ‘Now, do like I do …’ and 
thereby presuppose similarity.” (2007, p. 63-64) I argue that this early Econian 
account confuses similarity with identity. Following a Peircean account similarity is 
not subject to culture. Perhaps the way in which similarities are discovered is 
cultural. As an example, while Romanians see the similarity between easiness and 
flowers
17
, British see the similarity between easiness and a piece of cake. This does 
not mean that a Romanian would never see the easiness of a piece of cake or that a 
British person would not see the easiness of a flower. Indeed easiness and a piece of 
cake share qualities: the piece of cake is easy to handle, easy to eat, it is obvious 
what I can do with it and if it is only a piece I will not feel heavy after I eat it. There 
surely are other similarities between easiness and pieces of cake, but one only needs 
to discover a couple of them. In the same way, one shall find similarities between 
easiness and flowers worn, or hanging, by someone’s ear. Having discovered a 
similarity between x and y does not imply that the similarity between x and z is 
obscured, but only unfamiliar until discovered. 
It is important to notice that the iconicity assuming strand of semiotics (or, 
generally, of pragmatism) impetuously implies a liberal educational view, since 
learning is a discovery of similarities and similarity is not something taught and 
learnt. Similarity is discovered and in this phenomenon of discovery the teacher does 
not have much to teach her student. In Part II of this thesis I shall explain that the 
teacher has rather something to learn from the way in which her student learns a 
similarity. The anti-iconic strands propose instructional education, for the claim that 
similarity is a cultural construct which is learnt and taught through imitation. In this 
case, repeated imitation accounts for the building up of a cultural understanding of 
similarity. 
Umberto Eco, as an exponential figure of 20
th
 century semiotics, has been an 
emblematic figure for the 60s and 70s anti-iconic philosophy. It is Eco as well that 
becomes an emblematic figure for the schematic turn of semiotics, consisting in the 
proper rediscovery of Peirce’s icon concept and its stake for semiotics generally. 
Stjernfelt describes Eco’s 1997 Kant and the platypus as a confession of conversion 
from anti-iconic structuralism to Peircean (iconic) pragmatism. In this work Eco 
admits the impossibility of a semantic of everyday concepts (e.g. ‘platypus’) without 
an iconic ground. There needs be a schema, in the Kantian sense, inherent in 
semiosis which makes it possible. The Peircean equivalent of Kantian schema is the 
diagram (particular hypoicon). This is not the place for an analysis of the late Eco 
and his Kant and the platypus, what matters here is the schematic turn of semiotics, 
the shift of focus to icons. This explains the growing interest for Peirce’s semiotics 
                                                          
17
 It would be safe to suppose that the English idiom “piece of cake” is almost equivalent with the 
Romanian “floare la ureche” (lit. flower by the ear). 
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in the humanities and not only in the past two decades. This return of focus to icons 
immediately invited the understanding of signs as physiological phenomena, and not 
just cultural constructs. It imposes the take of semiotics as logic instead of cultural 
analysis method. The iconic (or schematic or phenomenological) turn of semiotics is 
richly manifesting. The semiotic works of the late Eco are its confirmation. John 
Deely’s realist semiotic accounts of history of philosophy, placing Peirce as the pivot 
from modernism to postmodernism are a manifestation of this turn (e.g. Deely 2001). 
From Deely’s perspective the non-pragmatic semiotics (semiology) of the 20
th
 
century are late versions of modernism that did not solve the dualist modern 
fallacies. Frederik Stjernfelt’s 2007 Diagrammatology is the strong declaration of the 
iconic turn, where this shift of focus was first systematized theoretically.  
Both Deely and Stjernfelt have commented on the compatibility between 
pragmatic semiotics and phenomenology. Stjernfelt explained the similarities 
between Peirce’s pragmaticism and Husserl’s phenomenology: they both advance an 
anti-psychologistic logic. Deely remarked the similarities between Peircean and 
Heideggerian ontology. These are justified in virtue of Peirce’s and Heidegger’s 
common medieval philosophical sources (e.g. their appreciation of Duns Scotus, see 
Deely 2000a and 2001a). Biosemiotics flourishedwithin pragmatic semiotics once 
with the iconic turn. If signs are regarded as cultural constructs biosemiotics is, of 
course, problematic: either it is absurd, or it will discuss non-human cultures, which 
is a dangerous enterprise for philosophical speculation. Accounting for signs as 
strictly cultural assumes a nature/culture dichotomy. The consequence, either way, 
would be the reduction of biosemiosis to anthroposemiosis and perhaps 
anthroposemiosis of a peculiar kind, that happening strictly within the borders of 
culturally regulated conventions. Once that iconicity is asssumed, particularly the 
idea of the iconic syntax of the physiology of arguments, biosemiotics can be 
developed. Biosemiotics has been the only version of pragmatic semiotics that 
endured through the second half of the 20
th
 century. It has always been regarded with 
suspicion by the semioticians of the time, its adepts being in an overwhelming 
proportion biologists, not semioticians or any strand of scholars of the humanities 
until the 90s. Taking into account a semiotics detached from linguistics, the issue of 
semiosis in the biological realm is not problematic anymore. 
Thus, Peircean semiotics of the dawn of the third millennium is a newly thriving 
strand of pragmaticism. It is being embraced in several fields, the present thesis 
bringing a full account of it, transposed and applied to education. If in 
phenomenology and history of philosophy this pragmatic semiotics has proved its 
compatibility with Husserl and Heidegger in philosophy of education it will find an 
ally in the third Husserlian phenomenologist whom is already popular in this 
philosophical area, namely Emmanuel Levinas (I explain this in Chapter 9). 
 Peircean pragmaticist semiotics is finally becoming a popular philosophical 
trend. The fertility of pragmaticism once with the iconic turn of semiotics marks all 
the more the essential difference between Peirce’s pragmaticism and the pragmatism 
of these mentioned. The effect of the iconic turn is that it reunited pragmatism and 
semiotics. The pragmatism of the 20
th
 century was not interested in semiotics, being 
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in its initial stage a new experience based philosophy, “radical empiricism” as both 
James and Peirce agreed in describing it, and a linguistic pragmatism once with the 
linguistic turn. Koopman’s history of pragmatism is accurate, apart from framing 
Peirce as a part of this non-semiotic pragmatic tradition. The reunification of 
semiotics and pragmatism inevitably drew the attention of researchers back to Peirce. 
The next two chapters build on the account of experience as semiosis explained 
in this chapter. In Chapter 4 I shall discuss the place of education and pedagogy in 
Peirce’s division of sciences. Peircean semiotics as philosophy of education is an 
experience focused education and can only be understood in its own terms by taking 
into account that experience is semiosis. In Chapter 5 I shall explain that Peirce’s 
philosophy, semiotics that is, is a suprasubjective and non-dual philosophy, contrary 
to Koopman’s argument, and I shall discuss the implications of a suprasubjective 



































Education in Peirce’s Divisions of Science 
 
In the previous chapter Peirce’s semiotics has been presented as a logic founded 
on the maxim of pragmatism (see Chapter 3 and CP 5.18). I argued that this 
pragmatic (or rather pragmaticist) approach has more to offer to education than the 
more popular pragmatic approaches of James and Dewey. The main reason for this is 
the richer account of experience that pragmatic logic brings along, namely 
experience as semiosis. The present chapter investigates some epistemological and 
ethical aspects of education in Peirce’s semiotics. Explaining Peirce’s understanding 
of science and its branches, in this chapter I argue that he implicitly proposed a 
curriculum. On a Peircean account the ideal curriculum would be identical to the 
divisions of science, because the various branches of science are similar amongst 
each other, meaning that they stand in iconic relations. The way in which the 
divisions of science stem from each other has an implicit diagrammatic coherence, 
and, thus, the most iconically operational curriculum would be precisely the way in 
which the sciences have evolved. 
Peirce’s classification of the divisions of science is a cornerstone in 
understanding Peirce’s thought generally. His divisions of science are directly 
inherited from the medieval classification of philosophy, originating in Aristotle. Of 
course, due to the discoveries and developments of modern science taking place in 
the meantime, particularly modernity’s focus on the quadrivium (mathematics), 
Peirce’s divisions differ from the medieval classifications.  
In Chapter 1 it was explained that semiosis is evolutionary while evolution is as 
well a semiosic phenomenon. The purpose of evolution is pursuing the infinitely 
distant identification between Mind and Truth. While being a teleological 
phenomenon, evolution sets its telos from within. It does not follow an externally 
imposed telos; since the identification of Mind and Truth is always infinitely distant 
(see Chapter 1) it cannot be pursued systematically, based on a prognosis. Evolution 
in general, and particularly the evolution of science, cannot be subject to project 
management. Instead, evolution sets the direction of its next step from within, 
according to the realizations (Interpretant) of the present stage. Education is a stage 
which resulted within this evolution. As such, there can be no project of planning 
ahead the path of education. The organizational management of educational 
institutions is the denial of liberal education, of freedom of evolution, and of these 
institutions’ rationale. 
This hypothesis, that evolution itself adapted to signification, already outlined by 
Peirce, found its proper place in biosemiotics (e.g. Stjernfelt 2011, 2014). This leads 
to the project of analysing learning practices, such as classroom phenomena, as 
Lebenswelt. Science is a typically human endeavour. When engaging in explaining 
his division of sciences, Peirce first mentions “that science is a pursuit of living men, 
and that its most marked characteristic is that when it is genuine, it is in an incessant 
state of metabolism and growth.” (CP 1.232) This is a clear expression of what 
pragmaticism mainly stands for, namely the assumption that things can only be in 
76 
 
the way in which they make sense, that is in actu. There can be no science without 
the scientist practicing it. The same argument applies to education: there is no 
education without the learners. This simple observation tends to be overlooked. 
Science is practised by the living, because the living are learning. As such, science 
can be studied as a biological phenomenon. Surely, biology is only a branch of 
science in its turn, but if biology is to investigate phenomena of the living then it is a 
science that par excellence can explain the phenomenon of science. Since in this 
thesis education is analysed as a path leading to science, as a method towards science 
(see Chapter 1), then education will be regarded as certain semiosic phenomena 
responsible for a Lebenswelt. If education is a method towards science then 
education can be labelled a meta-methodology: a method for a method of seeking 
truth. Since the rationale of education is that of serving the progress of science, 
education is strictly dependent on scientific life. Learning, education, and science 
stand in a First-Second-Third Peircean trichotomy. The previous makes the 
following possible and the latter regulates the former in an unending abduction-
deduction-induction loop. Learning makes education possible, which makes science 
possible. As a Third (Interpretant), science makes the learning-education dyadic 
relation meaningful. Without science as telos learning and education could not be 
practiced; they would have been useless endeavours. The findings of science 
remodel learning and education and so on. The triadic system sets its own telos from 
within: education systematizes learning in order to take the direction that science 
points at, while the horizon and the path itself change according to every significant 
progress. 
 
1. Divisions of Science 
 
Peirce’s divisions of science resemble the medieval classification of philosophy, 
inherited from Aristotle. The main medieval reference for the classification of 
philosophy and the curriculum is Cassiodorus’ Institutiones (Deely 2001), a work of 
strong Augustinian descent. Figure 3 below illustrates the medieval divisions of 
philosophy from which Peirce’s divisions evolved. 
 
Figure 3 – The medieval divisions of Philosophy, according to Cassiodorus 
 
Peirce divided science into theoretical and practical. Theoretical science is 
divided into retrospective sciences (sciences of review) and active sciences (sciences 
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of discovery). The sciences of discovery are Mathematics, Philosophy (Coenoscopic 
science), and Idioscopic science. The Idioscopic sciences are physical sciences 
(Physiognosy) and psychical sciences (Psychognosy). Physiognosy contains sciences 
such as physics, chemistry, biology, etc., and Psychognosy contains psychology, 
ethnology, linguistics, sociology, history, etc. (see CP 1.238 – 1.272). Figure 4 
below illustrates Peirce’s divisions of science. 
 
 
Figure 4 – The divisions of science, according to Peirce 
 
Peirce was aware that these disciplines are usually mingled and make use of each 
other. This fact is illustrated by this division. That all these fields fall under the same 
category (science), it means that they share qualities, and thus a diagram of the 
sciences is possible. This is why Peirce never needed to propose a curriculum 
explicitly: if the sciences are diagrammatic among each other than the best way to 
learn them is exactly as they are. The curriculum is itself science, or a further 
diagrammatization of subdivisions of it. The curriculum, therefore, needs to be like 
the divisions of science, that is an Icon of the divisions of science. Peirce stated from 
the beginning what is the similarity among the sciences. Their shared quality is the 
fact that they are all observational: 
“All knowledge whatever comes from observation; but different sciences are 
observational in such radically different ways that the kind of information derived 
from the observation of one department of science (say natural history) could not 
possibly afford the information required of observation by another branch (say 
mathematics).” (CP 1.238) 
As a diagram, this curriculum proposal is schematic and flexible. It gives just a 
principle, as a backbone, for a curriculum. This principle is the history of ideas. The 
diagram shows how the sciences evolved. It proposes, therefore, the learning of the 
most basic principles of observation in the earliest years of schooling. On this 
account, education should start with the learning of semiotics. This consists in 
developing a semiotic consciousness by the children, who would simply become 
aware that they are learning. To realize that the self is in relation with others around 
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and that only by these relations it learns is to gain a semiotic consciousness. The first 
subject to be taught, therefore, is logic (semiotics). Once the learners can perform 
logical operations consciously, they can proceed to observing mathematics, which 
leads to philosophy, and which leads to idioscopy. Of course, the first stages of 
learning any new subject are abductive. When a learner, for example, engages in 
learning philosophy the first thing she learns is to discover the “philosophical” 
knowledge she already gained by her everyday casual observation. As such, at a 
more mature stage, when she will make the next step of inquiring into the psychical 
sciences she can choose if she prefers to start with sociology, psychology or 
anthropology, according to where her abductions, deductions and inductions led her. 
For instance, a child might prove to be more interested in an individual’s behaviour, 
while another might find more interest in looking at group behaviour. The diagram 
of the curriculum contains general classes, such as ‘philosophy’, ‘psychognosy’ or 
‘physiognosy’, without specifying particular and narrow pursuits. That a student 
choses to focus more on a tradition of philosophy than on others and prefers to read 
Durkheim rather than Freud is her own choice. The schooling system has to be 
flexible enough to allow and encourage this possibility. At the same time, it is not 
only the individual’s choices and an individual path that sets the curriculum for the 
specific individual, but also the entire academic community and society. Lebenswelt 
particularities are not necessarily restrictive; they set the real possibilities of 
interpretation. The fact that we find ourselves in a certain moment within the history 
of ideas, within certain social, economic and cultural structures of signification, sets 
a space for signification to develop. If the Lebenswelt imposes, for some reason, the 
exploration of certain subjects, this should not be easily dismissed. It should all be 
done by allowing freedom for signification to grow in any direction (see Stjernfelt in 
Bundgaard and Stjernfelt, p. 232 and in Chapter 1). Semiotics is a hermeneutically 
rich logic that can only be practised freely. As such, the first statement it brings to 
education is that it needs to be a free system. Otherwise, the system would only bring 
forth Interpretants constrained by its inner structure. It would be diagrammatic, 
having inner coherency, but not metaphorical, that is, it would not expand by 
parallelism to something else, toward the yet unknown. As such, the proposed 
curriculum is not rigid; it will change in time, according to how signification 
evolves. Semiotics necessarily implies a liberal curriculum by the assertion that the 
first thing to be learned is observation itself.    
All learning happens through observation, which is experience. Different varieties 
of observation generate the variety of sciences. Theoretical sciences are directed 
towards, in Peirce’s words, “God’s truth” (CP 1.239) while the practical sciences are 
“for the uses of life” (CP 1.239). Retrospective sciences and active sciences regulate 
and respectively orientate each other. Mathematics, Philosophy and the Idioscopic 
sciences are a Peircean trichotomy. Mathematics “merely posits hypotheses, and 
traces out their consequences,” (CP 1.240), thus consisting in the abductive phase of 
the active sciences. As such, since the positing of hypotheses means discovery of 
predicates, mathematics is governed by icon manipulations. Peirce made it clear 
about mathematical observation that it is icon manipulation: 
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“The reasoning of mathematicians will be found to turn chiefly upon the use 
of likeness, which are the very hinges of the gates of their science. The utility of 
likeness to mathematicians consists in their suggesting in a very precise way, new 
aspects of supposed states of things.” (CP 2.281) 
Even more precise, in Chapter 2 it was shown that, according to Peirce, 
mathematical reasoning is diagrammatic, a particular type of iconicity. Mathematics 
“makes constructions in the imagination according to abstract precepts, and then 
observes these imaginary objects, finding in them relations of parts not specified in 
the precept of construction” (CP 1.240), Peirce explained. This proves that 
imagination is a part of experience, actually, the basic experience which makes all 
other experiences possible. We understand things because we can mentally 
manipulate tokens of them – this is an argument for the suprasubjectivity of reality. 
The signs we mentally manipulate are diagrams: they are icons, because they 
resemble the objects reconstructed, hypoicons because in the sign-relation 
constituted by the mental manipulation and its ground there is inner similarity, and, 
though signs of Firstness, by manipulating these signs, they manifest a degree of 
Secondness, because we can only manipulate Replicas of what we want to 
manipulate. Thus, mathematical observation finds in its objects relations of parts not 
specified in the precept of construction. (CP 1.240)  
It is proven therefore, putting it in this semiotic language, that at least all 
theoretical sciences start with icon manipulation; even more precise, they start with 
diagrammatic reasoning (retrospective sciences come along only as general 
abduction of the active sciences). From this point of view even the positing of 
hypotheses requires a discovery. Mathematics, nevertheless the First of this 
trichotomy, “meddles with every other science without exception.” (CP 1.245) 
Mathematical observation, just like icons generally in reasoning, is defused 
throughout all the divisions of science. A cornerstone for Peirce’s semiotics is that 
mathematics is very close to logic, a class under philosophy (CP 1.245).  The Second 
of the trichotomy, philosophy “deals with positive truth, indeed, yet contents itself 
with observations such as come within the range of every man’s normal experience, 
and for the most part in every waking hour of his life,” (CP 1.241), accounted Peirce, 
attributing the terminology that he inherited as coenoscopic to Bentham.  
Philosophy is, therefore, experience in the most common sense, and in this stands 
its difficulty: it’s objects of observation are so obvious that they are difficult to 
conceptualize. It implies a focus added to the hypotheses stemming from 
mathematics. If a London resident assumed the hypothesis that she lives in a space 
where the shortest distance between two points is the straight line uniting these 
points, she will infer that the quickest way between Oxford Circus and Covent 
Garden is via Oxford Street. She might change her mind, though, noticing the crowd 
on Oxford Circus. This is an example of philosophical obsevation.The Third, 
Idiscopic science, another terminology inherited from Bentham, consists in a special 
type of observation, an observation “which travel or other exploration, or some 
assistance to the senses, either instrumental or given by training, together with 
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unusual diligence, has put within the power of its students.” (CP 1.242) This is the 
stage were the London rezident will take a look at statistics of demographics in 
London to figure out her walk from Oxford Circus to Covent Garden. It involves 
signification of Thirdness, being the class of science where Arguments are 
developed. Retrospective science starts when the Londoner starts to doubt whether in 
London the shortest path between two points is the straight line between the points. 
The divisions of science form a sound diagram, being operational due to its strong 
inner similarities. This means that the learning and teaching of a subbranch is 
dependent on the teaching and learning of more primal branches. For example, 
philosophy cannot be inquired without logic (mathematical reasoning), or the 
psychical sciences are absurd without previous philosophical reflection. Indeed, 
psychology, sociology, linguistics and so on stem from philosophy. This is how they 
were historically developed as well. It does not make sense for a student to study 
psychology without any philosophical understanding. If it is possible for a student to 
understand Freud without having had studied Aristotle and  Nietzsche it is because 
she had been going through her own coenoscopy. The student’s own experience and 
reflection during every waking hour of her life might have made it interesting for her 
to study human behaviour. Interesting in this case means compatible to her web of 
signs. Surely, without the reasoning of philosophy, psychology would be pointless. 
For example, the desire of studying human behaviour is the result of a logically 
(mathematical, and, thus, diagrammatic) applied judgement possible only upon the 
observing of human behaviour. A human person will be interested in human 
behaviour once she has already noticed human behaviour and something made it 
interesting. If philosophical observation tends to happen naturally it does not mean 
that the curriculum should ignore it and count on the student’s own idioscopy. What 
Peirce is telling through this diagram is precisely that Freud is better understood by 
someone familiar with Aristotle and Nietzsche. 
Peirce gave a serious insight towards a theory of learning by explaining the 
practical sciences. The practical sciences are much like the medievals’ utilitarian arts 
(crafts), distinct from the liberal arts. Here there is not so much a classification to be 
done, neither are there mechanisms of reasoning to be explained. They are “well-
recognized sciences now in actu” (CP 1.243). Peirce gave an enumeration of 
examples of such practical sciences: “pedagogics, gold-beating, etiquette, pigeon-
fancying, vulgar arithmetic, horology, surveying, navigation, telegraphy, printing, 
bookbinding, paper-making, deciphering, ink-making, librarian’s work, engraving.” 
(CP 1.243) The first important insight to be derived from here is that the first 
practical science that Peirce named is pedagogics. By pedagogics here he meant the 
art, the very practice of teaching. By placing pedagogics here Peirce informs the 
reader at least about two important considerations for a theory of learning. First of 
all, that pedagogics is not a subbranch of pscychology which is an Idioscopic 
(therefore theoretical) science. It was already mentioned that he considered that the 
scientific man might lack in popularity as a teacher. Pedagogy is not the subject of 
psychology, sociology or any other psychognosy, but it is developed by practice. The 
second observation which should not escape is that since pedagogics is a science it is 
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observational. It will be developed by practical observation. The teacher needs to 
teach in order to learn this science. Observing other teachers is also a good method 
of practical observation. As such, we inherit from Peirce two recommendations for 
teacher training: (1) teachers should observe other teachers and (2) teachers should 
teach. 
Another observation stemming from this list of practical sciences regards 
what should be taught under a liberal system of education. The integration in a 
liberal curriculum of any of these crafts is problematic. Like any science, they should 
be taught in the situation where their teaching serves the hunger for and pursuit of 
truth. Perhaps a first hypothesis would be that they should be undertaken by these 
who find their use towards a scientific goal, such as a researcher undertaking 
teaching, as she might teach her research. There are examples of subjects that can be 
either a theoretical, either a practical science. For instance, music is an art of the 
quadrivium, while it was also approached as an utilitarian craft, in the case of 
playing techniques. Likewise, arithmetic is one of the four arts of the quadrivium, 
falling under mathematics in Peirce’s divisions, but Peirce also mentioned a vulgar 
arithmetic as practical science, an arithmetic allowing the performance of what can 
be called market place arithmetic, which is not underpinned by the conceptualization 
of metric relations as a scientific endeavour per se. This shows that a science is 
legitimate to be taught in the perspective of liberal education according to how the 
learner understands this science. If within a learner’s web of signs a certain 
discipline’s scientific character is revealed, she can find the justification for studying 
this science, which, as such, is interesting.  
However, the teaching of utilitarian crafts, arguably, might be necessary 
when individuals’ life would be meliorated in this way. However, their “teaching” 
would be limited to practical observation, as any theory (in the strict sense) about the 
practicing of crafts cannot meet the purpose of the practice. Crafts need to be 
practised.  
As for learning as a theoretical discipline, it occurs that it identifies with 
Mathematics, logic that is. Learning is nothing else, in this case, but pragmatic logic 
– semiotics. This brings us back to St Augustine’s and the medievals’ assumption 
that things are learnt through signs (Chapter 1). This is the first thing that St 
Augustine teaches in his pedagogical book (De Doctrina Christiana) and this is what 
semiotics teaches as the first thing that should be taught and learned.  
 
2. The Learning-Education-Science trichotomy 
  
Another argument presented in Chapter 1 is that the sole purpose, and, therefore 
the rationale, of education is the progress in knowledge per se. Any other objective 
besides this infinite progression which would deviate education from its path, 
starting with spontaneous learning and leading to scientific discovery, is an 
unjustifiable bias. Thus, an educational philosophy founded on pragmaticism is 
necessarily liberal education. The history of semiotics and educational philosophy 
supports this claim (see Chapter 1). In understanding the place of education in 
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Peircean philosophy the starting point is therefore this: education is a method of 
inducing from learning to science; it is a means by which spontaneous observations 
are systematized so as to serve science. It is essential to keep in mind that this 
method is not a rigid mechanism, but a critical part of human life. “Let us look upon 
science -- the science of today -- as a living thing,” (CP 1.234) Peirce urged his 
readers. If it is an essential aspect of science that is practiced by human beings then 
to learn about science one must enquire on these scientists. The assumption that 
learning is discovery implies that the progress in knowledge is the progress of 
knowledge. Knowledge belongs to life forms – they have it, they perform it. To 
understand science, Peirce went not to an abstract discipline, but directly to its life, 
to the scientists: 
“Now, did those men gradually become men of science as their stores of 
knowledge increased, or was there an epoch in their lives, before which they were 
amateurs and after which they were scientists? I believe that the answer is that, 
like any other regeneration, the metamorphosis is commonly sudden, though 
sometimes slow. When it is sudden, what is it that constitutes the transformation? 
It is their being seized with a great desire to learn the truth, and their going to 
work with all their might by a well-considered method to gratify that desire. The 
man who is working in the right way to learn something not already known is 
recognized by all men of science as one of themselves, no matter how little he is 
informed.” (CP 1.235) 
This already brings the focus on the issue of education. Science is best 
represented by those practicing it. One, therefore, grows to be a scientist, she 
undergoes an education towards it, be it the education offered by an external system, 
or her own endeavours, or a combination of both. The criteria for recognizing the 
scientist is her great desire to learn the truth. Hence, this is what education ought to 
cultivate, the desire to learn. Without the learner’s own sincere will of pursuing truth 
education is pointless. Science will spring forth from this desire, as a gratification of 
it. This desire to learn assures the compatibility between the known and the 
unknown, between that which the learner is and that which she will become by an 
achievement of knowledge. To express this in the terminology that this Peircean 
theory of learning is advancing, the will to learn a certain unknown puts the 
unknown in an iconic relation to the known: the learner looks at the unknown as at a 
certain something that has to resemble what for her is known. What is being learned 
and what is known are diagrammatic to the teacher-learner whole web of 
signification – it is a part that resembles the whole. Of course, if the only meaning 
phenomenon that describes learning is that the unknown is seen in a light that makes 
it similar to the known, learning, as well as the object to be learned, are quite banal 
and useless. There is another meaning phenomenon, a characteristic of this semiosis, 
that makes the learning and the to-be-learned interesting, namely that also the known 
becomes similar to the unknown. When learning something new, the learner not only 
realizes that that which she did not know is not that strange to her signifying world, 
but also that her signifying world had some inherent strangeness. The very fact that 
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we are subject to change proves the strangeness of the self’s own present state. 
Learning something new brings awareness of this strangeness and thus arouses a 
sense of wonder and thirst for knowledge. By developing a new Interpretant, the 
learner’s whole world, the learner herself, changes. The achievement of knowledge 
is an expansion of the web of signs which constitutes a learning subject. “The life of 
science is in the desire to learn,” (CP 1.235) considered Peirce. Science can therefore 
be practiced only if lived and, as such, cannot be done dishonestly, without a desire 
for learning the truth, whatever that may be and however it is thought of.  
An educational system objectifies learning goals on the path of the learner. If 
learning is simply an immediate sign of life, education is problematic because it 
constrains it. A web of signs expands according to its own will, in the limits of its 
Umwelt. Education comes as an external restriction for a living organism, refraining 
the organism’s natural wandering in its own Umwelt and focusing it upon objects 
which might not have been of interest beforehand. Perhaps a certain seven year old 
child is not interested in basic arithmetic, but would surely be interested in 
expanding its web of signs in the direction of geometry. Nevertheless, to survive in 
contemporary human Lebenswelt she will be taught arithmetic as well. Such are the 
cases where, according to Peirce’s above argument, education becomes problematic. 
It is problematic because while the child might nourish a desire for knowing what is 
true, she fails to see that what the educational system is teaching her is a path 
towards truth. Such situations will be further investigated in Part II. What needs to 
be noted at this stage is that education, schooling, has to inspire the desire to know 
the truth. It occurs that according to Peirce it does not even matter much how a 
person pursues truth once she lives a certain desire for it. Simply being driven by this 
desire will imply a general tendency towards truth, even if a certain instantiation of 
learning is wrong (whatsoever wrong might mean – implying false conclusions from 
true premisses, using a superfluous method, etc.). In Chapter 2, where Peirce’s sign 
types were introduced, it was explained that the fully developed sign to which all 
signs tend is the sign type that tends to the truth – the Argument. Therefore, the role 
of education is argumentation (developing arguments). For an Argument to serve as 
predicate an Icon is needed. This predicate is, in this case, the will (the desire, the 
interest) to learn – this is an icon, giving to the phenomenon of education 
diagrammatic coherency. The will to learn is similar to learning, it is an icon of it; as 
Peirce explained, it is almost confused with its object – once she wills to learn the 
learner is already engaged in learning. The educational system cannot offer this 
predicate (Icon) to the learner; it is for the learner alone to discover it. Each human 
being has its own personal reasons for learning and this is why for some it comes 
rather at hand to learn geology and for others painting.  
The diagrammatic coherence between the semiosic structure of the 
motivation and that of the unknown-to-be-learnt determines the direction that 
learning will take. Once the learner contains these predicates she needs to apply 
subjects to them. This is something that education as schooling does: it shows the 
learner subjects for her predicates. Subjects need to be Indices, signs of direct 
affection that point a direction. Therefore, the action of the educational system is that 
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of pointing direction, it provides orientation, a focus. It is a simple and oftenly 
occurring mistake that the educational system even punishes the learner by 
marginalizing her place in the suprasubjective Lebenswelt (e.g. society) if she fails to 
apply predicates to the subjects that the educational system is presenting forth. When 
this happens the problem is that between the predicates which the learner discovered 
by herself and the subjects that schooling is brining into attention there is no 
diagrammatic relation. From the perspective of the learner the subjects of the 
curriculum are not interesting, and from the perspective of the educational system 
the predicates of the learner are idle: both regard each other’s knowledge as useless 
and this obscures all possibilities of learning. Indices are unsaturated predicates (see 
also Part II and Bellucci 2013, p. 18) and, if the learner is to become able to apply to 
a subject one of her own predicates  she needs to develop from this subject a 
predicate. For this she needs to discover the iconic character upon which that index 
was developed; after this is achieved it is simple – a simple play with an Icon will 
result in its use as a predicate (a rheme). Once she knows the rhematic potentiality of 
the index she can use it as well as a subject (unsaturated rheme) applied to a 
predicate. This is so because by discovering the rhematic potentiality of a sign 
(rhematic potentiality is iconic character), the sign becomes diagrammatically 
coherent with her own web of signs. This phenomenon is referred to as discovery.  
The learner has to take pains to make discoveries herself. The educational 
system has two roles, therefore: (1) to provide to the learners a suitable amount of 
subjects worth pursuing – many, so that the chance that compatible subject-predicate 
structures occur is high, but not too many, as that would delude focus and obscure 
learning – and (2) to provide the adequate Lebenswelt for discovery to be happen – 
this is most of the time a negative endeavour, the educational system should be 
concerned with not obscuring the possibility of discovery. Living beings learn; they 
do so because they need to survive and grow. No matter what the explanation for this 
is they certainly learn: it was already taken as an assumption that living and learning, 
in this biosemiotic account, are equivalent. The only danger that might befall on an 
educational system is that of willing to pursue something else but truth: 
“If this desire is not pure, but is mingled with a desire to prove the truth of 
a definite opinion, or of a general mode of conceiving of things, it will almost 
inevitably lead to the adoption of a faulty method; and in so far such men, among 
whom many have been looked upon in their day as great lights, are not genuine 
men of science; though it would be foul injustice to exclude them absolutely from 
that class. So if a man pursues a futile method through neglect to inform himself 
of effective methods, he is no scientific man; he has not been moved by an 
intelligently sincere and effective desire to learn. But if a man simply fails to 
inform himself of previous work which would have facilitated his own, although 
he is to blame, it would be too harsh to say that he has violated the essential 
principles of science.” (CP 1.235) 
Therefore, education has to be well aware of the temptations coming from 
other sectors of society: economic, social, political and other interests might mingle 
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and delude education from its pure liberal path. Such interventions obscure the very 
telos of scientific discovery away from education, depriving education of its sole 
rationale. If a knowing subject is to know, she has to strip her will for knowledge of 
any selfishness: seeking to prove the truth of a statement, proving one’s own 
knowledge to be sufficient – these are pathological for education. Therefore, in her 
relation to a teacher, the learner’s only duty is to be genuinely interested in what the 
teacher has to teach. The same is valid for the teacher: her only way of sharing 
knowledge on a particular subject is to desire to know the knowledge of her student. 
This mutual willingness to know that which the other knows makes learning 
possible. This is the argument on which this Peircean Theory of Learning is founded; 
it will be thoroughly explained in Part II. Since the present study does not prescribe 
methods for learning, but for teaching the focus does not come on the student’s 
willingness to know the teacher, but on the teacher’s willingness to know the 
student. I argue that, according to Peirce, the teacher’s going out of herself, towards 
the student, embracing the knowledge of the student, is the mandatory condition for 
the student’s possibility for a growth of knowledge towards the knowledge of the 
teacher, towards the structures of signification that the teacher is aiming at. 
Science, and therefore education, as explained, belong to the world of human 
beings, to Lebenswelt. As such, they will lead to the production of very particular 
Lebenswelten. On what is a rather nominalist account, Thomas Kuhn referred to 
these different Lebenswelten as paradigms(Kuhn, 1970), a celebrated terminology. 
While Kuhn insisted on the strictly cultural aspect of science, a Peircean account 
subjects science to biology. Whether non-human animals live culturally and are 
capable or even perform science we cannot know. We simply cannot know what it 
means to be non-human (see also Stables 2012) and, fortunately, this we do not even 
need to know. Therefore, the question arises, is not Kuhn’s account rather adequate, 
looking at scientific progress as a socio-cultural enterprise? To this I answer that the 
Peircean account, subjecting education and science to the biological is insightful 
because learning is a characteristic of life and education and science are only 
possible where learning happens. Peirce’s semiotics does not place nature and 
culture in a relation of dichotomy, but instead they are regarded as continuous. 
Whether it is adequate or not to state that tigers educate their young is probably 
impossible to know, but surely tigers do learn. This learning is semiotically the same 
as learning in the human world – it is a discovery and use of predicates. Peirce’s 
account is therefore holistic in respect to Kuhn’s epistemology because it does not 
assume a nature/culture dichotomy. Nature and culture are continuous. Peirce 
stressed that having a different scientific direction implies living in a different world. 
Science, education, and learning are similar since they evolve one from the other. 
The Lebenswelt of scientific human beings, which goes under the name of academia, 
has its own peculiarities, but in the same time it is similar to more general 
Lebenswelten and to more basic Umwelten. Thus, it will be here studied as such. The 
web of signs constituting oneself is essentially captivated by a scientific endeavor, as 
the scientific man is taken over by the scientific growth of knowledge. A life of 
research is a certain, peculiar semiotic world: 
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“Such being the essence of science, it is obvious that its first offspring will be 
men -- men whose whole lives are devoted to it. By such devotion each of them 
acquires a training in making some particular kind of observations and 
experiments. (Unfortunately, his acquisition of books, instruments, laboratory, 
etc., depends upon qualifications in which the man of science is usually rather 
wanting -- as wealth, diplomacy, popularity as a teacher -- so that he is less likely 
to be provided with them than are men less qualified to use them for the 
advancement of science.) He will thus live in quite a different world -- quite a 
different aggregate of experience – from unscientific men and even from 
scientific men pursuing other lines of work than his. He naturally converses with 
and reads the writings of those who, having the same experience, have ideas 
interpretable into his own. This society develops conceptions of its own. Bring 
together two men from widely different departments -- say a bacteriologist and 
astronomer -- and they will hardly know what to say to one another; for neither 
has seen the world in which the other lives. True, both use optical instruments; 
but the qualities striven for in a telescopic objective are of no consequence in a 
microscopical objective; and all the subsidiary parts of telescope and microscope 
are constructed on principles utterly foreign to one another – except their 
stiffness.” (CP 1.236) 
Here it becomes clear that for Peirce education is directly connected and 
mutually dependent on science, raising a dilemma with which philosophy has 
struggled since Plato: the wealth of the scientist. According to Peirce it seems a 
safe assumption that the scientific man does not have the means to acquire not 
only abundant wealth, but the essential instruments for carrying out his research. 
Thus, providing these instruments is a role of the educational system. The 
educational system has to protect science, or rather the people pursuing science, 
from society – this falls under the previously mentioned role of education of 
providing the proper Lebenswelt for discovery: keeping education clear of any 
other purposes except the free pursuit of truth and providing the required means 
of research to the researchers (from access to bibliographical sources, to 
microscopes, offices, funding, etc.). It is a lonely Lebenswelt for the researcher: 
“He will thus live in quite a different world,” Peirce wrote.  
In Kuhn’s account as well the conversion from a paradigm to another is an 
uncontrollable act. This proves the seclusion of the scientist: who would claim to 
understand Socrates, or Newton, or Kant genuinely? In her Lebenswelt, the 
researcher shares with other researchers whose ideas are “interpretable” into her 
own.  
Interpretable is something compatible with a Representamen in such a 
way as to constitute the Interpretant of a Sign together with the Representamen. If 
the Representamen is here the web of signs identical to the Lebenswelt of a 
researcher, then structures of signification from the Lebenswelt of another 
researcher are interpretable so as to lead to the expansion of the first researcher’s 
Lebenswelt. An Interpretant has to be compatible (interpretable) with a 
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Representamen so as to constitute together one entity (one Sign). Being parts of a 
whole, the Interpretant and the Representamen need to be diagrammatically 
coherent. This means that they need to resemble as well each other as the whole 
(the Sign). The knowledge of a student has to resemble, therefore, what she is 
learning and both these semiosic structures have to resemble the learning 
phenomenon as a whole. It is up to the learner to discover the similarity between 
what she knows and what she does not know yet. For this she has to look into the 
knowledge of the teacher. The teacher, by knowing her student, can have an 
intuition about the knowledge of the student and anticipate possible similarities 
that she might try to reveal. In this endeavour the teacher has to be careful not to 
obstruct learning possibilities for her student, possibilities that the teacher herself 
cannot be aware of.  
There are infinite learning possibilities for the student (anything can be 
similar to anything else) and the teacher will never be aware of many of them 
because the teacher is never identical with the student. The teacher and the 
student cannot be identical but they can be similar and to be similar, to be 
diagrammatically coherent in potentiality, in this case, is to have the possibility of 
learning one from the other. It is an intimate act, an access to the self of the other, 
the teacher and the student come know each other’s knowledge, the other’s 
intimate semiosic structure. Learning is a form of an erotic act. It is an act of 
longing for the other, longing for the teacher, longing for the student. The student 
wants the knowledge of the teacher, the teacher wants the knowledge of the 
student. The semiotics consciousness, as it is clear in Peirce, proves that one’s 
knowledge cannot be separated from herself, as her knowledge is a determining 
aspect of her Umwelt. Learning is done with great care, so as not to traumatize – 
trauma is nothing else but the obscuring of learning possibilities. Being an 
intimate act, learning can cause violence and close learning possibilities. Teachers 
and students have favourites, they can get jealous, they get anxious, they are 
stressed, they have expectations from the other, they can also be surprised, they 
want to impress the other at times, at other times they want to show to the other 
that she has disappointed, they punish each other, they listen to each other, they 
teach each other – they have an erotic intimate relation. All these things are 
practised by one upon the other, an agent to a subject. It is erotic. The only thing 
that they do together is learn. Learning comes as erotic fulfilment, gratification – 
it is not the agency of one side towards the other, but it is a suprasubjective 
phenomenon per excellence where the two sides have reached diagrammatic 
harmony. This gratification, however, is not just sporadic and temporary. It 
cultivates intimacy and trust between the two. Learning is transcendence and it 
leads eros further into agape. This is the straightforward conclusion of Peirce’s 
theory of evolution and, thus, this is the account of learning that the present 
theory advances; it will be explained thoroughly in Part II. 




















































Suprasubjective Being and Suprasubjective Learning 
 
In this chapter I investigate the educational implications of a suprasubjective 
philosophy, such as the semiotics of Peirce is. I shall explain what suprasubjective 
reality is and what are the advantages and implications of a philosophy of 
suprasubjectivity for education. In Chapter 3 I explained that the account of learning 
as a suprasubjective phenomenon, since learning is semiosis (Stables 2006), is not an 
empiricist or pragmatic (in the Jamesian sense) account of learning. This chapter 
explores what the implications for learning are if experience is suprasubjective. This 
will help in realizing where a Peircean Theory of Education stands within 
contemporary philosophy. 
 
A. Suprasubjective Being: non-dualist philosophy 
 
In the previous chapters the concept of sign, the central concept for semiotics, has 
been introduced. The sign has been presented as a relation of three termini which 
Peirce termed Representamen, Object, and Interpretant. The first of the triadic sign, 
the Representamen, is also referred to in common language as sign, since it performs 
what Umberto Eco called the sign-function (Eco 1976). The object evoking the 
function inherited the denomination of sign-vehicle (Eco 1976). At times Peirce also 
used the word sign to refer to the Representamen of a triad, though, for him the sign 
par excellence is the triad. That he referred to the first of a sign also as sign and also 
the reason for this can be noticed in this following definition he gave, where the 
nature of sign as relation is clearly expressed: 
“A Sign is anything which is related to a Second thing, its Object, in respect 
to a Quality, in such a way as to bring a Third thing, its Interpretant, into relation 
to the same Object, and that in such a way as to bring a Fourth into relation to that 
Object in the same form, ad infinitum.” (CP 2.92) 
Peirce also called the Representamen a sign because from the Representamen the 
relation begins. The Representamen cannot be at all unless in infinite relation. It 
evokes infinite semiosis. The fact that it leads to a fourth terminus and so on ad 
infinitum does not make the sign infinite in an incomprehensible way, because 
graphs are reducible to 3
rd
 degree graphs. Nevertheless, semiosis is infinite and it 
could not be otherwise, as any terminus would bring about, into semiosis, an infinity 
of other relations. We can only think abstractly of the termini of a relation; only as 
termini of relations they have being. To acknowledge the relational character of 
being is a difficult task, since, as Christos Yannaras noticed: 
“In the empirical logic expressed by our everyday language, something first exists 
and is then related to, or comes into relation with, something else – something that is 
already existent.” (p. 1)  
Our everyday language was shaped in this way being underpinned by our 
metaphysical language, developed along centuries of essentialist (non-relational) 
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ontology. Modern philosophy’s dichotomies entrenched this all the more. However, 
there is a common sense way out of essentialism (givenism) and towards relational 
ontology. Yannaras observed that although we understand being as given, and thus 
preceding any relations “at the same time, common experience confirms that every 
being exists only as a coherent combination of relations, only as situated within a 
network of relations.” (p. 2) This is the path of Peirce’s critical common sense as 
well. If something does not relate to some otherness it does not exist – it is not in 
iconic syntax within the physiology of arguments. Meaning is always infinite and, 
unlike information, it is not quantifiable. This has deep implications for the way in 
which we understand teaching and learning. Information can be identified with the 
quantifiable part of meaning, which is often not relevant for the phenomenon of 
semiosis, especially in the case of learning. The quantifiable aspect of a structure of 
meaning which is being learnt might not be representative. It is impossible to 
quantify the creativity by which a student uses an Icon as a Predicate and it might 
often be irrelevant if the Icons a student is discovering are the Icons the teacher has 
in mind. This is why evaluation if problematic. Establishing a ranking of the students 
(e.g. by grading) entails quantifying the information that the students acquired in 
respect to what is expected. Adopting a semiotic philosophy of education, which 
supposes the hypothesis that meaning in its entirety is infinite and unquantifiable has 
to change this evaluation paradigm. To propose a method of evaluation that does not 
rely on quantification of information is not an easy task and it does not occur 
immediately. However, in the following chapters I explain that the crux of this 
matter stands in the personal relation between student and teacher and in the attitude 
with which the two engage in the relation. I argue that a suprasubjective account of 
reality implies a certain understanding of consciousness bounded to personality. Per 
Aage Brandt (2007) suggested that on a semiotic account consciousness and 
personality are at least intimately related. Personality is the Interpretant of the 
semiosis in which certain living beings (humans) are engaged.  
The sign is triadic, as two termini can come into a stable circularity by being 
linked to a third. A dyadic relation per se is useless because of its redundancy: a 
relation in which two termini relate to each other back and forth can never be used 
for anything. Something (a first) leads to something else in some respect (a second), 
which leads to another thing (a third) which can very well relate back to the one of 
the previous two – this is a graspable and useful being, proper relation. It is infinite 
but comprehensible. With the above sign definition Peirce accounted that the key to 
the comprehensibility of the Universe is the possibility of sharing: a chain of 
relations at some point (with its third element) relates back to the same Object to 
which the relation led from the start. As well, to this Object shared by the 
Representamen and the Interpretant the relation was possible in the first place in 
respect to a Quality. The sign in itself, therefore, is diagrammatic – it has inner 
similarity. Sharing of qualities is the definition used here for similarity (Chapter 1, 
section C). Infinite semiosis has iconic syntax by relating back to a previous 
terminus which was brought about in the first place due to a Quality. As such, since 
it shares the terminus that was brought forth in respect to a Quality, signification has 
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inner similarity. This is an explanation for the intelligibility of the world. It does not 
explain why things (whatever they are or are not) are graspable by cognitive, living 
beings, but it explains why reality itself is intelligible. Because reality is intelligible, 
because it can share, it can support local pluralities, which, as explained in Chapter 
1, is the very definition of life. This supports the claim from Chapter 1 that reality is 
not schizophrenic. This is where semiotics proves to be insightful for biology and 
viceversa: semiotic reality explains life as a growing urge of the cosmos to share. 
That life is local plurality is the biosemiotic formulation of the fact that phenomenal 
worlds overlap. The phenomenal worlds of living organisms (Umwelten and 
Lebenswelten) overlap but never coincide (Stables, 2012). If my experience of 
something (this glass on the table) is not identical with someone else’s experience 
(of the glass) it does not mean that we cannot share in our experiences (I can ask her 
to pass me the glass). Phenomenal worlds can overlap, thus joining into a 
suprasubjective reality, by their inner similarities. Neither do we live in the same 
identical and essentially unaccessible noumenal world, nor do we live in completely 
separated realities. It clearly occurs that the hypothesis that a physiology of 
arguments is possible due to iconic syntax supports the assumption of 
suprasubjective reality. This proves the compatibility between, firstly the Peircean 
semiotics of Frederik Stjernfelt and John Deely, and, secondly, the compatibility of 
these Peircean frameworks with the educational semiotics proposed by Andrew 
Stables.  
Being is suprasubjective because it shares, and, as such it is relation (mediation). 
The relation of a third to a previous is Peirce’s notion of habit (universal, tendency, 
law, etc.): since more termini relate to one terminus, a pattern can be recognized. 
They tend to relate to it, so to say, because if a third relates to something there 
certainly is a second that relates to the same first element. As well, the second and 
the third relate to each other directly, besides their connection to the first. Notice that 
a second of signification (an Object shared within triadic signs) is not simply a 
bridge making the connection between Representamen and Interpretant possible, 
these two being directly connected as well. Within the triadic sign each terminus 
relates to the other two, that is why it is not redundant (e.g. pure convention), but 
useful: each relation has a shared third. The triadic sign can be termed the sign-
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 The tripod is a structure that can serve as a good Icon to represent the sign-relation. The triangle has 
also been used to represent the sign-relation, but the tripod is preferred because by its intersecting 
three dyads in one point, unlike a triangle, it shows that the triadic relation is not merely a sum of 




Figure 5 – The Sign-Relation 
 
In Peircean semiotics the sign-relation is clearly identified with being. The three 
termini of the sign are not separable and do not have being in themselves. The 
Representamen’s and the Interpretant’s character as sign are implicit. None of them, 
like any sign, needs be mental, as it is often thought. The Object, the second of the 
sign, has its being within the sign. In itself it has the potentiality of evoking signs, 
but it is nothing except in relation. It is never a strictly mental or non-mental entity, 
as it is often thought. Since the sign is a 3
rd
 degree graph it cannot be reduced to 
smaller degree graphs (see Chapter 2). By this assumption Peirce offered a way out 
of modern dualism, uniting ontology and epistemology. Being is relation, 
transcending the realm of mind or that of non-mind. Being sweeps through reality 
without having its status as being affected by the shift from the mental to the non-
mental. Being, thus, is suprasubjective. In the words of Paul Bains, “relations do not 
respect any ontological Iron Curtain.” (Bains 2006, p. 9) 
If one tries to focus and grasp any of the three termini of a sign in isolation, to cut 
them away from the sign-relation, she will find other sign or signs constituting each 
of them. If one tries to isolate the Object of a Sign she will only think of the Object 
as a Sign. This is obvious, since we can only learn by signs – signs are the only 
things we can use. For example, we can think of a Representamen which can be 
described as the phenomenon of perceiving the changing of color into green at a 
traffic light, having as Object the impression this perception makes, and its 
Interpretant consisting in the consequences – the sense of traffic changes, a person 
can recall the smell of freshly cut grass (due to the shared quality of greenness), and 
another person is eased because she realizes she can make it in time. Together these 
three termini are a Sign (S1). The Object – the impression of a perception – can only 
be thought of as a Sign (S2); this Sign (S2), referring to another Sign’s (S1) Object, 
does not coincide with the referred Object, but, nevertheless, it describes it. This is 
not so because the Object (or some terminus of the Sign) is in itself noumenal, but 
because, as a real existing phenomenon, it is not precisely delimitated. The Object 
(or any terminus of the sign-relation) has its unique, genuine being in relation, in a 
set of infinite relations. The same observation holds true applied to any of the three 
termini. Difficult perhaps to explain, it is simple: we can talk about signs, and, of 
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course, we use signs to talk about signs. This is why it is difficult to give examples 
of signs: applying this metasemiotic analysis we always refer to signs by means of 
signs, which are always in actu. The signs we refer to, we refer to in abstract, 
through the mediation of other signs (signs about signs), which are Replicas, and 
therefore, we do not access the in actu sign we refer to. Nevertheless, reference is 
possible, because the sign mediates. Signs in actu, as obvious as they appear and are 
maneuverable (due to their Iconicity), have vague delimitations. In practice I know 
how to start moving towards some direction when I see green at a traffic light, but to 
describe the semiotic phenomenon is difficult unless taken into account the inherent 
vagueness of semiosis (on vagueness in Peirce’s semiotics see Nöth and Santaella 
2011). This, the discovery of semiotics by semiotic beings, is called by Deely 
semiotic consciousness (2009, p. 3). It is an important evolutionary stage: semiotic 
beings (life forms) discover semiosis – the Universe is discovering itself. Hence, the 
vagueness we experience when learning is justified and it also explains why 
vagueness can at times be a rhetorical virtue. Signs, by which we live, are not clearly 
charted within the physiology of arguments.  
An ontology of relations, a cosmology of signs, does not account for the typically 
modern dualisms from which philosophy still has a difficult time detaching: 
mind/body, mental/physical, objective/subjective. All strands of dualist philosophy 
have claimed the necessity of clarity in philosophy and, therefore, imposed clarity as 
a rhetorical virtue. As explained above, this is not the case of the suprasubjective 
account, which brings an awareness of the vagueness of (relational) being. The 
source for all these modern dichotomies is the ens rationis/ens reale ontological 
distinction (mind dependent/mind independent being, see Deely 1982, 2001a, 2009). 
By claiming that this distinction is not ontological, semiotics unites epistemology 
and ontology within itself. Purely mind dependent or purely mind independent signs 
are impossible to think of otherwise than abstractly. One cannot think separately of 
any of the three phenomenological categories (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, see 
CP 1.557)
19
 as one cannot separate mind-dependency and mind-independency. They 
can be thought of only abstractly, while being aware that the object thought of is still 
semiotic, and, as such, suprasubjective. This does not have to do with a limit of 
cognition, but rather it proves that mind-dependent and mind-independent being are 
at least limit ontological cases, thresholds of being, if not actually impossible. 
Semiotics unites ontology and epistemology, thus transcending what are strictly 
called realism and idealism into suprasubjectivism, or how Peirce described it, 
extreme scholastic realism. This characteristic of semiotics led some to see in 
Charles Peirce the first clear breakthrough from philosophical modernity to 
philosophical postmodernity. The first to proclaim this clearly is John Deely (e.g. 
1982, 2001). One can now observe that philosophy, along its history, focused either 
on mind independent being, which is the case of Aristotle, or on mind dependent 
being, as in the case of modern philosophy, the exponent of which is Kant. Thus, 
Peirce’s breakthrough from this either/or would announce the dawn of a new 
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“ […] no one of the categories can be prescinded from those above it [...].” (CP 1.557) 
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philosophical age. There was a tendency towards such a suprasubjective ontology 
throughout medieval philosophy ever since St Augustine developed Doctrina 
Signorum. Deely argues that the tendency was fulfilled and a proper suprasubjective 
philosophy was reached in late scholasticism, particularly in the case of Joao Poinsot 
(1982, p. 59, 2001a, 2009). There are, as well, contradictory opinions; for instance 
Marmo considers Poinsot’s philosophy to be no more than a mainstream Thomism in 
the age of Locke and Descartes (1987). According to Marmo, Poinsot achieved 
nothing new, but only used, in his understanding of signs, Thomas Aquinas’s theory 
of analogy, while holding on to the Augustinian definition of sign and to the 
innovations (and critics) brought to it in the meantime, by, for instance, Roger 
Bacon, as many medieval scholastics did.  
I consider that there is an important resemblance between Poinsot and Peirce’s 
semiotics. This confirms the interdependency between liberal education and 
suprasubjective semiotics, since Poinsot, in the context of late Iberian scholasticism, 
was a student and a teacher of the mainstream medieval liberal curriculum. Like 
Peirce’s definition of sign as relation, Poinsot’s definition of sign is minimal and 
reveals three elements: “that which represents something other than itself to a 
cognitive power.” (Poinsot 1631: [9al-30]) This definition recommends the sign as 
suprasubjective. It fits perfectly with Peirce’s definition: “the triadic relation existing 
between a sign, its object, and the interpreting thought, itself a sign, considered as 
constituting the mode of being of a sign.” (CP 8.332) The argument that Peirce 
indeed brings a breakthrough from modern dualism is strengthened by observing 
these similarities with Poinsot. That there was a non-modern, scholastic frame of 
mind which, by developing a logic of signs, gave an account of reality as 
suprasubjective proves that Peirce’s philosophy is non-dualist as well. Poinsot is an 
exponent and a proof of this. Peirce, having plenty of scholastic sources, many of 
which the same as Poinsot, developed the relational logic of semiotics. If one of 
these accounts is an apology for proper suprasubjectivism, then, arguably, so is the 
other.  
In both Peirce and Poinsot, ontology does not appear as an issue. This is so 
because they solved any possible dilemmas concerning by identifying logical 
phenomena (signs) with being. If triadic relations are suprasubjective nothing else 
can be more fitting to be considered being properly. Ontological status resides in the 
mode of relation and, as Deely comments about Poinsot’s sign, sign-relations 
transcend the subjectivity of the non-mental realm and the objectivity of the mental 
realm: 
“That form of being [the sign] is relation as suprasubjectively linking things 
in the environment among themselves, linking things to objects in apprehension, 
linking objects apprehended among themselves, and linking objects to the 
organisms doing that apprehending [...].” (Deely 2009, p. 73) 
The striking similarity with Peirce’s semiotics consists in the account of semiotics 
as logic: “the universal instrument of Logic is the sign.” (Poinsot, 1631: [642a1-26]) 
This proves to be the semiotic account that underpins suprasubjective ontology. As 
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discussed in Chapter 3, James did not understand pragmatism as a principle of logic 
and was not concerned with developing logic, and thus he did not aim at an account 
for suprasubjectivity.  
The structuralist and poststructuralist accounts of semiotics (de Saussure, the 
early Eco, Derrida) was not particularly concerned with suprasubjectivity either. 
Even though, arguably, in some of its instances, like Derrida and Deleuze, 
poststructuralism disconnected from the linguistic turn and from its roots in 
linguistics and anthropology, it did not manifest a strong interest for 
suprasubjectivity. This is a significant difference between structuralist and 
poststructuralist semiotics (semiology) and Peircean semiotics. For Peirce relational 
ontology has been an important focus inspired from his scholastic sources. The aim 
here is not to prove something about Poinsot’s work; the fact that scholasticism 
headed towards, and via Poinsot developed, a doctrine of suprasubjective reality 
proves Peirce’s interest to break away from modern dualism. The interesting 
discovery is that Peirce is not the only author who, for being strongly influenced by 
medieval scholasticism, developed a suprasubjective semiotics. Belonging to late 
scholasticism, Poinsot’s writings prove that the efforts of scholastic philosophy were 
tending to the development of a suprasubjective semiotics. That the suprasubjective 
character of ontology is clear in both the cases of Poinsot and Peirce enforces the 
argument that realist semiotics is indeed non-dualist.  
Poinsot’s account of the suprasubjective sign can be further used coherently in the 
development of a (neo-) Peircean philosophy. This thesis develops a Peircean Theory 
of Learning. As explained in Chapter 1, for grasping Peirce’s philosophy in its 
wholeness, a historical account of philosophy is necessary. This is so for two 
reasons: (1) such was Peirce’s method as well and (2) the sources from where Peirce 
recovered the Doctrine of Signs (Deely 2001a) need be, in turn, recovered by a late 
modernity which proved ignorant of medieval philosophy. The sources for Peirce’s 
recovery of the sign concept are the same (in a very large extent) as Poinsot’s. 
Therefore, the insights that Poinsot offers about the sign can shed a new light on 
Peirce’s semiotics and on what a Peircean Theroy of Learning can turn out to be. 
Deely considers Poinsot a precursor of biosemiotics in his own right, because his 
doctrine does not subject signification to a species-specific human cognition (2009, 
p. 62, p. 70). Signification is a matter of logic, not theory of mind. Suprasubjectivity 
is the key to understanding learning as adaptation and adaptation as interpretation. In 
Chapter 1 I have shown the necessity of biosemiotics for a Peircean Theory of 
Learning. Biosemiotics accounts for learning as a form and stage of evolution, 
understanding the organism as a part of its own environment, thus leading to an 
ecological (ecosemiotic) philosophy of education (e.g. Gough and Stables 2012, 
Andersen in Sebeok 1992, Stjernfelt 2011, 2014). It qualifies, as Gough and Stables 
argued, as education for uncertain times (2012), education for a transitional period. 
This is the transition identified by Deely (2001a) from dualist modernity to 
suprasubjectively minded postmodernity.  
I consider that Poinsot’s doctrine is an example of suprasubjectivity, being, 
though isolated and ahead of its time, not an unique example. The works of, for 
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instance, St Dionysius the Areopagite or St John of Damascus might hide similar 
philosophical surprises (Andreopoulos 2006). Deely noticed the germs of 
postmodernism in the Latin Medieval Age particularly because of the scholastics 
interest for signs, and thus posited the question “Quid sit postmodernismus?”(in 
Ciapalo 1997, p. 68). Postmodernism is therefore only a name for a philosophy that 
overcomes modern dualism by the suprasubjective Way of Signs (Deely 2009). The 
17
th
 century saw both the Way of Signs of Joao Poinsot as well as the Way of Ideas 
(mind dependent ontology) of Descartes and Locke. For the next couple of centuries, 
philosophy took the way of the latter. What we might call now philosophical 
postmodernism is postmodern only because it is becoming popular historically after 
modernity. To investigate its relation to the version of postmodernism proposed by 
Lyotard (1979) requires another study in its own right. It is safe to understand it as a 
non-modern doctrine, since Peirce did not invent semiotics, but recovered it from the 
medievals (Deely 2001) and developed it. Paul Bains pointed out a general 
contemporary philosophical interest for the concept of relation (2006). This is 
certainly a similarity with the scholastics who at least since the 13
th
 century where 
mostly concerned with the Aristotelian category of relation (Marmo 2010). The link 
to the scholastics is acknowledged also by Bains, who brings to light other recent 
philosophers concerned with relation: 
“Why write about the being of relation? I will take the risk of claiming that 
the concept of relation is like a skeleton or abstract key that allows us to move 
from Duns Scotus to John Poinsot, to Charles Sanders Peirce, to Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari, Immanuel Kant, Humberto Maturana, Martin Heidegger, John 
Deely, Alfred North Whitehead, Bruno Latour, and Isabelle Stengers (to mention 
a few members of the cast). All these thinkers are in one way or another 
concerned with relations and their being.” (2006, p. 3-4) 
Bains found some interesting possible compatibilities between, on the one hand, 
Peirce, and on the other, Deleuze and Guattari. This link should be investigated 
generally, as well as particularly in education, since Deleuze is so far much more 
popular in philosophy of education than Peirce. He is also an author of interest in the 
edusemiotics Lebenswelt (Semetsky 2006, 2009b). However, this thesis does not 
investigate the compatibility between Peirce and Deleuze. I shall only remark here 
Bains’ observation of a generally spread interest towards a suprasubjective doctrine, 
which broadens the horizon of philosophy beyond language, inviting the whole 
biological world back into the scope of philosophy. What Bains is observing is the 
tendency towards what Stjernfelt named the phenomenological turn (iconic turn), 
contrary to the linguistic turn: 
“Their understanding of the being of relation will determine the structure of 
their thought and the extent to which it is able to short-circuit the realist/idealist 
oscillation in Western philosophy; to provide the ontological foundations in 
relation both for a minimal correspondence between thought and things and for its 
more complex reformulation in terms of a collective of humans and non-humans 
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involved in a double individuation, a conjoined genesis of subject and object - in 
other words, what Deleuze and Guattari call the ‘truth of the relative’ rather than 
‘the relativity of truth’ (1994, 130). The inherent subjectivism of some modern 
and much postmodern thought (in its assumption that language and thought can 
have no relation to anything other than their own products) has yet to wake up to 
this possibility. What will thus be envisioned is what postmodernism might turn 
out to be (using John Deely’s Latin construction in the subjunctive mood - Quid 
sit postmodernismus?) if not a circular, or more complex, dead end.” (Bains 2006, 
p. 4) 
Indeed, the formula ‘the truth of the relative’ can fit to describe Peirce’s 
pragmaticist logic as well. As for the question why writing about the being of 
relation, Deely could answer it straightforwardly: 
“If there is one notion that is central to the emerging postmodern consciousness, 
that notion is the notion of sign.” (2001a, p. xxx) 
Phenomenological turn semiotics inevitably brings forth a postmodern strand of 
education, or at least a form of education foreign to modern western dualist 
philosophy. Its success or rejection proves the success or rejection of the project of 
suprasubjective semiotics as a new philosophical age. Since along its history 
semiotics has been closely connected to education (Chapter 1), if postmodernity is to 
be characterized by it, education will be one of the first affected fields. A semiotic 
based education will be exponential for the enhancement of semiotic consciousness 
as postmodern philosophy: not only should it be its first symptom, but, in turn, it will 
also cultivate it.  
A criterion that Deely has found for testing whether semiotic consciousness is 
assimilated stands in which tractatus comes into mind first when encountering this 
word: Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus, an exponent of western 
modern philosophy, claiming clarity as a necessity for philosophy, or Joao Poinsot’s 
Tractatus de signis, an example of relational logic, accounting for the 
suprasubjectivity and, implicitly, vagueness of being. Surely, a semiotic 
postmodernity would have Poinsot, as a philosopher of relation, an important figure 
of its educational curriculum.  
 
B. Suprasubjective learning 
 
For Peirce experience is suprasubjective. Experience is characterized by 
cognition. A modern dualist perspective will still tend to suppose that cognition is 
the objective, mind-dependent aspect of experience and that all that appears as mind-
independent is simply assumed by a mind to be independent of it, thus still being 
essentially mind-dependent. Of course, Peirce’s semiotics is not solipsistic. On his 
account cognition is a part of experience, and, also, suprasubjective in its turn, being 
composed of both objective and subjective elements: 
“Every cognition involves something represented, or that of which we are 
conscious, and some action or passion of the self whereby it becomes represented. 
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The former shall be termed the objective, the latter the subjective, element of the 
cognition.” (CP 5.238) 
Stables discussed the implications for education of non-dualist semiotics in the 
2012 Be(com)ing Human: Semiosis and the Myth of Reason. Even though Stables 
does not refer particularly to the term ‘suprasubjectivity,’ his emphasis on 
overcoming the modern dualist mindset (2005, 2012) through semiotics shows that 
his work fits in phenomenological turn semiotics. Stables found that the account of a 
participative phenomenology – supposing that reality consists in an overlapping of 
phenomenological worlds – is essential for a non-dualistic educational framework. 
This phenomenological overlapping can be seen as compatible with Peircean 
semiosis, Deely’s idea of suprasubjective experience, that is. While relying on 
Peirce, Stables also criticized Peirce’s notion of sign for still clinging on to 
essentialism to some extent, and his concept of Object (of the sign) for being 
unjustifiable and unnecessary. I argue that Peirce’s notion of sign is absolved from 
essentialist assumptions if Peirce is read as a logician, not as a philosopher of 
science, as Stables accounts. By Object, Peirce never meant something distinct or 
attached to the sign, but simply the Object of the sign, the logical object. The Object 
might exist or not, be real or not, fictional or non-fictional; like any terminus of the 
sign, the Object has its being only within the triadic relation. This stems, for 
instance, from the definition of Icon. With icons signification properly comes in actu 
(Chapter 2). In the definition of the Icon sign type, Peirce mentioned that while the 
Sign refers to the Object, the Sign is “just the same, whether any such Object 
actually exists or not.” (CP 2.247)  
A key to understanding suprasubjectivity, according to Stables, is the account of 
understanding as not necessarily mental. In Chapter 2 I have explained that for 
Peirce the action of judging, that is, inquiring on the value of truth of a proposition, 
is not strictly a mental process, though we only experience it cognitively. Stables 
identified a similar stance in Wittgenstein: 
“The sense of the ‘something … me’ comes from recognition of sequences but 
need not be understood as a mental act. It may be better construed, on a process 
account as implication in events. To quote Wittgenstein: 
Try not to think of understanding as a “mental process” at all. – For that is the 
expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what 
kind of circumstances, do we say, ‘Now I know how to go on…’ (Wittgenstein, 
1967: $154)
20
” (Stables 2012, p. 48) 
Despite other divergences, this is an interesting similarity between Peirce’s 
semiotics and Wittgenstein’s analytic philosophy. It directly concerns 
suprasubjectivity, and therefore it directly concerns this learning theory. It could lead 
to further investigations and, in the circumstances of the rising popularity of 
semiotics, it could set new directions of research in analytic philosophy. 
                                                          
20
Wittgenstein, L. (1967) Philosophical Investigations.Oxford: Blackwell quoted in Stables 2012. 
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The variety of divergent interpretations of Peirce is part due to our yet incomplete 
and disorganized collections of Peirce’s vast work. His so far published work is 
“diffuse, and sometimes scrappy” as Stables explained (2012, p. 4). However, I 
consider that Stables’ semiotic account of human becoming is compatible to 
Peirce’s. The present thesis offers an account of the Peircean sign different in some 
regards to Stables’. Nevertheless, Stables accounts as well for what is here termed 
the suprasubjectivity of Peirce’s semiotics. Stables observed that semiotics generally, 
and particularly the semiotics of Peirce, dismisses modern dualism
21
. He identified 
three issues at stake for contemporary philosophy of education which a 
suprasubjective philosophy solves: “that Cartesian mind-body substance dualism, 
though generally explicitly rejected, still infects educational and social thinking to an 
unwarranted degree”, “that the world as ‘is’ cannot be therefore divorced from the 
world as it means to us humans,” and “that processes, events and forces are 
fundamental; matter and substance are the result of processes and events, not vice 
versa” (p. viii). Stables acknowledged that Peirce, with his notion of sign, “moves 
beyond Kant’s distinction between noumenon, the thing itself prior to our 
understanding of it, and the phenomenon, the thing as humanly perceived and 
understood. Peirce’s ontology here is simultaneously realist, progressive and 
interpretive.” (p. 6) Using a term preferred by Deely, Peirce’s ontology is 
suprasubjective.   
In a characteristically semiotic manner, Stables discusses the theme of what he 
termed “eternal Nowness: the sense that experience is present while it is always in 
flux.” (p. 45) Stables developed this concept on a Derridian account, by arguing that 
the present is deferred in the context of passing time (2012). This understanding of 
time is typical for semiotics. That being belongs to the present is Peirce’s 
assumption as well. This is sustained by Peirce’s idea of continuity, which 
characterizes time. The time of present is an instantiation, a matter of Secondness 
that is, since it makes possible the mediation between First (time passed, which is 
present as Representamen) and Third (time to come, which is present as 
Interpretant). The past contains the qualities necessary for the objectified present and 
the future is the tendency of the present. Evidently, this passage is continuous. 
According to the Peircean account of continuity, that time is continuous implies that, 
its components (past, present and future) cannot be extracted from it. In Chapter 3 I 
mentioned that on a semiotic account time can be justified on account of semiosis 
(experience): semiosis occurs in time; this is what is meant by stating that past is 
instantiated in present and fulfilled in future. An important characteristic of Peirce’s 
semiotics is that the termini of sign-relations cannot be separated from the relation. 
Thus, past cannot be separated from present, which cannot be separated from future. 
Any instantiation of the Past (a memory of it, a consequence, etc.) only participates 
in semiosis as present and it only has sense in the perspective of future (the 
                                                          
21
Even more than overcoming modern dualism, dualism is completely foreign to Peircean semiotics 
because of Peirce’s pre-modern sources. 
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possibility of mediation). In the words of Stables, “experience is present while it is 
always in flux” (2012, p. 45). 
It is important to notice that a particular approach to time, with a focus on the 
present passing instant characterizes semiotics. The first to explain that being 
belongs strictly to the present was the father of semiotic consciousness, St 
Augustine. In his Confessions, St Augustine found it necessary to explain memory 
and, to explain memory he had to explain time. St Augustine, understanding that 
being can only be present, explained that the times of past, present, and future 
cannot be the ground for any being: past things are not present since they have 
passed, future things did not come to pass yet, and since the present is simply the 
timeless moment where past and future meet it does not have space to contain being. 
The discussion is highly relevant for semiotics, as St Augustine aimed at explaining 
that meaning happens in time, as a passing. He reached the conclusion that 
experienced times, where semiosis occurs, and real phenomena that can be contained 
are present past – containing the present state of things that have passed, such as 
consequences of past events, memories, etc., present present – containing things that 
are immediately present, and present future – containing what is present of things 
that are to come such us the rain which will fall soon through the present clouds, 
expectations, intuitions. He made it explicit that time is the passage of time, a 
transition that is: 
“What now is clear and plain is, that neither things to come nor past are. Nor is 
it properly said, “there be three times, past, present, and to come”: yet perchance 
it might be properly said, “there be three times; a present of things past, a present 
of things present, and a present of things future.” For these three do exist in some 
sort, in the soul, but other where do I not see them; present of things past, 
memory; present of things present, sight; present of things future, expectation. If 
thus we be permitted to speak, I see three times, and I confess there are three. Let 
it be said too, “there be three times, past, present, and to come”: in our incorrect 
way. See, I object not, nor gainsay, nor find fault, if what is so said be but 
understood, that neither what is to be, now is, nor what is past. For but few things 
are there, which we speak properly, most things improperly; still the things 
intended are understood.” (Confessiones, Book XI, Chap. XX) 
Time, therefore, is a shared ground in Lebenswelten. Two individuals might 
not necessarily share in memories or expectations, but it is clear that in the 
classroom, the Lebenswelt at stake, the individuals share in being present. The 
teacher should be aware of this sharing of the present moment, the moment where 
her world is overlapping to that of her students.  
It is interesting to notice that this typically semiotic notion of time directly 
accounts for the vagueness of reality. St Augustine, observing this, mentioned that 
he does not bother in making clarity and precision aims of his discourse. Anyway, 
few things are properly spoken, most things are improperly spoken of, but what 
matters is that things intended are understood. This same understanding of time, 
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the acknowledgement that being can only belong to presence characterizes 
Deely’s semiotic history of philosophy. Before he develops his semiotic history, 
in the 2001 Four Ages of Understanding, Deely defines the present as “the 
exclusive preserve of the living.” (p. xxix) The way in which he frames his public, 
the readers of history, reveals this understanding of time as passage whereas the 
presence of things allows being: 
“I write for the present, the living, both in being and to come into being”. (p. 
xxx) 
This understanding of time as passing is typical for semiotics. In the next pages 
I explain that this is also Peirce’s concept of time. It is also revealed in Stables’ 
educational semiotics. Stables showed that a fully semiotic philosophy accounts 
that the phenomenal worlds of living beings interact and overlap. This is as well 
the statement of biosemiotics, stemming from the understanding of environment 
as meaningful environment (Umwelt, Lebenswelt). The concept of Umwelt, while 
bringing the understanding of environment as species-specific and also as 
individual, also explains how it overlaps with other Umwelten. A mosquito and a 
frog inhabiting the same pond live in different Umwelten, but this biosemiotic 
concept allows a simple understanding of their interaction. Some structures of 
meaning are shared in Umwelten. Stables explains this interaction of phenomenal 
worlds also in what regards time with his concept of My Now. This is essential, 
since life proceeds in time, and, as remarked previously, for the semiotic 
consciousness approaching time has always been an important concern (Stables is 
another example besides St Augustine, Peirce and Deely). Meaning occurs in 
time, as a passing, and life, while it proceeds in time, it belongs to the present, the 
now: 
“Suppose that my phenomenal world, incorporating the sum total of my 
present experience, and involving my different awareness of past and future, can 
be referred to as my ‘My Now’ (MMN). This is a phenomenologically, or 
phenomenographically, or existentially derived definition, though as 
comprehensive as possible on those terms. It does not attempt, for example, to 
clarify the nature of ‘now’ beyond ‘what I am experiencing’. It accepts as valid 
that I have experience. Furthermore, this experience carries with it traces of other 
previous ‘nows’ and awareness of other experiencing persons. Again, it cannot be 
proved ultimately that ‘Your My Now’ (YMN) is real for you, but, on the basis 
that you are comprises not only My My Now but also many Your My Nows as 
there are people in the world. At least, therefore, I can conclude that the totality of 
phenomenal experience comprises MMN + YMN.” (Stables, 2008b, p. 92) 
That phenomenal worlds overlap is coextensive with the biosemiotic account 
of the self. If the whole Umwelt of a living organism is part of the self then other 
organisms, that find themselves in the Umwelt, become part of the self. Of course, 
a rabbit signifies very differently in a wolf’s Umwelt than in an ant’s Umwelt. 
This is why the overlapping of worlds is phenomenological and, as such, it cannot 
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be supported on a noumenal account of existence. Stables’ explanation of 
phenomenal overlapping and the idea of semiotic suprasubjectivity share the 
fundamental assumption of a relational, anti-atomistic ontology. 
Since signification is suprasubjective, to acknowledge that the reality of an 
Umwelt contains the phenomenal world (Umwelt) of another living being is not 
difficult. Actually, that signification is suprasubjective proves that we (human 
beings) perform well in understanding the phenomenal world of another. This is 
why it is important for us to brush our teeth and to choose the appropriate shirt. 
Of course, brushing teeth is cultural, but we do care about it because of the way in 
which something affects another being’s phenomenal world, culturally or 
otherwise, that is at Umwelt or Lebenswelt level. The suprasubjectivity of 
signification, thus, accounts for a concept of totality of phenomenal experience: 
the acknowledgement of reality containing the always infinite sum of relations 
among phenomenal worlds.  
The recent findings regarding the cognitive activity of mirror-neurons 
(Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004) can explain this sharing of reality from a 
neuroscientific point of view. There is one striking contradiction, though, that 
regards the implications for learning between our so far understanding of mirror-
neurons and Peirce’s semiotics. The activity of mirror-neurons is understood 
through the prism of the hypothesis that imitation learning is an essential aspect 
of human life and that human culture rests on it (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004). 
That imitation is an essential aspect of human culture because it is a species 
specific mode of learning is the general assumption of the cognitive approaches to 
social interaction (Tomasello 1999, 2008). In Chapter 3, section C.ii, I mentioned 
that on a Peircean account learning does not consist mainly in imitation. Also, in 
Chapter 1, section D, I explained that learning is a discovery of similarities, since 
it is the result of Icon manipulation. Discovery supposes a degree of creativity, 
understood in opposition to imitation. Thus, Peircean semiotics can offer a new 
insight in what regards mirrors neurons. The role of mirror-neurons in the waking 
time of our lives has been so far understood through the theoretical apparatus of 
social cognition, but the assumption of imitation learning, inherited from social 
cognition is not necessary. Semiotic suprasubjectivism is a proper ground for 
understanding mirror-neurons and continuing a dialogue between neuroscience, 
the social sciences, and philosophy. This semiotic educational philosophy would 
place imitation at the periphery of teaching practice.  
The same account was initially inherited in cognitive semiotics and in 
experimental semiotics, which are now (if not at least should be) aligning to the 
phenomenological (iconic) turn of semiotics. This shift can be felt therefore in the 
social sciences as well, by the realization it brings that in a shared reality learning 
is discovering and, thus, it does not necessarily require imitation. This thesis does 
not develop on these inquiries, but they should be further explored in the horizon 
brought by a Peircean Theory of Learning. The implications of Peircean semiotics 
on creativity and imitation are discussed in Part II. 
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The acknowledgement of the other as non-self is not problematic for 
suprasubjective semiotics, hence the social function of mirror-neurons does not 
present any problems if denying the importance of imitation learning. At stake it 
is not whether but how one’s life relates to non-self. Reality is suprasubjective 
because it is shared, and, thus, our efforts to learn stand in our availability to share 
with others. Intersubjectivity is possible in suprasubjective reality. On a cognitive 
semiotic account Per Aage Brandt (2007) explains intersubjectivity by accounting 
alloscopic experience as iconic signification. Brandt’s idea is that we understand 
our relation with the Other because we can simulate the Other’s phenomenality of 
(my) self by performing iconic cognition. By a manipulation of icons I know that 
I am the Other’s other. This is possible because of certain similarities between the 
self and the Other: 
“Seeing oneself through Others seeing oneself, and remembering this alloscopic 
vision, is essential to consciousness on higher levels. […] This Other […] will itself 
be implied in the scenario as a ‘helper’, or in narratological terms, an ‘adjuvant’ 
actant. For the Subject to enter in contact with the ‘helper’ is to imagine itself being 
the helper (of someone like the Subject)” (p. 52-53) 
It is remarkable that, drawing on the semiotics of Peirce and Greimas, Per 
Aage Brandt explains intersubjectivity by using Levinasian terminology. In 
Chapter 9 the possibility of applying Levinas’ phenomenology of the face in 
semiotics is further discussed. 
Once a semiotic perspective is taken, therefore, the question comes down to 
whether we decide to live for the self and relate to the non-self as a subject of the 
self or to live for the non-self, acknowledging its right to being independent of the 
self. Arguably, this is the starting point for ethics. I argue that this is crucial for 
education and that on Peirce’s account, understanding learning and education as 
growth, the latter is the only attitude that allows learning. This is the core of a 
Peircean Theory of Learning, which I develop in Part II. I suggest that, on account 
of the compatibility between Peircean semiotics and Husserlian phenomenology 
(accounted for in Chapter 2 and in Stjerfnelt 2007) Emmanuel Levinas’ 
phenomenology of the face can be taken on board by a Peircean Theory of 
Learning. Both Peirce and Levinas favoured the self’s focus on the non-self, not 
in an abstract way, but in an immediately practical way. Peirce treats this 
immediate acknowledgement of the other in terms of “neighbour” and Levinas in 
terms of “face”. If throughout Peirce’s works this focus on altruism is mentioned 
explicitly only sporadically, while being implicitly present, in Levinas this is the 
predominating topic. Therefore, Levinas’ phenomenology of the face can prove 
valuable in further developing a Peircean Theory of Learning. This suggestion 
will be explored in Part III. The reasons for which I have chosen to develop this 
theory of learning as Peircean, and not as a Levinasian approach are explained in 
Chapter 1. Mainly, there are two reasons: (1) because Peirce’s semiotics brings a 
firm ground for a new philosophical age through its account of suprasubjective 
reality, much needed in education, and (2) because Peirce’s sign typologies offer 
a fully semiotic account of learning: the evolutionary passage from the Icon sign 
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type to the Argument sign type, within a physiology of arguments governed by an 
iconic syntax.  
By his usual method of subduing idioscopy to coenoscopy, for Peirce 
education is (proceeds) within the borders of cosmology. Since the physiology of 
arguments is governed by iconic syntax, iconic syntax is what makes learning 
possible as well as what sets the limits of its possibilities. Stables arrived as well 
at the conclusion that what makes knowledge possible, generally, also limits it. 
This is for him an important but so far not enough acknowledged truth for 
philosophy of education: 
“It is an important truth little acknowledged in educational theory that that 
which makes knowledge and understanding possible – our interpretive 
frameworks including our assumptions and prejudices – is also that which limits 
them.” (2012, p. 47) 
Our interpretive frameworks, assumptions and prejudices constitute, in one word, 
our Lebenswelten. The inner coherency of the Lebenswelt and, generally, of the 
Umwelt, stands in its iconic syntax (see Chapters1, 2, 3 and section a of this 
Chapter). It is, therefore, iconic syntax, as a characteristic of the phyisiology of 
arguments, that evokes and limits learning. The continuity of the physiology of 
arguments is guaranteed by iconic syntax, as similarity is the criterion distributed 
continuously through the typologies of signs from the Icon type onwards. 
The account of suprasubjective being, the rejection of the mind independent and 
mind dependent ontological distinction, because it characterizes the whole cosmos, is 
inherited in all areas of reality, including education. An implication of 
suprasubjectivity in education is the rejection of a teaching/learning dichotomy. 
Learning, as argued (Chapter 1), is the Universe’s method of discovering itself. 
Being spread from a self to another, learning is enhanced. Teaching is this particular 
case of learning where the learning of a non-self is at stake. Thus, teaching has 
proved valuable for living beings as an enhancement of learning. The account of 
teaching as a particular case of learning, and a non-dichotomical relation of teaching 
and learning, has occurred together with the emergence of semiotic consciousness, as 
St Augustine explained in De Doctrina Christiana that learning depends on two 
instances: (1) the acquistion of knowledge and (2) the passing on of it. On a cultural 
timescale, in the human Lebenswelt, suprasubjectivity produced education. The 
awareness of the overlapping and interaction of phenomenal worlds brings forth the 
realization that learning is evoked by sharing. In his refutation of the early Eco’s 
arguments against iconicity, Stjernfelt explains that learning is possible because of 
sharing (see Chapter 3, section C.ii). Stables arrived at the same conclusion about 
sharing and learning – learning is possible because while two different beings are 
unique and distinct, and therefore do not coincide, they can share. Sharing is possible 
because since we are part of the same Universe, we inherit its iconic syntax: 
“It is self-evident that the resources that I bring to MMN are not unique to 
myself. They include words from a shared language, and body parts that 
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correspond to those of others and react in similar ways to environmental stimuli; 
if this were not so, medical science would not be possible, let alone organ 
transplantation. My ‘My Now’ is not possible without your ‘My Now’ (YMN) 
and, by extension, others’ ‘My Now’ (OMN), including the ‘Now’ of entities that 
may not be conceived of as having any consciousness at all. However, just as 
organ transplantation is not simple or always effective, because bodies have the 
tendency to reject elements from other bodies (though they also sometimes 
welcome them, as in sexual activity, and even in the act of eating), so each 
individual is unique in the pattern of responses to which s/he is prone, and such 
patterning also modifies over time. YMN therefore overlaps but does not 
coincide, with MMN.” (2012, p. 49) 
On this semiotic account, it is important to take into consideration the temporal 
dimension of our Umwelten and Lebenswelten. The overlapping of phenomenal 
worlds happens in time. 
 
 
C. Learning as evolution of the self 
 
Learning is a passage through time. This is brought into awareness by the 
suprasubjective account of being and, implicitly, of learning. Semiotics generates 
this discussion on time because semiosis occurs in time and has to be examined as 
such. Learning is a passage from one type of signification to another. This passage 
takes place in time.  
Life is characterized by learning, according to both the biosemiotic definition of 
life (Chapter 1, and Kull 2005, and Kull in Bundgaard and Stjernfelt 2009) and the 
semiotic approach to time (Deely 2001a, Stables 2012). This realization recommends 
semiotics as philosophy of education. If the main characteristic of life is learning (a 
life form is re-cognized by it being something that is learning) then being a living 
organism, such as human, is a continuous learning. Using Peirce’s concept of 
continuity I have explained that the experience of a living organism is continuous 
(Chapters 1, 2, and 3). Therefore, the life of a living being is a continuous becoming. 
According to Stables the perspective of living as becoming allows an altruistic frame 
of mind because it implies that no one at any present moment is fully human. The 
present is the time of the living and since the present is a passing, the step from a 
past then to a future then, the self is a becoming. At every present moment we are 
becoming, continuously meant to evolve in some sense. This idea, according to 
Stables, brings a more humble awareness of the self, making oneself available for the 
other: 
“Aspiration to full humanity is far more humbling on this than on the standard 
humanist account, whereby we are imbued with a human essence that we might 
betray but can generally only express rather than improve.” (Ibid., 2012, p. 96) 
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Like cosmological evolution, the evolution of the self does not pursue an 
externally predefined telos (Chapter 1), such as reaching a certain standard that 
qualifies the individual as human. Instead, evolution sets its telos from within the 
system, usually being aware only of the one next step. According to Peirce, Truth 
needs be pursued while being aware that it is infinitely distant at all times. In this 
regard, as well, Stables’ view is coherent with Peirce’s: 
“The proposed approach is more challenging, as fully human status is always 
both desired and simultaneously out of reach. It cannot ever be attained fully, though 
everyone who aspires is trying to attain it.” (Ibid.) 
That is to say, a self as Representamen is tending to a future self as Interpretant, 
to which the present self is supplying meaning from itself.  
For Peirce the key to understanding the suprasubjectivity of learning stands in 
the sound understanding of the development of the mediated self. The mediated self 
is the self as Interptetant, in relation to self as Representamen and self as Object. The 
self as Interpretant is never present, but always presently pursued. The Interpretant 
self is a future self, present in its relation to Representamen and Object – the self’s 
becoming is, therefore, an eternal nowness. This similarity makes it not surprising 
that both Peirce and Stables, when explaining the development of the self, found it 
relevant to look upon the development of children. Looking at a child’s becoming an 
adult it is clear that learning is a passage, a becoming. Peirce considered that very 
young children do not have a clear consciousness of the self. Self-consciousness 
emerges, according to Peirce, because of testimony. The idea is that “error appears, 
and it can be explained only by supposing a self which is fallible.” (CP 5.234) 
Testimony is certainty stemming suprasubjectively. It is safety in numbers. Arguably 
an operation of critical common sense, it is a safety that solipsistic thought cannot 
accept:  
“At the age at which we know children to be self-conscious, we know that 
they have been made aware of ignorance and error; and we know them to possess 
at that age powers of understanding sufficient to enable them to infer from 
ignorance and error their own existence. Thus we find that known faculties, acting 
under conditions known to exist, would rise to self-consciousness. The only 
essential defect in this account of the matter is, that while we know that children 
exercise as much understanding as is here supposed, we do not know that they 
exercise it in precisely this way. Still the supposition that they do so is infinitely 
more supported by facts, than the supposition of a wholly peculiar faculty of the 
mind. 
The only argument worth noticing for the existence of an intuitive self-
consciousness is this. We are more certain of our own existence than of any other 
fact; a premiss cannot determine a conclusion to be more certain than it is itself; 
hence, our own existence cannot have been inferred from any other fact. The first 
premiss must be admitted, but the second premiss is founded on an exploded 
theory of logic. A conclusion cannot be more certain than that some one of the 
facts which support it is true, but it may easily be more certain than any one of 
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those facts. Let us suppose, for example, that a dozen witnesses testify to an 
occurrence. Then my belief in that occurrence rests on the belief that each of 
those men is generally to be believed upon oath. Yet the fact testified to is made 
more certain than that any one of those men is generally to be believed. In the 
same way, to the developed mind of man, his own existence is supported by every 
other fact, and is, therefore, incomparably more certain than any one of these 
facts. But it cannot be said to be more certain than that there is another fact, since 
there is no doubt perceptible in either case.” (CP 5.237) 
There can be used another example of borderline consciousness to illustrate this 
argument, besides that of an infant. Take the case of a drunk man. The drunk man is 
not aware that he is drunk. If a number of sober persons testify to him that he is 
drunk, he might not find any solid reason to believe this account. Nevertheless, when 
he will be sober he will be certain that he is sober. Doubting whether one is sober is 
evidence that one is not sober. When one is sober he will not doubt whether he is 
sober. Doubting that I am is therefore useless since this is what I am most sure of. 
Stables expressed this conclusion of semiotics in a nutshell by claiming that “What 
things are is what they mean to us.” (2005, p. 8) I am what I am to myself, and, since 
I am identical with myself, there cannot be anything more certain than this. My 
“error and ignorance” testify that I am. Through a series of errors I get to know 
myself. This is a relation between the past I, present I, and future I. This continuity 
of apperceptive ego leads to inferring the self: me in my privacy, who I really am, 
the evolving sign-relation. The self is inferred. This inference starts from necessary 
conclusions drawn from error. Error appears in our life (e.g., feeling of pain) and that 
shows that there is something doing something wrong – thus an author of the error is 
supposed and identified with the phenomenon of awareness with which it coincides 
and the consciousness of self is developed: 
“Ignorance and error are all that distinguish our private selves from the absolute 
ego of pure apperception.” (CP 5.235) 
This is truly a strong awareness of the reality of the self. Modern philosophy 
could never trust facts as independent from the self’s own faculties of mind. On 
Peirce’s account the Cartesian dubito ergo cogito, cogito ergo sum principle is not 
needed to escape doubt of one’s own existence. Rather, one’s own existence is 
certain because our inference of the self is certain. Errors testify suprasubjectivity: if 
I banged my head against the wall, not only that I banged my head against the wall, 
but, also, the wall is there and it has such a consistency (its qualities are inferred). 
The awareness of the self emerges in time, at a very young age, and in time it is 
further developed. There is an age to which we refer as childhood and another one to 
which, in opposition to childhood, we refer as adulthood. Stables explained that we 
do not have any ultimate criteria to judge when childhood ends and when adulthood 
begins (2012). The passage from a child’s Umwelt to an adult’s Umwelt is 
continuous. There is a continuous set of experiences that a human passes through 
that constitutes this passage. This evolutionary set forms, therefore, one continuous 
experience. Throughout an entire lifetime a living being learns. The realization that 
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like the child is always becoming so is the adult, should give an adult a sense of 
humility – nothing essentially really changed since she was a child: 
“[…] there is not a point at which the non-human, pre-human or becoming-
human child becomes the fully human adult: the quest towards full humanity is 
endless. We live in overlapping phenomenal worlds, the human ones among 
which share a sense of what is worth aspiring to as human.” (p. 99) 
This perspective does not justify any advantages that the adult might have over 
the child because both the child and the adult are human (or not) in the same manner 
– they are both becoming. In analogy to teaching, the teacher should realize that, like 
her student, she is in continuous becoming and therefore, she is not better in any way 
then the student. The student has to become in some regard similar to her teacher; 
this is the aim of teaching. Regardless of what the taught matter is, the student has to 
become similar in her knowledge of it to the teacher’s knowledge. Stables noticed 
that we do not have ultimate criteria for determining where life begins and ends. The 
present thesis brings an insight to this matter. According to the biosemiotic ground 
of this theory, starting with Chapter 1, I have associated life with learning. Life, in 
the biological sense, begins and ends where learning begins and ends. This does not 
contradict Stables’ affirmation: as we cannot draw the borders of life, we cannot tell 
where exactly learning begins and where it ends. Learning, life that is, inherits the 
characters of semiosis: it is continuous and its delimitations are vague. The very 
young infant might not have a clear awareness of the self, but to put our finger on the 
point where learning begins remains impossible, as it might not even depend on the 
development of self-awareness: 
“On the other hand, children manifest powers of thought much earlier. Indeed, 
it is almost impossible to assign a period at which children do not already exhibit 
decided intellectual activity in directions in which thought is indispensable to 
their well-being. The complicated trigonometry of vision, and the delicate 
adjustments of coördinated movement, are plainly mastered very early. There is 
no reason to question a similar degree of thought in reference to themselves.” (CP 
5.228)  
We cannot spot where learning begins because it does not simply begin at a 
certain moment of an individual’s existence in time-space. It is a much broader 
phenomenon, which, as explained in Chapter 3, does not assume neither tabula rasa, 
neither a priori ideas. A human infant is not a reasoning being because it shares a 
human nature that qualifies it as reasoning, but because it shares qualities inherited 
from the abyssal continuums of evolution. Such is the fact of having a body which 
perceives, cognizes, and so on: 
“A very young child may always be observed to watch its own body with great 
attention. There is every reason why this should be so, for from the child’s point 
of view this body is the most important thing in the universe. Only what it touches 
has any actual and present feeling; only what it faces has any actual color; only 
what is on its tongue has any actual taste.” (CP 5.229) 
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Learning does not start in a definite, isolatable, moment because it is part of the 
Universe’s self discovering and thus it belongs to infinite continua of which the self 
is just a continuous subset. When philosophers committed to substance dualism 
search for the source of knowledge in an individual they deny at least the cultural 
and biological, if not also the cosmological, context which led to the individual 
knowing. Therefore, taking Peirce’s concept of continuity (see Chapters 1 and 2), an 
individual’s learning (becoming) cannot be isolated, removed, not even as an 
abstraction, from the larger learning of human kind and of life forms in general. 
Abstract mental operations that we might perform on an isolated in void, ideal 
thinking being do not reveal anything real and useful about learning. The 
suprasubjective being account implies that living beings are semiotically integrated 
within larger webs of signs (Umwelten). As such, this semiotic account contradicts 
the brain in vat hypothesis. Paul Bains observed this as well: 
“We are semiotic, existential territories rather than brains in vats, and these 
territories or ecologies are not contained within our physical anatomy, nor are 
they known only as immanent representations. The question becomes this: Where 
does your cognition or subjectivity terminate if it is a suprasubjective process and 
not a stable substance? The ‘self’ becomes a sign relation or interpretant rather 
than an unrelated, ontological entity.” (2006, p. 21) 
As Stables remarked, the resources that a self brings in its own awareness of real 
presence (My My-Now) are not unique to the self. That phenomenological worlds 
overlap means that reality is shared, intersubjective that is. Because being is 
relational (suprasubjective) the intersubjectivity of real existence is suprasubjective. 
As such, real existence continuously expands towards infinite real possibilities. This 
is the same with saying that semiosis is infinite. For Peirce selves are connected 
continuously such that this whole continuum of selves might look as if one Self: 
“Every reality, then, is a Self; and the Selves are intimately connected, as if 
they formed a continuum. Each one is, so to say, a delineation, -- with 
mathematical truth, incongruous as the metaphor is, we may say that each is a 
quasimap of the organic aggregate of all the Selves, which is itself a Self, the 
Absolute Idea of Hegel, or God. [...] It will be observed that if the Selves did form 
a continuum, each would be distinguished by its own point of Self-
consciousness.” (CP 8.125) 
These points of Self-consciousness can only be in relation to other selves, within 
this continuum of consciousness, just like signs only are signs in actu, that is, used in 
and as relations, and within the physiology of arguments. Such remarks might 
inspire to read in Peirce a kind of panpsychism. The hypothesis of panpsychism is 
not necessary, I argue, for a coherent and holistic understanding of Peirce’s semiotics 
and its implications regarding self-consciousness
22
. All selves belong to one 
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With very few exceptions (Deely in Sebeok and Umiker-Sebeok 1992) the semiotic academic 
community tends to regard Peirce’s possible panpsychism with scepticism (e.g. Stjernfelt 2007). I 
consider that the hypothesis of panpsychism can be avoided in the development of the present thesis’ 
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continuum because they each develop in relation to one another, not because they are 
indistinguishable. Peirce made a clear distinction between one self’s consciousness 
and general consciousness. That I am is much more specific, implying a private 
consciousness, than merely the existence of the I: 
“Self-consciousness, as the term is here used, is to be distinguished both from 
consciousness generally, from the internal sense, and from pure apperception. 
Any cognition is a consciousness of the object as represented; by self-
consciousness is meant a knowledge of ourselves. Not a mere feeling of 
subjective conditions of consciousness, but of our personal selves. Pure 
apperception is the self-assertion of THE ego; the self-consciousness here meant 
is the recognition of my private self. I know that I (not merely the I) exist. The 
question is, how do I know it; by a special intuitive faculty, or is it determined by 
previous cognitions?” (CP 5.225) 
According to Peirce, the self is a sign. As such, the self has to be in relation to 
signs similar to itself – other selves that is. The self developed from sets of signs and 
develops as a sign-relation. Peirce explicitly applied his Sign-relation concept to 
explain the self and the non-self (other):  
“This passage from the many to the one is numerical. The conception of a third 
is that of an object which is so related to two others, that one of these must be 
related to the other in the same way in which the third is related to that other. 
Now this coincides with the conception of an interpretant. An other is plainly 
equivalent to a correlate. The conception of second differs from that of other, in 
implying the possibility of a third. In the same way, the conception of self implies 
the possibility of an other. The ground is the self abstracted from the concreteness 
which implies the possibility of another.” (CP 1.556) 
Thus, through relation to other selves, the self develops the characteristics that 
constitute a personality. Personality is evoked by the self’s iconic relation to other 
selves. This notion of relational self brings to mind Heidegger’s Dasein; some 
possible links to Heidegger will be suggested in Part III, in the context of the general 
discussion regarding the compatibility between Peircean semiotics and Husserlian 
phenomenology. 
The (capital letter) Self is a semiotic way of approaching such realities as those 
that sociology dealt with in terms of mental collective, collective memory, social 
cognition, and so on. Peirce’s notion of self-consciousness is not merely a sum of 
feelings, psychological states, and so on, but a knowledge of ourselves. Self-
consciousness gives to the self its personal dimension, a re-cognition of a private, 
intimate self – its genuine character, that is, me, I. What the answer to Peirce’s how 
                                                                                                                                                                    
argument. However, because of Peirce’s method of stating hypothesis, namely abduction, more easily 
accepts a hypothesis than the more popular and sceptical method of Ockham’s razor, I consider that, 
for the purpose of understanding Peirce’s own philosophical thinking, the hypothesis should not be 




question envisages is broader than the self. It points to the non-self and the whole 
cosmos within which the self has spring forth to become itself – to re-cognize itself. 
Thus, a student and a teacher, being part of each other’s Lebenswelten, are re-
cognized by each other within each other’s developing selves. In the first now instant 
of their encountering they are simply an aspect of each other’s non-self. For their 
relation to evoke the desired learning they have to re-cognize the continuity between 
their two selves in regard to what is being taught and learned so as to produce the 
Interpretant Self. The self is a sign-relation and, as well, the teacher-student relation 
(a Levinasian I/Thou) is a sign-relation.  
Learning properly happens when the consciousness of the teacher and that of the 
student are coextensive, perfectly continuous, without any interruptions, so that an 
Interpretant consciousness can occur. Two self realities evoke a third self reality – 
this is where learning begins. This means that the two are in relation. The fact that 
they are in relation means that they are distinct within the relation, but stop being 
outside the relation. This suprasubjective account of learning implies a tuning of 
significations between the student and the teacher, so that in their semiosis they can 
adhere to the Interpretant. The Interpretant here is common, shared consciousness, 
transcending the self and the non-self. The two selves are continuous, and, as 
continuous, cannot be extracted from the continuum. Literally, in semiosis, one 
simply stops being without the other. To be meaningless without the other: this is the 
conclusion of Peirce’s suprasubjective semiotics applied to teaching and learning. 
The student learns to think through the teacher and vice versa, and, therefore, if 
something could halt their relation they would be meaningless. The self is extended 
into the non-self. The student becomes the teacher, to some extent, and vice versa: 
this is what it means that they share. In Part II of this thesis I will explain this 
thoroughly. I will show that the core assumption of Peirce’s theory of evolution 
stands in that learning is agapic – it is a falling in love.  
If there is anything in the Interpretant of the two selves’ wills not harmonious 
with the Representamen and the Object then, if one of the two (teacher or student) 
does not desire the Interpretant, the possibility of learning is denied. If I do not want 
to be a part of the other, I do not want to learn from the other. This is a refusal to 
engage in a personal relation. Of course, semiosis cannot be in any sense suspended, 
the Interpretant necessarily emerges. Within this semiosis, the other has to be re-
cognized as self. For example, when someone teaches me how to row, my 
experience of rowing becomes his experience and his knowledge of rowing becomes 
mine. The personality evoked by self-consciousness is not lost by the emergence of a 
common, shared consciousness (Interpretant). On the contrary, personalities are 
better emphasized when engaging actively in semiosis with the other. As noticed 
above, Peirce mentioned that if the Selves did form a continuum, each would be 
distinguished by its own point of Self-consciousness. 
The other, in some extent, belongs to the future. In MMN I can only retain aspects 
of the other, of YMN. Therefore, for learning to occur there needs be a tendency 
(habit, law, an element of Thirdness) towards the other. The present can only contain 
an instant attitude, but not a tendency. As noted in Stables, “the totality of 
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phenomenal experience comprises MMN + YMN” (Stables 2008b, p. 92, see above). 
This totality can only be a habit, it belongs to an Interpretant of the semiosis in 
which MMN and YMN are engaged.  As a habit, an element of Thirdnes, it is not 
possessed (grasped) at any present moment, but it is a tendency. As such, it belongs 
to eternal nowness. The totality of phenomenal experience is argument: presently 
pursued while always infinitely distant. Self-consciousness is a habit as well, since it 
is developed, or rather, it is in continuous developing:  
“Introspection is wholly a matter of inference. One is immediately conscious 
of his Feelings, no doubt; but not that they are feelings of an ego. The self is only 
inferred. There is no time in the Present for any inference at all, least of all for 
inference concerning that very instant. Consequently the present object must be 
an external object, if there be any objective reference in it. The attitude of the 
Present is either conative or perceptive. Supposing it to be perceptive, the 
perception must be immediately known as external -- not indeed in the sense in 
which a hallucination is not external, but in the sense of being present regardless 
of the perceiver’s will or wish. Now this kind of externality is conative 
externality. Consequently, the attitude of the present instant (according to the 
testimony of Common Sense, which is plainly adopted throughout) can only be a 
Conative attitude. The consciousness of the present is then that of a struggle over 
what shall be; and thus we emerge from the study with a confirmed belief that it is 
the Nascent State of the Actual.” (CP 5.462) 
This explains that an other which at some point is distinct from the self, properly 
a non-self, can become part of the self. The other in its dimension of Secondness 
presents a surprise – the surprise of encountering anything distinct from the self. As 
Thirdness, as mediation, the other stops being non-self: it is part of the future self, a 
constituting part of the Interpretant Self. Engaging or detaching from relation to 
another essentially changes my future self. It is because the self as well is a 
continuous becoming, that the self and the other can cooperate. The self has room to 
expand in the future, and, thus it can expand towards the other, in personal relation. 
Thus the self can integrate within the future self what as a present actuality is non-
self: 
“This reference to the future is an essential element of personality. Were the 
ends of a person already explicit, there would be no room for development, for 
growth, for life; and consequently there would be no personality. The mere 
carrying out of predetermined purposes is mechanical.” (CP 6.157) 
According to Peirce, personalities develop in time, being at each passing moment 
characterized by present feelings: 
“This personality, like any general idea, is not a thing to be apprehended in an 
instant. It has to be lived in time; nor can any finite time embrace it in all its 
fullness. Yet in each infinitesimal interval it is present and living, though 
specially colored by the immediate feelings of that moment. Personality, so far as 
it is apprehended in a moment, is immediate self-consciousness.” (CP 6.155) 
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The non-self always belongs to the future, to the Interpretant self, as in the 
present there is no room for an other. The other facilitates the self’s personality’s 
growth in the future, as it brings a concrete dimension to expand into. The self can 
engage into knowing the other, into knowing the other’s knowledge. Therefore, 
when the student is facing the teacher, the student should have such feelings that 
would make her personality compatible with the teacher’s personality. The same 
is true for the teacher. The cooperation between student and teacher is, of course, 
a semiosis, since semiosis is par excellence cooperation – the cooperation of 
Representamen, Object, and Interpretant. The purpose of teaching concerns the 
Interpretant of the semiosis between student and teacher. Peirce explained that 
personal character develops in the same way as the cosmos. There is a 
coordination (semiosis) between self-consciousness, which evokes personality, 
and everything that is non-self. Arguably, in this regard there can be noticed a 
similarity between Peirce’s idea of personality, and that of the Patristic notion 
(persona, hypostasis), which was only conceived as relational and underpinned a 
triadic ontology (see Zizioulas 1985). Probably Peirce’s reading of St Augustine 
influenced his concept of personality. Peirce explained that the coordination of 
the self with non-self builds up personality, in a developmental teleology, thus 
personality implying more than simply an immediate self-consciousness at a 
moment in time-space: 
“But the word coordination implies somewhat more than this; it implies a 
teleological harmony in ideas, and in the case of personality this teleology is more 
than a mere purposive pursuit of a predeterminate end; it is a developmental 
teleology. This is personal character. A general idea, living and conscious now, it 
is already determinative of acts in the future to an extent to which it is not now 
conscious.” (CP 6.156) 
Therefore, the teacher and student need be in a teleological harmony, for the 
semiosis of their consciousnesses to evoke an Interpretant favourable to learning. 
The student and the teacher, in the learning and teaching phenomenon, have to 
develop together. Not only are they part of the same greater physiology of 
arguments, and semiosis is possible between them, but they need to develop their 
own argument, their own micro universe of discourse. The universe of discourse 
is “that to which the truth or falsity is limited” (CP 6.531). Peirce’s universe of 
discourse is similar with Wittgenstein’s idea of family of language games. The 
universe of discourse of the student and teacher is a specific educational 
Lebenswelt. This Lebenswelt is developed between student and teacher and, as 
such, by developing its own inner iconicity, can become incompatible to other 
Lebenswelten. For example, the student-teacher relation can lose a part of its 
teleological harmony in the presence of a third – another student, another teacher, 
the student’s husband. Any such third presence deviates the Lebenswelt from the 
universe of discourse which the student and the teacher have developed. This 
might raise some concerns about the interference of colleagues, such as other 
students or other teachers. The classroom and the institution are an important part 
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of the Lebenswelt within which the student and the teacher develop their personal 
relation: this is where they discover similarities. The possibility of a 
teacher/student personal relation stems from the impossibility of isolating the 
relation, just like scientific experimentation cannot be practised in absolutely ideal 
experimental conditions (see Chapter 4). One teacher/student relation is part of 
the syntax of the classroom (Lebenswelt) which includes several teacher/student 
relations. As such, any of the teacher/student relations of one classroom have to 
be a diagram of the classroom. Each such relation has to reflect the whole 
classroom in terms of inner similarities. We know each other in context. The 
relations’ copulation (semiosis) is possible because, according to Peirce, a 
predicate can be applied to several subjects. Further on, these relations have to be 
in diagrammatic harmony for the predicate (the teacher’s teaching) to be 
compatible with all subjects (the students’ learning). However, external 
interferences might be experienced: another student might require the teacher’s 
time, attention, and efforts (her life altogether), or another teacher might require 
the student’s. In Part II of the thesis I explain how any such obstacles are 
overcome via the agapic principle, the principle of growth. 
There are mainly two semioses involved in the construction of this universe of 
discourse: one which has the student as Representamen and the teacher as Object 
and one which has the teacher as Representamen and the student as Object. The 
first moment when the student encounters the teacher, she encounters the Object 
(the Second) of semiosis, herself being the Representamen (the First, from where 
semiosis starts). For the teacher is the same: she is the Representamen, the student 
is the Object. These two semioses have two distinct Interpretants. The 
compatibility between the student and the teacher, that iconic syntax that allows 
learning, stands in the similarity of these two Interpretants. A student can learn 
from a teacher proportionally to the similarity of these two Interpretants. If the 
Interpretants completely coincide then the Representamen and the Object will 
coincide and the teacher and the student will reach such a level of closeness and 
self-giving that they themselves would hardly distinguish self from the other. I 
argue that this situation occurs at moments. We must not forget that semiosis 
happens in time and, therefore, such situations when these Interpretants would 
coincide are elusive, last but a glimpse of a moment. In that moment of 
coincidence of Interpretants the other appears manoeuvrable, comprehensible to 
the self, the other’s knowledge is available to the self, one can understand the 
other, the other is revealed, opened to be discovered. It is a giving of the self: the 
self is discovered by another. When operating on an Icon one forgets that she is 
operating on the Icon and not on the Icon’s Object. Stjernfelt coined this 
peculiarity of icon manipulation as the “imaginary moment” (2007, p. 83). As 
when “walking” on the streets represented on a map, one forgets that her teacher 
is a distinct consciousness: they are thinking together in that moment. The 
momentarily coincidence of Interpretants is such an imaginary moment. 
Semiosis is continuous, and the Interpretants of a certain moment of 
coincidence evolve into further, future Interpretants. They do not simply 
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disappear; they are part of an evolution of a web of signs. If teaching is desired, 
then the resulting Interpretant signs of the student-teacher semiosis and the 
teacher-student semiosis have to be as similar as possible, even with moments of 
coincidence. The student-teacher semiosis is the semiosis where I as student am 
the Representamen and the teacher, as experienced, is the Object, and the teacher-
student semiosis is the semiosis where I as teacher am the Representamen, and the 
student, as experienced, is the Object. The degree of similarity between the 
Interpretants of these two semioses constitutes the iconic syntax of the student-
teacher sign-relation.  
As explained in Chapter 1, the physiology of arguments is intelligible because 
of its inner iconic syntax. This is what makes communication possible as well. 
Personalities are compatible according to their similarities. By similarities here is 
not meant merely psychological or cultural similarities. I recognize another 
person because of similarity. I am person as well and I know what to recognize: 
“The recognition by one person of another’s personality takes place by means 
to some extent identical with the means by which he is conscious of his own 
personality. The idea of the second personality, which is as much as to say that 
second personality itself, enters within the field of direct consciousness of the first 
person, and is as immediately perceived as his ego, though less strongly. At the 
same time, the opposition between the two persons is perceived, so that the 
externality of the second is recognized.” (CP 6.160) 
The very fact that I am person and the other is person as well allows dialogue, 
as I re-cognized in the other something that I have myself, namely personality. 
Therefore, the term personality is here used as iconic syntax of the self. A healthy 
personality is a self with sound inner iconic syntax – perfectly continuous inner 
similarity
23
. A person is in teleological harmony with another according to the 
diagrammatical character of their semiosis, the iconic syntax of their semiosis, 
that is. On a semiotic account personality is understood as a phenomenon of 
signification. Underpinned by suprasubjective ontology it becomes all the more 
clear that personality is relational. Per Aage Brandt defined personality as 
metonymy: 
“Metonymy is essentially the cognitive logic of personhood; this well-known 
rhetorical trope is really a cognitive process that is as deeply rooted in the human 
mind as the concept of Person: a self, understood as a Person, transcends any 
bodily reference (you are not ‘just’ your body), because it is determined 
metonymically as the abstract or ideal referent of all accessible indices of the 
activity of the individual.” (Brandt, 2007,p. 55)” 
In cognitive linguistics metonymy has been generally defined as the conceptual 
relationship within a single domain (see Geeraerts 2008), in contrast with the 
metaphor, which is understood as a relation between elements of distinct domains. 
                                                          
23




In the same manner, according to Peirce metaphor is a parallelism with something 
else, something external to the relation between Representamen and Object. 
Therefore, metonymy is identified with Peirce’s diagram. The diagram type 
evokes the phenomenon and particular existence of person. Personhood is 
defining, as such, for the human Umwelt. 
In this chapter I have shown that a suprasubjective reality implies a 
suprasujbective account of learning. Selves, being sign-relations, expand. The 
expansion of the self is the Universe’s expansion and suprasubjectively connected 
learning selves is the Universe’s self-discovery. Since the self is an expanding 
sign-relation, the interaction of selves is, therefore, a semiosis. This semiosis, the 
cooperation of two selves, reveals the element of personality evoked by each self-
consciousness. I have advanced a semiotic understanding of personality, 
identifying personality with the inner iconic syntax of the self. Two selves can 
tend towards shared personalities, to some extent, within their relation. The 
student and the teacher have to tend towards this personal sharing, so that their 
communication can evoke their expansions towards and within the other. This is 
the purpose of teaching: that the teacher’s knowledge becomes the student’s. It is 































In this part I develop the main arguments of the Peircean Theory of 
Learning.  
I define learning as the passage from Icon to Argument. This definition 
implies that learning is an evolutionary semiosis. As such, I approach education in 
the perspective of Peirce’s theory of evolution. According to Peirce, there are 
three modes of evolution, corresponding to the three phenomenological 
categories: Tychasm, evolution by chance, Anancasm, evolution by necessity, and 
Agapasm, evolution by love (CP 6.302). The cornerstone of the Peircean Theory 
of Learning consists in the understanding of learning as a cosmological matter, 
having as rationale self-denying love.  
I argue that, following Peirce’s theory of evolution, a student/teacher 
relation can only be justified on the ground of mutual, self-denying love. This is 
revealed by the way in which signification evolves, from iconicity, being driven 
































From Icon to Argument 
 
In Chapter 2 I introduced Peirce’s sign typologies, including the concepts of 
Icon and Argument. In this chapter I explain why the Icon plays an essential role in 
learning and how learning can be defined as the passage from Icon to Argument. I 
consider that this is a broad, comprehensive account of learning which, unlike other 
attempts at definition, does not reduce the richness of the learning experience to the 
limitations of a theoretical framework. In the same time, while it does not narrow 
down learning, accounting for it in all its aspects, it is deeply insightful from the 
semiotic perspective. 
The Icon has been presented as the sign which in its existential relation to the 
object presents a similarity (Chapter 2). This means that the Icon is the sign which 
signifies by means of similarity, a likeness that is. The phenomenon of signification 
occurring by similarity shall be referred as iconicity. The difference between Icon 
and iconicity is purely conceptual since the Icon, like any sign, is a phenomenon. In 
the present work the term iconicity refers to the general phenomenon and the term 
Icon shall refer to particular signification phenomena. An Icon can be analysed, 
while the sign’s iconicity can also be analysed. Even though it would not be 
conceptually wrong to discuss ‘a sign’s Icon’ it would be somewhat strange and 
perhaps misleading, since the Icon is a sign type. Therefore the use of a sign’s 
similarity to its object will be referred to as the ‘sign’s Iconicity’. Consequently, the 
indexicality, the symbolism, the proposisionality, the argumentation etc. of the sign 
are as well phenomena of signification (signs) that can be analysed as such. This 
apparent terminological confusion is due to the fact that the types (and classes) of 
signs are always mingled in experience (semiosis). Signs, we must not forget, are 
relations. This is why Peirce discussed in terms of the sign’s correlates (the types of 
signs composing a sign, each identifiable within the phenomenon of signification, 
but none separable). (CP 2.238) 
Frederik Stjernfelt’s Diagrammatology (2007) offers a new insight into 
Peirce’s Icon, underlining the importance that Peirce himself gave to this sign type 
particularly as regards its role in learning. This framework brings two controversial 
claims (in regard to Peircean semiotics) that are essential for the present thesis, 
namely (1) that iconicity suffices for meaning to occur and (2) that signification 
cannot occur without iconicity, or at least that an iconless sign would be an useless 
abstraction (e.g. the contextless variable x, a proposition that does not contain a 
predicate, etc.). Stjernfelt defines Iconicity as follows: 
“Iconicity is generally conceived of as the sign-relation making one 
phenomenon signify another by similarity in some respects.” (2007, p. 49)  
Similarity is the criterion for Iconic signification, but it does not define it 
entirely. Similarity can also be called “shared qualities” (Stjernfelt 2007, p. 75). 
While Iconicity is a phenomenon of signification similarity on its own does not 
suffice to signify. As Stjernfelt explains, it needs an intention. This happens because 
similarity is symmetrical, while signification is not necessarily symmetrical. This 
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means that if a is similar to b then b is necessarily similar to a, while if a signifies b 
then b does not necessarily signify a. It can be said that a is similar with b, while the 
essential character of the sign does not stand in that a is signifying with b, but that a 
signifies b. If someone thinks of me as a result of her seeing a photography of me, 
because she finds the content of the photography to be similar with me, it does not 
mean that she would necessarily think of the same photography if she would see me 
in flesh and blood (by this not construing at all the infinity of semiosis: if a signifies 
b it does not imply that a does not simultaneously signify b1, b2, b3, …, bn). This 
does not mean that in signification the equivalence is excluded, but only that it is not 
implied. If I would see Al Pacino in flesh and blood surely the cover of the 
Godfather movie would come to my mind when recognizing him. This direction of 
signification in the case of the Icon is determined by the way in which the sign is 
used. The way in which the sign is used constitutes the sign’s mode of being: the use 
determines the type of the sign. I have explained in the previous chapters that a 
cornerstone of Peirce’s semiotics is that a sign is only a sign in actu (see Chapters 2 
and 3).This is the application of the principle of pragmaticism to semiotics. Peirce 
clearly accounted for this: 
“A sign is only a sign in actu by virtue of its receiving an interpretation, that 
is, by virtue of its determining another sign of the same object.” (CP 5.569) 
Thus, a web of signs is meaningful (comprehensive for the mind) if the signs 
constituting it share a common object which constitutes a middle term. Signs are 
therefore placed in syllogistic relations. Peirce noted that “Every assertion is an 
assertion that two different signs have the same object.” (CP 2.437) This is the sort 
of sharing within the physiology of arguments which Stjernfelt (2007) identified as 
iconic syntax. That is why a certain meaning can be dissonant with another: there 
might be no common object inferred. For example, a person who developed a more 
sensitive experience of colors might disagree with another claiming that the sky on a 
particular day is blue, but she might claim the sky to be azure. While one might find 
blue and azure to be more or less the same qualities, another might find a dissonance 
between the sentences a is blue and a is azure, while simply failing to see a common 
object between the signs (iconic predicates) ‘is blue’ and ‘is azure’. Of course, one 
might be considered presumptuous for not admitting that as predicates the qualisigns 
blue and azure share in their turn some qualities (e.g. they share their being within a 
certain range of the chromatic spectrum, therefore there should be a genus of which 
they are both species), but one must understand that signification is not quantifiable 
and, thus, what for one is obvious for another might be contradictory while none of 
them being necessarily wrong or right. The principle of excluded third does not 
apply in semiotics (Semetsky, 2005b). Peirce stated that “the principle of excluded 
middle only applies to an individual (for it is not true that “Any man is wise” nor that 
“Any man is not wise”)” (CP 6.168). Within the physiology of arguments entities 
cannot be separated into individual termini. Peirce inherited from Duns Scotus the 
scholastic realist assumption that the real existence of individuals rests 
metaphysically on the real existence of universals, an interdependence that occurs 
clearly from Peirce’s three phenomenological categories and their cooperation 
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(semiosis). As such, there is no a priori for Peirce; none of the termini of the sign is 
a priori to any of the other two, as the triadic relation is not a sum of dyads or 
monads. 
Consider the teacher-student possible situation where the teacher’s concept of 
negative numbers functions within the perspective of ideal numbers, while the 
student’s concept of the same object functions only as concrete numbers (e.g. the 
student can express with negative numbers that there is sea level below 0, or that 
there are such realities as one being in debt to the bank more money than she actually 
has). In such a situation, if the teacher would try to teach complex numbers to this 
student, a subtle problem would occur. The student will experience a categorical 
mismatch between her concept of negative numbers and the way her teacher is using 
this concept when her teacher will tell her that there is a number i so that i*i = -1 
(e.g., the sea level cannot be equal with the square of a number, but an ideal number, 
that does not simply define quantity, but is a quality in itself – and, thus, contains 
within itself the possibility of being used as predicate, can). This categorical 
mismatch will determine some particular effects in the semiosis implied. In this 
situation, the web of signs constituting the student is not fitting with the web of signs 
that she encounters. Several consequences might occur, from the student giving up 
mathematics, to the student making an effort of assimilating a new web of meanings 
into her own and thus redefining her understanding of negative numbers, or to 
increasing the amount of chocolate she eats daily (the teacher has no real control 
over this). 
The present theory of learning will not engage with such situations either as 
change of opinions, shift of paradigm, or as a simple theoretical advancement on the 
behalf of the student. Such situations will be approached as experience of meaning 
that provoke the changing of one’s Lebenswelt; this means the changing of one’s 
own very self. If my understanding of wine changes then my entire phenomenal 
world changes: from my appreciation of art to the way I swim and to my 
understanding of semiotics, because all these signs that constitute my being are (and 
need be) coherently connected syllogistically. The Lebenswelt and Umwelt of a 
living being are dynamic, evolving as the organism is evolving. Since experience is 
continuous, that is, the self is a continuously expanding sign, the Umwelt and 
Lebenswelt continuously evolve as well. All knowledge (the entire being) of a 
knowing subject is connected. The situation in which one would know what negative 
numbers are without this affecting his performance of swimming is impossible. Like 
the cognitive scientist knows that all organs of an organism are connected to the 
brain, and thus they are all together interconnected, so the semiotician needs to be 
aware that all semiosis in which a knowing subject is involved is integrated in one 
web of signs. In the framework advanced here to be interconnected is the same with 
being connected, as one of the principles of Peirce’s relational logic is that “to be in 
relation to X, and to be in relation to a relation to X, mean the same thing” (R 
611:14–15, 1908, in Bellucci, 2013, p. 181). To state that one knows something 
which is not part of herself is like stating that an organ which is not connected to her 
brain is hers. Of course, the web of signs, the self, expands into knowing the other; 
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the student gets to know the teacher and vice versa, and thus they are assimilated one 
into the other. Their phenomenal worlds merge into one. I explained in Chapter 5 
that this merging of phenomenal worlds is ideally a coincidence of Interpretants, 
which results from operating on the other’s knowledge as with an icon. This requires 
having the other’s knowledge available as purely iconic. In that moment the other is 
perfectly operational for the self; it is part of the self. I consider that learning needs 
have such moments, elusive as they might be. This sharing of signification is the 
peculiarity of life, defined in biosemiotics as local plurality (see Kull in Chapter 1) – 
the possibility of breaking ontology through unification of phenomenal worlds. 
Stjernfelt observed that in icon manipulation such a climax is reached at 
some point, where “the icon performs its full impact, a moment of imagination, one 
might call it.” (2007, p. 83) This imaginary moment consists in such a fine 
manipulation of the icon that it is identical to the manipulation of the Sign Object. 
This is possible because the icon, being pure quality, makes the Object operational. 
The Icon sign presents its Object in respect of some of the Object’s qualities. 
Because qualities are graspable in terms of similarities, an Icon’s Object is 
operational. An Object which in relation to the Representamen lacks iconicity is 
meaningless; it lacks any sort of Representamen, and is not a terminus of a Sign-
relation. These are limit cases such as pure convention, which is, if possible at all, 
useless (a void, functionless parameter or variable x, a subject without predicate). It 
is inaccessible, if existing at all. Iconic manipulation effects an operation of 
substitution, which allows the performing of experimentation on the Replica as on 
the Type. A simple example is that of our manipulations of geometrical figures. Due 
to their very definition a triangle, a square, a circle cannot be drawn (geometrical 
lines do not have width, it is impossible to obtain the precise measure of angles, an 
infinity of points cannot be represented, etc.), but, nevertheless, we draw things 
similar in some regards to the triangle type, the square type, the circle type etc., 
which allow us to operate on the types. This is possible because we can operate on 
these perceivable iconic grounds as if on the types themselves. We forget that those 
traces of ink on paper, actually, are not a triangle, while maintaining our 
understanding of the triangle. This relation is an icon: the triangle, the drawing, our 
manipulation of them. One can argue that the similarity between a pictogram and a 
triangle is only constructed – there is no real, inherent similarity between the 
geometrical figure that contains three angles and some traces of ink on paper. If this 
would be the case the pictograms are either useless, or any pictogram can be used to 
serve for an Icon about a triangle. The answer to this stands in that the pictograms 
that best serve as a perceptible ground for a triangle Icon share obvious similarities 
between them, which they do not share with the pictograms that best serve as 
perceptible grounds for Icons of squares, circles or other figures. If one tries to 
operate on a drawing that iconically presents itself as square as if on a triangle, it will 
simply not work.  
Anything can be similar with anything else and anything can signify anything 
else, but the Icon represents the sharing of qualities between the Representamen and 
the Object in some respect. It is this exigency of the Icon – of signifying in some 
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respect – that makes it so useful. Of course a triangle is similar to a square, is similar 
to a whale, is similar to my feelings in this moment, but the pictogram that is usually 
used to represent triangles for geometrical purposes is useful because it represents 
the triangle in the respect in which concerns relations of trigonometry (it clearly 
evokes the characteristics of three segments and three angles). The triangle might 
signify as well my feelings in this moment, but we are operating on an icon when the 
operations on the triangle coincide with operations on my feelings, when the triangle 
casts light on some features of my feelings so as to make them available 
(operational).  
Iconic manipulation makes reality accessible. I can lift the glass of wine on 
the table to my mouth and drink because I can simulate this action in my 
imagination. For the action to be successful the relation between it and the 
simulation has to be iconic. Drinking from a glass is not a difficult task, the 
possibility of its simulation simply proves its possibility. Nevertheless, iconic 
manipulation can give insights towards the performing of more difficult tasks. Take 
the example of a soccer player trying to score a goal from a free kick from a 
distance: her simulation of the event is crucial for its performance. The better the 
simulation is, the better the performance will be. A better simulation here implies a 
more accentuated iconic character in the relation to the (desired) performance. This 
gives a hint to how the Peircean Theory of Learning can be used in teaching 
practices generally (take into consideration the insight that this example offers 
regarding physical education). The teacher needs be aware that the student needs to 
be capable of simulating the performance. This is what the icons does: 
“The value of an icon consists in its exhibiting the features of a state of things 
regarded as if it were purely imaginary.” (CP 4.448) 
Stjernfelt considers that the imaginary moment of iconic manipulation is 
essential for the possibility of thought: 
“This moment of fiction is crucial to the possibility of thought, of 
imagination, or contemplation of pictures to approach the object intended.” (p. 83) 
This statement does not concern only cognition and mental representation. It 
gives an insight on ontology, as it explains iconic syntax. In Chapter 2 I have 
explained that according to Peirce judgments are not strictly mental and in Chapter 5 
I have mentioned Stables’ similar remark, which he identified in Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations. According to Stables this is an important aspect of 
phenomenologically overlapping reality (termed suprasubjectivity in this thesis). The 
present thesis does not aim at performing an investigation on Wittgenstein, but it is 
relevant that, even though essentially incompatible with semiotics, there are common 
assumptions with Wittgenstein’s contribution to analytic philosophy, particularly 
regarding suprasubjectivity. 
The imaginary moment phenomenon can be, as well, a more rigorous and 
insightful explanation of the folkloric “If you can dream it, you can do it” motto. 
According to Stjernfelt, the success of any experiments rests on the realization of the 
imaginary moment of icon manipulation – the identification of Object of 
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signification with an Object of pure qualities (the realization of an iconic version of 
the Object): 
“In many cases, of course, this imaginary moment may be unrestricted as 
the notorious ‘free play of imagination’; in others it is constrained by various, more 
or less severe, regulations pertaining to the object, for practical, aesthetical, 
scientific, or other purposes. In all cases, however, this moment of identification 
where the manipulation of the icon in a certain sense is a manipulation of the object 
itself, is crucial to the possibilities of solving the constraints and success of the 
experiment.” (p. 83) 
To draw a portrait or to solve a mathematical equation the simulation of the 
act needs to precede it. In many cases education aims precisely at cultivating 
simulation (distinct from imitation). This is clearly the case of mathematics, which 
consists in diagrammatic reasoning par excellence. The solving of an equation is 
itself a simulation of a real life circumstance. Surely, one needs to be capable of 
simulating the writing of her PhD in order to write it. At times only the next small 
step is available for simulation, but this is already another aspect of learning. If 
something (e.g. psychological states) obscures the performing of the simulation, the 
success of the learning itself is compromised. Also, if the simulation is not accurate 
the learning can be compromised. Such is the case when one is overly enthusiastic 
(naïve) and simulates her moment of glory when her PhD is published (a case of 
lucid dreaming), but ignore the simulation of the writing of her PhD (the schedule 
planning, playing with the icons of her argument, etc.).  
The imaginary moment is the moment when no distinction is perceived 
between the Type (an Icon’s Object) and the manipulated Replica (an Icon as 
Representamen). When “roaming on the streets of a map” we tend to forget that this 
shape on paper is not the building we are looking at. Actually, we tend to point at a 
colored rectangle on the map and say “This is Westminster Abbey!” This is the 
imaginary moment. Peirce described this central point of icon manipulation: 
“I call a sign which stands for something merely because it resembles 
it, an icon. Icons are so completely substituted for their objects as hardly to 
be distinguished from them. Such are the diagrams of geometry. A diagram, 
indeed, so far as it has a general signification, is not a pure icon; but in the 
middle part of our reasonings we forget that abstractness in great measure, 
and the diagram is for us the very thing. So in contemplating a painting, there 
is a moment when we lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, the 
distinction of the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure 
dream -- not any particular existence, and yet not general. At that moment we 
are contemplating an icon.” (CP 3.362) 
As in icon manipulation generally there is a moment of coincidence when the 
Object is translated into a qualitative Representamen (Icon), thus becoming 
operational, there needs to be a moment of coincidence in the student/teacher 
relation. The student (as sign) becomes the teacher (as sign) and, obviously, vice 
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versa. Chapter 5 concluded with the idea of the momentary identification between 
self and other, at least in some respect, as necessary for learning. It is a sharing of 
phenomenal worlds in its ultimate stage, that of identification of Interpretants. This 
moment of identification of Interpretants, having the characteristics of the imaginary 
moment, consists in one’s (the student’s) possibility to use the other’s (the teacher’s) 
knowledge. Further on, this identification leads to argumentation. Since the student 
could iconically manipulate some of the teacher’s knowledge, they now have a 
common predicate: they share it. From here they can develop arguments together. 
The sharing of phenomenal worlds, almost up to the point of identity at 
moments, is an unavoidable phenomenon that makes teaching and learning possible. 
In the same time, it can have two negative effects: (1) the student can be 
exaggeratedly biased by her teacher, which brings obstacles to her learning and (2) 
the teacher expects the student to be the student of her own web of signs, and thus in 
her evaluation of the student will look for herself rather than for the genuine student 
(what the teacher knows about the student is different than what the student knows 
about herself). The problem here is that the self subjects the other to the self. If the 
student sees in the teacher only what she already knows about the teacher 
(apperceptive other), without acknowledging that there is an abyssal unknown 
teacher (the personal teacher), and not the genuine teacher, she cannot learn from the 
teacher. This is because the apperceptive other is already part of myself– it is my 
concept about the teacher – and, therefore, instead of growing in signification 
towards the other the self is still focused on its own meaning phenomena. If the 
teacher fails to see the genuine student and is aware only of her awareness of the 
student (apperceptive other), evidently, the teacher has nothing to offer to the 
student. This situation is particularly dangerous when evaluating the student: the 
teacher will be searching for herself in the student, for identification, and not for 
similarity. By this attitude the teacher rejects the student’s unique personality (see 
Chapter 5) and any possibility of creativity from the student’s part. 
The phenomenological school developed since Husserl has been concerned 
with this aspect of personal relations as well. Heidegger’s concept of Dasein and 
Levinas’ concept of Thou (inherited from Martin Buber and generally from the 
Chasidic philosophers) offer a valuable insight in this regard (further explored in 
Chapter 10). Stjernfelt (2007) found essential similarities between Peirce’s semiotics 
and Husserl’s phenomenology (Chapter 2). If the legacy of the former brought about 
the understanding of being as suprasubjective (e.g. Deely, 2001), the legacy of the 
latter brought the understanding of being as intersubjective (Levinas, 1998) – both 
explain that our phenomenal worlds collide and overlap. The intersubjectivity of 
humans involved in learning is understood as personal suprasubjectivity (personality 
is evoked by self-consciousness, realized in relations of the selves’ consciousness, 
see Chapter 5). This can be seen as coextensive with Stables’ semiotic philosophy of 
education, centered around the idea of a reality of “overlapping phenomenal worlds” 
(Stables 2012, see also Chapters 2 and 5); its implications will be investigated 
further on. In Part III I explain how Husserlian phenomenology, via Heidegger and 
Levinas, is coextensive with the Peircean Theory of Learning and that semiotic 
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phenomenology can lead to further advancements in edusemiotics. For now it will 
suffice to take into consideration that the key to overcoming these two obstacles in 
learning (stemming from the same one problem) is accepting the authenticity of the 
other. While the student must not develop a fanatical appreciation of her teacher, 
thus developing her-own-teacher (the teacher as apperceptive other) and obscuring 
the genuine teacher, the teacher has to search for the genuine student, not her own 
subjectification of the student. This comes down to a search for similarity, a relation 
which is opposed both to the relations of difference and identity. Each knowing 
subject involved in the learning phenomenon has to discover the genuine other. If 
learning in general was defined as a discovery of similarities, learning in the student-
teacher situation is a discovery of the other. The discovery of the other has to be 
done, of course, via discovery of similarities. It is an erotic relation which transcends 
the inauthenticity of the mundane: 
“To love is to exist as if the lover and the loved one were alone in the world. 
The intersubjective relation of love is not the beginning of society, but its negation.” 
(Levinas, 1998, p. 20) 
Like Levinas claiming that “the emergence of the human in the economy of 
being upset the meaning and plot and philosophical rank of ontology,” (1998, p. xiii) 
Peirce accounts that the encountering of the other is a surprise: 
“The phenomenon of surprise in itself is highly instructive in reference to 
this category because of the emphasis it puts upon a mode of consciousness which 
can be detected in all perception, namely, a double consciousness at once of an ego 
and a non-ego, directly acting upon each other.” (CP 5.52) 
Learning something new literally places one in a new (different to some 
degree), phenomenal world: the semiosis the learner is involved in is different now, 
that she is (constituted by) a new set of signs. The ethical dimension ascribed to 
learning from this perspective transcends the mere teacher-student local 
circumstance. A fundamental idea introduced in Chapter 1: education is a method 
which appeared along the Universe’s discovery of itself. The teacher is not only 
responsible for her student or for herself and likewise in the case of the student. They 
are both engaged in semiosis: the Universe is unfolding, the ultimate Argument is 
slowly being unveiled. Education concerns the entire evolution of signification. 
Arguably, the entire academic community and the entire human society benefit from 
a growing student/teacher relation. As the learner learns the web of signs expands. It 
is important to acknowledge that both the student and the teacher are learners. Not 
only that we permanently learn through our lives, but within the teaching/learning 
experience both sides are learning, as each side is confronted with the shocking 
reality of dealing with a web of signs other than its own – and they have to signify 
together. From this point of view, an artist is one who interprets art, the art lover, not 
the producer of an artifact. The producer of an artifact (painter, musician, etc.) is 
only an artist because in the process of production she is interpreting her own 
creation – otherwise she could not perform it. Nevertheless, any interpreter of her 
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artwork is an artist in her own right, as anyone could discover meanings in the 
artwork that its producer herself could not discover: 
“In a painting are concealed many enigmas which the painter himself has 
never contemplated (and since the sheet of the painting is continuous, the number 
of possible similarities is infinite which means that he would never even be able to 
contemplate them all in finite time – so much for the biographical method) – what 
is, for instance, the precise distance between the main characters, which geometric 
figure do the persons describe if we draw lines between them, what is the sum of 
the height of all the trees depicted.” (Stjernfelt 2007, p. 85) 
The same happens in the case of teaching. The student always has the 
possibility of discovering information in the taught material which is hidden for the 
teacher herself. Of course, as in Stjernfelt’s examples, many possible similarities are 
not insightful. Nevertheless, in an infinite class of similarities no one will exhaust the 
insightful ones. No one’s knowledge is infallible or perfect. The teacher needs be 
aware of this about herself; it should be a constant and continuous characteristic of 
her MMN and, as such, influence the classroom Lebenswelt accordingly. Meanwhile 
the student is learning she can unveil new meaning for her teacher as well. That the 
student-teacher semiosis arrives at the level at which it can properly be called 
mediation it becomes symmetrical (student-teacher = teacher-student); the teacher 
and the student share a predicate. Thus, a habit is developed between student and 
teacher. Sharing has to become a habit, a matter of Thirdness, that is, for the teacher 
and the student. In Peirce’s terms habit and mediation are synonymous, as they both 
refer to a Third signification, an Interpretant. When one is teaching one is learning. 
In the authentic discovery of her teacher the student transcends the dangers of 
boredom on the one hand or blind indoctrination on the other and in her discovery of 
the student the teacher overcomes the banal replication of knowledge, and, through 
her student, she generates new knowledge. Thus the purpose of education is 
achieved: the web of signs expands and the Universe is discovering itself through 
life forms. 
Icons are signs that pertain to a domain of Firstness. They are the First in the 
Icon-Index-Symbol trichotomy and thus they set the criterion on which this 
trichotomy develops continuously from simple to complex: similarity. Peirce 
preferred to refer to sets of signs (not webs). A set can have an inner continuity. 
Similarity is, as mentioned, a relation that occurs among qualities of things. 
Similarity evokes signs. If the sign was there and it was discovered by a knowing 
being or if it was created once with its discovery or if it was simply constructed by a 
knowing being it is perhaps impossible to discern, but surely, it has been evoked by 
the similarity discovered by the knowing subject. Also, according to Peirce 
continuity occurs among qualities of things (Peirce’s concept of continuity was 
explained in Chapter 2). By thing we shall here understand anything, be it an actual 
sign or a possible sign. Thus, thing, in this sense, is synonymous with no-thing (there 
is no dichotomy, since all of these – a thing, nothingness, and anything, in their 
generality, can signify).What cannot signify, that which is useless, has no ontological 
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validity whatsoever, and, therefore, about such a thing, such as the Kantian thing-in-
itself, there is no reason to speculate. Since it cannot come into the physiology of 
arguments, since it cannot be of this world, it would be wrongly considered a thing. 
This is not because our only grasp of existence happens via meaning, but because 
things have the quality of signifying. Even a non-existent thing might signify. The 
possible but not yet actual sign can only be contemplated abstractly, because as soon 
as any cognition of it arises (e.g. the slightest mentioning of it) it signifies and thus it 
becomes an actual sign
24
.  
To return to the issue of continuity, the individual entities populating a set are 
not continuous, but the qualities of the individuals give the set’s continuity. Thus, if 
two objects share a quality, like an apple and a car being both red they can be placed 
in the same continuous set of red objects. Such a set of redness, according to Peirce, 
is continuous and infinite, containing all the redness in the world and infinitely more 
redness as possible reality. According to Peirce’s account of Iconicity, a continuum 
can never be exhausted by the instantiations it includes. Since Icons pertain to 
Firstness it is no surprise that they represent qualities. In Chapter 2 it was explained 
that qualities populate Firstness, indivual, brute objects populate Secondness, the 
category of haecceity (thisness), and Thirdness is populated by laws. It is a crucial 
observation that similarity is not identity. Similarity means shared qualities, but not 
identity of haececeity (individuality), or of anything else. If two perceptibles share a 
quality (e.g. these two cars are red) it does not mean that they have something 
identical (the red paint covering one car is literally the same physical red paint 
covering the other), but that they both dispose of a quality from the same continuum 
(the red paints are distinct in their being objectified on different cars, but they are 
continuous – they belong to the same continuity of redness). For this Peirce considers 
that only Icons are the signs that can function as predicates (see Chapter 2, section C) 
– to predicate is to discover the sharing of a similarity (e.g. These two cars are red): 
“The only way of communicating an idea is by means of an icon; and every 
indirect method of communicating an idea must depend for its establishment upon 
the use of an icon. Hence, every assertion must contain an icon or set of icons, or 
else must contain signs whose meaning is only explicable by icons. The idea which 
the set of icons (or the equivalent of a set of icons) contained in an assertion 
signifies may be termed the predicate of the assertion.” (CP 2.278) 
Semiotics brings the insight that the essential characteristic of a predicate is 
its being an icon (it is essential for a predicate to signify iconically). Stjernfelt 
accounts that “the predicate in logic as well as ordinary language is essentially 
iconic.” (2007, p, 76) This reveals the importance and the role of predicates in 
learning, since all learning happens via icons. An Icon can evolve in two ways: (1) it 
can become an Index by establishing a reference following a continuum of similarity 
                                                          
24
St Augustine remarked that the unspeakable is speakable at least in the extent that it can be named 
as unspeakable which already involves speaking about it: “There is a kind of conflict between words 
here: if what cannot be spoken is unspeakable, then it is not unspeakable, because it can actually be 
said to be unspeakable.” (De Doctrina Christiana, I, 13-14) 
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between the Representamen and the Object, or it can become a Predicate (Rheme) by 
mediating the similarity between Representamen and Object to an Interpretant. To 
state something in the form of a proposition requires both an Index and a Predicate. 
Having learnt something, one can use a predicate so as to state something about what 
was learnt. 
As presented in Chapter 2, the proposition, also termed dicisign, is a Subject-
Predicate structured sign. The Subject has to be an Index, the sign that has an 
existential relation to its Object, and the Predicate, has to be an Icon. Peirce’s 
denomination for Predicate (see Chapter 2) is Rheme. The Rheme (predicate) is 
simply an Icon used to communicate (to mediate) – an Icon extended to Thirdness, 
an Icon in its Interpretant aspect. Therefore the Predicate can be defined as a Sign 
that in relation to its Object presents a similarity and its relation to its Interpretant is 
a possibility (e.g., “is blue”). By adding to such a sign a Subject (which needs be an 
Index), a Proposition is constituted (e.g. “the sky is blue”). Even a noun (such as 
“sky”) can essentially be understood for its iconic structure. Its interpretation as a 
pure index is practically impossible and our use of such signs as strictly nouns is a 
theoretical abstraction (according to the pragmatic maxim of logic, we can only 
understand “sky” as “sky!”, thus making it a predicate).   
Francesco Bellucci is right in arguing that according to Peirce “common 
nouns are in fact unsaturated predicates or rhemata, i.e., predicates from which one 
or more subjects have been removed.” (2013, p. 181) Signs tend towards the 
Argument type (see Chapter 2). Arguments are constituted by copulated sets of 
Propositions. What makes the copulation of Propositions possible is a criterion of 
continuity. Continuity distributes a criterion throughout the three categories, from 
Firstness to Secondness and to Thirdness. Thus, the criterion of such continuity 
within arguments has to be similarity: if the continuity would be simply quality, the 
criterion of Qualisigns, the distribution of quality would not be anything else but 
shared quality and this is similarity. In its progression towards argumentation a sign 
obtains the criterion of possibility, once it becomes rhematic, but it is similarity itself 
that makes the horizon of possibility real. This is the same with saying that 
predication is possible because of the continuity of similarity (in Chapter 2 I 
explained that Peirce’s concepts of similarity and continuity are inter-dependable). It 
is the development of sign relations towards the Argument that constitutes the very 
phenomenon of learning: the Universe’s discovery of itself, the Universe’s becoming 
aware of itself through life forms. 
So far there are three types of signs that prove to be essential to learning: the 
Icon, the Proposition (Dicisign) and the Argument. The Icon evokes learning. The 
Proposition sign type is necessary in the development of arguments. Among an 
Argument’s correlates there has to be a Symbol as well, so, arguably, if a sign 
evolves to a Symbol, before it has any propositional character, it could evolve to 
Argument while avoiding the Proposition type. In this case, such an Argument 
would have a Proposition as a correlate in its composition accidentally rather than 
properly participating in the semiosis. Nevertheless, the nature of Arguments is 
mediation of propositions. The mediation of propositions is symbolic and the 
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mediation of symbols is propositional. Mediation is, by definition, the characteristic 
of Thirdness. Propositions have Thirdness through a Predicate correlate, but there 
needs be Thirdness stemming from an Index for copulation of propositions to occur 
– a phenomenon of signification literally pointing to what the copulation consists in. 
Indexical copulation constitutes a middle term (tertium comparationis). Indexicality 
per se is a matter of Secondness, and by developing mediation from an Index to a 
Symbol – the sign that signifies its object as law – emerges. Therefore, at this 
categorical level of signification, iconic syntax is developed into a symbolic syntax. 
It does not come as a surprise at all that Symbols make the copulation of 
propositions possible, since it was already established that this copulation is possible 
due to the continuity of similarity. The Symbol is the Third of the trichotomy 
through which similarity is distributed continuously, starting from the Icon, and 
continuing with the Index. The Proposition has in its constitution a Rheme 
(Predicate) and an Index (Subject). Therefore, to enrich a Proposition’s signification, 
a Symbol could be correlated to it. The evolution of two propositions into one sign, 
therefore, will imply a symbolic signification. To mediate into one sign (whatever 
that sign is) the proposition George is here with the proposition The cat is hungry 
one needs to know that George is the cat (the cat’s name is George, that is). This is a 
symbolical syntax which makes such copulation, that is the mediating of two Indices 
into one Symbol, possible. A proper noun (George) is a symbol. Even the copulation 
between The cat is hungry and The cat is here, that is the copulation between two 
Replicas of the same Type (cat and cat) needs a Symbol because the Index is the 
Replica of a Symbol, and the Subject of a Proposition is always an Index (cat). 
Therefore, mediation of propositions is symbolical. Copulation of symbols has to be 
propositional as well, since Symbols are still unsaturated predicates. A non-
propositional copulation of symbols is just an enumeration. The argument is the 
fulfillment of signification. As such, it is inexhaustive and its digression presents a 
perfect harmony of correlated sign types. To express the ultimate Argument’s full 
incomprehensible character, Peirce explains precisely the high level of complexity 
resulted from the combination of simple Qualities: 
“The Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great 
poem -- for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony -- just as every true 
poem is a sound argument. But let us compare it rather with a painting -- with an 
impressionist seashore piece -- then every Quality in a Premiss is one of the 
elementary colored particles of the Painting; they are all meant to go together to 
make up the intended Quality that belongs to the whole as whole. That total effect 
is beyond our ken; but we can appreciate in some measure the resultant Quality of 
parts of the whole -- which Qualities result from the combinations of elementary 
Qualities that belong to the premisses.” (CP 5.119) 
Learning, therefore, is this passage from Icon to Argument. The premisses 
are constituted by qualities which signify iconically – they are comprehensible, they 
make the world intelligible. The Argument is constituted from the combination of 
qualities: upon qualities new qualities occur. The Argument is overwhelming, 
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beyond our ken, but, due to its iconic syntax, it is intelligible. The iconic syntax is 
precisely this diagrammatic character, the parts resemble the whole: Quality 
premisses together form intended Quality. What we can understand, what we can 
appreciateconsists in parts of the whole, as Quality. 
 Process philosophy adopted such views from Peirce, that reality consists in 
an evolutionary passage (a process). Nevertheless, process philosophy generally did 
not commit completely to the idea of Universe as a physiology of arguments. This 
can be observed in Alfred North Whitehead’s Process and Reality (1929). 
Whitehead advanced a notion of ‘applicable’ which appears to be equivalent with 
Peirce’s idea that signs can only be fulfilled in actu. Nevertheless, Whitehead’s 
thought is different than Peirce’s in that, like it is commonly the case of modern 
philosophy, it regards language as a means, more or less appropriate, for describing 
reality. From this point of view the means that build our knowledge, such as 
language and even experience are limited and bring obstacles in knowledge: 
“Philosophers can never hope finally to formulate these metaphysical first 
principles. Weakness of insight and deficiencies of language stand in the way 
inexorably. Words and phrases must be stretched towards a generality foreign to 
their ordinary usage; and however such elements of language be stabilized as 
technicalities, they remain metaphors mutely appealing for an imaginative leap.” (p. 
4) 
 For Peirce, the Universe, reality itself, has a semiotic structure from which 
life, experience, and language spring and evolve. Language is not something else, 
apart from reality, but it is inherent in reality and thus similar to the other (non-
linguistic) signs around it. Words, phrases, metaphors are signs that constitute the 
Universe. If by words we refer to units of articulated speech we know that we only 
find them (at least so far) in the human Lebenswelt and that they are absent in the 
entire non-human world. Nevertheless, words can be indices, symbols, rhemes, 
metaphors and other types of signs which are used by several other living beings. We 
use the same sign types because we partake in the constitution of the same reality, 
the same physiology of arguments. Metaphors are not simply attempts at describing 
reality in artificially constructed, but intelligible analogies. According to Peirce, 
metaphors “represent the representative character of a representamen by representing 
a parallelism in something else” (Chapter 2, CP 2.277) and, as signifying pure 
quality, they are hypoicons stemming from diagrams. The difference between 
Peirce’s semiotics and this account of process philosophy stands in that, for Peirce, 
the imprecision and vagueness of language and of signification generally makes 
communication possible (Nöth and Santaella 2011). The Universe is metaphoric and 
there is no point for us to try to understand it non-metaphorically: 
“Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of 
the universe, I shall reply that the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol 
of God’s purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every 
symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons 
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of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an 
argument that, they of course, play in the universe -- that Universe being precisely 
an argument. In the little bit that you or I can make out of this huge 
demonstration, our perceptual judgments are the premisses for us and these 
perceptual judgments have icons as their predicates, in which icons Qualities are 
immediately presented.” (CP 5.119) 
A representamen’s character as conclusion is a metaphor (the 
representamen’s parallelism in something else). Conclusions by definition are 
Interpretants, but there is a sign of Firstness that represents as conclusion; this is the 
sign which explains a First in parallelism to something else, the metaphor, namely. A 
metaphor, such as the Universe is, has inner diagrammatical character because if 
something can be represented in parallelism (relation of similarity) to something 
else, than it needs to have similarities between its parts and the whole. Its own iconic 
syntax makes it possible to correlate it iconicaly to something else that has iconic 
syntax, otherwise iconic syntax itself is unintelligible. The universe has such an 
iconic syntax, and therefore it can be analysed mereologically. 
For this, Peirce’s semiotics is rather compatible with Husserl’s 
phenomenology (Stjernfelt 2007) and not with process philosophy, as it has been 
often argued. Husserl’s idea of analysis of constituting parts and whole being 
possible due to the a priori grammar of local ontologies is the same as the iconic 
syntax of a physiology of arguments (see Chapter 1, section D). Certainly, the 
sharing of sign types does not mean that two different living beings will know 
precisely the same signs (different learners are not learning the same thing, the 
knowledge of the learner is never identical with that of the teacher). On the contrary, 
two distinct living beings discovering the same Replica is probabilistically 
impossible. The types of signs, the mode of signification, are the same, otherwise 
reality would be schizophrenic. We use metaphors in literature, in mathematics, in 
complementing our lover because metaphors appear (are experienced) in our 
Umwelt. Experience stands in that Qualities (of Firstness) are objectified (in 
Secondness) and mediated amongst each other (in Thirdness). This is the central 
assumption of this thesis: signs, by combination of their Qualities, lead to the 
ultimate Interpretant, the Argument, the identification of Mind and Truth. Since this 
happens via combination of Qualities, it happens through Icons, which play the role 
of predicates in premisses. Whitehead, not following this aspect of Peirce’s 
semiotics, advances a different notion of learning than discovery of similarities. 
While for Peirce the ground for learning is that which is present, because it can 
produce analogies due to similarities, Whitehead accounts for the essential role of 
difference and absence in learning: 
 “We habitually observe by the method of difference. Sometimes we see an 
elephant, and sometimes we do not. The result is that an elephant, when present, 
is noticed. Facility of observation depends on the fact that the object observed is 
important when present, and sometimes is absent.” (p. 4) 
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As mentioned, the reason for which Propositions are essential to learning is 
that by their copulation Arguments are constituted. In Chapter 2 I explained that a 
judgement is the action of acknowledging the truth of a proposition. Since the 
interest does not fall on the psychological, but on the semiotic aspect of the 
judgement, the judgement will be treated as an Argument. This is possible because 
“we may discern the phenomenological core in the psychological shell” (Stjernfelt, 
2007, p. 102). Hence, Propositions will be examined as a part of learning only 
because they mediate the passage from Icon to Argument. Of course, as it was 
already shown, all types of signs participate in this mediation: Predicates (as Icons 
used to express possibility), Indices (at least by playing the role of Subjects), 
Sinsigns (at least as necessary Replicas), Legisigns (without which reference and 
therefore copulation would not be possible), Symbols (by which copulation of 
propositions particularly is made possible) etc. Thus, a fully semiotic definition of 
learning, expressed in Peircean terminology, is that learning is the passage from Icon 
to Argument. Actually, it is even broader, it is the passage from Qualisign to 
Argument. Strictly a Qualisign is too basic to be used without immediately becoming 
an Icon, but we do not have any insight on a pre-Iconic signification – such a 
signification is at least ungraspable, if even possible. The question if life forms are 
the only semiosic beings will not be posed here (it is not the topic of this thesis), but 
since this thesis investigates learning within the endeavour of education, the 
spectrum of learning is constituted in the agents involved in the passage leading from 
Icon to Argument. This passage is a semiosic process, obviously. 
 The importance of the Icon type stems from the fact that iconicity is 
necessarily required and sufficient in the formation of a sign. This is a premiss in 
Stjernfelt’s (2007) reading of Peirce, and it justifies that the semiotic examination of 
learning should start with and follow the role of Icons in argumentation. The role of 
iconicity in the basic formation of the sign was discussed since long before Peirce. 
As it was shown in section C of Chapter 1, the idea of learning something new by 
analogy to something familiar has been supported by several authors from different 
ages, such as the cases of St Dionysius the Areopagite in the Patristic Age or Petrus 
Fonsecus in late scholasticism. The idea is that analogy is possible due to similarity.  
Iconicity is the answer that this study brings to the following educational 
dilemma: how is learning possible at all if learning presupposes learning something 
which, at a moment, is unknown? Learning something unknown is possible because 
anything can be similar to anything else: “every scientific explanation of a natural 
phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which the human 
reason is analogous” (CP 1.316). This analogy is not a sort of an a priori concept, it 
does not account for givenism. This analogy is iconic syntax: I am part of the world, 
my thoughts are part of the world, therefore I am in coherent iconic syntax with the 
rest of the world within which I am a self-conscious sign. I am semiotically (not 
necessarily psychologically) coherent within myself because I am diagrammatic with 
the rest of existence with which I am in relation. As such, as a constituting part of the 
world; I inherited the world’s iconic syntax.  
133 
 
Thus, when similarity is used to signify in regard to the object to be learned 
the unknown starts being discovered in relation to the known. It can be said that a 
learner knows about x when she can predicate about x, that is when she can apply 
predicates to x, and a certain mastery of x is achieved when she can use x as a 
predicate. How she knows, how precisely she uses x as a predicate is something 
pertaining strictly to the intellectual intimacy of the learner – here no one, not even 
the teacher who taught her about x, has access, because x as meaning is appropriated 
into her own being, into her own set of signs, into her own signifying world, once it 
was learned. Once it was learned, x for the learner stops being x and takes upon a 
new form of being, we can call it x’. This x’ is the sign or set of signs that the learner 
now masters about the x sign that the teacher was teaching her. X and x’ cannot 
coincide, apart from the elusive imaginary moments of coincidence of Interpretants. 
The occurrence of imaginary moments only allows sharing, so that the student can 
manipulate the teacher’s knowledge as if her own and vice versa. X and x’ are never 
identical, but the proof of the learner having learnt precisely about x and not any 
other adjacent subject is the similarity between the learner’s x’ and the teacher’s x. 
To put it simply, one never learns x from someone, one can only learn about x. 
Something about x is distinct from x and similar to it: the result of the semiosis 
involving x’ and x is an Icon. 
 A common observation that comes against this iconicity based learning is 
that if anything can be similar to anything else, similarity stops being useful. Indeed, 
this is the case, but signification is a matter of use, a fact which makes the Icon a 
highly operational sign. It is the focusing on a particular similarity, on some 
particular qualities, that characterizes the signification. For instance, part of this 
focus is a motivation of the sign, giving its intentionality – the element that together 
with similarity makes an Icon. Thus the Icon can be defined as used similarity. When 
a similarity is used, focused upon, it becomes insightful: one can infer that the 
picture is representing a particular person for observing a certain resemblance, which 
determines the sign so that it will not signify another person, though it could. This 
focus is a matter of use. Understanding Icons is essential for learning because, more 
than being strictly necessary and sufficient for signification, the Icon is operational. 
The Icon is useful because it is easy to play with: while being immediately 
recognizable it affords manipulation; it is immediately graspable. It is for its very 
quality of being, the primal way of signification, the fact that iconicity presents the 
sign in actu, that qualifies it as operational, bringing about an understanding and thus 
broadening the horizon of real possibilities. Since it is highly operational an Icon 
brings about more than simply its own signifying instance. Peirce himself stated this 
clearly: 
“For a great distinguishing property of the icon is that by the direct 
observation of it other truths concerning its object can be discovered than those 
which suffice to determine its construction.” (CP 2.279) 
This remark of Peirce leads Stjernfelt to comment straightforwardly which is 
“the most decisive feature in icons at all: the fact that they are the only signs through 
the contemplation of which it is possible to learn more.” (2007, p. 78)  
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The Peircean Theory of Learning is grounded in that learning is a play of 
musement (Sebeok, 1981), nothing else but experimenting with Icons. 
Experimentation and thinking in general are possible because of imagination. Real 
actual signs by which we live, forming our semiotic environment, are particular 
cases of real possibilities, an infinite playing ground for the mind to experiment in. 
Free manipulation of signs results in learning. While we can easily imagine fictional 
situations (e.g. unicorns), or things we haven’t witnessed (e.g. the battle of Waterloo) 
or we can even lie to ourselves (e.g. “this never happened”) we cannot imagine 
impossible things (e.g. a round square). This has to do with the way in which we 
manipulate Icons, the signs that signify due to similarity. Stjernfelt accounts that 
“The icon has the undeniable quality of showing something possible – it cannot, 
unlike symbolic speculation, yiled neither Husserlian Unsinn nor Widersinn, the first 
being only possible through the breakup of iconic syntax, the other only by 
constructing a contradictory predicate. We may talk and wonder about the xlypf, the 
which are has, the round square, the rational square root of two, or the married 
bachelor, etc., but no simple icon can display any of them.” (2007, p. 87)  
We can use language because of its fundamentally Iconic structure. Our long 
history of developing conventional metaphysic languages might be misleading and 
obscure the iconic character of any mediation, and language is par excellence a 
mediator. Original onomatopoeic proto-languages would show this clearly, but, 
however, one might ask what qualities does the English word “dog” share with the 
reality of that barking four-legged animal? This is a question stemming from 
linguistics and it might be approached, for example, by semantics or phonetics, but 
semiotics is concerned with signification as being, not strictly with the content of 
language. Peirce accounts that languages which at a first glance are all the more 
artificial and conventional than native languages, languages, as we have seen, as the 
algebra of mathematics, are iconic, let alone English or Chinese: 
“That icons of the algebraic kind, though usually very simple ones, exist in 
all ordinary grammatical propositions is one of the philosophic truths that the 
Boolean logic brings to light. In all primitive writing, such as the Egyptian 
hieroglyphics, there are icons of a non-logical kind, the ideographs. In the earliest 
form of speech, there probably was a large element of mimicry. But in all 
languages known, such representations have been replaced by conventional 
auditory signs. These, however, are such that they can only be explained by icons. 
But in the syntax of every language there are logical icons of the kind that are 
aided by conventional rules.” (CP 2.280)  
The manipulation of an equation’s syntax by means of arithmetic relations 
leads to the same solution for the equation as its graphical representation – this 
stands as evidence that the graphical and the algebraic representation share iconic 
syntax: 
“Another prototypical example is the solution of an equation during a 
series of well-controlled steps according to the transformation syntax given by the 
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elementary arithmetic – mirrored by the solution of the same equation given its 
graphical representation thanks to analytical geometry.” (Stjernfelt, 2007, p. 101) 
Stjernfelt emphasized Peirce’s idea that algebra is comprehensible and useful 
to the extent that it can be manipulated. Any type of syntax can be manipulated due 
to its iconicity: 
 “Mere formalization without motivated syntactical, generative possibilities 
is in this view a blind alley. Of course, it may not always be told beforehand 
whether a certain formalization is fertile, and the relevant experimentation might 
be very mediate: to write down a fifth grade equation might seem hopeless in so 
far as we now know it has no canonical solution, but the very fact that it is 
formulated in the same language as solvable polynomial of lesser grade ultimately 
permitted the proof that it in fact has no solution – which is an even more 
impressive manipulation of it. But the mere substitution for some objects or object 
categories by letters or the like makes no manipulable icon, and this is why so 
many algebraic attempts in the humanities have proved sterile: they have merely 
exchanged some concepts with letters and have not furnished a motivated (that is, 
iconic), formal set of rules for their manipulation.” (Stjernfelt, 2007, p. 79)  
This critique of attempts in the humanities that proved to be unusable targets 
the paths that both recent analytic philosophy and post-structuralism have followed. 
They aimed at developing abstract, Icon-less, tools for philosophy. Analytic 
philosophy’s focus on the clarity and precision of arguments as well as the concept 
of structure became abstract but useless conceptualizations, as a contextless, floating 
in void, variable x. 
 The fact that only from Icons other truths besides their construction arise, or, 
in other words, that only from Icons information can be derived, leads to the 
assertion that the physiology of arguments has an Iconic Syntax, by which, through 
living beings, which are part of the same syntax, creatively discovers itself. Reality is 
algebraic because reality, like the algebraic codification that we developed, is iconic. 
Otherwise it would not represent, it could not bring about anything else besides itself 
and living beings could only be schizophrenic, as reality itself would be, by 
managing to focus only on the immediately present. If the physiology of arguments 
would not have an iconic syntax, mediation, that is representation, would be 
impossible and the I could not go out of itself into Thou; ego would never be aware 
of non-ego, or, in the best case, could not relate to the other person, but only to the 
apperceptive ego of other: 
“This capacity of revealing unexpected truth is precisely that wherein the 
utility of algebraical formulae consists, so that the iconic character is the prevailing 
one.” (CP 2.279) 
Some similarities are obvious and do not offer an insight, but nevertheless, 
real discovery consists in the same: 
“The fact that it has never before been asserted that this orange on the 
table before me is similar in shape to the moon (given a certain granularity of 
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similarity classes), might cause sensible souls to see me as a genius for creating 
metaphors, but, modestly, it seems strange that this similarity should be 
something created by me. I merely discover (no great effort) this similarity by 
applying a certain tertium comparationis (a circle, give or take a certain rate of 
deformation). In rare cases, of course, it may take great pains to establish a new 
complicated tertium comparationis to see a similarity (Newton discovering the 
similarity between the movement of the apple and of the heavenly bodies, Eliot 
discovering the similarity between cruelty and the growth of April flowers).” 
(Stjernfelt, 2007, p. 57) 
Peirce himself accounted that essentially learning consists in discovery and 
that discovery is the accident of experimentation. It is something more basic than 
experimentation that makes learning possible, namely experience. He distanced 
himself from classic empiricism, as he distanced himself from modern philosophy 
generally, by rejecting the idea of tabula rasa (see also Chapter 3), not because there 
would be an innate notional ground, but because it is simply not an issue: 
“Experience is our only teacher. Far be it from me to enunciate any 
doctrine of a tabula rasa. For, as I said a few minutes ago, there manifestly is not 
one drop of principle in the whole vast reservoir of established scientific theory 
that has sprung from any other source than the power of the human mind to 
originate ideas that are true. But this power, for all it has accomplished, is so 
feeble that as ideas flow from their springs in the soul, the truths are almost 
drowned in a flood of false notions; and that which experience does is gradually, 
and by a sort of fractionation, to precipitate and filter off the false ideas, 
eliminating them and letting the truth pour on in its mighty current.” (CP 5.50) 
Our only teacher is semiosis. On this account of experience, inquiries to know do 
not stand mainly in the elimination of wrong notions, but also in letting the truth 
pour on its mighty current, which means discovering premisses (see also Chapter 4). 
This is the logical operation of advancing hypotheses by qualified guessing, 
abduction (or retroduction), as Peirce coined it (see CP 2.96, CP 2.638, CP 2.753, CP 
1.755, CP 5.189). Eliminating wrong notions in order to letting “the truth pour on its 
current” means emptying and adjusting the self so that it can take in new, unknown 
yet, signification. Adjusting the self so as to be similar to what yet is non-self, and, 
therefore, unknown, and to engage in semiosis with what is yet unknown, is an act of 
selflessness. This act of selflessness is facilitated by having an other to focus upon, 
to have a teacher, if a student, or to have a student, if a teacher. Abduction here finds 
its material in the other: the self can consider hypotheses as they stem from the other. 
This is the principle of agapism which I discuss in Chapter 8. Agapism, which 
supposes continuous growth, starts with diagrammatic reasoning, a play on icons, 






Diagrammatic reasoning and learning 
 
In Chapter 2 (section D) Peirce’s idea of diagrammatic reasoning and the 
hypoicon sign types have been introduced. Hypoicons are pure Icons, describing a 
Representamen’s Iconicity. They are divided into Images (simple qualities), 
Diagrams (relations of qualities) and Metaphors (parallelism of qualities in 
something else). The peculiarity of diagrams consists in that they signify by the 
similarities between the parts and the whole, as well as among the parts. Stjernfelt, in 
Diagrammatology (2007), his work focused on the semiotic concept of diagram, 
explained that the peculiarity of the diagrammatic Icon stands in it being constituted 
of rational relations: 
“The diagram is a skeleton-like sketch of its object in terms of relations 
between its parts, but what makes it apt to reason with, to experiment on, 
respectively, is the fact that it is constructed from rational relations.” (p. 94) 
Metonymy is an example of diagram. In Chapter 5 I presented Per Aage 
Brandt’s idea of personhood as metonymy. Personal relations and a society 
composed of personal relations are diagrams. As such the classroom can be thought 
of as a diagram. 
The notion of diagrammatic reasoning explains icon manipulation and, thus, 
gives an insight into the phenomenon of re-cognition. Below I approach these two 
topics (diagrammatic reasoning and re-cognition). 
 
A. Diagrammatic reasoning 
 
Diagrammatic reasoning is a translation, therefore, from structures that are 
difficult to grasp to manoeuvrable structures of interrelated rational parts. This, 
Stjernfelt observed is a continuation of Kant’s project of schematism. The essential 
difference between Peirce and Kant, as well in this regard as in general, is the 
difference between givenism and pragmatism. Peirce “pragmatized” Kant’s synthetic 
a priori concept (see Stjernfelt, 2007, Chapter 4). While admiring his role in the 
history of philosophy, Peirce stated that Kant’s question ‘How are synthetical 
judgements a priori possible’ should rather be ‘How are universal propositions 
relating to experience to be justified?’ (in CP 4.92) The answer to Peirce’s 
(reformulation of the) question lies in his idea of diagrammatic reasoning. Stjernfelt 
presented diagrammatic reasoning as an analysis of parts and wholes:  
“As soon as an icon is contemplated as a whole consisting of 
interrelated parts whose relations are subject to experimental change, we are 
operating on a diagram. Thus, the inclusion of algebra, syntax, and the like in 
the icon category takes place thanks to their diagrammatic properties – but 
the same goes for your average landscape painting as soon as you stop 
considering its simple qualities, colors, forms etc. and move on to consider 
the relations between any of these parts and aspects. As soon as you judge, 
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for instance, fore-, middle-, and background and estimate the distance 
between objects depicted in the pictorial scene, or as soon as you imagine 
yourself wandering along the path into the landscape, you are operating on an 
icon – but doing so in this way is possible only by treating it as a diagram.” 
(p. 92) 
The study of parts and wholes was coined by Husserl in his Logical 
Investigations as mereology. Stjernfelt found four main sources of philosophical 
interest for mereology (p. 161). One is, obviously, Peirce, for his notion of diagram. 
The second are the founders of phenomenology, Franz Brentano and Edmund 
Husserl. The other two are also linked to phenomenology, being influenced by 
Brentano and Husserl. One is the case of formal and structural linguistics, here 
mentioning, above all, Roman Jakobson and the other consists in the structuralist 
beginning of the Copenhagen school of semiotics, in the case of Hjelmslev and 
Uldall.  
Peirce’s argument for the iconic syntax of logic is particularly similar to 
Husserl’s idea of formal ontology and grammatical analysis of logic, explored in 
Husserl’s Third Logical Investigation. According to Husserl “the relationships 
between Whole and Part and among the Parts of one and the same whole” are a 
priori
25
and, as such, can be analysed phenomenologically (1900b, p. 465, 
Investigation 3, 15). That these relations are a priori does not suppose a noumenal 
existence, but, instead, the underpinning of existence by a logical structure, 
something such as iconic syntax on which the physiology of arguments stands (the 
possibility of rational relations among entities). Phenomenological analysis, Husserl 
argued, is possible due to formal ontology. As in Peirce’s case, Husserl’s formal 
ontology analyses any kind of syntax in its grammatical parts and the relations 
among them. The assumption for diagrammatic reasoning is that something is 
manoeuvrable (by this understanding comprehensible, apprehensible, signifying, 
useful etc.) if the coherent relations between its parts and the whole are discovered. 
A possibility can be used as a predicate if in itself it presents some similarities. For 
example, I can use a hammer if I notice the relations between, for instance, its handle 
and the metal top; once I realize its structure in terms of relations between parts and 
the whole I know how to grab it and I know I can knock nails with it by performing 
certain moves. At this point I have learnt how to use the hammer, I actually see the 
hammer (like in the case of seeing the sum of two adjacent angles (Chapter 2)), and 
not just a wooden bar and a piece of metal. 
With his famous experiment, Duncker (1945) proved the difficulty a human 
being faces when she needs to reconceptualise things that have become familiar. 
Duncker’s candle problem experiment consisted in presenting to his participants a 
box of thumbtacks, matches and a candle and asking them to attach the candle to the 
wall so that wax would not drip on the table underneath. Most participants tried to 
fix the candle to the wall with thumbtacks or by melting it. Too few had the idea to 
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On the Austrian (non-Kantian) notion of a priori, inherited by Husserl, see Chapter 9, section A and 
Stjernfelt 2007, p. 176. 
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empty the box of thumbtacks and to fix the box (instead of the candle) to the wall so 
as to serve as a support for the candle. The difficulty is that of re-cognizing the box 
as something else, something such as a support. As such, this solution to the task 
implies a modification of one’s Lebenswelt – a growth, an evolution of signification. 
For arriving at this more elegant and practical solution one needs to perform a 
mereological analysis. If the rational relations between box of thumbtacks, matches, 
and candle are observed they might appear similar with the rational relations 
between the interrelated parts of a candle support. Thus, a diagram integrating box, 
thumbtacks, and candle might turn out to be, in its Interpretant, a candle support. 
This discovery, resulting with the invention and fabrication of a candle support, is 
realized if the parts that together will become a candle support are treated together, 
as one operational sign – one icon that is. Treating them as one sign is possible if the 
similarities between them are discovered; this is precisely what constitutes an Icon. 
The interrelated parts do not simply signify each other, but they also signify together, 
as one Icon. As such, they need be in iconic syntax. Thus, the candle support 
possibility is discovered when box, thumbtacks, and candle appear as an icon treated 
like a diagram. Such a discovery is a growth of Lebenswelt, as it broadens the 
horizon of similarities. 
A complex sign, an argument for instance, is analysed diagrammatically. The 
argument is comprehensible through the analysis of its parts: subjects (indices) and 
predicates (rhemes), which have to be icons, form propositions (dicisigns) which 
copulate via a middle term (icon). The process of developing an argument consists in 
the copulation of parts, which is possible by seeing the sharing of qualities between 
the parts coming together in the whole. This process is diagrammatic reasoning. 
Nevertheless, learning consists in continuous experience, and not in a discrete set of 
events in which to a proposition another one is added. This is also the case for 
diagrammatic reasoning, which “is no more built out of Propositions than a motion is 
built out of positions. The logical relation of the Conclusion to the Premisses might 
be asserted; but that would not be an Argument, which is essentially intended to be 
understood as representing what it represents only in virtue of the logical habit which 
would bring any logical Interpreter to assent to it. We may express this by saying 
that the Final (or quasi-intended) Interpretant of an Argument represents it as 
representing its Object after the manner of a Symbol. In an analogous way the 
relation of Predicate to Subject which is stated in a Proposition might be merely 
described in a Term
26
. But the essence of the Proposition is that it intends, as it were, 
to be regarded as in an existential relation to its Object, as an Index is, so that its 
assertion shall be regarded as evidence of the fact.” (CP 4.572) 
Thus, learning, as diagrammatic reasoning, is a continuous process of 
transformation whereby the argument (or any sign) is understood because of its 
diagrammatic structure (its local formal ontology). The diagrammatic character of its 
composing signs makes copulation possible. It is the same diagrammatic character of 
sign-relations that makes possible the understanding of a whole argument as one 
                                                          
26
‘Term’ here is synonym for rheme (or predicate). 
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predicate, one icon. According to the previous passage quoted from Peirce, a Term 
(predicate) can express the whole meaning of the proposition, but by its copulation 
with a Subject and becoming a Proposition an existential relation is asserted. The 
compatibility between a Subject and a Predicate consists in their diagrammatic 
signification, meaning that there has to be an inner sharing of qualities between 
subject and predicate. When two signs signify together, and thus act as one sign, 
such as in a proposition like “I am” they share qualities: “I” could not “be” if “I” was 
not similar to “being”. The concepts of square and rectangle cannot signify as 
“square rectangle” because none can be applied as predicate to the other. They are 
similar, since they both are geometric figures, but their copulation would not be an 
icon, and it is thus absurd, since any of them used as a predicate cannot be 
understood diagrammatically in relation to the other. “Square” as a hypoicon does 
not have the trigonometrical similarities making it compatible with the hypoicon 
“rectangle” – their inner qualities do not match. It was previously noted (Chapter 6) 
that that the Peircean Icon cannot produce either Husserlian Widersinn (logical 
nonsense), or Unsinn (grammatical nonsense). That is, Icons can neither combine 
irreconcilable syncategorematica, nor can be semantically contradictory, while 
grammatically correct. The same does not happen for the iconless abstraction – the 
‘round square’, the ‘pregnant father’, the ‘dsfghjkl’ etc. 
Thus, the concept of diagram can be used to explain as well the compatibility 
between student and teacher, or between taught and apprehended. In the 
student/teacher relation, as a whole, the parts (‘student’ and ‘teacher’) have to share 
qualities with the whole. The student/teacher relation needs its inner iconic syntax. 
When one obscures the other from coming in the relation diagrammatic 
compatibility is not possible. Such are the cases when the teacher wants to impose 
her teaching on the student or when the student is not interested in what the teacher 
is teaching. In such a situation copulation of signification (overlapping of 
phenomenal worlds) is impossible. Of course, the extreme case where absolutely no 
similarity is found is probably never actually experienced. One can try to imagine the 
situation in which a human being is taught to hunt by wolves, but even here it might 
work. Apparently there is a similarity between wolf and man: they obviously share 
qualities: both are animals, mammals, both can be hungry, can bite, etc. – these are 
predicates by which both wolf and man live. In the same way, as mentioned 
previously, the case where what is taught is identical with what is learnt is 
impossible.  
A classic example of a discovery of similarities that generated the 
development of a new, usable predicate, that produced a scientific breakthrough is 
that of August Kekulé’s discovery of the stereochemical arrangement of the Carbon 
atoms in Benzene. Before Kekulé’s discovery it was clearly known what atoms form 
the Benzene molecule, but the scientific method seemed to be stuck and incapable of 
explaining how six atoms of Carbon and six of Hydrogen can be arranged in the 
same molecule. In the thinking that led Kekulé to his revolutionary discovery 
Stjernfelt finds an obvious example of diagrammatic reasoning. The diagrammatic 
analysis of Kekulé’s reasoning explains to some extent how the researcher’s 
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creativity was triggered, and how a discovery of similarities proved so useful. 
Kekulé himself explained how he discovered the structure of the Benzene molecule 
and Stjernfelt explains the obvious diagrammatic reasoning that made the discovery 
possible:  
“According to his description in his 1890 25 years celebration speech, 
the scientist sat in 1863 daydreaming before the fire, exhausted by 
speculation. He then saw one of the flames  assuming the figure of a snake 
which turned around and bit itself in the tail to form a ring-like structure 
which wiggled contemptuously before his gaze – and all of a sudden, Kekulé 
realized that the normally linear carbon chain in the Benzene case turned 
around to form a circle. That discovery thus formed a spontaneous case of 
diagrammatical reasoning, realized in the shape of metaphors. The flame was 
taken as a metaphor of the snake which, in turn, was taken as a metaphor of 
the carbon chain, a structure of metaphors held together by the common 
diagram of a piece of line, able to bend. The spontaneous diagram experiment 
argued that the Carbon chain, just like a snake was able to form a ring, and 
subsequent chemical analysis corroborated the idea, leading to a major 
breakthrough in organic chemistry.” (2007, p. 102) 
For his thinking to proceed to the understanding of this arrangement of atoms 
Kekulé needed an Index (Secondness), that is a strong focus on Benzene, but, also, 
when the yet unknown structure of Benzene appeared incomprehensible, he needed 
to go back to an Icon (Firstness), back to a random play that allowed the discovery of 
similarity between a snake biting its own tail and the arrangement of atoms. Before 
the imaginary moment where a flame became similar to a snake Kekulé did not have 
something known which could be similar to the unknown focused upon.  
For Peirce imagination is a part of experience, experience being broader than 
strictly empirical experience. In this regard there is a similarity between Peirce and 
Whitehead’s process philosophy, which also accounted imagination as a means of 
experiencing things that are not experienced in actual physicality. For Peirce 
imagination is the form of experience which enables all other types of experiencing: 
if we could not simulate possibilities, we could not cognitively process actual reality 
neither. The reasoning by which Kekulé made this discovery is diagrammatic. 
Within his argument, the arrangement of the atoms became a clear conclusion once 
the hypothesis of the snake biting its own tail was discovered. Before the flame was 
taken as a metaphor for the snake there was no way of predicating about Benzene’s 
molecular structure. Diagrammatic reasoning produced a metaphor: a snake biting its 
own tail, something comprehensible that is, was place in a relation of parallelism to 
something unknown – the molecular structure of Benzene. A likeness to a possibility 
was discovered and then the rest was easy. Once this Icon was discovered Kekulé 
knew something which is similar to the unknown, and this Icon made the set of 
metaphors, and the whole argument, coherent.  
At a first glance it might seem strange to the scientific mind that what appears 
to be idle speculation consisted in the ground for firm, revolutionary scientific 
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results. This should not come as a surprise, though, as all reasoning occurs in this 
way and science is founded on this method. This discovery is just an example. The 
discovery did happen spontaneously, a fact that might sound frightening to teachers 
who have the illusion of being in control of the apprehension of their students. We 
do not know for how long Kekulé focused on the Benzene molecule, how much he 
struggled with the Index of Benzene that is, without having a predicate to apply to it; 
in the narrative we are told that he was exhausted by speculation. We might consider 
that the more he focused upon it, the more chances increased that he had this insight, 
but the moment of discovery was spontaneous nevertheless. Teachers have to be 
aware that while a big workload might favour learning it is not the essential 
ingredient involved in their students’ apprehending what is taught. A big and wrong 
workload might even be distractive, it might bring to a student’s semiotic structure 
sets of signs that obscure learning. This is a discovery as well: the discovery that 
what is taught is similar to boring, to uninteresting, perhaps even to harmful and so 
on. This accounts for boredom, lack of creativity, etc. Work overload might be a 
distraction in itself, a diversion away from the taught object. The inventio that 
triggers learning consists in a re-cognition, like in Kekulé’s case. In that case, of 
course, experience was the only teacher, but from such examples ways of triggering 
this inventio can be examined. This analysis should uncover methods also for 
teachers, who should inspire their students and also for students who are trying to 
learn. 
Once some similarities are shared (e.g., between snakes biting their tails and 
arrangements of carbon atoms) they suddenly become obvious and are impossible to 
negate. Diagrammatic reasoning makes the unknown resemble the known and thus 
makes arguments possible. If the unknown resembles the known (molecule of 
Benzene resembles snakes) then also the known starts resembling the unknown (all 
of a sudden the concept of snake changes, since it now resembles molecular 
structure). For this, sound diagrammatic reasoning can be justly qualified as critical 
thinking. In this sense, pragmatism is critical common sense (Chapter 3). 
Diagrammatic reasoning, by advancing a possible similarity of the known to the 
unknown redefines the known as well, putting it in a different light. Having the 
structure of an adbudction-deduction-induction continuous process diagrammatic 
reasoning keeps on redefining the hypothesis, not only the conclusion. Through this 
method the conclusion is integrated in the premiss and the premiss rearranged as to 
fit the new set of signs which it receives. This tends to give rise to new conclusions 




The phenomenon of integrating yet unknown structures of meaning into the 
known is an act of re-cognition (Chapter 1). Re-cognizing signs consists in (1) the 
identification of real possible relations of signification and (2) the cognitive 
operation applied to them. Re-cognition is the centrepiece concept of this thesis’ 
attempt to give a mereological account of educational philosophy. It is an account of 
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how the unknown becomes known, of how that which is taught is integrated in what 
is already mastered. It is a continuous phenomenon that characterizes life. The 
compatibility between what is taught and the learner’s already existing signification 
is the diagrammatic character of learning, that is, the resemblance between taught 
and learned. The student has to re-cognize what is taught by using what she already 
knows and the teacher has to re-cognize what is taught into what starts being learned. 
The situation where the teacher does not re-cognize what was taught among the 
knowledge of the student is probably a case of unjust evaluation. The operations that 
the teacher’s re-cognition supposes are applied to what is taught rather than to what 
is learned. It is rare that the student fails to discover any similarity between what she 
knows and what she is being taught. Eventually, the student and the teacher have to 
re-cognize themselves in each other if learning is to happen. This account of learning 
as re-cognition is coextensive with the idea of semiotics as a theory of life, an idea 
developed on Peircean ground in biosemiotics (Kull, 2005) and also in semiotics of 
education (Stables, 2005).  
The main argument of this thesis stems from the possibility of re-cognizing 
the curriculum in the divisions of science. In Chapter 4 I explained that the ideal 
curriculum coincides with the divisions of science because the divisions of science 
constitute one diagram (Figure 4 in Chapter 4). A different, invented curriculum is 
not as operational as the naturally evolved one because it is to some extent artificial. 
Its degree of iconicity is lesser while its symbolic character (e.g. symbolical 
language) is more strongly present. Symbolic signification which is not sufficiently 
supported by underpinning iconic signification is less fertile. This is what is meant 
by ‘artificial’ here. The way in which over historical time science has been divided 
into branches according to modes of observation is obviously a case of semiosic 
evolution, and, therefore, has to be diagrammatic: it inherits the universe’s iconic 
syntax. Because the various sciences are similar, and thus together form a diagram, 
education is possible. By education here is understood the application of certain 
indices to the icons of spontaneous learning. Humans, like all living species, learn. 
Humans are (at least one of) the species among which education developed: we 
imposed systematic directions of focus to our random learning. In other words, we 
concentrate, we focus. This is possible due to our discovery of semiosic activity. 
According to Deely (2009) metasemiosis is species specific to humans
27
. 
Metasemiosis refers to the knowledge of, the study of semiosis – semiotics, namely. 
There was nothing ever taught systematically that does not fall under the divisions of 
science because something that is not observational cannot be taught. To be 
scientific is to be observational. Our awareness of semiosic activity, through its 
various historical stages, led to our indexicalization of learning. What we learn we 
systematically hand over, we point it out (index it) to others – this is education. 
                                                          
27
Whether metasemiosis is characterizing the peculiarity of humanity might still be controversial. 




In Chapter 1 I explained that semiotics should bring a liberal approach to 
education. Therefore, the proposed liberal curriculum coincides with the theoretical 
sciences: the study of mathematics, philosophy, psychical and physical sciences and 
the method of retrospection
28
. This means the teaching and learning of a (logical) 
diagram. The curriculum thus coincides with logic, under its other name, semiotics. 
The liberal curriculum cultivates, through its own very structure the abductive-
inductive-deductive operation that is found in the sign-relation’s Representamen-
Object-Interpretamen structure. Practical sciences should be taught as well, but not 
as part of the essential liberal education because their teaching is more problematic: 
they are observed only via practice. This is the case of pedagogy (Chapter 4). 
Thus, I argue that the growth of semiotic consciousness can justify the 
teaching of semiotics as one of the first subjects in primary education (see also 
Chapter 4). Since semiotics proves itself so closely connected to and supporting 
liberal education there is no reason not to start the education journey by learning 
semiotics. So far we only know semiotics as an academic discipline. Certainly, a 7 or 
8 year old will not be taught the particularities of Ferdinand de Saussure’s signe or of 
Charles Peirce’s sign, but triadic relation (signification) is, arguably, more basic than 
reading, writing, and counting. If children would develop an awareness of causality 
as a triadic phenomenon, instead of dyadic, many subjects would become easier to 
learn. The understanding of the natural world as composed of actions and reactions, 
dyads, that is, underpins a mechanistic view of the world. Such is the example of 
classical mechanics, which, ever since it was developed by Newton and Galilei, has 
been determined by a dualistic view which implies a dyadic structure of physical 
phenomena. ‘Life’ in this case is seen as the reaction to a certain initial impulse 
which sets the mechanism in motion. This is the ‘ghost in the machine’ argument. 
Rightly so, modern science refuses to approach the ghost: it does not need such a 
hypothesis. The difference between the ghost and the machine, between the action 
and the reaction, is ontological. Semiotics argues that phenomena are triadic (see 
Chapters 1, 2, and 5) and that a phenomenon’s three elements are inseparable. One 
of the crucial differences that this brings along is that, as such, phenomena are 
infinite. Triadic cooperation (semiosis) is infinite, but it is graspable, because of its 
core triadic structure. The dualist view, therefore, tends to see experimentation 
within ideal conditions, where the elements of the phenomeonon are separated from 
the rest of the Universe, as desirable. The semiotic (triadic) view does not admit 
there to be much relevance in isolating in void, scientifically hygienic conditions, the 
elements involved in the phenomenon: the phenomenon at stake occurs within the 
infinity of the Universe. This Universe is driven by chance, which might mess up the 
experiment, by necessity, which makes the experiment worthwhile, and also by love, 
which escaped modernism. Cultivating the consciousness that phenomena, by being 
                                                          
28
The seven classical liberal arts are all included here: mathematics as a branch per se, dialectic, 
rhetoric and grammar as branches of philosophy or of psychical sciences, according to the method of 
observation used. Literature is not missing either. It falls under philosophy as curious investigation or 
under psychical sciences as literary critique, text analysis etc.  
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triadic, are infinite will overcome the modern dualist paradigm and the mechanistic 
view of life in favour of a phenomenological hermeneutics. How this, namely 
semiosis, can be taught to children is a difficult question because of the simplicity of 
semiosis. This thesis advances the first recommendations for such an education: 
eliminating dualist assumptions and allowing learners the freedom to explore (to 
play). 
The implications of having a semiotic consciousness for speaking, reading 
and writing any language (from a native language to mathematics, logic, or 
chemistry) are immediate, though. I argue that learning the basics of semiotics, in the 
terms of a child, would offer new horizons to the child’s possibilities of 
categorization generally. She would be eager to subject her opinions 
(Representamen) to further abduction. At the same time, she would be eager to reject 
imposed information that does not resonate with herself. Such objective information 
(a matter of Secondness) would not prove fertile in semiosis with the learner. Rather, 
the semiotic awareness of a child would develop the child’s critical common sense. 
Re-cognition would be easy and it would replace the useless and mechanical 
adoption of information. For example, when learning about the First World War, an 
eleven to fourteen years old child can learn that what produced it was the 
assassination in Sarajevo of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. However, to limit oneself to 
this as an explanation would be reductivist. Of course, one can look at this 
assassination as being the result of several conflicts in the Balkans at the time, and 
those conflicts produced, in their turn by other events and so on. On this dyadic 
account history looks as a linear and mechanistic set of events. If the learner explores 
the circumstances of the First World War freely she can discover many factors and 
parameters that contributed in various ways to the conflict. From a semiotic 
perspective such an historical event does not have a linear structure, but a rhizomatic 
one. The different and complementary aspects that various historical approaches, 
anthropology, sociology, geopolitics and other sciences would look at and discover 
are not understood, from a semiotic perspective, as contradicting or excluding each 
other. By freely exploring the subject the learner can understand the richness of its 
semiosis: that it is not a dyadic event, merely a cause with an effect. It is difficult to 
identify an objective (dyadic) causality because there is no such cause. By the free 
exploration of the topic, the free iconic manipulation of the features of the event, 
which semiotic founded education brings, the learner accepts its wholistic 
complexity (or simplicity). The psychological traits of the assasins in Sarajevo, the 
socio-cultural dynamics in the Balkans at the time, the world and regional political 
situations are all relevant in understanding the conflict. They are all elements 
participating in the same semiosis. The student has to learn to see all of these as 
related into one coherent diagram. This begins by the free investigation of the 
subject. There in only one teaching practice that can be prescribed to serve in this 
sense. This consists in simply showing to the student that every time she considers 
that she discovered something what she discovered is true and, also, incomplete. It is 
a matter of presenting new real possibilities connected to the studied subject, an 
indexicality that obliges her to take into consideration more. This differs from the 
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Socratic method by which the learner’s knowledge is claimed incomplete, its 
relevance and truth are accepted. What we know is not ignorance, but rather very 
useful to continue learning. This is an expression of the contradiction between 
realism and scepticism.  
Learning through a semiotic approach implies learning about semiotics as a 
first step of the curriculum. This might seem controversial and difficult to implement 
but our curriculum is already teaching semiotics in an unassumed manner. For 
instance, mathematics is one of the first and most emphasised subjects of our 
curriculum. According to Peirce (see Chapter 4) mathematics is mostly abductive, 
coinciding to a large extent with logic. The change that a semiotic consciousness 
would generate would be a switch from the vulgar arithmetic taught in the first 
classes to calculus, instead. This, again, might seem controversial as we tend to think 
of calculus as a complicated subject which only keen mathematicians can understand 
well. However, calculus is nothing else but the discovery of relations among classes. 
Therefore, I argue that this is something which young children (seven and eight year 
olds) can learn, in the first years of schooling: discovering similarities among 
classes. They do not even need to know numbers and counting to perform this. The 
very engagement in discovering similarities among classes will help children 
understand numbers, since classes are composed of certain numbers of elements. 
Thus, a child might discover that a class, in some respects, is bigger, smaller, or 
equal to another class. From here the intuition of a concept of number and counting 
can come forth. Discovering a numerical similarity implies learning to count. By 
arriving at the Interpretant that a certain class (Representamen) is bigger than another 
class (object) the child is on her way to discovering numbers. The Interpretant holds 
the possibility of serving further on as Representamen in a semiosis which has as 
Interpretant a sign containing the qualities specific to numbers. Differences and 
simialities in quantity are relations that are similar to numbers. Like in the above 
example regarding the teaching of historical events, in the teaching of numbers as 
well, the only teaching practice that can be prescribed consists in showing to the 
child that, while her comparison of quantity is good, it can also be improved. The 
child herself can improve her understanding, by exploring all the more the 
potentiality of icons already discovered. For instance, a child is right in managing to 
express that a set of nine apples is three times bigger than a set of three apples, but 
further exploration can lead to the understanding that the apples compared are not 
identical in size. This leads to the discovery of rational numbers (an apple can be one 
and a third bigger than another one) and, therefore, to the evolution of the child’s 
understanding of quantity and numbers. 
I consider that research in semiotics and education can lead to finding ways 
of replacing a curriculum of established subjects from an early age to a more organic 
curriculum, where the child can chose her own direction. Learning that causality is 
triadic might cultivate the desire for knowledge, the very purpose of liberal 
education. Realizing the difference between type, token and tone, such as for 
instance between the type of triangle, its representation, and its composing parts that 
are not the triangle itself, can arouse curiosity towards more investigation. It feeds 
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the simple realization that there is more to reality than it occurs immediately. The 
simple thought that the word ‘chair’ is not the object <<chair>> can lead to a 
reflection on, for instance, ontology or linguistics. By this the child is already 
engaged in a semiosis with the curriculum that shall develop as Interpretant an 
appropriate subject for this person to study next. The curriculum thus develops on 
the evolution’s usual criteria. 
In the next Chapter I apply Peirce’s phenomenological categories to 
education. This reveals the abduction-deduction-induction structure of education. 
Since education is diagrammatic and inherits the iconic syntax of the physiology of 
arguments, it has to preserve the diagrammatic reasoning of its students. I explain 
that, according to Peirce’s theory of evolution, the only rationale and fulfilment of 
education is agapism. In this case, agapism consists in the self-denying love between 
teacher and student. The teacher’s self-denying love for her student preserves the 
student’s original genuine discovery and play on icons, allowing its undertaking in 
further investigations. The student’s self-denying love for her teacher manifests in 
the student’s genuine interest for what the teacher has to offer, the knowledge to be 
acquired.  Thus, the teacher-student relation has diagrammatic coherency and is a 
































Science has been presented as a result and stage of evolution (Chapter 1) 
having as a main symptom an incessant state of metabolism growth (CP 1.232 in 
Chapter 4). Following this understanding of science I here explain that according to 
Peirce any growth, of which science is one of the best examples, is only possible due 
to self-giving love for the other. This conclusion is the immediate result of applying 
Peirce’s theory of evolution to education. Peirce’s theory of evolution has to be the 
ground for a Peircean Theory of Learning, since learning is understood as growth 
(evolution) par excellence.  
Peirce did not develop a theory of strictly biological evolution, but generally 
of cosmological evolution. As such, the principles of cosmological evolution are 
continuously inherited in biological and cultural evolution. Also, this evolution does 
not imply a transition from ‘lesser’ life forms to ‘better’ ones, but an evolution of 
signification, an expansion of the web of signs. As a growth of signification, 
evolution is not mono-directional and arborescent, but it is circular (or spherical) 
spreading in an infinity of directions (using Deleuze’s term, evolution is rhizomatic). 
A less evolved species is not by any means worse than a more evolved one; it is 
simply different. More evolved is, actually, a clumsy way of expressing an evolution 
of signification that is closer to the Argument; nevertheless, it is still, at all times, 
infinitely distant from grasping Truth in its totality. Therefore any hierarchy among 
constituting parts of the physiology of arguments (among which life forms) which 
would evaluate some things as ‘better,’ in absolutely any sense, than others is simply 
wrong. A human being is not better than a monkey or a worm, just like an adult is 
not better than a child. Different species and different individuals signify in different 
ways and re-cognize different Umwelten and Lebenswelten. It is curious that while 
any grocer knows that apples are not quantifiable with pears (the reality of having ‘2 
kilograms of apples and 10 kilograms of pears’ is not equivalent with that of having 
‘12 kilograms of apples and pears’), mankind still tends to evaluate itself as better 
than other species, teachers as better than students, adults as better than children, etc. 
I explain that this attitude obstructs learning (understood as metabolism growth). 
The awareness of the reality that we are always infinitely distant to the Truth 
should feed critical common-sense (pragmaticism), and, therefore, a certain sense of 
humility. Having this in mind the teacher has no reason to regard her students as 
lesser than herself. We are all commensurable with each other, not only in our 
strictly ‘mental’ knowledge, but in our whole being. To be a person and to have a 
personal life means to be unique and commensurable, at the same time, with other 
persons. While selves cannot coincide, we can and must learn from one another. The 
other is the best source from which yet unknown signification can be re-cognized by 
the self. As self-conscious signs, we are tending towards the Argument which is 
always infinitely distant.  
It is understandable why we developed modes of signification that 
acknowledge us about our advancement through the web of signs: moments of 
149 
 
knowledge acquisition feel pleasant. This pleasure is not a mere emotion; it is a sign 
for the organism’s insight. By learning, the Lebenswelt of an organism changes so 
that the organism finds itself in a new world. If a human being is not pleased with 
her own life all she needs is to learn something. If one learns art history every 
building she walks by will be different than before the learning happened. This is an 
insight to a new world, to a new stage of life, continuous with the organism’s entire 
life. Learning is a powerful way of reinterpreting the world; by reinterpreting we 
readapt (Gough and Stables 2011 in Chapter 1). A re-cognition of sound 
argumentation implies the re-cognition of pleasure, of joy, in the self-conscious sign. 
This is a re-cognition of the self: the self-conscious sign re-cognizes that itself has 
grown in signification (has learnt something) and so it re-cognizes something which 
used to be foreign, non-self signification, as part of itself. Self-conscious signs, at 
least human beings, mostly enjoy integrating other self-conscious signs into their 
own. Such are the cases of friendship, love and any state generally characterized by 
compassion. Such has to be the student-teacher relationship in order for learning to 
be most favored in the semiosis of these two self-conscious signs. Certainly, growth 
is not determined by re-cognition of pleasure or joy. One might want to learn the 
unpleasant truth that there is a predator in the area and has to be cautious and act 
accordingly. However, to escape from the danger caused by a nearby predator is, 
arguably, pleasant and allows the organism at stake to further grow in knowledge. If 
the predator learnt her hunting skills better than her prey learnt her survival skills 
then the argument is articulated by the predator eating its prey. It is important to 
acknowledge that the teacher-student relation is not a predator-pray relation. Even if 
at times a learnt truth is painful, because of the nature of education itself, how and 
why it evolved to be, there are no such situations (or should not be) in the student-
teacher relation or in the classroom generally. The phenomenon of learning the truth 
is often painful, it is a struggle. My argument, the cornerstone of this Peircean 
Theory of Learning, is that this pain is overcome by love. Not only that love justifies 
the effort of learning but it is the sole rationale for the teacher and student to engage 
in a relation. The account of love in this sense, as the foundation and rationale of a 
relation between teacher and student, is not limited to love as merely an emotion or 
feeling. It does not entirely fall under the subject of cognitive scinces. It is a 
cosmological matter, as it stems from Peirce’s evolutionary semiotics. Such love 
does not deny the existence of certain pleasant emotions and feelings, even 
infatuation, in the relation’s subjects. Such emotions and feelings can be an 
important aspect of this semiosis. However, they are not the love itself. Feelings and 
emotions might as well come in the way of what shall be termed agapic semiosis, by 
which the teacher and the student develop their relation and, therefore, their 
knowledge. If one might like the other then this can be good starting point for 
learning. It might also be an obstacle, as it might evoke, for example, inhibition. 
In 1981 Thomas Sebeok’s book on the Peircean view of learning as a Play of 
Musement was published. Due to Sebeok’s development it is now acknowledged that 
for semiotics learning is a wondrous quest through a labyrinth of signs. It clearly 
occurs that learning can only happen properly in a free environment where the 
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learning subject has the freedom to play. What Sebeok could not accomplish yet in 
1981, but due to the developments on schematism (and therefore iconicity) occurring 
in the meantime is possible now, is the identification of this play of musement with 
Icon experimentation. This is the claim of the iconic turn (Chapter 5). Operating on 
icons is a play of musement. Iconic signification pertains to Firstness, the category of 
qualities, which is governed by chance. The play of musement is a vital sign (a sign 
of life), the very evidence that a self-consciousness can be identified within the 
continuity of consciousness. Only living organisms show this curiosity of playing 
with signification. Discovery is the result of musement and therefore “the student 
must be taught to observe,” as Sebeok quoted Joseph Bell (Joseph Bell in Sebeok, 
1981, p. 48). Science consists in that which is observational (Chapter 4). The 
Peircean Theory of Learning should offer teachers a strong awareness of the reality 
that, at least from their perspective, there is always an element of chance in that the 
student learns.  
Learning is continuous in a self-consciousness; it describes its life. It might 
seem discordant to consider that while learning is continuous it is only possible in a 
free environment. This shows, on the one hand, that there always is a degree of 
freedom of a living organism. There is a degree to which an organism organizes its 
own Umwelt and Lebenswelt even in a prison cell. On the other hand, the more 
obvious its freedom, the more a self-consciousness is likely to learn (to expand 
meaning). This is so because the class of real possibilities with which it can play is 
larger. The class of real possibilities contained by a Lebenswelt is the degree of 
freedom a living being enjoys. Learning expands this class. 
At times one is prone to learn rather under an apparent restriction: a student 
learns to cook when for the first time she is living on her own, an outcast learns to 
hunt when it is essential for his survival, a prisoner learns to meditate while in his 
prison cell. This is so because these apparent restrictions are a gateway to freedom. 
In what appears to be absolute freedom a self-consciousness might be largely 
restricted by its own self. We can always be self sufficient with ourselves. The 
challenge of freedom consists in going out of the self, out of that which is already 
known. The risk of never-ending random play with Icons is idleness. One can 
continue to play with things already discovered. This is where Indices literally come 
into play: to the random play of signs a focus is inputted. The result of this indexical 
signification is that the play of musement proceeds within certain parameters.  
It is difficult at times to impose focuses on the self by ourselves because the 
self does not know anything outside the self to focus on. This is where the other, the 
teacher, helps: another, a teacher that is, imposes a focus on a learner. Suppose that a 
child has discovered counting one way or another, by some series of random playing 
with signification in her Lebenswelt. She might even perform very simple additions. 
However, she never really needed to perform the operation of addition often. This is 
where the teacher sets an Index: she points out the operation of addition to the child. 
The teacher imposes the focus on the learner. It is as if the teacher puts horse eye 
covers to the learner’s play of musement, so as to play within one direction only, the 
direction of what is being taught. For the teacher the Index is sound. In her own webs 
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of signs it occupies a harmoniously integrated place, it is justified, because she 
knows the Symbol to which it leads: because of such and such tendencies of the 
world addition is useful. Until the learner sees the Symbol, the Third signification – 
the goal of the Index – the Index is, though perhaps understood, useless. This is why 
the teacher has to learn the student as well. To explain her own Symbol to the 
learner, the teacher has to know the Icons of the learner on which this Symbol is 
ought to develop. 
We cannot tell where musement leads us or any other living organism. 
According to Peirce’s theory of evolution, evolution starts with the play of 
musement. Peirce’s doctrine which he calls Tychism consists in that Firstness is 
governed by chance. The Icon type pertains to Firstness. Nevertheless, on Tychism 
are developed further on Anancasticism – evolution by necessity – and, finally, 
Agapism – evolution by love –, which explain how chance is transcended into other 
evolution criteria. Evolution is not all the way an element of determination. Chance, 
the tychastic principle, is always present, in some degree. Also, determination, the 
anancastic principle, that of mechanical necessity, is overcome in Agapism. Agapism 
is only manifested freely, as the “spirit of love” is “the support of a vital freedom.” 
(CP 6.305) The principles of Tychism and Anancasticism are degenerate forms of 
Agapism (6.303). The three constitute a continuous evolution, when one mode of 
evolution inherits the previous. Peirce named the continuous principle active in this 
doctrine of evolution Synechism. 
Peirce defined Synechism as “that tendency of philosophical thought which 
insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime importance in philosophy and, in 
particular, upon the necessity of hypotheses involving true continuity.” (CP 6.169) 
While among all types of signification there is continuity, the second trichotomy of 
signs, describing the sign’s relation to its object, is par excellence the Synechistic 
trichotomy, as it starts precisely with continuity of similarities, from Icon to Index 
and to Symbol. The word Peirce chose for this doctrine suggests a coming together, 
an ordinate classification of qualities into objects, as it starts with the prefix “syn”, 
meaning a togetherness. It is no wonder that Synechism concludes with Symbol 
(literally, the “throwing together”). Agapism is “the law of love” (CP 6.302). The 
Greek word agape (αγάπη), the root of Peirce’s agapism, is simply translated as love, 
a perfect love that incorporates and transcends eros (έρως), philia (φιλιά) and storge 
(στοργή). According to Peirce, the doctrine of chance, “tychism must give birth to an 
evolutionary cosmology” (CP 6.102). This evolutionary cosmology is the physiology 
of arguments, the Universe’s expansion of meaning from Iconicity, similarities 
shared by chance, through Indexicality, organizing Icons into Propositional relations 
and to Arguments.  
 Peirce developed this threefold theory of evolution in the early 1890s, the 
period when his mature thought was crystalized. The conclusion of his semiotic 
theory resulted in this theory of evolution, whereby the entire Universe of signs, the 
physiology of arguments, is best characterized by “Evolutionary love” (CP 6.287). 
The Peircean Theory of Learning has a Tychism-Anancasticism-Agapism structure. 
These three doctrines are modes of evolution: 
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 “Three modes of evolution have thus been brought before us: evolution by 
fortuitous variation, evolution by mechanical necessity, and evolution by creative 
love. We may term them tychastic evolution, or tychasm, anancastic evolution, or 
anancasm, and agapastic evolution, or agapasm. The doctrines which represent 
these as severally of principal importance we may term tychasticism, 
anancasticism, and agapasticism. On the other hand the mere propositions that 
absolute chance, mechanical necessity, and the law of love are severally operative 
in the cosmos may receive the names of tychism, anancism, and agapism.” (CP 
6.302) 
 In the Universe’s quest of discovering itself, learning first arose, probably 
from mere chance, and it is driven by chance, as learning is defined here as 
discovery of similarities – this is Tychism. Sebeok, continuing further on from 
Peirce’s intuition of semiosis as a reasonable explanation for the emergence of life, 
considered that “It is important to realize that only living things and their inanimate 
extensions undergo semiosis, which thereby becomes uplifted as a necessary, if not 
sufficient, criterial attribute of life” (Sebeok 1994, p. 6). It then moved and it was 
objectified. Life forms learned and thus organized themselves into social structures, 
and being was extended from the natural to the cultural domain, so that, at some 
point, as a necessary result of this evolution learning was institutionalized into 
education. This is the principle of Anancasticism. Further on, the purpose of 
education is driven from the purpose of learning: the discovery of the Argument, the 
unfolding of the Universe and its revelation, ultimately, infinitely distantly realized 
by the identity of Mind and Truth
29
. The purpose of education is much more than 
serving the mere functionality of society; the purpose of learning and education is 
research. Therefore, the Tychism-Anancasticism-Agapism cosmological evolution 
applied to learning reveals the Learning-Education-Research evolution of the role we 
play in the Universe’s revelation of itself. Thus Peirce teaches that research is the 
Law of Love: 
“The movement of love is circular, at one and the same impulse projecting 
creations into independency and drawing them into harmony. This seems 
complicated when stated so; but it is fully summed up in the simple formula we 
call the Golden Rule. This does not, of course, say, Do everything possible to 
gratify the egoistic impulses of others, but it says, Sacrifice your own perfection 
to the perfectionment of your neighbor. Nor must it for a moment be confounded 
with the Benthamite, or Helvetian, or Beccarian motto, Act for the greatest good 
of the greatest number. Love is not directed to abstractions but to persons; not to 
persons we do not know, nor to numbers of people, but to our own dear ones, our 
family and neighbors. “Our neighbor,” we remember, is one whom we live near, 
not locally perhaps but in life and feeling.” (CP 6.288) 
                                                          
29
This relation of identity is a real possibility but ever infinitely distant. The similarity to Truth, on the 
other hand, is achievable. 
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One might be intrigued by the need of developing an entire cosmogony when 
the exigency is strictly that of understanding learning and improving education 
(whatever that might mean). It seems antiscientific: would so many hypotheses need 
be assumed? This is not an unscientific assumption of unneeded hypotheses though, 
but an embracing of a holistic view on education. According to Peirce such an 
approach is unavoidable, since the history of philosophy led here: 
“Such are the materials out of which chiefly a philosophical theory ought 
to be built, in order to represent the state of knowledge to which the nineteenth 
century has brought us. Without going into other important questions of 
philosophical architectonic, we can readily foresee what sort of a metaphysics 
would appropriately be constructed from those conceptions. Like some of the 
most ancient and some of the most recent speculations it would be a Cosmogonic 
Philosophy.” (CP 6.33) 
This justifies the need for integrating biosemiotics and the history of 
semiotics in the effort of developing a fully semiotic and holistic educational 
philosophy. Myrdene Anderson promoted biosemiotics for the argument that it 
advances the understanding that “the earth is a living organism” (in Sebeok, Umiker-
Sebeok, 1992, p. 5), a conclusion of which philosophy of education might be in need 
now (Gough and Stables developed such an argument in 2011). Semiotics integrates 
education in a holistic view whereas life forms are a part of learning itself. 
Learning is the discovery of the other. The ultimate revelation of this 
Cosmogonic Philosophy is the discovery of the other which occurs through the 
abandonment of the self. It is not a matter of ethics. Peirce made it clear that his 
‘Golden Rule’ is not utilitarianism (not the Benthamite motto). It is the cosmos’ 
evolution through life forms, such as human beings. Evolution by chance (tychasm) 
led to evolution by necessity (anancasm) which led to evolution by love (agapasm). 
The ultimate expression of agapasm which the cosmos came about with so far is 
personal existence, personality namely. On endless continua of being structures 
became aware of themselves – life emerged, that is. Self-conscious signs developed 
personality. Personality was developed in and by selves involved in semiosis with 
other self-conscious signs (see Chapter 5). Personality is, therefore, evolution’s 
mode of adapting to certain structures of signification. So are, as argued in Chapter 
1, education and science. Learning is enhanced and more easily becomes scientific if 
it is structured in an educational system. Education implies learning from others. We 
call this teaching. Teaching is a particular mode of learning, the learning of a non-
self.  
A Cosmogonic Philosophy is required, because love is not merely a 
sentimental thing, or a matter of morality. It is the rationale and drive of life, which, 
in turn, is the utmost expression of an existing and evolving Universe. Love is not 
only the result of chance, it is not Tychistic. Living beings do not just ‘fall in love’ 
randomly. Love is not only mechanically determined either, it is not Anancastic. 
This means that living beings do not ‘fall in love’ out of necessity and determined by 
biological, cultural or other factors. In either of these two cases love would be the 
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object of cognitive sciences, or sociology, or anthropology, and its manifestations 
that would be apart of these sciences’ spectrum would not be interesting anyway. 
Even feelings, emotions, thoughts and beliefs can be studied into a large extent from 
the mentioned perspective, but love does not coincide with any of these and neither 
is it the sum of all of them. Love is the very transcendence of chance and necessity. 
This agapic love has to be actively manifest in the relation of the student and the 
teacher. By this learning randomly or mechanically are transcended. Of course, one 
might object that by making love the subject of semiotics there is the risk of reducing 
it in some way, as other sciences would as well. The answer to this stands in that the 
Argument is the agapic sign (Thirdness of Thirdness) and, as explained (Chapter 2), 
the Argument is the sign that most thouroughly tends to the infinitely distant truth. 
Therefore, Peirce’s semiotics simply realizes that love cannot be fully comprehended 
or satisfactorily approached. At the same time, love is not noumenal or impossible. 
In Peirce’s cosmology, it is the possibility of transcendent presence. It is obvious 
when, for instance, a student learns by the semiosis in which herself and her teacher 
are involved, as they discover new arguments.  
Surely, lion cubs learn from their mothers, but the more personal these 
relations between teacher and learner are, the richer the interpretation is. Personal 
relation results in an attachment to the other even to the point of self denial. The 
teacher-student relation imitates the parent-child relation, which was already well 
established within evolution by the time education came about. Thus, adoption of 
orphaned younglings is a result of agapastic evolution. Some species (such as 
Chacma baboons, see Hamilton, Busse, Kenneth 1982) developed this method which 
is quite often found in humans. Life forms get to know the relation to parent even 
before birth, through the intra-uterine life (in the case of mammals) and develop it 
strongly since the first moments of extra-uterine life. The fact that any new 
individual of a species has its procreation literally in another individual of the 
species is an expression of agapasm. It is impossible to tell where precisely a new 
self-conscious sign (a new organism) was crystalized within the continuum of 
consciousness, imposing itself as a self. What is obvious is that it is part of the 
continuum since it clearly sprang forth from an already defined self. Evolution made 
association of individuals necessary: at some point organisms needed to copulate in 
order to reproduce. This justifies that the synechism of tychism and anancasticism 
necessarily implies agapism: an external focus becomes mandatory for evolution. A 
cosmology of chance and necessity would be incomplete, according to Peirce. Their 
mediation is love, agapism. The only critique that Peirce brought to Hegel consists in 
that Hegel, in his triadic philosophy, did not arrive at the idea of transcendence by 
love. Therefore, Hegel’s philosophy is seen as mechanistic (assuming the 
determination of chance and necessity): 
“The anancasticist might here interpose, claiming that the mode of evolution 
for which he contends agrees with agapasm at the point at which tychasm departs 
from it. For it makes development go through certain phases, having its inevitable 
ebbs and flows, yet tending on the whole to a fore-ordained perfection. Bare 
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existence by this its destiny betrays an intrinsic affinity for the good. Herein, it must 
be admitted, anancasm shows itself to be in a broad acception a species of agapasm. 
Some forms of it might easily be mistaken for the genuine agapasm. The Hegelian 
philosophy is such an anancasticism. With its revelatory religion, with its 
synechism (however imperfectly set forth), with its ‘reflection,’ the whole idea of 
the theory is superb, almost sublime. Yet, after all, living freedom is practically 
omitted from its method. The whole movement is that of a vast engine, impelled by 
a vis a tergo, with a blind and mysterious fate of arriving at a lofty goal. I mean that 
such an engine it would be, if it really worked; but in point of fact, it is a Keely 
motor. Grant that it really acts as it professes to act, and there is nothing to do but 
accept the philosophy. But never was there seen such an example of a long chain of 
reasoning -- shall I say with a flaw in every link? -- no, with every link a handful of 
sand, squeezed into shape in a dream. Or say, it is a pasteboard model of a 
philosophy that in reality does not exist. If we use the one precious thing it 
contains, the idea of it, introducing the tychism which the arbitrariness of its every 
step suggests, and make that the support of a vital freedom which is the breath of 
the spirit of love, we may be able to produce that genuine agapasticism at which 
Hegel was aiming.” (CP 6.305) 
Peirce’s argument is that pragmaticism, as a doctrine of critical common 
sense, if it considers that reality is synechistic, inevitably leads to agapism. Critical 
common sense urges us to see the law of love active in the Universe, setting 
existence free from chance and mechanical determination. By this argument it occurs 
that Peirce considered that the idea which ultimately qualifies his semiotics as realist, 
and not idealist, is the idea of agapistic evolution. 
This reality of the natural realm is present, of course, in the cultural. Any 
human being knows that parenting is, or at least should be, associated with love. 
Therefore, assuming the continuity of nature and culture, any teacher-student relation 
which is deprived of love is pathological and it will not function. Such a relation 
would be against the cosmos’ evolution. 
This association of personality and science might raise some doubts: how can 
personal love be the very essence of research? How can research still be objective if 
its drive is personal? According to Peirce’s pragmatic maxim the effort for 
objectivity only makes sense when performed by “an experimenter of flesh and 
blood” (CP 5.424). Science and research are practised within the conditions of 
suprasubjective reality. We claim that our science should be objective because it 
should be indexical – focused on an Object. We tend to fallback to the play of 
musement, the preponderantly Iconic level of learning, which is pleasant and easy 
for us. It is difficult to stay focused and perform semiosis on one and the same 
Object. The semiotic Universe is very rich and presents many distractions for a life 
form to play with all around. Nevertheless, to develop arguments indices are needed, 





 in arguments. This fall back from more complex signification to Icons is the 
unscientific subjectivism that science should be aware of. 
The argument type brings even more pleasure than the play on icons, because 
the Argument is agapastic, though, at times this is difficult to see for both teacher 
and student. Before the student develops arguments on the Objects indexed by the 
teacher she cannot foresee how the argument is interesting: its semiotic power and 
the joy of using it. The argument is the sign most capable to change a Lebenswelt. 
There is no better adaptation (interpretation) than argumentation. An argument, for 
instance, can accommodate a student with her teacher. Without having arrived at the 
Argument yet, the student only knows the semiotic fertility of the icons that she can 
use for developing the argument. Also the teacher might be tempted to give up on the 
student: since she knows the power of these arguments and does not perceive any joy 
towards them from the student it might seem pointless. It is important to be aware 
that never is there an ultimate argument reached. Two students will develop each 
their own unique argument in regard to one teacher’s teaching on the same subject. 
None of their arguments is better than the other and none of their arguments puts an 
end to learning on the topic. That arguments are agapistic means precisely that they 
enhance the growth of learning. To have developed an Argument starting from a 
certain predicate means that the horizons of using that predicate are expanding 
widely, not that a certain point of sufficiency was reached.  
Nevertheless, the fallback to Icons sometimes might be useful: the student 
might become so lost in indexical signification that she forgets her own icons from 
where it all started, by which sense of things came about in the first place. In that 
situation, when the Iconic ground is ignored, to the extent that it is possible to be 
ignored, the arguments the student develops will lack iconic syntax. As such, they 
are not proper arguments. It is a case which is referred to as mechanical learning, 
characterized by the student’s apparently performing well when evaluated but not 
understanding herself the arguments. It is the student’s way of lying. She did not 
discover a similarity by which she developed herself a predicate that could argue on 
the taught topic. Instead, she discovered a predicate that allows her to mislead the 
evaluation method: her performance simulates having had discovered a relevant 
similarity. 
Peirce’s argument for science’s necessity for Agapism is revealed in his 
interpretation of love as from the Gospel according to St John, the ‘ontological 
gospeller’, as Peirce referred to him (CP 6.287): 
“Everybody can see that the statement of St. John is the formula of an 
evolutionary philosophy, which teaches that growth comes only from love, from I 
will not say self-sacrifice, but from the ardent impulse to fulfill another’s highest 
impulse. Suppose, for example, that I have an idea that interests me. It is my 
creation. It is my creature; for as shown in last July’s Monist, it is a little person. I 
                                                          
30
It is possible for an Index to become the element of copulation (middle term) because of its Iconic 
ground. Indices used as Subjects are unsaturated predicates (Chapter 4). When used as middle terms 
their Qualities (Iconic valency) is used. 
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love it; and I will sink myself in perfecting it. It is not by dealing out cold justice 
to the circle of my ideas that I can make them grow, but by cherishing and tending 
them as I would the flowers in my garden. The philosophy we draw from John’s 
gospel is that this is the way mind develops; and as for the cosmos, only so far as 
it yet is mind, and so has life, is it capable of further evolution. Love, recognizing 
germs of loveliness in the hateful, gradually warms it into life, and makes it 
lovely. That is the sort of evolution which every careful student of my essay “The 
Law of Mind” must see that synechism calls for.” (CP 6.289) 
By this Peirce also stated that the growth of the Universe is possible while 
there is life populating it. It is clear that by development, or growth, Peirce had in 
mind something biological
31
. Since the issue here is a cosmogonic philosophy, this 
focus on life can be intriguing: stars, planets and entire galaxies expand infinitely in 
the infinite vastness and yet without life forms, which quantitatively are 
insignificant, development is not possible. This comes not as a conclusion, but as a 
necessary assumption, a result of abduction. It is a breakthrough out of any eparhe, a 
denial of any slightest flavour of skepticism. How is one capable of performing this 
absolute denial of skepticism and place the equal sign between learning and loving? 
“His statement that God is love seems aimed at that saying of Ecclesiastes 
that we cannot tell whether God bears us love or hatred
32
. “Nay,” says John, “we 
can tell, and very simply! We know and have trusted the love which God hath in 
us. God is love.” There is no logic in this, unless it means that God loves all 
men.” (CP 2.287) 
That arguments are agapistic and that their evolution is enhanced by intra-
personal relations also means that an agapic semiosis will lead to learning in some 
way; it will set things straight, even if obstacles are encountered. If a teacher 
admits that she really loves her pupils, but at the same time she hates teaching 
them a certain subject, then she already has the appropriate Lebenswelt to turn the 
hatred of the teaching practice into an enjoyable activity. It requires sacrife, as 
Peirce suggests. The teacher’s love for her students provides the willing to 
sacrifice. Agapism is revealed by the teacher’s willingness to make the efforts, to 
care more about her students than about herself, eventually. At that stage of the 
semiosis it will not be possible for her to hate the teaching of any subject to these 
students, as she does not perform it for herself anyway (except the unfortunate 
cases of the system imposing the endoctrination with ideologies of hate that 
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The threshold between life and non-life is at least vague, if not problematic in Peirce. The issue of 
panpsychism is discussed in Chapter 5. 
32
Peirce’s interpretation of Ecclesiastes is, however, not necessary for the development of this theory 
of evolution. Neither his interpretation of the Revelation book stemming from the same text 
(“Evolutionary Love”) is necessary. The main argument stems from his interpretation of the Gospel 
according to St John and of his epistles. The important idea is that love is not contradictory to hatred, 
but rather it is overwhelming, transforming everything, including hatred, into loveliness, and 
establishing in everything a healthy growth. 
158 
 
exclude the possibility of agapism, as their semantics do not fit in the syntax of an 
Agapic Universe). 
 More than anything else, we, the presently alive, are developing the 
argument. Love is a matter of ontology, that is why Peirce terms the gospel writer 
who stated “God is love” the “ontological gospeller.” From here also the ethics of 
this theory of learning germinates: if a teacher’s teaching produces anything but 
love in any regard, it is not to be accepted. Love does not exclude love. If a 
student and teacher love each other, as desirable and necessary, then this will 
result by their love expanding. A teacher excluding the rest of the classroom for 
love for one student is a contradiction: this is not how agapism works. Also, if by 
her love for the teacher, the student comes to exclude from her love other things, 
the learning is not agapic. An example would be the teaching of hatred doctrines: 
if the students love their teacher who is teaching them racism, then, by the 
exclusion from love of a certain race, their learning is not agapic. An agapic 
meaning phenomenon would be that in which the students are not compelled by 
the teacher’s racism, but love the teacher nevertheless. By the argument for 
evolutionary love, in this case, those formally called students will be teaching the 
one formally called teacher: their love will eventually persuade her to a different 
argument. The student’s argument, because agapic, will be stronger than the 
teacher’s. The argument is agapic, and, therefore, properly an argument, because 
it follows the principle of evolution. Therefore, the Peircean Theory of Learning 
brings simple criteria for accepting or not accepting a certain teaching. Agapism 
enhances learning, and therefore, the criterion stems immediately: anything that 
obstructs learning is not desirable. Love alone enhances learning without 
obscuring any potentiality. 
Creating ideas is falling in love. Though, just before making this remark, which 
might be suspiciously narcissistic (falling in love with one’s own ideas), Peirce 
explained that love happens (it occurs) for “our neighbour”, who is no abstract 
concept, but “one whom we live near”. Love is personal, it is practised by self-
conscious selves for self-conscious others. Self-consciousness evokes personality 
(Chapter 5). Thus, education will always be driven by the desire of fulfilment within 
the other. The student has to be the teacher’s neighbour and vice versa. It is no 
wonder that students have teachers. In the opening of De Doctrina Christiana St 
Augustine argued that learning consists first in teaching the self but also in teaching 
to others.  
In the first stage, that of learning, the student is free, explores aimlessly. The drive 
of Agape – the tendency of the cosmos – towards knowledge, makes the student 
delight in a play of musement – she is discovering similarities. The learning process 
of logic is immanent, occurring naturally, as evolution has perfected it over time, 
being any human person’s capability of predicating (discovering similarities). This is 
the Tychistic stage of learning. It is mostly characterized by iconic signification: the 
learner randomly discovers relations of similarity in her Umwelt and Lebenswelt, 
thus expanding them. Further on, the student is restricted by the teacher, she is 
forced by her teacher to focus upon some particular object and to look for some 
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particular qualities that, according to the teacher, have to occur as similar. This is the 
Second, that is the Anancastic, stage of the learning continuum. It is mostly 
characterized by indexical signification: the teacher (or educational institution) 
points out (indexes) to the learner what to study. It is here that the two previously 
mentioned learning obstacles are found. One possibility is that the student either 
hates the teacher for unjustifiably taking her freedom away and obscuring from her 
the free musement that she loved, and thus, she sinks into boredom. The other 
possibility is that the student is fascinated by what the teacher is revealing to her, up 
to the point of adoration. In this case the student loses the interest to discover and 
develop her own predicates. Usually these two possible situations mingle, the student 
arriving at an Interpretant about the teacher as perfect and depersonalized 
connoisseur: the teacher’s perfection is sought after but never reached. Of course, the 
teacher’s knowledge is never achieved, because these two sets of signs (the teacher’s 
and the student’s) cannot coincide. Having this in mind the student should not lose 
hope for not identifying with the teacher. The teacher should not want the student to 
be identical to her. This identity is impossible and, if sought after, detrimental: the 
student loses her own personality by being confounded in the other’s self-
consciousness. 
Peirce defined Secondness as “struggle” (CP 1.322). The anancastic stage of 
learning, the dyadic stage of teacher/learner situation is a struggle where one 
becomes aware “of the presence of a non-ego” (CP 1.332). Surprise is also a matter 
of secondness, an anancastic matter, as it consists in this encounter with the non-ego 
(see Chapters 5 and 6). When we have learned we are surprised, it is a bewilderment: 
the world has changed, we live in a different Lebenswelt and the reality of 
possibilities is different than before the discovery. It happens accidentally, like 
stumbling upon something unforeseen: 
“But precisely how does this action of experience take place? It takes 
place by a series of surprises. There is no need of going into details. At one time a 
ship is sailing along in the trades over a smooth sea, the navigator having no more 
positive expectation than that of the usual monotony of such a voyage, when 
suddenly she strikes upon a rock. The majority of discoveries, however, have 
been the result of experimentation.” (CP 5.51) 
Experimentation has something more than mere experience. Aimless 
experiencing is tychistic, experimentation is anancastic and also synechistic. 
Experimentation is experience with a certain focus (Index). The focus is imposed by 
the teacher on the activity of the student. It involves an effort, a struggle, and when it 
is imposed from the outside, that is by the teacher, upon the student, it might seem 
useless. Unless the student sees herself the purpose of experimentation she cannot 
follow it successfully: 
“Now no man makes an experiment without being more or less inclined to 
think that an interesting result will ensue; for experiments are much too costly of 
physical and psychical energy to be undertaken at random and aimlessly. And 
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naturally nothing can possibly be learned from an experiment that turns out just as 
was anticipated. It is by surprises that experience teaches all she deigns to teach 
us.” (CP 5.51) 
This is why the student needs to comprehend the experimentation that 
schooling is putting her through as continuous with her life experience. What the 
teacher is teaching needs to be similar with what the student used to discover by 
herself in her ordinary experiences. Since anything can be similar with anything else 
this wouldn’t be a problem, but the student needs to discover the similarity between 
her experiences and focused experimentation, between the pleasant, accidental 
meanings she discovered by herself with the meanings that her teacher is urging her 
to discover. That is to say that the Index (anancastic struggle) is useless unless 
grounded in the Icon (tychistic discovery). The grounding of the Index in an Icon is 
what gives experimentation its continuity (synechism). If the student has a teacher in 
flesh and blood she also has an inner teacher – her own experience, that is, which is 
flesh and blood as well. That is from where the possibility of any teaching and 
learning emerges. The self is never a tabula rasa which could fit any new teaching; 
at any point the self is a sign (or set of signs). No self-consciousness is, at any point, 
tabula rasa, since it originated from another self-consciousness. An organism which 
has paws and a tail and two eyes gives birth to an other with paws, a tail and two 
eyes. This most simple remark dismisses any discussion of either tabula rasa or 
innate ideas. Life is continuous. Peirce showed his disappointment with pedagogy in 
general for not being aware of the continuity of life and the reality of the learner’s 
play of musement: 
“In all the works on pedagogy that ever I read -- and they have been many, 
big, and heavy -- I don’t remember that any one has advocated a system of 
teaching by practical jokes, mostly cruel. That, however, describes the method of 
our great teacher, Experience. She says, 
 
Open your mouth and shut your eyes 
And I’ll give you something to make you wise; 
 
and thereupon she keeps her promise, and seems to take her pay in the fun of 
tormenting us.” (CP 5.51) 
We learn only by experience. As such, learning is an enjoyable torment. Even 
if we are following an indexical signification, we never know what the outcome of 
the experiment will be. If we knew, we would not run the experiment. In the same 
time, without an expectation, an Interpretant probably in the form of a Symbol, we 
would not run the experiment neither. The student, thus, needs to have an 
expectation that interests her towards what the teacher is teaching. When the teacher 
is identified with the deliverer of the interesting outcome the student is falling in love 
with the teacher. Even though expressed so simply, this is much more than a 
Pavlovian stimulus (that semiosis does not account for Pavlovian behaviorism see 
161 
 
Eco 1976). The student is not merely consuming bits of information coming from the 
teacher.  The two (student and teacher) are involved in a complex semiosis by which 
they are realizing, at some point, that they are learning the other, in all her 
complexity, not just some abstract, detached from personality, free floating ideas. 
Anacasticism, this struggle, calls for Agapism, for evolution by self-denying 
creative love. The only chance to overcome the anacastic struggle is loving the non-
ego. The self finds no difficulty in learning by itself because learning is the 
evolutionary tendency of the Universe. The situation is different of course in 
situations such as a person having multiple personalities. If one self both hates and 
loves its own structures of signs it will encounter serious obstacles in playing 
coherently with icons. In such a situation the self, actually, does not really love: true 
love, in the form of agapism, would overcome hatred, transforming it into loveliness, 
as agape (evolutionary love) is not opposite to hatred, being all-encompassing. This 
thesis does not aim at examining psychological disorders though. That which matters 
is acknowledging that for a coherent, that is inner continuous and diagrammatic 
personality, learning is pleasant. As such, it is necessary that the initial play of 
musement is carried continuously carried further on throughout the evolution of 
signification. 
Learning by oneself is a play of musement: wherever the self’s own Umwelt 
and Lebenswelt lead, that is where and what the self explores. The self is surprised 
that one should learn from another. The self might not see the purpose of 
anacasticism, of the indexical imposition set from outside (e.g. by a teacher). The 
direction of the self’s own growth, like the growth of the cosmos, has been set from 
within. The cosmos, in its Agapasm, makes an identifiable self-consciousness along 
the continuum of consciousness cooperate with other self-consciousnesses. 
Anancasticism – the encountering of the non-ego – is only overcome by Agapasm. 
The non-ego becomes self, it comes to belong to one’s own Lebenswelt like an organ 
of its own body, like a defining sum of ideas of its own, like a set of signs which 
critically defines the self. The self can only learn from another if it loves the other. 
Once anancasticism is transcended the student recovers her freedom by 
wanting to pursue her own research. This is the moment where the student/teacher 
relation becomes freely assumed discipleship and, the more both of them inquire into 
it, they become the predicates and the student/teacher relation is transcended into, I 
shall use Buber’s and Levinas’ terminology, I-Thou
33
. For the student the other is not 
teacher anymore, she is Thou and likewise for the teacher. Mediation is a matter of 
Thirdness:  
“By the third, I mean the medium or connecting bond between the 
absolute first and last. The beginning is first, the end second, the middle third. 
                                                          
33
 Levinas’ philosophy places his understanding of I-Thou in the context of western metaphyiscs and 
phenomenology, which gives it valencies beyond Buber’s I-Thou, developed rather within the 
rationale of religious experience and worship. However, Levinas inherited this terminology from 
Buber and in the present thesis the terminology is used to refer to the relation between the self and 
non-self, particularly between the teacher and student.  
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[…] Sympathy, flesh and blood, that by which I feel my neighbor’s feelings, is 
third.” (CP 1.337)  
In Agapasm, the transcendence of Tychism and Anancasticism, there is no 
more student and there is no more teacher, there is Thou, and the key to the long 
awaited, infinitely distant telos that the student foreseen since the innocent stages of 
her initial play of musement, haunting her desire for knowledge ever since, is found 
in the teacher, in Thou, who is not anymore a demagogue, but a mentor. Research is 
personal love. This is the third stage of learning, the agapic stage. Not only that this 
stage is characterized by metaphors, symbols, and arguments, but at this point the 
teacher and the student signify as one Argument. They are in continuous 
diagrammatic coherency and participate in the semiosis of an Argument. The agapic 
moment is the moment of recognition, when the student and the teacher re-cognize 
themselves in each other; it is the moment of discovery: I is similar to Thou. This is a 
great discovery because it leads from the perceptual judgment of non-ego being an 
obstruction to the self to it being the self’s only chance of transcendence. This is 
where the student realizes that she has what to learn from the teacher. Locked in the 
limitations of the self, without the teacher, life is boring. Life without the teacher is 
no more local plurality. In that case life would be death. Something is alive if 
something learns (Chapter 1) and now, in the agapic moment, the student is learning 
from the teacher. The student observes how her Lebenswelt expands and her life 
achieves new horizons because of the teacher’s teaching. The teacher unlocks hidden 
treasures. After one has learned how to operate with negative numbers, how to swim, 
how to play the violin, the awareness of real possibilities expands. Music is much 
more interesting and generates more profound aesthetical experiences after one has 
discovered some similarities among sounds, namely if one learned some musical 
theory. Once with having learnt something the self holds a richer plurality of 
signification. She who learned will be infinitely grateful to her teacher while also 
aware of the uniqueness of her learning: her teacher never played a vibrato on the 
violin with the particular sensitivity with which she performs it and yet her teacher 
taught her to do it. The teacher should experience joy as well when hearing her 
student’s vibrato – they have learned each other. The student gives a new voice to 
the teacher’s teaching. As such, the teacher can evaluate herself, can practically 
observe the results of her teaching while being aware that it is the student’s merit for 
the learning and, therefore, for a new expression of her own doctrine (e.g. a vibrato 
performed by the student). The teacher teaches things that herself does not know 
because she is not teaching herself, she is teaching an other self. 
In Agapasm, the student is not any more biased by the teacher, but inspired. 
The same happens for the teacher: “The conception of mediation springs out of the 
plural consciousness or sense of learning.” (CP 1.378) This obviously places 
learning in a coextensive relation with life, which, in Chapter 1, has been presented, 
according to Kull’s biosemiotic account, as “local plurality” (in Bundgaard and 
Stjernfelt, p. 116) Research is a mediation of Learning and Education. It is the 
mediation (Thirdness) of the student’s diagrammatic reasoning (Firstness) and the 
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teacher’s indices (Secondness). Learning is free discovery and education is 
externally imposed focusing. The transcending mediation of these two consists in a 
revelation of knowledge, a unification of signs in one Argument. Learning happens 
in time. The self, a First, contains its own past. The other, the non-ego, the Second, is 
an element of the future self – there is a time when the other is unknown. The Third 
consists in their coming together in a present sign. Thus, the present is the only time 
when transcendence in to Thou can happen, that is, it is the only time when learning 
can happen at all. Peirce most likely inherited from St Augustine’s Confessions this 
conception of time which determines a phenomenology of the self. A similar 
argument was developed within philosophy of education by Stables (2012) around 
the concept of “my now” (Chapter 5). 
The development of the Agapistic state from an Anancasticism that might 
even be characterized by hate is not antagonistic. Peirce explains the irrelevance of 
hatred in respect to love, which conquers and transforms all. Peirce explained the 
irrelevance of hatred in respect to love using a metaphor of light and darkness: 
“Thus, the love that God is, is not a love of which hatred is the contrary; 
otherwise Satan would be a coordinate power; but it is a love which embraces 
hatred as an imperfect stage of it, an Anteros -- yea, even needs hatred and 
hatefulness as its object. For self-love is no love; so if God’s self is love, that 
which he loves must be defect of love; just as a luminary can light up only that 
which otherwise would be dark.” (CP 6.287) 
The light and darkness idea here is a metaphor, because it is a parallelism of 
something to something else: light can enlighten darkness – they present a potential 
similarity in one direction only. Darkness cannot comprehend light by any means, 
but light makes something dark similar with itself: it enlightens it (e.g. the Moon 
shines in its turn because it reflects light originating from the Sun). Following this 
metaphor, the teacher and the student have to lighten for each other that which used 
to be dark, thus transposing each other in a new semiotic world, closer to an 
ecosemiotic harmony, a shared Lebenswelt, coming closer to the identity of Mind 
and Truth. The Argument, the fully developed sign type, is realized at the level of 
Agapism. In this sense learning is achieved only in the circular movement of love 
which Peirce considers the principle of growth. The passage from Icon to Argument 
is a suprasubjective phenomenon of meaning which is possible only by the search for 
the genuine other both from the part of the student and from that of the teacher. It 













 In this Part I discuss the new insights and advantages of this Peircean Theory 
of Learning in respect to other mainstream philosophical approaches to education. I 
identify the arguments of the Peircean Theory of Learning that might seem 
controversial and explain them, so as to clarify the potential and coherency of the 
theory. I shall treat individually each of the possible objections that might stem from 
other philosophical schools. The rationale of this part is to explain aspects of the 
Peircean Theory of Learning in contrast to other schools. It brings a critique to other 
educational theories, but its main purpose is to further explain the Peircean approach 
and to underline its similarities and opposition to other approaches. This will clarify 
the theory’s epistemological stance. 
As I mentioned previously (Chapter 2), Husserlian phenomenology is the 
school which presents most similarities with Peircean semiotics. Therefore, a chapter 
(Chapter 9) is dedicated to comparing the Peircean Theory of Learning with 
phenomenology as applied to education. I explain that the Peircean Theory of 
Learning brings new insights for the phenomenological analysis of education. They 
envisage the framing of learning phenomena within semiosis, thus placing human 
education in continuity with cosmological, biological, and historical evolution. This 
phenomenological semiotics (broader than a linguistic semiotics) proves to be a 
comprehensive ground for the analysis of classroom phenomena, understanding the 
classroom as Lebenswelt, and the semiosic evolution of the student-teacher relation, 
the agapic integration of two selves as Intepretant. 
However, the present thesis envisages only the development of a Peircean 
Theory of Learning. The links with phenomenology that this educational semiotics 
presents are only mentioned and briefly explained here. The proper collaboration of 
these two schools would be a larger project which this thesis does not aim at 
resolving. Also, their full collaboration could not be exhausted in one work, but in an 
effort that would take years of research undertaken by semiotics and 
phenomenology. I simply remark the compatibility between these two traditions, 
emphasizing one of the epistemological circumstances that brought forth the present 
thesis, namely the phenomenological turn in semiotics. 
 Another chapter (Chapter 10) is dedicated to identifying and discussing the 
main objections that other philosophical positions might bring to the Peircean 
Theory of Learning. I discuss the main objections that can be brought to the Peircean 
Theroy of Learning from three different perspectives on education: pragmatism, 
humanism, and instructionalism. By approaching the objections coming from these 
three directions I cover the basic and general critique that the thesis is subject to. The 
issues raised concern: (1) the critique of the Peircean Theory of Learning as 
logocentric and therefore limited in approaching human life to its fullness, (2) the 
apparent preference to use theory without being backed up by empirical evidence, 
(3) the excessive focus on the role played by iconic signification in learning and an 
apparent ignorance of the importance of indexical and symbolic signification, (4) the 
focus on the personal aspect of the teacher-student relation being detrimental to the 
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focus on the taught content, (5) the dangers of a close erotic and agapic relation 
between student and teacher, and (6) the apparent non-differentiation between 













































The Peircean Theory of Learning and Phenomenology 
 
 This chapter explains how this semiotic approach to learning brings new 
insights to the phenomenological developments in education. I argue that semiotics, 
being coextensive with the phenomenological school, broadens the 
phenomenological research horizon, as well generally as particularly in education. 
The key to the new semiotic insights stands in semiotics’ specific concepts, those of 
sign and semiosis. Thus, I propose semiotics as a cosmological framework for 
phenomenology, where the phenomena populating the world are meaning 
phenomena, signs that is, cooperating in semiosic triads. 
The phenomenological tradition set in motion by Edmund Husserl is coherent 
with Peircean semiotics, especially in what concerns learning, particularly because 
both of these schools assume a mereological (diagrammatic) structure of existence 
(see Chapter 6). Two epistemological developments were noted in the previous 
chapters: (1) that iconic turn semiotics is phenomenological (see present thesis, 
Chapters 1 and 3 and also Stjernfelt in Bundgaard and Stjernfelt, and Stjernfelt 2007) 
and (2) that phenomenology already is an established approach to education (e.g. 
Peters 2009). I explain that semiotics’ recent phenomenological turn can generate a 
semiotic turn in phenomenology, as Peirce’s hypoicon (image, diagram, metaphor, 
see Chapter 2, Section D) concepts provide a rich apparatus for mereological 
analysis. Using Peirce’s schematic semiotics for mereological analysis implies 
identifying phenomena with meaning phenomena, that is signs. Moreover, I explain 
that the phenomenological approaches to education have developed positions close 
to Peirce’s agapistic principle of evolution. However, phenomenology has never 
explained the mutual, self-denying love in the student-teacher relation (or in general) 
as a matter of evolution. The semiotic perspective explains this mutual love as a 
matter of cosmological evolution of meaning. Phenomenology has shown an 
anthropocentric tendency at times, at least for the reason that the only way we can 
look at phenomena is from and within our human perspective. Semiotics offers a 
phenomenological and holistic explanation that integrates human life in the wider 
perspective of biologic and cosmologic evolution. Thus, the horizon of 
phenomenological research can be substantially broadened by performing 
phenomenological analysis in the perspective of a semiotic universe. On this 
account, phenomenology is epistemologically grounded in semiotics. This is possible 
by taking into consideration both Peirce and Husserl’s arguments for a logic which is 
not subject to psychology (see Chapter 2, Section B) and their preference of non-
noumenal ontology. 
Iconic, that is phenomenological, turn semiotics, the reading of Peirce 
accounted for here, is the semiotic trend that accounts for the crucial role of the icon 
type in learning. In Chapters 1 and 3 it was explained that iconic turn semiotics, first 
clearly noticed in 2007 by Stjernfelt, is a phenomenological turn. The turn towards 
an Icon focused semiotics was triggered by the cognitive approach to meaning, 
finding that meaning phenomena are continuous and not reducible to algebra. The 
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iconic turn consists in the rediscovery of semiotics as phenomenological and 
independent from linguistics. This take on meaning proves coherent with the 
simultaneous “Peirce renaissance in semiotics” (Stjernfelt 2007, p. 53), being partly 
triggered and enhanced by it. Peirce’s schematic semiotics is a rich conceptual 
ground for mereologic phenomenological analysis. The concepts of diagram and 
metaphor are employed as means for mereological analysis of the student-teacher 
relation. 
If in 1988 Garisson and Shargei noticed that despite the many common 
interests between Husserl, the main figure in phenomenology, and Dewey, the main 
figure in 20
th
 century progressive education, an educational phenomenology was still 
not developed. In the recent years phenomenological research has become an 
established trend in philosophy of education (Peters 2009, Friesen Norm, Henriksson 
Carina, Saevi Toni 2012). Hence, for the establishment of an educational philosophy 
based on a phenomenological trend of semiotics an awareness of other 
phenomenological approaches to education and the compatibility between these and 
the semiotic account is necessary and useful. Both semiotics and phenomenology, 
being hermeneutically rich and highly descriptive philosophical approaches, have 
provided mostly qualitative methods when implemented in the social sciences in 
general or in education in particular. Both of these approaches impose an analysis of 
phenomena as experienced, denying any attempt of an objective and detached 
experimenter. When approaching education, semiotics and phenomenology tend to 
focus on interpretation phenomena occurring in the teacher-student relation, offering 
a descriptive analysis of this relation. However, phenomenology does not possess the 
conceptual tools that semiotics developed. The semiotic concepts of sign and 
semiosis and the typologies of signs explain suprasubjective reality through the 
perspective of being as meaning phenomenon, an account missing in 
phenomenology. Thus, phenomenology, for its compatibility with semiotics, can be 
employed by semiotics as a method in education research.  
Phenomenological research in education can open itself to a semiotic horizon 
by embracing the concept of sign as the most comprehensive concept of 
phenomenon. Thus, the iconic turn of semiotics can generate a semiotic turn of 
phenomenology: the focus of attention to phenomena of meaning. The insight that 
semiotics offers is that all phenomena are meaning phenomena (signs). An example 
of such a collaboration, which I discuss in section C, would be the understanding of 
Levinas’ face as a particular application with an ethical dimension of Peirce’s Icon. 
A particularity of face is that it is conceptless; it stands beyond any rationalization. If 
sign is not strictly a concept then these two cannot refer to the same reality. The 
Peircean sign, the vehicle and result of semiosis, is a real existing phenomenon. 
Though we can refer and think of sign and face only conceptually, none of them, as 
real phenomena, is conceptual. Peirce’s sign is a real phenomenon as lived 
experience. This is why theoretical examples of signs cannot evoke a sign’s 
character as sign properly. What I propose, as a phenomenological analysis within a 
semiotic cosmology, is the understanding of the face-to-face encounter within the 
context of the Universe of signs. 
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The mereological analysis of signification reveals aspects of real existent 
phenomena, but it never exhausts reality. This is so because semiosis is infinite. The 
analysis, as well, can be performed ad infinitum. The infinity of semiosis is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of observation and science. At the same time, 
the infinity of the observed object makes any observation, any analysis incomplete. 
That nothing can be isolated out of the infinity of the physiology of arguments and 
analysed in perfect laboratory conditions qualifies any analysis as falsifiable. In 
Chapter 4 it was explained that the falsifiability and imperfection of analysis, 
stemming from the infinity and vagueness of its object makes the analysis potent and 
worthwhile. Since any analysis is incomplete but can be revealing, Peirce’s ten 
classes of signs, composed by sign types, which we encounter in experience (see 
Chapter 2), can be analysed mereologically. We can state that an example of the 
class of signs of Rhematic Indexical Sinsign is a spontaneous cry (2.256) or that a 
weathercock is a Dicent Sinsign (CP 2.257), but such a statement does not determine 
the local plurality. The sign is the correlation of three termini which occurs only in a 
peculiarity of circumstances. That the experienced sign always has a token (replica) 
character, a component of Secondness, means that signs are unrepeatable. Because 
signs are mediations and mediated reference is possible we can refer to that 
spontaneous cry or that time when John noticed the weathercock changing direction, 
but the genuine and unique sign which is referred to is not disclosed. It is impossible 
to put our finger on this or that sign precisely as signs do not have clear borders. 
Because of the infinite proceeding of semiosis signs are vague phenomena (on the 
vagueness of semiosis see also Nöth and Santaella 2011). Certainly, the vibrations of 
some vocal chords and of the air and their effect on a human eardrum and on a 
cognitive system participate in the semiosis composing the spontaneous cry as a 
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign. These elements can be identified, but semiosis is never 
exhausted and it is impossible to circumscribe the limits of the particular sign: the 
pain that caused one to shout, the blowing of the wind in a certain direction, the 
previous experiences of one hearing the shout, are these elements of the sign referred 
to, or are they elements of signs to which the Rhematic Indexical Sinsign in question 
interacts semiosically outside its tripartite structure? How essential are they in 
providing the sign’s Interpretant as real possibility? We can think of and refer to that 
spontaneous cry but we cannot repeat the genuine meaning phenomenon that 
occurred. Nevertheless, signs can be mereolgically analysed and this gives some 
insight about the lived experience that partakes at a life form’s Umwelt through the 
life form’s engagement in signification. Analysing the semiosis evoked by a 
spontaneous cry as a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign reveals the correlates composing it 
and the relations amongst them: (1) an Iconic Sinsign (a cry as a generally 
intelligible unsaturated predicate), which in turn contains a Qualisign (a quality that 
affords the sign’s intelligibility within the world of experience), and a (2) Qualisign 
(a quality which affords the construction of a predicate). 
Such an analysis of face would be false to the real experienced phenomenon, 
the face-to-face encounter. Instead, I argue that face can be analysed in the 
perspective of a semiosic Universe, being an example of agapic evolution. Even face 
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has a diagrammatic character and it is possible only as phenomenon of signification. 
As part of the Universe of signs, it is implicit that face has a diagrammatic structure; 
it obviously does so in the relations between its components: eyes, nose, mouth, 
brows, and all the rest. Any description of face is false to it because its defining 
character is its infinity. Semiosis is infinite as well, and one of the main assumptions 
of a Universe of signs is that there can be no isolated semiosis. Any attempt to give 
examples of a sign is false to what the sign is (a triadic mediation among 
mediations). I shall discuss this in section C of the present chapter. Face, like the 
other, to which face is a gateway is infinite. Semiosis, as well, is infinite. The face of 
the other makes the self acknowledge that the genuine non-self which the self is 
beholding cannot be circumcised. The other cannot be comprehended in a totality. 
Semiosis brings the same awareness regarding Truth and the pursuit of truth: it is 
never ending. As such, a semiotic approach to face is possible without narrowing the 
genuine immediacy of face to a sum (totality) of concepts.  
Face, if understood as meaning phenomenon, is descriptive for the human 
Lebenswelt. Being a species specific Iconic signification, face characterizes the 
human Lebenswelt without implying a discontinuity in the biological realm between 
human and non-human. All species experience icons: the semiosis’ regional 
ontology, its specific a priori ontology, is the same. The phenomenology of face 
explains a human being’s re-cognition of another human being in her intimacy, 
engaging in an assumed intersubjective relation of two self-aware consciousnesses, 
making each other possible as personality (Chapter 5). Understood in the broader 
horizon of biosemiotics, the semiotic account of face avoids the danger of 
anthropocentrism or human/non-human ontological dichotomy. This is the general 
epistemological advantage of performing phenomenological analysis with a semiotic 
consciousness (that the Universe is constituted of signs), placing phenomenological 
analysis in the context of semiosis, much broader than the strictly anthropologic 
horizon where signification is regarded as constructed within cultural boundaries, 
and, as such, purely symbolical and devoid of iconicity. 
Levinas’ phenomenology of face is a proper Husserlian approach to the 
encounter between self and non-self. In an introduction to Levinas’ Totality and 
Infinity John Wild recommends Levinas’ philosophy as the proper candidate for a 
contemporary non-dualistic phenomenology. He declared that “Ever since the 
beginning of the modern phenomenological movement disciplined attention has been 
paid to various patterns of human experience as they are actually lived through in the 
concrete.” (Wild in Levinas, 1961, p. 11) Peirce as well paid attention to experience 
as lived. Peirce’s logical approach to life (semiotics) led to the concepts of sign and 
semiosis, which, in Peirce’s philosophy, came to have a cosmological relevance. The 
phenomenological school did not insist systematically as much on meaning, though 
Husserl’s mereology stands on his theory of intention and his concept of signitive 
act. Nevertheless, both Peirce’s semiotics and Husserlian phenomenology qualify as 
logical approaches to life and develop a suprasubjective ontology. Thus, the 
developing phenomenological philosophy of education can develop together with, or 
rather into, a semiotics of education. Semiotics can offer its own tools to the 
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qualitatively descriptive analysis of education: sign, semiosis, the sign types, and the 
classes of signs describe the real phenomena which phenomenology is interested in. 
Some accounts of phenomenological philosophy are still embedded in 
modern dualism. As an example, Wild considered that Sartre’s phenomenology 
presents the danger of a dualistic ontology, because of the dichotomy between en-soi 
and pour-soi (in Levinas 1961, p. 11). Heidegger, Wild argued, is “the only 
contemporary thinker who has formulated a total ontology which claims to do justice 
to the stable results of phenomenology and to the living existential thought of our 
time.” (p. 11) Nevertheless, there is one issue with Heidegger’s phenomenology, a 
point at which it fails to be entirely coherent with Peircean semiotics as well: 
Heidegger’s phenomenology is exaggeratedly anthropocentric (Wild, p. 11). As 
such, Levinas’ philosophy of the Other remains the most suitable candidate for a 
suprasubjective phenomenology. If face is accounted for as Icon, then it gives an 
immediate embodied access to the Other’s face which is similar to the self’s face 
while each face is obviously unique. Terms such as love or agape do not belong to 
Levinas’ philosophical vocabulary but I argue that, on this joining of face as the 
ethical application of Icon, as phenomenological analysis, Peirce’s doctrine of 
agapism reveals the spirit of Levinas’ ethics. Thus, it can be argued that there is a re-
cognition of faces that makes intersubjectivity, inter-personal relations, possible. The 
teacher-student semiosis requires the re-cognition of faces, the iconic level of a 
semiosis that reveals the similarity with the Other: the self and the Other are 
potential personalities. Another candidate, besides Levinas, is Merleau-Ponty, who 
developed a phenomenology of the body, on the basis of Husserl’s phenomenology 
and von Uexkull’s biology. For this, Stjernfelt commented that Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology confirms (unintentionally) several Peircean hypotheses (Stjernfelt 
2007, p. 257-267). In his case it is particularly interesting that locating the animal in 
an “inter-animality” anticipates “intersubjectivity” (cf. Stjernfelt, p. 257). However, I 
shall not approach Merleau-Ponty particularly, as there is no need for the further 
development of the biosemiotic apparatus within this thesis. If philosophy of 
education will properly take the direction of iconic turn semiotics then Merleau-
Ponty’s work will prove an important pivot that will help phenomenology integrate 
in a biosemiotic framework. 
In this chapter I show that the Husserlian phenomenological school is 
generally coherent with Peirce’s semiotics and that particularly Levinas’ philosophy 
centered on the genuine Other, who is situated beyond the self’s concept of the other, 
is thoroughly coherent with Peirce’s agapistic principle. The basic common idea is 
that by denying the Other, the self denies itself, thus losing any possibility of what 
Peirce referred to as growth, or evolution. Therefore, as in Peirce’s case, approaching 
learning and education from Levinas’ perspective inevitably leads to the life (local 
plurality) of the student-teacher relation.  
To begin, I shall explain the general compatibility between Peircean 
semiotics and the Husserlian phenomenological school. Once these similarities 
underpinning both of these approaches are introduced I will discuss the place that 
Heidegger and Levinas can play in a semiotic or phenomenological postmodern, 
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non-dualistic approach to education. These two of Husserl’s most influential 
students, Heidegger and Lévinas, are currently common references in philosophy of 
education and their works, following the lines of Husserlian phenomenology, loosely 
fit epistemologically with the Peircean Theory of Learning. 
 
A. Edmund Husserl and Charles Peirce: logic grounded in phenomenology 
 
Stjernfelt noted the possibility that Peirce actually inherited the term 
phenomenology from Husserl’s Logical Investigations, works which Peirce had read 
(2007, p. 144). Also, Stjernfelt accounts the lack of interest between these two 
contemporary logicians on a mutual misunderstanding. Without going into details on 
Peirce’s reading of Husserl and vice versa, below I point out the main reasons that 
interest philosophy of education, which qualify their philosophies as profoundly 
similar. 
The main reason for the coherence between Peircean (iconic turn) semiotics 
and phenomenology (in the Husserlian tradition) is that both of these account for a 
non-psychologistic logic (see Chapters 1 and 3). Husserl’s quest for pure logic has a 
similar aim with Peirce’s quest for semiotics. Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology is, as he put it, “not founded as the empirical science of the 
empirical facts of this field of experience.” (1913b, p. 11). Husserl had in mind a 
notion of transcendental experience which comes close to Peirce’s (suprasubecjtive) 
semiosis, precisely a transcendence of the empirical and the a priori, but not the 
Kantian synthetic a priori. Stjernfelt explained that Husserl inherited a concept of a 
priori different than that of Kant, stemming from the Austrian tradition, mastered, 
among others, by Husserl’s professor and one of the first developers of mereological 
analysis, Brentano (Stjernfelt 2007, on Brentano see also Chapter 6). The main 
difference between the Kantian and the Austrian tradition a priori stands in that 
according to the latter it refers to the object of judgment, and not, like in Kant, to 
“anybody’s ‘judgment’.” (Stjernfelt 2007, p. 176) This is precisely the assumption of 
a non-psychologistic logic. Both Peirce’s and Husserl’s logic are based on reality as 
experienced. 
Husserl’s version of a priorism is noticeable in his distinction between 
‘regional’ and ‘formal’ ontology, which roughly corresponds to Heidegger’s 
distinction between ontic and ontological. Formal ontology consists in the study of 
abstract concepts and relations – the possibility of mereology. As such, formal 
ontology manifests analytic a priorism and regional ontologies are manifested 
synthetic a priorism (Tieszen 2005). Mereology, however, is applied in regional 
ontologies, which deal with the various domains (regions) of being (language, 
Lebenswelt, a species specific Umwelt, a scientific paradigm). Thus, “Husserl’s idea 
is to base the mereological description of language on certain ontological 
presuppositions, namely the privileging of the noun and sentence, respectively, as 
independent entities (after the Scolastic distinction between categorematica and 
syncategorematica, respectively; the former possessing an autonomous 
signification).” (Stjernfelt 2007, p. 164) The mereological character of regional 
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ontologies makes phenomenological analysis possible. Therefore, Husserl’s a priori 
is strictly bound to the supposition of diagrammatic coherency. This means that the 
rational character of the relations between parts and wholes within a regional 
ontology (iconic syntax) is what makes phenomena intelligible. Stjernfelt’s 
statement that “Husserl’s mereology further forms the basis for his reinterpretation 
of the a priori,” (p. 163) qualifies mereology (that reason is diagrammatic) as a 
phenomenological a priori. This is to say that (only) grammar is a priori. Grammar 
is, of course, a priori to the content which is grammatic, but there is no grammar 
without a content, without elements in grammatical relation. This a priori grammar is 
iconic syntax. This is equivalent to Peirce’s idea that pure Icons (hypoicons) are 
matters of Firstness. By necessity, icons (Firstness) exist objectified (Secondness). 
The revealing insight is that analogy, in the form of diagrams and metaphors, gives 
rise to real possibilities. No ontology would be possible unless through analogy, not 
an analogy performed by a third, but an analogy between the constituting parts which 
evokes and in itself already is the third, the mediation. 
Peirce himself justified the psychological sciences’ dependence on 
metaphysics by the “intimate bearing of logic upon grammatical syntax.” (CP 1.250) 
The assumption here is that regional ontologies (language) resemble the structure of 
formal ontology and, therefore, a phenomenological a priori can be noticed in both 
(grammar is prior to language). In Peirce’s presentation of the ten classes of signs 
(see Chapter 2) the combination of sign types by which sign classes are obtained is 
possible due to a certain syntax that per se is meaningful. For instance, in explaining 
the combination of an Iconic Sinsign (‘it is’) and a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign 
(‘John!’ as a spontaneous cry) which leads to a Dicent Sinsign (a simple proposition, 
such as ‘It’s John!’), Peirce mentioned that “the mode of combination, or Syntax, of 
these two must also be significant.” (CP 2.257) This means that these signs, an 
Iconic Sinsign and a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign contain some qualisigns, which 
behaving as hypoicons
34
 in their composition, assure the iconic syntax between the 
two signs (this is to say that there is a basic similarity between John and it is – they 
share in participating, or at least in potentially participating, in the physiology of 
arguments). The signs can be combined into one Interpretant sign because of their 
diagrammatic compatibility which is ontological syntax. In Chapter 7 it was 
explained that this syntax is diagrammatic coherence. This leads to another important 
reason for this epistemological allegiance, namely the equivalence between Peirce’s 
realization that something is meaningful (intelligible) because of its diagrammatic 
character and Husserl’s assumption that any syntax can be analysed mereologically. 
Putting it simply, both Peirce and Husserl accounted for the rational character of 
relations among parts and wholes. This is a cornerstone for both of these accounts of 
                                                          
34
This is precisely the place that hypoicons occupy in signification, since, like qualisigns, they are 
Firsts of Firstness. The qualisign is a signifying quality, before it is embodied so as to act as sign and 
inevitably becomes an Icon (see CP 2.244, and Chapter 2), and the hypoicon type is an Icon in its 
Firstness, prior to its Second relation, that of similarity to its Object, which defines it as Icon. 
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logic. This compatibility was explained thoroughly by Stjernfelt (2007) who termed 
this assumption iconic syntax. 
Also, they both regarded meaning as general, that is universal (Stjernfelt 
2007, p. 145). Mediation, Thirdness, is, according to Peirce, the very definition of 
generality. Moreover, like Peirce, Husserl seemed to account for the idea of the 
universal as tendency. Peirce, by his extreme realism, was a pioneer in considering 
laws (natural, social, cosmic, etc.) as general tendencies and not definite, rigid, 
absolutely determined states of affairs which under any circumstances present the 
same identical behaviour and outcome (e.g. Argument signs tend to the truth). 
Husserl as well remarked this, stating that such an observation has profound 
consequences for logic: 
“Norms, however, do not say “universally it is so”, but rather “so it should 
be”; thinking is supposed to take this form, or else it is not, nor can it <be> 
correct thinking. It falls short of the goal of truth. This may, for the time being, 
give an inkling, an inkling of a certain difference in the way in which psychology 
on the one hand, and logic on the other, are concerned with thinking.” (1906/07, 
p. 4, §1, 3-8) 
Peirce expressed in a few words the idea that the indeterminacy of real 
universals is a necessary condition for a phenomenologically based logic: 
“It would be a great mistake to suppose that ideal experimentation can be 
performed without danger of error […]. The results of induction from sensible 
experimentation are to afford some ratio of frequency with which a given 
consequence follows given conditions in the existing order of experience. In 
induction from ideal experimentation, no particular order of experience is forced 
upon us; and consequently no such numerical ratio is deducible. ” (CP 3.528) 
Husserl developed a concept and method of analysis of pictures in 
conformity with his mereological method. It is mostly developed in the third Logical 
Investigations (Husserl, 1990b) and in Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung 
(Husserl, Husserliana XXIII, 1989-1925). Husserl’s concept of picture is an example 
of the Peircean icon. It is only an example of icon, which is a more comprehensive 
concept, because it covers less phenomena than the Icon type since for its 
functionality it requires termini that are strictly physical and non-mental, and termini 
which are strictly mental. Each of the termini of the Peircean sign, as presented, can 
be anything; it is their triadic cooperation that gives the relation its character as sign. 
Husserl’s picture has, like any sign (and thus like the icon), three components: 
picture (physical), pictural object, and sujet. The picture (the first element of 
picture) is the physical and mind-independent aspect of a picture: the canvas with its 
traces of paint, the ink on a piece of paper, etc. The pictural object is the 
representing object, the analogical ground for the depicted subject in its real 
instantiation. The sujet is the fictional depicted (represented) object. Between 
picture, pictural object, and sujet, in Peircean terms, an iconic semiosis takes place to 
constitute the picture act. According to Husserl, picture acts are possible because of 
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the similarities between the three parts – this is the diagrammatic (mereological) 
character of the picture act, its iconic syntax. It is important to note that while some 
of the elements of the picture act belong strictly to the mental realm and some 
strictly to the non-mental, because of this very bringing together of mental and non-
mental in one act, the picture act as a whole is suprasubjective. 
Husserl also introduces the concept of contradiction which, together with that 
of similarity, is necessary for the picture act. There is similarity but also 
contradiction within a picture act so that the three elements, while similar, do not 
coincide. Through the concept of contradiction Husserl explained that the coherency 
of a picture act demands similarity only, and not identity. Each of the three elements 
of the picture act is always distinguishable from the other two. There is 
contradiction, for example, between some yellow and blue traces of paint (pictural 
object) and a flower (sujet) because a flower is not some traces of blue and yellow 
paint. This contradiction is necessary so that traces of yellow and blue paint can 
actually signify a flower. This is equivalent with Peirce’s stress on the irreducible 
threefold structure of the sign: if two of the termini of the relation would coincide the 
relation would be a dyad, not a triad, and, therefore, not a sign.  
This mereological analysis applied to picture acts – obvious cases of iconic 
signs – demonstrates the coherency between Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology and Peirce’s schematic semiotics (see also Chapter 14 in Stjernfelt 
2007). However, the Peircean Icon, by covering any phenomena of signification by 
similarity, can be applied to situations to which Husserl’s picture act is not meant to 
be applied. Such would be human intersubjective relations, particularly, the focus of 
this thesis, the teacher-student relation. As such, Peirce’s Icon can also offer an 
insight on the grammar of human relations inferred from the grammar of 
diagrammatic reasoning generally. 
As such, the phenomena specific to educational contexts can be analysed 
diagrammatically. The classroom, a regional ontology, is understood as Lebenswelt. 
It is not merely the sum of its composing parts (each student, student social groups, 
teachers etc.), but it can be analysed mereologically, in terms of part-whole relations 
and relations among parts. Here the concepts of icon and hypoicon prove to be 
highly relevant. The classroom needs its own iconic syntax, which results from its 
diagrammatic structure. Every student comes from different Lebenswelten and they 
need to develop a common grammar, so as to develop semiosically a Lebenswelt. 
Iconic signification is the symptom of personal compatibilities. An inner relation of 
the regional ontology (Lebenswelt) enhances the educational potential, the real 
possibilities of free discovery, if and only if it is agapic. As agapic it is characterized 
by (proper, fluent) argumentation. Even if such a signification is argumentation, a 
personality is available to another as pure Icon. That the teacher is available to a 
student means that the teacher has nothing to hide towards the student and, as such, 
the teacher as personality is operational for the student. The agapic fulfilment among 
composing parts (diagrams) assures the iconic syntax of the whole Lebenswelt. As 
agapic, the Lebenswelt is in ecosemiotic harmony, each composing part (student, 
group of students) being expressed as personality. When a diagram that represents 
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the learning phenomena of the classroom is possible then that classroom is a 
coherent Lebenswelt with no obstacles towards intersubjectivity (personal 
suprasubjectivity).
35
 Learning, in this case, is, in Peirce’s terms, a real possibility. 
Only as such the possibility of growth is evoked, since personality is a specific 
character of the human Lebenswelt which implies the understanding of a self as 
dynamic and infinitely projected in the future (Chapter 5, CP 6.157). Understanding 
another self as personality, as local plurality in her own right, leaves room for 
evolution in the future, the relation between self and non-self not being saturated in 
the present (satisfied) by necessity, as a phenomenon of Secondness, but fulfilled 
agapically in the infinitely distant future, as argument. This is the very integration of 
non-self into self. This integration of selves assures the diagrammatic character of 
the Lebenswelt in which the life forms (local pluralities) share a common life.  
Such a semiotic analysis of classroom phenomena can easily identify 
educational problems. They are manifested as a diagrammatic unfitting, and, as such 
are understood as a denial of engaging into relation with other selves (other students, 
teachers) and the impossibility of constituting a Lebenswelt together. Such situations 
are denial of life itself, as life has the purpose of agapic fulfilment.   
 The issue of the intelligibility and sensibility of reality brings forth a third 
reason for the collaboration of the Peircean and Husserlian traditions. It consists in 
the recognition of Lebenswelt as a result of the analysis of the constituting parts of 
Umwelt. This is an inheritance from the scholastic idea that the physical environment 
is of itself sensible but not intelligible. Deely clearly linked the account of 
suprasubjective reality with the idea of diagrammatic coherency (though he did not 
express this in terms of diagrams or grammar):  
“Hence the objective world, seen in relation to itself, already consists of a 
mixture of mind-independent and mind-dependent relations. But these relations 
are undistinguished as such. They are not explicitly recognized as mind-
dependent, but simply function in accordance with their objective mutual 
equivalence as relations within the apprehension constitutive of Lebenswelt.” 
(2000a, p. 54) 
 The suprasubjective and the mental and non-mental undistinguishing 
within Lebenswelt becomes all the more clear in Heidegger. 
 
B. Martin Heidegger and Charles Peirce: retaking of medieval philosophy of education 
 
Heidegger’s work can be used in further research along the principles set by the 
Peircean Theory of Learning for the above mentioned reason. It directly envisages 
diagrammatology. Deely observed that the Heideggerian present-at-hand explains 
the (Peircean) category of Firstness:  
                                                          
35
 It is needless to specify that the self-conscious signs (pupils) partaking in a Lebenswelt (classroom) 
are vividly expressing their personality. It is not merely their freedom to express personal tastes or 
personal preferences. This is a matter of semiotic ontology, namely that agapic semiosis manifests 
selves as personalities by placing them in dialogue. Personality is revealed in relation to personality.  
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“Thus the first action of the understanding is to apprehend its objects in such 
a way that they can eventually be understood critically, and this is to apprehend 
the objective world under that mind-dependent relation which allows its contents 
to appear, truly or falsely, as present-at-hand and not merely ready-to-hand (as 
they appear to the animals which are not human). 
Whence, to Heidegger’s question, “Why does Being get ‘conceived’ 
‘proximally’ in terms of the present-at-hand and not in terms of the ready-to-
hand, which indeed lies closer to us?”, the answer lies in the difference between 
zoösemiosis as common to animals and anthropo semiosis as unique to linguistic 
animals. Ens ut primum cognitum, “Firstness”, which constitutes the species-
specifically human mode of apprehension underlying the exaptation of language 
for communicative purposes and at the root of the transformation of Umwelt into 
Lebenswelt, does no more than establish the foundation for the eventual arising 
thematically of questions of the form, “What is that?” Ready-to-handness neither 
requires nor admits of any such thematic development, for it contains no 
apprehension of otherness in the required sense.” (Deely, 2000a, p. 54-55) 
Signification of Firstness is mostly iconic (Icons signify their Object by means 
of similarity – the element of Firstness). Therefore, intelligibility of reality – that 
which makes learning possible – is accounted by both Peirce and Heidegger in the 
same manner.  Deely suggests that the common root of this similarity between 
Peirce and Heidegger stems from the scholastic medieval idea of primum 
cognitum. Certainly, Peirce and Heidegger’s thorough scholarship in medieval 
philosophy and appreciation of Duns Scotus is a common ground for both of their 
detachment from modern philosophy. Peirce’s Icon accounts for the same 
phenomenon as Heidegger’s present-at-hand. The Icon contains a direct (present) 
apprehension of otherness, as iconicity describes the way in which a 
Representamen stands for a Second, its Object. The second of the sign is a matter 
of otherness. This does not contradict the Icon’s belonging to Firstness, because 
the way in which it signifies otherness – the Second – is a matter of Firstness, 
namely similarity. Similarity is sharing of qualities and, quality is a resource that 
the sign itself (the sign’s Representamen) possesses. Thus, the Icon is present-at-
hand – the self’s (First) similarity to another (Second). The mediation itself, 
which happens via similarity, is the Third of the Sign, the Interpretant. 
From the perspective of iconic turn semiotics this approach is problematic in 
one aspect, though. Deely’s strong distinction between zoösemiosis and 
anthroposemiosis, following on the lines of Heidegger’s anthropocentric 
existentialism, is not coherent with the biosemiotic project underpinned by the 
continuity of semiosis among the various self consciousnesses. Biosemiotics 
acknowledges that the semiosis of which a human being is responsible is species 
specific because the semiosis of which a dog or an amoeba are responsible are 
species specific in their turn. This difference among the species is justified in 
biosemiotics by the obvious remark that an obviously different signifying body 
shapes a particular Umwelt. Thus, if the Umwelten of two dogs can never be 
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identical, surely their Umwelten are more similar than the Umwelt of a dog and 
that of a human being. This is because the semiotic bodies of two individuals of 
the same species are more similar than the semiotic bodies of two individuals of 
different species. The problem has no easy reconcilliation and Heidegger’s 
antropocentrism has often been the target of critique. 
In what concerns pedagogy, Heidegger’s stand is very close to that of Peirce. 
Following each of these two authors’ thought, learning (observation generally) 
can only be understood as it happens, as the present activity of a self, as semiosis, 
a phenomenon belonging intimately to a certain My-Now instance of reality. 
Philosophy, at least in its coenoscopic stage, already belongs to any human being 
prior to her initiation in any systematic education. In both Peirce and Heidegger 
there can be noticed an emphasis on the idea that any educational system needs to 
develop its teaching practices in awareness of this. It stems explicitly in Being 
and Time that the usual everyday experience by which acquisition of things 
proceeds (the semiosic expansion of the self) shapes Dasein:  
“This way in which things have been interpreted in idle talk has already 
established itself in Dasein. There are many things with which we first become 
acquainted in this way, and there is not a little which never gets beyond such an 
average understanding. This everyday way in which things have been interpreted 
is one into which Dasein has grown in the first instance, with never a possibility 
of extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, 
interpreting and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew, are 
performed. In no case is a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in which 
things have been interpreted, set before the open country of a ‘world-in-itself, so 
that it just beholds what it encounters.” (Heidegger, Being and time, p. 213, SZ 
169) 
The coherent iconic syntax (diagrammatic character) between one self’s 
coenoscopic understanding and certain idioscopic aims is this self’s disposition to 
learning a certain subject (for a semiotic approach to the concept of disposition in 
education see also Pikkarainen 2013 and 2014). On this semiotic account, 
disposition, as the coherent iconic syntax between Icon and Index in the case of a 
learner, can be identified with the Heideggerian openness, “which belongs to 
every being according to its subject matter and according to its own ways of 
Being, prescribes the specifically determinate, possible and appropriate ways of 
access to the beings that are to be apprehended.” (Heidegger G29/30 135 in 
Ehrmantraut, p. 155) 
Ehrmantraut (2010) considers that from Heidegger’s understanding of the 
relation between philosophy and Dasein a pedagogical philosophy stems. As in 
the case of the Peircean Theory of Learning, Heidegger found that the rationale of 
teaching is the care for the other. According to Ehrmantraut, in Being and Time it 
occurs that the teacher’s leadership is, actually, a ‘following’ (p. 44). In the same 
manner, the agapic evolution of the teacher-student relation brings the teacher to 
the position of seeing the student as neighbour (this is the term used by Peirce, CP 
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6.288), one to whom she is close, to whom the self has the impulse of fulfilling 
her highest desires (Chapter 8). 
Heidegger’s philosophical pedagogy is determined by the assumption that 
philosophy belongs to Dasein and that Dasein is immersed in philosophy. In the 
same way, according to Peirce the self is immersed in philosophical induction 
(coenoscopy). Philosophy is experienced reality. In Chapter 4 it was presented 
that for Peirce philosophy takes place, coenoscopically at first, in every man’s 
waking hour of life (CP 1.241) and, thus, this is from where education takes a 
student further into an observational discipline. Also, philosophy, science, and 
any potential object of liberal education pertains particularly to, in Peirce’s terms, 
“flesh and blood” (CP 1. 337, CP5.424, see Chapter 7) or, in Heidegger’s terms, 
to “our choosing, willing, doing, and letting.” (G275-6, in p. 31 in Ehrmantraut, p. 
31) Philosophy, or knowledge in the broadest sense, is not an abstraction but, life 
concretely. For both Peirce and Heidegger it is essential that there can be no 
philosophy without the philosopher (see Chapter 4). It characterizes a human’s 
Lebenswelt, not only generally but “our Dasein now and here, in this moment 
[Augenblick] and in the perspectives which this moment has, in which we prepare 
ourselves to act from out of philosophy.” (G275-6 in Ehrmantraut, p. 31) 
Philosophy characterizes Dasein. It appears that Heidegger’s understanding of 
philosophy mostly coincides with Deely’s semiotic concept of Lebenswelt: it is a 
human being’s existential environment. As explained throughout the present 
thesis, the phenomenon of learning always happens as the activity of a self-aware 
web of signs (a local plurality). On both accounts, Peirce and Heidegger, learning 
is experiential and the position to teaching practices is the result of the general 
understanding of philosophy. Ehrmantraut (2010) noticed that for Heidegger the 
introduction of students to a new subject should consist in “awakening latent 
possibilities within the student, not of conveying new information.” (p. 41) This 
can be seen as a statement for liberal education in the sense intended in the 
present thesis, as promoting knowledge for the purpose of knowing (growth of 
signification).  
The Peircean Theory of Learning developed in the present thesis states the 
same: education envisages the evolution of the student’s Lebenswelt in relation to 
taught subjects. The Peircean Theory of Learning affirms that the student and the 
teacher have to constitute an agapically evolving system of signification. Thus, 
the student’s horizon of real possibilities (openness) expands towards that of the 
teacher. This growth of Lebenswelt aims at enhancing the student’s possibilities 
of discovery within a curricular topic rather than the mere providing of new 
information on the topic. 
Following both Peirce and Heidegger, education aims at cultivating something 
more specific (idioscopic science, in Peirce’s terms) than every day observation 
(coenoscopic science, philosophical everyday induction). The student can be 
aware only of idioscopic possibilities which are in iconic coherency with her 
coenoscopy – with her everyday awareness. That is why the first purpose of the 
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teacher is to expose her own Lebenswelt to the student: so that the student can 
observe new possibilities. This line of thought is shared by Peirce and Heidegger. 
It is safe to assume that it is an inheritance from the medieval liberal education 
Lebenswelt. 
Peirce’s semiotics and Heidegger’s existential phenomenology can be joined in 
the argument for the importance of a liberal curriculum. Heidegger did use the 
term re-discovery to describe genuine understanding. The present Peircean 
Theory of Learning, as well, assumes that any genuine apprehension is a 
discovery of meaning, under the form of a re-cognition of Lebenswelt. Such is 
generally the aim of liberal education, seeking new hermeneutical potentialities 
from the students, not a mere melioration of certain practices required by society. 
However, one must keep in mind that in some regards (e.g. anthropocentrism) 
these two approaches are irreconcilable. 
 
C. Emmanuel Lévinas and Charles Peirce: Otherness 
 
In this section I develop a brief analysis of the relation between self and non-
self by using a joint approach, bringing together Levinas’ phenomenology of the 
face and Peirce’s schematic semiotics. This analysis emphasizes the relevance and 
fertility of Peirce’s concept of Icon for intersubjective relations.  
In previous chapters I explained that Levinas’ phenomenology should be an 
interesting concern for a Peircean scholar generally and, all the more, particularly 
for the endeavour of developing a Peircean educational philosophy (Chapter 1, 
section B and Chapter 3, section C.ii). It is interesting generally for Peircean 
semiotics because of the general reasons for which phenomenology is of interest, 
but, also, because in different terminology and coming from different paradigms, 
the cornerstone of Levinas’ and Peirce’s philosophies appeals to be the same: the 
ontological structure of the world is determined by the relation between self and 
non-self. It is curious that so far, apart from Stevens (2009) where Levinas’ ethics 
and Peirce’s semiotics are integrated in an ethical-aesthetics, there is no literature 
offering a thorough comparison of these two, while the other 20
th
 century major 
phenomenologists have been analysed in regard to Peircean semiotics: Husserl’s 
logic by Stjernfelt (2007), Heidegger’s existentialism by Deely (2001a), and 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body in the context of biosemiotics, by 
Stjernfelt (2007 and in Nöth 2006) and by Elke Müller (in Nöth 2006). The 
project of comparing Peirce’s agapism with Levinas’ phenomenology of the face 
should be pursued, particularly within philosophy of education. 
Below I briefly translate a Levinasian approach to intersubjective relations in 
Peircean semiotic terms. The aim here is to argue a certain compatibility between 
Peirce and Levinas and, on this basis, emphasize the relevance and insights that 
Peirce’s semiotics brings. If the analysis presents some conceptual dilemmas it is 
because the purpose is not to find equivalent concepts between Peirce and 
Levinas. The concepts are not equivalent, but the analysis proceeds rather in the 
spirit of critical common sense.  
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What for Levinas is phenomenology of the face can be regarded as a 
manifestation of Peirce’s agapistic principle of evolution. As Heidegger, 
throughout his philosophical work Levinas focused on human relations. However, 
his phenomenology of the face is not the result of an anthropocentric 
philosophical perspective. His focus on human relations is simply the 
consequence of an interest, as it is in human intersubjectivity that we, as human 
beings, can notice the ultimate expression of love. This comes down to a denial of 
the typically modern or classical theories of knowledge, whereas proper 
knowledge has to be free of the self’s intervention in knowledge: 
“Truth is in effect not separable from intelligibility; to know is not simply to 
record, but always to comprehend.” (Levinas, 1961, p. 82) 
As Stjernfelt argued about Merleau-Ponty that he noticed the prefiguration of 
intersubjectivity in the life of non-human animals, so it can be argued about 
Levinas that he anticipated the importance for ontology that the account of 
suprasubjectivity in the phenomenological school will have (e.g. it gave iconic 
turn semiotics the awareness of a phenomenological semiotics). He considered 
that Husserl’s intention theory is a new gateway for ontology: 
“This possibility of conceiving contingency and facticity not as facts 
presented to intellection but as the act of intellection – this possibility of 
demonstrating the transitivity of understanding and a “signifying intention” 
within brute facts and data (a possibility discovered by Husserl, but attached by 
Heidegger to the intellection of being in general) constitutes the great novelty of 
contemporary ontology.” (Levinas, 1998, p. 2) 
In other words, Truth stands in the Interpretant; it is a matter of evolution, 
which reveals it, and of adaptation, as life forms adapt to the truth, and, as such it 
is a matter of interpretation. By adapting to the truth, being presents a certain 
intellection. The Interpretant to which evolution tends is an Argument and it is 
always infinitely distant (see Chapter 1). 
If for Peirce life first came about due to semiosis (Chapter 1, CP CP 6.322), 
Levinas uses the above concept of intellect to explain life, which is tied up to 
Husserl’s concept of signitive acts (intention theory) and, thus, an account of 
suprasubjective ontology. Like semiosis, intellect is continuous and circular. This 
perspective, not surprisingly, leads to the dismissal of concepts such as 
misunderstanding or misinterpretation: 
“We exist in a circuit of intelligence with the real; intelligence is the very 
event articulated by existence. All misunderstanding is simply a deficient mode of 
understanding.” (Entre nous, p. 4) 
By mentioning a circuit of intelligence with the real Levinas should gain the 
attention of biosemiotics research. For this reason, for a Peircean approach to 
education, which is committed to the iconic turn take on Peirce, Levinas is mostly 
interesting. Levinas developed a phenomenology essentially centred on the other 
and the I/Thou relation and his work has been explored already and extended 
within philosophy of education.  
181 
 
Another reason that should stir the interest of Peirceans towards Levinas is 
that, while western philosophers, they both had a thorough knowledge and 
appreciation of Scripture. Of course, it is the case of Christian literature for Peirce 
and Judaic literature for Levinas. However, some similarities stem from this, 
particularly concerning the ‘Golden Rule,’ the cornerstone of Peirce’s evolution 
theory. To develop a proper Peircean-Levinasian educational research framework 
it would be another project in itself, which is not the attempt here. A framework 
bringing Peirce’s semiotics and Levinas’ phenomenology together already started 
being developed by Stevens (2009) who explained that Peirce’s semiotics and 
Levinas’ phenomenology of the face can be integrated in an ethical aesthetics. On 
the basis of the same observation I only highlight the directions on which a 
Peircean educational philosophy can also benefit from the phenomenology of the 
face. 
The I/Thou relation, the matter of relating to the Other, and Face are 
metaphysical matters in Levinas’ work, having cosmological dimensions. Only in 
the face-to-face encounter can there be an ethical fulfillment of a teleological 
cosmology. In the same time, his metaphysics is focused on the simplicity of life, 
which is an event of existence, prior to any concepts. For instance, face is the 
authentic face available only in the genuine face-to-face unrepeatable situation; it 
would be wrong even to analyse it as a phenomenon. The phenomenology of the 
face is a more comprehensive philosophical account than anthropocentric 
existentialist approaches to self, otherness, and such relations. It stems from a 
cosmological endeavour, not being a tool or concept meant to explain social 
relations, human communication, or, generally, mere anthropological phenomena. 
Standish (in Egéa-Kuehne 2008, p. 56) found several potential dangers that might 
stem from applying Levinas’ metaphysics to approach social and psychological 
concerns, without having a firm consideration of the real nature and interest of his 
metaphysics, such as multiculturalism, the assimilation of Other in “a politics of 
recognition,” “a psychology of dialogical relations,” and generally in 
communication. Peirce’s semiotics presents similar dangers when applied to areas 
such as culture, social dynamics, or communication. 
Levinas’ phenomenology reaches beyond the limitations of the continental 
tradition because of his joining together of western philosophy and a thorough 
scholarship in Scripture and Talmud. Thus, in Levinas, 20
th
 century western 
metaphysics is fertilized by Judaic literature. If in some aspects western 
metaphysics, the entire vast tradition, might have its doorways towards 
skepticism, towards eparhe, in these slippery places Levinasian philosophy is 
invigorated by the eschatological optimism typical of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition. As a result, it leads to the same general conclusion for philosophy at 
which Peirce arrived in his metaphysical quest through the reading of Scripture: 
agapism, that love (αγαπη) for the Other (for the neighbour) is the sole rationale 
of wisdom (σοφια) and the principle of all reality. Peirce’s pragmaticism, his trust 
in critical common-sense and his evolution theory, the belief that evolution is 
ultimately driven and fulfilled agapically, is arguably a similar way out of 
182 
 
skepticism.  That it is in the nature of a semiotic Universe not to be subject only 
to chance and necessity brings hope for freedom to the western mind, a way out 
of modern skepticism. That chance and necessity are transcended by and into love 
is the sort of hypothesis that the skeptical philosopher would be most inclined to 
be skeptical about. 
Peirce’s lifetime investigation of signification led him to the conclusion that 
the principle of agapic evolution is active in the entire Universe of signs, the 
Argument being characterized and fulfilled by overwhelming, self-denying love 
for the neighbour that transcends chance and necessity (Chapter 7) and that, 
therefore, the purpose of life is love for another consciousness. This is explained 
as the integration of non-ego into self through semiosis, the phenomenon by 
which life came about. Levinas’ argues for the same self-denial (love) for the 
Other, focusing mostly on this relation. On both accounts, the rationale of 
existence is love. Peirce noticed it in signification generally, Levinas noticed it 
particularly in human relations, on which he focused, but in both cases the stake is 
a metaphysical principle of existence. 
Levinas’ account of face leads to a phenomenology of face which is an ethical 
account of the physiology of arguments. Therefore, face is accessible as Icon. Face 
gives access to the genuine Other, situated in front of the self: 
“It is primarily a matter of our finding a vantage point from which man ceases 
to concern us in terms of the horizon of being, i.e., ceases to offer himself to our 
powers. The being as such (and not as an incarnation of universal being) can only 
be in a relation in which he is invoked. That being is man, and it is as a neighbour 
that man is accessible: as a face.” (Entre nous, p. 9) 
Like a pure Icon, face is prior to any conceptualization of it: 
“The face is the very identity of being; it manifests itself in it in terms of 
itself, without a concept. The sensible presence of this chaste bit of skin with 
brow, nose, eyes, and mouth, is neither a sign allowing us to approach a signified, 
nor a mask hiding it.” (Entre nous, p. 33) 
By sign Levinas here does not mean Peirce’s sign-relation, relational being, but 
rather the sign (signifier) implying a signified, the concept stemming from the 
Saussurean tradition. The features of the face – chaste bit of skin with brow, nose, 
eyes, and mouth – can be understood as Peircean Qualities that form the Icon that 
Face is. These Qualities are in relation, which means that they have an inner iconic 
syntax. Face has its own grammar, that is. This grammar makes it re-cognizable. 
This is not an analytic approach to Face or to the Other, it is not an attempt at 
conceptualizing the non-conceptual personality of otherness. The fact that iconic 
relations give an insight towards the Other is a cosmological matter. As semiosis 
fulfilled agapically is the rationale of the emergence of life, it “upset the meaning 
and plot and philosophical rank of ontology.” (Entre nous, p. XII-XIII) It is “a 
uniqueness indiscernible by logic, in responsibility for the other person, an 
undeniable election, bearing love in which the other, the loved one, is to the I unique 
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in the world.” (Outside the Subject, p. 3) While acknowledging the difference 
between what Peirce generally means by logic – the cooperation of triadic relations – 
and what Levinas means by it here – a method of argumentation, linked to ontology 
as it might be – it is interesting that this statement stands in both cases. Firstness is 
not governed by the laws of logic. The Other as Icon is indiscernible by logic, 
because the pure Icon in itself does not reach the order of logic because it is not a 
Predicate (Rheme) yet. When the Icon becomes Predicate the I remembers itself 
because it is conceived as subject (Secondness) of the Other. 
To arrive at the Other as Icon, at the Other as First in her own right, presents the 
same difficulty as grasping Firstness generally: any thought (concept) about it is 
false to it. In the previous chapters the fulfilment of agapism was presented as 
Thirdness, as an Interpretant which is an Argument. This is so, but the chance to 
evolve together agapically springs from the giving up of the sense of I as First in 
favour of the other. Within the semiosis between I and Other, the Other is the 
Representamen predicating, I is Object, to translate Levinas in Peircean terms. This 
is to say, as Levinas, that “Conscience welcomes the Other.” (Totality and Infinity, 
p. 84) 
It does not suppose a complete oblivion of self, of the I, but simply following 
Peirce’s ‘Golden Rule,’ by giving to the Other (to the neighbor) the semiosic 
primacy. Levinas did not argue for the oblivion of the self, but the willingness to 
sacrifice for the other: 
“To welcome the Other is to put in question my freedom.” (Totality and Infinity, 
p. 85) 
The denial of the self for the Other needs to be “even to the point of sacrifice, 
even to the possibility of dying for him or her” (Entre nous, p. xii). To 
acknowledge the Other as First and the self as Second, as Object of the Other as 
Representamen, can only occur fugitively, of course, in the imaginary moment 
(Chapter 5, part C), when one can operate on another as on an Icon. By being 
predicate for the other and, in turn predicating with the other, semiosis can evolve 
by the principle of agaspism, towards I-Thou as argument. When I-Thou is 
argument and there are no dichotomies in the teacher/student relation, symmetry 
and asymmetry are no longer issues. In accordance with Levinas, from the 
perspective of the self, I died in the face of the Other, for the Other, choosing not 
to kill the Other, not to replace her with apperceptive otherness. Therefore from 
each of the selves’ perspective the relation is asymmetrical, Thou prevails (on the 
asymmetry of I/Thou as teacher-student in Levinas see Joldersma 2002). Thou is 
First. However, this asymmetry does not last as I/Thou evolves as one sign into 
Argument. There is no more teacher and student, there is one sign, us, and as a 
diagrammatically coherent whole this sign evolves.  
I consider that this analysis, managing to approach in terms of signification 
phenomena the I/Thou intimacy, confirms the fertility of Peirce’s semiotics, 
pointing out what should become an object of research for Peircean scholars 





















































In this chapter the Peircean Theory of Learning developed in the present 
thesis is contrasted with different approaches to education. I critically compare the 
theory with three mainstream approaches by answering to the divergences that occur. 
These three approaches are (1) (mainstream) pragmatism (Dewey and James’ strand 
of pragmatism, in its contemporary form exemplified by Koopman), (2) humanism, 
and (3) instructionalism. I consider that by answering to the immediate objections 
that would stem from these schools the epistemological position of the theory is 




From the mainstream understanding of pragmatism as theory of knowledge there 
might stem one immediate critique. In the perspective of a of strand pragmatism 
developed on the lines of James’ extreme (radical) empiricism, the Peircean Theory 
of Learning might seem to be founded on a theoretical inquiry, not paying attention 
to experience and thus betraying its pragmatic stand. The logical exploration of sign 
cooperation, of an almost analytic fashion, might be suspected of ignoring real life 
experience. I explain that, because the very nature of Peirce’s sign concept places 
any analysis within phenomenology, this is not the case.  
Strand (2014) argued that it is pointless to describe Peirce’s philosophy as a 
philosophy of experience, but rather “we are dealing with a philosophy in 
experience.” (p. 436) I argued that according to Peirce all knowledge is experience. 
As such, all sciences are observational and idioscopy is not possible without 
coenoscopy (Chapter 4). This could not be stated more clearly than in Peirce’s 
words: “and there is no knowledge antecedently acquired in the light of which 
experience is to be interpreted. The interpretation itself is experience.” (CP 7.527) 
The identification of interpretation and experience is the key to Peirce’s non-
dualistic philosophy. By this firm consideration mind and body (organism) become 
synonymous. Perhaps there might be a difference of emphasis between these words 
(mind emphasizing the characteristics of Innenwelt and body those of Umwelt), but 
they both refer to an organism’s life. Experience is not reduced to an account of 
mental activity that ignores sensitivity or the organism’s other functions. Experience 
is not reduced to mere computation because it is understood as life. All mentality is 
manifested in and continuous with life itself: “experience is the entire cognitive 
result of living, and illusion is, for its purposes, just as much experience as is real 
perception.” (CP 7.527) From here Peirce developed the three phenomenological 
categories (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness), which aim precisely at accounting for 
a notion of experience which essentially includes thoughts, dreams, sense 
perceptions, and so on. Concisely, experience is “the total cognitive result of living, 
and includes interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of sense.” (CP 7.538) 
Therefore, we can analyse the cooperation of meaning phenomena. This analysis is 
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diagrammatic, since Peirce’s threefold list of phenomenological categories accounts 
for the Universe as semiotic, a physiology of arguments, with a grammar that has its 
coherency assured by iconic syntax.  
The conclusion is that pragmaticism brings a more comprehensive account of 
experience which allows the analysis of life itself, otherwise ungraspable in its 
wholeness by pragmatism as extreme empiricism (James) or as meliorism 
(Koopman). Pragmatism, unlike pragmaticism, did not focus on developing a 
suprasubjective ontology, whereas relation is being. Suprasujective ontology allows 
the mereological analysis of life. After all, Peirce criticized James’ conception of 
experience which, even though not identical with sense-perception, is bounded to 
sensations and their patterns (Strand 2014, p. 436). This reduces the richness and 
wholeness of life: 
“For me experience is what life has forced upon us, – a vague idea no doubt. 
But my phaneron
36
 is not limited to what is forced upon us; it also embraces all 
that we most capriciously conjure up, not objects only but all modes of contents 
of cognitional consciousness.” (NEM 3.834) 
In the present thesis the conjuring up of modes of contents of cognitional 
consciousness was termed re-cognition. It constitutes a semiotic take on what in our 
entire experience is considered, in the most general sense, learning. Of course, there 
is nothing in experience that is not learning, but experience is not identical with 
learning. The learning that occurs (only) by experience is our re-cognition of the 
Umwelt or Lebenswelt. 
Having this semiotic notion of experience in mind, it appears that the Peircean 
Theory of Learning does not focus on either theory or practice. The argument stems 
clearly from that semiosis is experience. Also, as a consequence of this, pedagogy is 
accounted for as a practical science (Chapter 4). The Peircean Theory of Learning 
actually argues that teaching can only be meliorated through practice. This explains 
also the refrain from giving practical advices, apart from the main argument, namely 
that love evokes learning. This is a non-dualist approach, theory and practice being 
two inseparable aspects of semiosis, not a dichotomy. This study might be subject to 
skepticism coming from pragmatism, since it is not sustained by any empirical data. 
However, this is so precisely because of its pragmatic nature. In its own terms, it is 
mostly an abductive study and at this level it would be unscientific and not 
pragmatic to search for laboratory empirical evidence. At this stage, laboratory 
examination would only deviate the study away from real life experience. Of course, 
since it claims to bring a theoretical insight the study itself is an idioscopy; it is a 
close look, with the aid of specific philosophical tools, at learning phenomena. 
Nevertheless, as an idioscopy it is in its abductive stage: it only advances the 
hypotheses that prepare the ground for a philosophical paradigm, namely the 
                                                          
36
Phaneron (φανερός) is another term which, semantically correct, Peirce used for phenomenon 
(φαινόμενoν). Peirce’s use of phaneron coined the term in philosophy (see CP 1.284). 
187 
 
Peircean branch of semiotics applied to education, in the context of the emerging 




One might remark that the learning theory developed in this thesis, as in Peirce’s 
philosophy generally as well, uses a language that appears technical, detached from 
genuine human life. This technical language might seem to betray the assumption 
that the theory is a doctrine of critical common sense (pragmaticism). Therefore, 
from the perspective of humanism there appear to rise two immediate issues that 
require clarification: (1) that the Peircean Theory of Learning is logocentric – a logic 
based philosophy which forces the richness and subtleties of human life, phenomena 
such us love and compassion, to fit in the rather narrow conceptual patterns of a 
system of argumentation – and (2) that the technical language of biosemiotics refuses 
to see the differences between learning in the human and in the non-human world, 







 century semiotics and semiology came as a way out of the 
logocentrism of analytic philosophy and, generally, of late modern western 
metaphysics (see Derrida, 1967). At a first glance Peirce’s semiotics, its tools 
employed in developing the present thesis, appears logocentric: it is a system of 
logic, having as cornerstone the Argument, which is the fully developed and only 
genuine type of signification. This would generate a conflict: previously there have 
been presented some similarities between Peirce’s suprasubjective ontology, his 
theory of evolution and Deleuze and Guatari’s rhizomatic structure (1980). This 
rules out the possibility of it being arborescent (logocentric). Even its discourse on 
love (agapism) is developed by the means of this system of logic: love is Argument. 
This might raise the suspicion that it does not take a full account of rather complex 
phenomena, such as love, and that it is not a holistic account of life, human or 
otherwise. 
The aim of this section is to explain that Peirce’s semiotics is not logocentric. It 
does not intend to comment on other anti-logocentric philosophies, such as the cases 
of Derrida or Deleuze. Derrida’s account of logocentrism is mentioned below only 
for demonstrating that Peircean semiotics does not fit in such a description. This is 
an important aspect of Peirce’s semiotics, particularly in regards to a learning theory, 
as it would not require the development of logocentric skills of argumentation from 
the students.  
To begin, Peirce’s semiotics is rather icono-centric, not logocentric. I explained 
that the Peircean sign is not bound to any perceptive modality (Chapter 1). Also, the 
Peircean sign does not even suppose a mode of existence of its Object: 
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“By an object, I mean anything that we can think, i.e. anything we can 
talk about.” (MS [R] 966) 
The Object is a possibility of the Sign: it is the thing, synonymous with anything 
and no-thing (Chapter 6). The Sign is the triadic relation within which two of the 
termini (Representamen and Interpretant) are signs in their turn and the other one 
(the Object) can be anything; it does not even need to be a sign, it suffices to be a 
sign potentially. There is no stress on words and linguistically articulated 
argumentation in Peirce’s semiotics. It is not an argumentation theory sensu stricto, 
as to be mistaken for a logocentric doctrine, but, as explained in Chapter 1, it 
accounts for a physiology of arguments. As such, the present Peircean Theory of 
Learning is not a logocentric educational philosophy, but an evolutionary approach 
to learning through signs. In the perspective of semiotics, such an evolutionary 
approach recommends itself as an educational philosophy altogether, as it explains 
learning as a stage, result, and aim of evolution, which enhances semiosis.  
Nevertheless, there is an essential difference between Peircean semiotics and 
Derrida’s account of anti-logocentrism. Derrida regarded the metaphysics of 
presence as implied by and connected with logocentrism: 
“The system of language associated with phonetic-alphabetic writing is that with 
in which logocentric metaphysics, determining the sense of being as presence, has 
been produced.” (1967, p. 44) 
There is no doubt that for Peirce semiotics is not associated with phonetic 
alphabet writing. At the most, it can be suspected that Peirce, a western modern man, 
subconsciously inherited the structures of a phonetic alphabet. However, his 
philosophical thinking is detached from logocentrism. On a Peircean account, 
humans learned to use an alphabet, phonetic or otherwise, from the natural doctrine 
of signs. Signs, such as icons or propositions, constitute the Universe of living 
beings (see Stjernfelt 2011). Peirce’s semiotics is a conscious effort of detaching 
from western modern logocentrism. On the other hand, Peirce’s semiotics is a 
metaphysics of presence, not of absence. Even though accounting for a relational 
ontology, the represented is present in the relation: 
“The first character of a general idea so resulting is that it is living feeling. A 
continuum of this feeling, infinitesimal in duration, but still embracing 
innumerable parts, and also, though infinitesimal, entirely unlimited, is 
immediately present. And in its absence of boundedness a vague possibility of 
more than is present is directly felt.” (CP 6.138) 
This is justified by Peirce’s idea of continuity and because the entire existence, 
since things have being only as in relation, is continuous. Since the Universe is 
continuous, all of a piece, it is suprasubjective, not supporting dichotomies. This, 
for Peirce, is the main refutation of nominalism: 
“Second, in the presence of this continuity of feeling, nominalistic maxims 
appear futile. There is no doubt about one idea affecting another, when we can 
directly perceive the one gradually modified and shaping itself into the other. Nor 
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can there any longer be any difficulty about one idea resembling another, when 
we can pass along the continuous field of quality from one to the other and back 
again to the point which we had marked.” (CP 6.139) 
The similarities among qualities that assure the continuity and coherence of 
being are the grammar of the Universe, its iconic syntax, the inner diagrammatic 
character of the Universe. 
Also, it is typical for logocentric metaphysics (e.g. analytical philosophy) to 
manifest an appreciation for clarity and precision, at least as a rhetorical virtue. 
This is not the case with Peirce’s semiotics, where the vagueness of meaning is 
accounted for. In a semiotic mindset, to the extent that meaning is vague, 
existence itself can be vague. Signs and the termini composing them do not have 
clear boundaries. Vagueness is a necessary condition for the possibility of sign 
growth, according to Nöth and Santaella (2011). For this reason, on a Peircean 
account vagueness can be a rhetorical virtue:  
“Vagueness is not only a rhetorical vice but also a virtue. We can never hope 
to reach absolute precision, and even if we could, we would not want to; for were 
we able to express ourselves with absolute precision, nothing would be left to 
speak about.” (Nöth and Santaella, p. 247) 
To aim for a total precision of signification would be wrong because, within 
the physiology of arguments, signs are dynamically evolving. The exigency of 
absolute precision would imply to deny one of the main assumptions of Peirce’s 
pragmaticism, namely that Truth is always infinitely distant (see Chapters 1 and 
2). In the same way, an absolute skepticism that would qualify any attempt to any 
level of clarity as futile would contradict Peirce’s understanding of Truth. The 
evolution of signs occurs by pursuing the infinitely distant Truth. This pursuit 
proves to be fertile: wherever it happens it constitutes growth (be it in educational 
learning, personal relations, semiosis between organs of the body). 
This awareness should have immediate and profound consequences for 
education, contrary to an educational system developed on the basis of 
logocentric philosophy. The Peircean Theory of Learning not only does not 
require identity of knowledge between teacher and student, but, with this 
awareness, the teacher would not be necessarily seeking for clarity and precision 
in her student’s discourse. Rather, she would appreciate her student’s play of 
musement, the student’s creativity and her own play on the vagueness, clarity, 
and meaning subtleties of discovered predicates. 
The Peircean Theory of Learning is not logocentric. It is true that it approaches 
human activity via logic, but the very concepts of Peirce’s (semiotic) logic are 
adequate for an analysis of intimate personality and personal relations. Using 
Peirce’s concepts, the Peircean Theory of Learning places teaching situations in 
the broader context of the semiosis of the Universe, and, therefore, it does not 
separate human life from non-human life. Because of the nature of the Peircean 
concepts by which the theory is developed, the account is not logocentric. 
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Peirce’s sign concept, the sign types (Icon, Index, Symbol, Rheme, Proposition, 
Argument, etc.), and the ten classes of signs are not bound in any way to a 
linguistic logic. The evidence that this is not a logocentric account stands in that it 
is obviously a schematic account: iconic, diagrammatic, and metaphoric signs 
stand at the basis of this theory’s approach to learning. The theory explains that 
learning is not necessarily a matter of articulated human language. This is so 
because semiotics is a relational logic which has as main concept a 
suprasubjective entity, the sign, which, while it can explain language insightfully, 
is not subject to human language. 
 
ii. Human and non-human learning 
 
The principle of agapism is active in the entire Universe and semiosis occurs 
among all living beings, human or not. Modern education tended to be 
anthropocentric in an ideological manner. Biosemiotics brings a fresh 
reconceptualization by which life is accounted for as continuous. Differences among 
species do not suppose ontological interruptions in life. 
To point out precisely what is specifically human and what is not it is a difficult, 
if not false, endeavor in the first place. This is so because we do not know what non-
human is (Stables, 2012). Deely (2009) proposed to regard the human species as 
distinctively metasemiotic: we are aware of semiosis. This proposal is still 
controversial and debated. 
However, a peculiarity of human education can be noticed. It is explained as a 
result of synechistic evolution: the human species discovered that indexical 
signification builds up to agapism, and thus we index (point out) to further 
generations what was already learnt. The cognitive sciences drew upon the same 
idea. Tomasello (1999, 2008) found intentionality and joint attention, and the 
indexicality that stems from it, as the main cognitive capacity that distinguishes 
human communication and culture. Even though I argue that indexicality gives an 
insight towards human specifics of semiosis, I do not account it on cognitive, but on 
semiotic aspects. What particularly characterizes human life, the specific human 
Lebenswelt, does not stand in mere gestures of pointing and the cognitive capacity of 
joining attention. I argued that indexicality, and more complex signification that 
requires indexicality, such as propositions, are forms of semiosis that mandatorily 
occur in other species as well (Chapter 1, see also Stjernfelt 2011, 2014). To explain 
the particularity of human life by what is evoked by mere indexical gestures would 
reduce the complex meaning phenomena of the human life to cognitions of a certain 
kind. The human specific character of learning stands in regarding education as 
Synechism, which is not just mere indexicality, but the continuous manifestation and 
implications of necessity (Secondness) in a continuous abduction-deduction-
induction type evolution. In the case of humans, Synechism brought forth a 
peculiarly systematized method of enhancing learning by indexicality. This is 
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precisely the understanding of education that this thesis brings. This peculiarity in its 
wholeness, the subject of another investigation in its own right, is, in Peirce’s words 
“beyond our ken” (CP 5.119, see Chapter 6). In itself it is an example of vague 
signification. 
This indexicality (education) is only a means, as learning properly happens only 
at the agapic stage, where the Interpretamen appears as Argument. It is essentially 
impossible to tell whether this semiosis is the same in the case of other species. It is 
nevertheless possible to analyse the human specific Lebenswelt, not by negative 
comparison to other species’ Umwelt, but by taking into awareness the insight about 
it that we, as humans, have from within. In accordance with the hypothesis of 
iconicity, in the regards in which we are similar to other species, it is obvious (e.g. 
humans and most fish tend to have two eyes); in the regards where it is not yet 
obvious it is unknown, as it implies that the similarities have not yet been discovered 
(e.g. what family does the platypus belong to). The unraveling of unknown 
similarities does not necessarily consist in the positing of new conclusions, but, by 
abduction, it implies the reshaping of our (on some cases entire) scientific 
Lebenswelt. A new such re-cognition that sets the direction for the evolution of the 
scientific Lebenswelt has powerful consequences for the educational system (e.g. a 




The Peircean Theory of Learning directs the focus on the teacher-student 
personal relation instead of the content to be taught. The semiotic expression of a 
teacher-student harmonious personal relation is the key to a healthy growth of 
signification. This statement might seem controversial, especially for the 
instructionalist approach to education. The Peircean Theory of Learning 
developed in this thesis opposes the instructinalist paragdigm. 
An exponent of pedagogical instructionalism is the pedagogy of Vasilii 
Vasil’evich Davydov (2008), developed within a Marxist mindset, upon the 
psychological pedagogies of Vygotsky and Piaget. Davydov considers that the 
crucial question for education is whether certain capacities can be instructed to a 
person: 
“Can we, by means of instruction and upbringing, develop in a person certain 
psychical capacities or qualities that previously did not exist?” (p. 13) 
From a Peircean point of view the question is wrongly placed. The aim of 
education is not to develop psychical capacities or qualities in another person. 
The educational system should not be interested at all in developing some 
particular features in a person. Education is a cosmological matter, not strictly 
social, and certainly not individual. Because it is a cosmological matter it is 
personal, in contrast to individual (which is a matter of Secondness and thus 
cannot be agapic), as personality is an evolutionary agapic development (the 
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semiotic account of personality was introduced in Chapter 5, section C, and 
further explored in respect to agapism in Chapter 8). As a personal matter, the 
possibility of learning resides in the personal relation. 
Instructionalism is mostly a psychologistic approach, while this thesis brings a 
semiotic approach to education. Not only that the Peircean account denies the 
instruction of capacities as being the purpose of education, but according to 
instructionalism, these capacities are psychical.  
Besides this epistemological difference, there is a contradiction between 
Peirce’s teleology and that of Davidov. The latter considers that “Just like any 
natural process, goal-directed, conscious human activity is an objective process.” 
(Davydov 2008, p. 21) For Peirce objectivity is not a goal. Objectivity is the 
definition of Secondness. According to Peirce teleology is triadic. Signification is 
telos. The Interpretant, the mediation, is the goal. An objective teleology, like 
accounted by Davydov, is subject to the biosemiotic critique to mechanical 
philosophy (see von Uexküll 1926, Gough and Stables 2012, Kull in Bundgaard 
and Stjernfelt, Henning and Scarfe in Chapter 1). According to Davydov, labor is 
such a goal: 
“Practical, object-oriented productive activity – labor – is the basis of all human 
cognition.” (p. 85) 
Learning is first of all developed by play of musement, random observation. 
As such, this theory opposes the widespread idea that learning and teaching 
require effort. This might appear surprising to some practising teachers. The 
assumption that the learner is supposed to make an effort leaves room for the 
teacher’s self justification in the case of the learner’s failure. The teacher can 
always argue that the learner failed the exam because she did not put enough 
effort in the process. The present theory opposes this attitude to teaching. The 
answer is rather that the learner could not have learned anyway if her semiosis 
with the teacher was preponderantly anancasticist,that is mostly driven by 
struggle (effort), without evolving further towards an agapic Interpretant. Since 
struggle is a terminus of the semiosis (Secondness, the anancasticist element), the 
theory explains that effort is necessary in learning from both teacher and student, 
as the semiosis of learning reaches an Argument as Interpretant only as agapism. 
This implies an overcoming of effort, struggle, or labour.  
The hypothesis of this thesis is that for proper, cosmological learning to 
develop, the teacher and the learner should focus on cultivating an agapic 
personal relationship instead of focusing on the curricular information. Labour is 
not essential, certainly not a goal. Instead, Peirce considered “the great 
evolutionary agency of the universe to be Love.” (CP 6.287)  
Love is the simple action by which learning becomes simple and does not appear 
as labour anymore. If the student and the teacher love each other, they will learn 
each other. Learning the curricular subjects is rather a means to the goal of loving 
(Chapter 8). However, love itself makes possible and facilitates learning. It is a 
challenging statement for the modern educational paradigm. However, the 
argument of the Peircean Theory of Learning is that the proper understanding of a 
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curricular object is a natural consequence of a teacher and student agapasm. The 
key stands in that indexical signification precedes symbols, metaphors, and 
arguments. Agapasm is the mediation of tychasm and anancasm. This implies that 
the education’s indices signifying the curriculum, the teacher’s drawing of 
attention towards certain subjects, is mandatory for the relation’s agapasm. As it 
is essential that the student’s play with icons is not inhibited by the teacher and 
that the teacher builds her indices, as much as possible, upon iconic relations 
available for the student (Chapter 6), so it is important that the argument they 
pursue is developed upon these indices. However, to develop this argumentation, 
which is the learning itself, the teacher and the student need to transcend the 
learning stages of chance and necessity and attain freedom of learning. According 
to Peirce, this happens in agapasm, namely by personal love for one’s neighbor. 
This is the justification for which it is easier to learn from a teacher than by 
oneself: the student receives a potential neighbor in flesh and blood, one that she 
can love. Thus, the indices are not imposed from an impersonal educational 
institution or system, but instead they are to be discovered in another self-
conscious sign. Loving this non-self is the key to accessing these indices that 
signify the curriculum and, thus, it is the key to learning.  
The Peircean Theory of Learning concludes in that a relation’s agapic character 
is the real telos of education and that the learning of curricular objects is always a 
means to the much wider purpose of cosmological evolution. By denying the Other 
and refusing to fall in love, the possibility of learning is obscured. The egocentrism 
of the self traps the self in itself, obscuring the possibility of growth. An agapic 
teacher-student relation, the focus on the personal dimension of the relation, will not 
compromise the curricular objects, because it is agapic evolution in the first place 
that employed learning as its method. This also gives an insight to the abductive 
restructuring of the curriculum because if the curricular object is denied by the 





















The argument developed by this thesis is that personal love is the foundation and 
rationale of education. Because education is a means to enhance learning towards 
proper research, it needs to follow the teleological evolution of the Universe of signs.  
The principles of the modes of evolution, in Peirce’s semiotic account, are 
chance, necessity, and love. At first, we learn by chance, iconically. Further on, out 
of chance, learning proves necessary, and so we focus on learning specific matters. 
This indexicality proves to be a struggle, an effort. Its results are often unexpected. 
The struggle of necessity and the determination of chance and necessity are 
transcended by the principle of love. Love is the only principle of growth (Chapter 6, 
CP 2.287), and it is liberating. Growth is best expressed by personality (Chapter 5, 
Section C, CP 6.157), as agapism, the principle of evolutionary love, has its 
expression among personalities (Chapter 8, CP 6.288). An agapic student/teacher 
relation is understood, in Peirce’s terms, as Argument. Thus, learning is the passage 
from Icon to Argument. If the teacher does not accept the student’s icons, learning is 
artificially imposed and it becomes an empty formalism. Its structures of 
signification can be described as iconless symbols. If the student does not accept the 
teacher’s indices, learning remains spontaneous and it might become idle. The 
mediation of chance and necessity is the personal engagement with the other. It is the 
going out of the self, which we refer to as love. Applying Peirce’s phenomenological 
categories to education, and explaining learning in terms of phenomena of 
signification leads to a rigorous semiotic account of the common sense idea that love 
enhances learning. 
It might seem surprising that the cornerstone and rationale of existence, for a 
logician such as Peirce, is love. Actually, this idea is present throughout most of 
Peirce’s work, even though he only stated it explicitly in 1893. Peirce’s philosophy 
is not dualistic, denying even a dichotomy between love and science. Often in his 
work he referred to the love for truth, or the love of the scientific man (1.49, 1.255). 
This is proper love, not just an aesthetical appreciation that the scientist experiences 
in her research: “For it is not knowing, but the love of learning, that characterizes the 
scientific man.” (CP 1.44) Learning is characterized by a burning desire, “true 
scientific Eros” (CP 1.620), similar with Levinas’ idea of metaphysical desire. The 
scientific community, being driven by agapism, is a welcoming community; all that 
is required to enter is one’s desire: 
“If a man burns to learn and sets himself to comparing his ideas with 
experimental results in order that he may correct those ideas, every scientific man 
will recognize him as a brother, no matter how small his knowledge may be.” (CP 
1.44) 
Learning is a search for the Other. Learning by herself the student might be filled 
with scientific Eros (still unsaturated Predicate), but it is the teacher that opens the 
possibility for Agapism (Argument as Interpretant). 
To describe Firstness, as much as it is possible, Peirce used a reference to 
Scripture, to the book of Genesis, explaining that Firstness is like what the world 
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was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it (CP 1.357, see also Chapter 2, 
section D). Using a similar analogy, another passage from Genesis can be employed 
to express the idea of Other as First, namely what Eve was to Adam on the day he 
opened her eyes to her. According to Genesis, when Adam first saw Eve (the Other), 
awoken from a trance, he said: “This is now bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh. 
She shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of Man. For this reason a man 
shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife; and the two shall become 
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